mishkan and shabbos

I get nervous whenever I write something more drush-like.  When I look back at things I've written in that style, I often cringe.  So take that as a disclaimer.

In the next few parshios, Hashem tells us of the concept of a mishkan and commands us to build one - vi-asu li mikdash vishachanti bitocham.  G-d limits this command, however, by emphasizing several times over that the mishkan is not to be built on shabbos.  There are three places that I am aware of where this limmud appears in chumash:

1. pasuk in ki tisa - ach es shabsosai tishmoru - the word ach is to exclude shabbos from being used to build the mishkan.

2. in the beginning of vayakhel, the torah, immediately before discussing building the mishkan, mentions the prohibition of shabbos, to imply that shabbos takes precedence over the building of the mishkan.

3. in kedoshim, the pasuk says es shabsosai tishmoru vi-es mikdashi tirau ani hashem.  chazal say: you and the mikdash are commanded in hashem's kavod; therefore don't violate shabbos for the mikdash. (see rashi shavuos 15b about this).  I once wrote something trying to explain this strange formulation (the mikdash is commanded in Hashem's kavod?), but that is not the focus now.

We know that in hilchos shabbos, there are so many loopholes that allow one to perform what would be a melacha deoraysa of shabbos in a way that is only derabanan.  The reason for this is (in large part) the din of mileches machsheves. Mileches machsheves means (at least) two things.  Primarily, it means that one is only responsible for a melacha done on shabbos with daas - knowledge of and intent for the result that will ensue from the melacha.  But a misasek, for example, is patur - so much so that he does not even bring a korban.  המתעסק בשבת - פטור, מלאכת מחשבת אסרה תורה.

Second, rashi writes, מלאכת מחשבת שהיא מלאכת אומנות (rashi beitzah 13b).  A melacha that is not performed in the way a craftsman would perform it is not mileches machsheves.  This is what leads to the many loopholes in hilchos shabbos (on a deoraysa level).  For example, performing a melacha kilachar yad or bishinuy is generally assumed to be only a rabbinic violation because of the concept of mileches machsheves.

 So this leads to the following question:  why couldn't bnei yisrael build the mishkan bishinuy, or using some other loophole, and since there probably were no drabanans then, they could have their cake and eat it too! - they could both keep shabbos and build the mishkan.

(While this may seem like a ridiculous question, I told it to my chavrusa expecting him to chew me out, and he told me that R. Tzarfati asked this question at a kollel chabura, also pleading with his audience to "hear him out".  If anyone was there and remembers R. Tzarfati's answer, I would love to hear it.)

There is a famous piece of Torah from the eglei tal. The eglei tal notes that there are two limmudim which connect shabbos and mishkan.  One is, as we've been discussing, that binyan beis hamikdash is not docheh shabbos.  The other is that the melachos that are assur on shabbos are those that were performed in the mishkan.  This is no coincidence - the 2 derashos are really one.  By disallowing binyan beis hamikdash on shabbos, the torah is telling us that the melachos that are prohibited on shabbos are those which are part of the binyan beis hamikdash.   This is a very elegant shtickel torah.

The mekor for the din of mileches machsheves on shabbos is also from the mishkan.  The torah describes the mileches hamishkan as mileches machsheves.  By the aforementioned limmudim, melacha on shabbos is only assur if it is a mileches machsheves.

I suggest (admittedly without much basis) that the torah is not being merely descriptive when it refers to meleches hamishkan as mileches machshves - rather, the torah is prescriptively commanding for the mishkan to be built only via mileches machsheves.  Just like there is a din lishma by terumas and binyan beis hamikdash (first rashi in this week's parsha), so too there is a din of machsheves - the binyan beis hamikdash must be done with full daas and understanding, and it must be done with craftsmanship and expertise.

The shtickel of the eglei tal cuts both ways:  The melacha that is assur on shabbos is that of building a mishkan.  If melacha that is not machsheves is muttar on shabbos, then it must be that such melacha is not fit for building a mishkan!

I have always wondered what hashkafic message chazal meant for us to take away by presenting us with this "dialectic" of mishkan and shabbos, and telling us that shabbos is "more important" than mishkan.  Maybe its as follows:  If mileches hamishkan were to be muttar on shabbos, then it would come out that "mileches kodesh" is muttar on shabbos - so the only melacha that is assur on shabbos is mileches chol, and that melacha is muttar during the week.

Comes along the torah and says you've got it all wrong.  Mileches chol isn't assur on shabbos alone and muttar during the week - it's assur period!  Shabbos can only be coming to assur mileches hamishkan because that is melacha that is muttar during the week - mileches kodesh is muttar.  Mimeila the melacha that is assur on shabbos is the melacha that comprises binyan beis hamikdash - thats the melacha that the torah was referring to when Hashem said sheshes yamim taavod.

I don't mean at all to prohibit working for a living or anything of the sort.  But any melacha one does, one had better sit down and cheshbon that it is part of their avodas hakodesh and can be considered a mileches kodesh.  Mileches chol has no place in the life of a ben torah.

And when one does meleches kodesh during the week, like in the mishkan, it has to be machsheves.  It must be done excellently and with "craftsmanship" - mediocrity is unacceptable.  More importantly, it must be done with daas and machshavah - we cannot go through our avodas hashem haphazardly and without thought.  Action must be deliberate - the intent and tzurah of an action defines it more than the action itself.

If we succeed at that, then we can appreciate shabbos when we rest and abstain from mileches machsheves - we look back at and reflect upon our mileches machsheves of the previous week.  We should all be zocheh!

Good shabbos.

rambam taamei hamitzvos revisited

While I'm already just citing other people, you might recall this kashya (link) we raised.  This guy at Slifkin's blog thinks he has an answer (link and link)- I don't understand what he's talking about.  Like I said the first time, any suggestions are much appreciated.  The only thing to be happy about is a validation of the question.

gittin again

You might or might not remember this post (link) about gittin.  I'm a little uncomfortable with it because I'm not really in any position to give mussar or talk about these issues.  For whatever reason, I do so anyways.  Either way, in that post I criticized a certain Rabbi Safran for his ridiculous article.  I just found someone else who also takes him to task in a very interesting way, so I just wanted to link to that as well (link).  I note that in general I don't necessarily agree with a lot of the crazy stuff on Daas Torah, but here he is right on the mark.

maharal and the gra on drashos vs mefurash bakra

The Gemara in several places, beitzah 30a amongst them, has the principle "מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ואל יהיו מזידין" - better to not rebuke somebody if you know they won't listen - this way, when they sin it will only be bishogeg instead of bimeizid.

The gemara has a hava amina that we only apply this rule to dinim derabanan, but ultimately, rejects this position.  Whether the sin being transgressed is dioraysa or drabanan, better to let someone sin unintentionally then rebuke them and lead them to sin bimeizid.

The Ran, however, adds an important caveat (cited in shulchan aruch orach chaim 608):

בכל דבר איסור (ה) אמרינן: מוטב שיהיו שוגגין ולא יהיו מזידין; * ודוקא (ו) שאינו מפורש בתורה, אע"פ שהוא דאורייתא;  אבל אם  מפורש בתורה, * (ז) מוחין בידן (ר"ן דביצה ורא"ש בשם העיטור

While the gemara says that we apply the principle of mutav... even to dinin dioraysa, thats only true for those dinim which chazal darshened using the yud gimmel middos.  The principle does not apply, however, to a din which is mefurash bakra.

This is very difficult to understand, for several reasons.  First, why does the logic of the principle of mutav not apply to dinim that are mefurash bakra?  Shouldn't we still say that it is better to let the violator transgress bishogeg and therefore to not rebuke him and thereby lead him to transgress intentionally?  What is the difference whether the din is mefurash bakra or not?

The Mishna Berura has a very dachuk pshat in this:

שאינו מפורש בתורה - ר"ל [ו] דאז אנו יכולין לתלות ששוגגין ומוטעין הם בזה ומה שלא ישמעו לנו מה שנאמר להם שהוא אסור מחמת דקיל להו הדבר ולכן אמרינן בזה מוטב שיהיו שוגגין וכו' אבל בדבר המפורש בתורה והם עוברין ע"ז [ז] בודאי אינם שוגגין ולא שייך בהו לומר מוטב שיהיו שוגגין [ח] ומחינן בהו וענשינן להו עד דפרשי:

Its not worth wasting time/ space to explain why this is obviously not the pshat in the rema / ran.

The emes, kayadua, lies in the explanation of the vilna gaon:

דמה שאינו מפורש בתורה קרי' דרבנן ועי"ד סי' רל"ט.

The Ran is coming off of the hava amina of the gemara.  Originally, we thought mutav should not apply to any din dioraysa, whether it comes from a derasha or an explicit pasuk.  The gemara rejects that - we apply mutav even to dinim that come from derashos, because in a sense, those dinim are also derabanan!  But even limaskana, we do not apply mutav to a din that is a "full-fledged dioraysa" - namely, any din that is mefurash bakra.

Thus, we don't really have a question anymore on the ran - our question is now on the gemara: why do we only apply mutav to dinim derabanan and not to dinim dioraysa?

The bigger question is, how do we understand this chiddush of the gra?  Why is a din that comes from a derasha, despite the fact that it is a din deoraysa, "nikra drabanan" ?

The Gra cites as support to this chiddush another chiddush of the ran in nedarim 8a.  We know there is a principle that a shevua cannot take effect on something which one is already mushba vi-omed alav m-har sinai" - I cannot swear to do or to not do a mitzvah because I am already bound by an oath from har sinai on all the mitzvos.  Hence, no subsequent shevuah can be chal.  The Ran, in a tremendous chiddush, limits this principle to dinim that are mefurash bakra.  A din from a derasha, despite its being "deoraysa", does not have the status of mushba vi-omed mehar sinai and therefore a shevuah can be chal on such a din.  Again, why?  If the din is deoraysa, then it was included in the oath to keep the torah at har sinai, and if not, then why do we call such a din a din deoraysa?  Where does this middle ground come from?

The answer lies in a maharal in this week's parsha, which is what brings this topic up.  The Gemara records that Moshe gave bnei yisrael an extra day to prepare for mattan torah "midaato". The gemara then goes on to find a derasha to support Moshe's reasoning.  Tosfos asks, if there was a derasha, then it wasn't midaato - it was a din deoraysa!

The maharal explains that it is no contradiction for a din to come from a derasha gemura and yet be called "midaato" shel moshe.  After all, if a din is a din deoraysa, why would Hashem put it in derasha form and not just write it out explicitly?

I quote:

והתוספות (שם ד"ה היום) פירשו דהך דרשה דכתיב "היום ומחר" לאו דרשה גמורה, שאם דרשה גמורה - לא הוסיף משה מדעתו. ולפי דבריהם לא נקרא 'מדעתו' עד שיהיה כולו מדעתו. ולא ידעתי ליישב 'מאי דריש' דקאמר, הא מדעתו הוסיף, ומאי שואל תלמודא מאי דרשא. ועוד, אם זה דרשה לאו גמורה, למה הוסיף משה יום אחד. וכל זה מפני שהוקשה לתוספות דממה נפשך, אם דברי תורה הוא הדרש שדרש "היום ומחר" - לא הוסיף משה מדעתו, ואם לאו דברי תורה הוא - אם כן אינו נרמז בתורה. וכל זה פלא בעיני

כי נראה לי כל הדרשות שדרשו חכמים כלם הם מן התורה, ולא שהם גוף התורה, רק הם יוצאים מן התורה. דמיון זה, הבנאי בונה בית והשלימו, והניח מקום להעמיד שם דברים הצריכים אל הבית. ובא אחר כך חכם אחד ומתבונן בבית למה בנה הבית בצורה זאת, רק להוסיף דבר זה, ועוד בנאו בצורה זאת - להוסיף דבר זה. הנה כל התוספות הוסיף האיש החכם, אבל הוא לקח אותם מבנין הבית. ובשביל זה כאשר הוסיף אותו החכם אותן הדברים - בשביל זה לא יאמר שהם מבנין הבית, רק מה שהוסיף החכם בהתבוננות הבית. ולפעמים החכם מבאר ומפרש איזה דבר נקרא בית ואיזה חדר, ואין זה תוספת, רק פירוש וביאור. כך הוא התורה, ניתנה בלא תוספות ובלא מגרעת, והניחה מקום לחכמים לבנות, והם הרמזים בתורה. ומכל מקום מאחר שלא כתב זה בפירוש, כאילו אמרה תורה אתם החכמים יש לכם במקום הזה להוסיף, והוא דעתכם, אבל אין כל כך דבר פשוט [ו] הכרחי כמו דעת בתורה, שזה החלוק בין הדברים שהם אסמכתא, שאין כל כך הכרחי, כמו דברי תורה.

אך עתה עמדו דרשנים דורשים דברים אשר לא כן, כל העולה על רוחם ודעתם, ואין ספק אלי שהתורה חוגרת שק עליהם לפרש התורה כרצונם, וזהו מעשה האומות שמפרשים כרצונם, ובזה האמת נעדרת תחת אשר נקראת "תורת אמת" (מלאכי ב, ו).

If you push someone into a corner and ask them, "did G-d directly command us to keep dinim that come from derashos" - the answer is no.  Hence, we are not mushba vi-omed mehar sinai on such dinim, and chazal have the right to waive the mitzvah of tochacha on such dinim when we apply the sevara of mutav.

Nonetheless, they are considered binding, and on the level of deoraysa.  Hashem wants our input into the torah, for us to be partners with hashem in understanding what the torah is all about and thereby extrapolating new dinim which reflect ratzon hatorah.

It is telling that the source for this idea is Moshe's delaying of mattan torah - the torah could only be given after this concept was built in as a foundation for understanding everything that would follow.  Torah cannot be understood as a dry list of commands.  It must be understood as an organic living document that commands more than explicitly stated - we must look beyond the letter of the law and understand what is truly being asked of us.

Good shabbos!

P.S.  I didn't really explain in detail what ends up happening with mutav... and why we only apply that sevara to dinim that are not mefurash bakra.  The explanation I hinted at seems to conflict with something we have discussed earlier (link) which I do not have time right now to get into.

beshalach - hishtadlus vs desperation

There is a very famous Rashi that is somewhat difficult to understand.  Right before Moshe splits the yam suf, Hashem tells him, "מַה־תִּצְעַק אֵלָי דַּבֵּר אֶל־בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל וְיִסָּעוּ".  Rashi explains: למדנו שהיה משה עומד ומתפלל, אמר לו הקב"ה לא עת עתה להאריך בתפלה שישראל נתונין בצרה.

Since when are you not supposed to daven when klal yisrael face a time of danger?  Chazal famously say, afilu cherev munachas al tzavaro, one should still daven.  Its not like Moshe had some way to save klal yisrael without a miracle such that he should have been performing hishtadlus instead of davening and relying on miraculous intervention by Hashem.  So why is Moshe criticized for his prayer?

People talk about this a lot.  But the ramban gives a very simple answer to this question:

ורבותינו אמרו (מכילתא כאן) שהיה משה צועק ומתפלל, והוא הנכון, כי לא ידע מה יעשה, ואף על פי שאמר לו השם ואכבדה בפרעה, הוא לא היה יודע איך יתנהג, כי הוא על שפת הים והשונא רודף ומשיג, והיה מתפלל שיורנו ה' דרך יבחר. וזה טעם מה תצעק אלי, שהיית צריך לשאל מה תעשה ואין לך צורך לצעוק, כי כבר הודעתיך ואכבדה בפרעה

It wasn't the tefillah that was wrong per se.  It was the way the tefillah was performed that reflected something wrong with Moshe.

Before we explain this, lets shift focus to the story of Yosef and the Sar Hamashkim.  We know that Yosef was punished for putting his trust in the sar hamashkim instead of having bitachon.  And again, it is difficult to understand what yosef did wrong.  A person isn't supposed to do hishtadlus?

The famous answer is that the amount of hishtadlus a person needs to do is a function of each person's respective madreigah.  Yosef was such a big tzaddik that for him, even asking the sar hamashkim was too much hishtadlus and was a chisaron in bitachon on his madreigah.

I don't like this teretz.  I have no kashyas on it to prove it wrong or anything like that (That is, this teretz is certainly defensible according to many rishonim. I'm not sure if it would hold according to all.)   But it is somewhat meaningless on my level (not that that is a metric of truth on any objective level) and misses the depth of the teretz we're about to give.

The Kli Yakar quotes the medrash that censures Yosef:

חז"ל אמרו (בראשית רבה פט ג) שיוסף חטא בזה שתלה בטחונו בשר המשקים, ואמר שתי פעמים לשון זכירה כי אם זכרתני וגו' והזכרתני וגו' וכנגדם נענש בכפל השכחה, ולא זכר שר המשקים את יוסף וישכחהו:

What difference does it make whether yosef says the word zechartani once or twice, such that chazal single that out as his sin?

I once heard explained that Yosef didn't do anything wrong by performing hishtadlus per se, but it was the way that Yosef did it that was his sin.  Hashem requires that we do hishtadlus - but that doesn't take away one bit from the fact that we have to have complete bitachon in Hashem and recognize that any possibility of success stems solely from G-d's will.  Yosef asked the sar hamashkim twice to be remembered; chazal looked at the pesukim and picked up a hint of desperation in Yosef's voice.  That has no place in the hishtadlus of a baal bitachon; one who trusts in G-d shouldn't feel desperate and feel the need to cling at straws by begging the sar hamashkim to remember him.  The way that Yosef did his hishtadlus reflected a lack of bitachon, and he was punished for that lack.

I believe that the ramban in beshalach is picking up on that same theme.  Davening is always appropriate, and all the more so in the face of distress (the ramban actually holds that tefillah is only deoraysa in an eis tzarah.)  But tefilah in the wrong way can also reflect a lack of bitachon; moshe's tefilah as a "tzeaka" and not "she-eilah" leads chazal to pick up on the desperation in Moshe's voice and censure him for that lapse.

The reason I like this approach more than the first one is because of the way it is simultaneously a poter and a  mechayev.  On the one hand, it levels the playing field - everyone has to do hishtadlus because thats the way Hashem created the world.  No one should expect G-d to just deliver manna to their feet.  On the other hand, unlike the other approach, this approach does not just leave the rest of us (who cannot expect open miracles) in the dust and say, "For you losers who have to do hishtadlus, none of this applies."  To the contrary, everyone who does hishtadlus is bound by the rules: G-d wants you to do hishtadlus, but only if you can simultaneously recognize that ultimately, everything stems from G-d.  The tzurah of the hishtadlus defines whether the act is one that is positive or negative; as we've discussed before, this is part of a general principle that the way an action is performed is often more important in defining the action than the actual action itself.  This is a tremendous mechayev.

Good shabbos!

bechira 3 and R Elchanan's kashya

So a bunch of points to finish our discussion of bechira (see here and here):

1. The frankel rambam cites the sefer ha-ikkarim who (they claim, correctly so) argues with the rambam's understanding of menias habechirah.  I looked it up (maamar 4 perek 25), and I was very happy to find exactly the same mashal we gave in explaining the ramban:

יש שב מיראת העונש המוטל עליו, כעבד שהוא מתחנן לפני אדוניו בעוד שמלקה אותו, וכשיקל האדון מעליו שבט אפו ישוב למרוד בו כאשר בתחלה, כמו שהיה הענין בפרעה, שבהיות המכה עליו היה אומר ה' הצדיק וגו' (שמות ט' כ"ז), וכשהיתה הרוחה חזר להכביד את לבו כבתחלה, וזה בלי ספק היה מורה שהתשובה הראשונה היתה על צד ההכרח מאימות מות נפלו עליו וגו' ושלא היה פעל בחיריי, ועל כן אין ראוי שתחשב לו לתשובה כלל

He goes on to explain in a way that is very fascinating and diverges from the ramban (I believe).  Its not my point here so instead of discussing it, I will just paste it here to save you the trouble of looking it up (if you feel like reading it, otherwise feel free to skip it.):

ועל זה הדרך יתפרש מה שנמצא בכתוב שהשם יתברך מחזק לב הרשעים או מקשה ערפם ומונע מהם דרכי התשובה, וזה שהרשע בבא עליו המכה הוא מתחסד ושב אל השם מיראת עונש המוטל עליו, כמו שאמר פרעה חטאתי הפעם ה' הצדיק וגו', ובעבור שזה הפעל דומה לאונס ואינו בחיריי, הנה השם יתברך מחזק את לבו כשנותן לו צד או צדדין לתלות בהן המכה ולומר שבאה במקרה ולא על צד ההשגחה האלהית, וזה כדי שיסור מלבו המורך שקנה מחמת המכה וישאר על טבעו ובחירתו מבלי מכריח, ואז יבחן אם היתה תשובתו בחיריית, ומאשר בחירת פרעה כשסר מעליו עול המכה היתה לרע, אמר השם יתברך אני הכבדתי את לבו, כלומר כשהסירותי מלבו המורך שקנה מחמת המכה, וישאר על טבעו ובחירתו, והוא לרוע בחירתו בקש עלות ותואנות לתלות בהן ענין המכות ולומר שהיו במקרה.

  ועל זה אמר הכתוב ואם תלכו עמי קרי, כלומר שתיחסו דברים אל המקרה, והלכתי אף אני עמכם בחמת קרי וגו', ובזה הצד ננעלים שערי התשובה בפני הרשעים, לא שהשם יתברך ימנע מן האדם טוב בחירתו חלילה, אמר הכתוב כי לא אחפוץ במות הרשע כי אם בשובו מדרכיו וחיה, אלא שהשם יתברך משאירו על בחירתו בלבד מבלי מכריח מחוץ, והוא בוחר דרך לעצמו, וכן היה ענין סיחון שאמר עליו הכתוב כי הקשה ה' אלהיך את רוחו ואמץ את לבבו, וזה כי לפי שסיחון נתחייב לשם מחמת רשעו אלא שהיה מתירא מפני פחד ה' להתגרות בישראל, הביא הקדוש ברוך הוא עצות מרחוק להסיר מלבו המורך שקנה מצד המופתים ששמע שנעשו לישראל, כדי להשאירו על בחירתו בלבד

2. I want to clarify a little more the machlokes between the ramban and the rambam.  We said that according to the ramban, the kashya was only how hashem could take away someone's bechira and then punish them for what they were coerced to do - but there wasn't a kashya just by virtue of the fact that Hashem took away someone's bechira.  Why not? Isn't it a fundamental principle of our faith that people have free will?

I think the ramban would tell you that just like there all sorts of natural external circumstances which limit one's free will, Hashem's influence to pharaoh would have been no different (if Hashem hadn't then gone and punished pharaoh for not letting bnei yisrael out).  It would have been just one more thing on the list that take away from a person's free will.

R. Dessler writes in michtav me-eliyahu about this idea called kav habechira.  According to R dessler, we don't really have full bechira - we can't just turn around and become a tzaddik gammur tomorrow because the fight, as he puts it, is wherever the front line currently is.  Bechira, he claims, applies to a small limited subset of one's actions  - those actions on "the front lines."

R Twersky once pointed out that the Rambam sharply disagrees with this, and I would go so far as to say (R twersky did not) that what R dessler is saying is karov lekefirah according to the rambam:

רשות לכל אדם נתונה אם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך טובה ולהיות צדיק הרשות בידו, ואם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך רעה .להיות רשע הרשות בידו

אל יעבור במחשבתך דבר זה שאומרים טפשי אומה"ע ורוב גולמי בני ישראל שהקב"ה גוזר על האדם מתחלת ברייתו להיות צדיק או רשע, אין הדבר כן אלא כל אדם ראוי לו להיות צדיק כמשה רבינו או רשע כירבעם או חכם או א סכל או רחמן או אכזרי או כילי או שוע וכן שאר כל הדעות, ואין לו מי שיכפהו ולא גוזר עליו ולא מי שמושכו לאחד משני הדרכים אלא 

הוא מעצמו ומדעתו נוטה לאי זו דרך שירצה

ודבר זה עיקר גדול הוא והוא עמוד התורה והמצוה שנאמר ראה נתתי לפניך היום את החיים, וכתיב ראה אנכי נותן לפניכם היום, כלומר שהרשות בידכם וכל שיחפוץ האדם לעשות ממעשה בני האדם עושה בין טובים בין רעים, ומפני זה הענין נאמר מי יתן והיה לבבם זה להם, כלומר שאין הבורא כופה בני האדם ולא גוזר עליהן לעשות טובה או רעה אלא הכל מסור להם. 

Lishitaso, it is the rambam who cannot accept G-d's violation of someone's bechira in and of itself, without regard to the punishment that comes after.  For it is the rambam who accepts no limitations whatsoever on a person's bechira: every person has the ability to turn around and become a tzaddik gammur like moshe rabbeinu - nothing, not even G-d, can stop you.  This is quite the scary shittah.

3. a friend of mine pointed out to me that according to rashi / ramban, the question we asked about how hashem was allowed to take away the bechira of the biryonim bothering r meir isn't such a kashya.  According to the ramban, theres no problem if hashem should choose to violate someone's bechira; the only problem is if hashem then rewards or punishes you for an action that was not in your control.  Who said hashem rewarded the biryonim for doing teshuvah and no longer bothering r meir - maybe hashem forced them to do teshuvah so they would stop bothering R Meir and because the teshuva wasn't of their own free volition, gave them no reward for it.

That made me think that there might be an answer even according to the rambam.  We explained that the rambam's kashya was that Hashem shouldn't take away someone's bechira and force them to do aveiros.  But maybe mitzvos are different; we are familiar with the famous rambam in hilchos gerushin that when you force someone to do a mitzvah, you aren't taking away their free will; you're just helping them overcome their yetzer hara and allowing them to do what they really want to do (Looking at that rambam again now, I actually believe that there is a severe limitation on its application that is commonly overlooked.  But not for now.)  Does that logic apply even if Hashem is the one forcing the action -- on the one hand, it should, but on the other hand, saying that would seem to uproot the entire principle of free will - the rambam emphasizes numerous times that hashem isn't gozer on anybody to be "either a tzaddik or a rasha".  yesh li-ayen bazeh.

Finally, I don't have a teretz, but R Elchanan has a tremendous kashya that I will share in the hopes of someone finding an answer.  The gemara in moed kattan has a very cryptic statement: ר' אילעאי אומר אם רואה אדם שיצרו מתגבר עליו ילך למקום שאין מכירין אותו וילבש שחורים ויתעטף שחורים ויעשה מה שלבו חפץ ואל יחלל שם שמים בפרהסיא - if a person cant control their yetzer hara, they should go to a far away place and sin there so as to not be recognized and cause a chilul hashem.

R elchanan quotes the rosh: פר"ח ז"ל וליתא לדרבי אילעאי אלא אע"פ שמתגבר יצרו של אדם עליו מיבעי ליה לאותובי יצריה דקי"ל (ברכות דף לג ב) הכל בידי שמים חוץ מיראת שמים: - we dont paskin like the gemara in MK because we hold hakol bidei shamayim except for yiras shamayim = we hold there is free will (that phrase is the source in chazal for the idea of free will).  Only WE hold that there is free will?  And the gemara in MK doesn't???  How is that not kefirah!

tzarich iyun gadol.