So lets actually focus on the question I threw out parenthetically in the previous post (copied here): When we ask about pharaoh's loss of bechira, are we bothered with the punishment brought afterwards for something which the person did not do, or are we bothered with the very fact that G-d takes someone's bechira / makes them do an aveirah?
We saw Rashi take the first side. The Ramban seems to do so as well: והנה פירשו בשאלה אשר ישאלו הכל, אם השם הקשה את לבו מה פשעו - lit. translation, if pharaoh was forced, what was his sin? we aren't bothered with how hashem could have forced him, we're just bothered with how hashem considered his refusal a sin and punished him for it, given that he was forced. Thus the Ramban answers: כי פרעה ברשעו אשר עשה לישראל רעות גדולות חנם, נתחייב למנוע ממנו דרכי תשובה, כאשר באו בזה פסוקים רבים בתורה ובכתובים, ולפי מעשיו הראשונים נדון. - Pharaoh wasn't punished for anything he did after his bechira was taken. But Hashem needed time to finish the punishment for all the evil he did beforehand with full free will. So Hashem had to "hold him down" and prevent him from doing teshuva so that he could be meted out the full punishment.
A mashal for understanding the ramban: when a kid is bad, he needs to be spanked. So you take your kid and lie him down, and begin spanking him - obviously after the first smack he's going to start crying out that he's sorry. But you need to finish the punishment = finish spanking him. So you ignore his "teshuva". Similarly, Hashem didn't let pharaoh say he's sorry and get out of the rest of the punishment the second the spanking got too tough - once you sin, you have to tough out the rest of your punishment even if you're now sorry.
The Rambam, while commonly interpreted in line with this ramban, disagrees (I think). Take a look:
ואפשר שיחטא אדם חטא גדול או חטאים רבים עד שיתן הדין לפני דיין האמת שיהא הפרעון מזה החוטא על חטאים אלו שעשה ברצונו ומדעתו שמונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו כדי שימות ויאבד בחטאו שיעשה, הוא שהקב"ה אמר על ידי ישעיהו השמן לב העם הזה וגו', וכן הוא אומר ויהיו מלעיבים במלאכי האלהים ובוזים דבריו ומתעתעים בנביאיו עד עלות חמת ה' בעמו עד לאין מרפא, כלומר חטאו ברצונם והרבו לפשוע עד שנתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה שהיא המרפא, לפיכך כתוב בתורה ואני אחזק את לב פרעה, לפי שחטא מעצמו תחלה והרע לישראל הגרים בארצו שנאמר הבה נתחכמה לו, נתן הדין למנוע התשובה ממנו עד שנפרע ממנו, לפיכך חזק הקב"ה את לבו, ולמה היה שולח לו ביד משה ואומר שלח ועשה תשובה וכבר אמר לו הקב"ה אין אתה משלח שנאמר ואתה ועבדיך ידעתי וגו' ואולם בעבור זאת העמדתיך, כדי להודיע לבאי העולם שבזמן שמונע הקב"ה התשובה לחוטא אינו יכול לשוב אלא ימות ברשעו שעשה בתחילה ברצונו,
וכענין זה שואלין הצדיקים והנביאים בתפלתם מאת ה' לעזרם על האמת, כמו שאמר דוד הורני ה' דרכך, כלומר אל ימנעוני חטאי דרך האמת שממנה אדע דרכך ויחוד שמך, וכן זה שאמר ורוח נדיבה תסמכני כלומר תניח רוחי לעשות חפצך ואל יגרמו לי חטאי למונעני מתשובה אלא תהיה הרשות בידי עד שאחזור ואבין ואדע דרך האמת, ועל דרך זו כל הדומה לפסוקים אלו.
The Rambam tells us that when a person loses their bechira, its only because they ultimately face death and kares - their soul dies forever. Notice that the ramban made no mention of that. I believe that that is an important machlokes.
Already the Rambam does not fit with our spanking the child mashal. You don't spank your child to kill him! You just need to finish the punishment. Thats obviously not the idea that the rambam is referring to.
Within this Rambam there is another hidden machlokes between him and the ramban, this time concerning the purpose of the makkos. The Ramban in parshas bo famously tells us what he believes to be the purpose of yetzias mitzraim and the makkos / nissim/ niflaos performed in egypt:
ועתה אומר לך כלל בטעם מצות רבות. הנה מעת היות ע"ג בעולם מימי אנוש החלו הדעות להשתבש באמונה, מהם כופרים בעיקר ואומרים כי העולם קדמון, כחשו בה' ויאמרו לא הוא, ומהם מכחישים בידיעתו הפרטית ואמרו איכה ידע אל ויש דעה בעליון (תהלים עג יא), ומהם שיודו בידיעה ומכחישים בהשגחה ויעשו אדם כדגי הים שלא ישגיח האל בהם ואין עמהם עונש או שכר, יאמרו עזב ה' את הארץ. וכאשר ירצה האלהים בעדה או ביחיד ויעשה עמהם מופת בשנוי מנהגו של עולם וטבעו, יתברר לכל בטול הדעות האלה כלם, כי המופת הנפלא מורה שיש לעולם אלוה מחדשו, ויודע ומשגיח ויכול. וכאשר יהיה המופת ההוא נגזר תחלה מפי נביא יתברר ממנו עוד אמתת הנבואה, כי ידבר האלהים את האדם ויגלה סודו אל עבדיו הנביאים, ותתקיים עם זה התורה כלה:
ולכן יאמר הכתוב במופתים למען תדע כי אני ה' בקרב הארץ (לעיל ח יח), להורות על ההשגחה, כי לא עזב אותה למקרים כדעתם. ואמר (שם ט כט) למען תדע כי לה' הארץ, להורות על החידוש, כי הם שלו שבראם מאין ואמר (שם ט יד) בעבור תדע כי אין כמוני בכל הארץ. להורות על היכולת, שהוא שליט בכל, אין מעכב בידו, כי בכל זה היו המצריים מכחישים או מסתפקים. אם כן האותות והמופתים הגדולים עדים נאמנים באמונת הבורא ובתורה כלה:
The Rambam cannot agree to this. The Rambam writes in hilchos yesodei hatorah that osos and mofsim were never performed to prove the existence or capabilites of Hashem. What we need to know in emunah, we know from har sinai:
משה רבינו לא האמינו בו ישראל מפני האותות שעשה. שהמאמין על פי האותות יש בלבו דופי שאפשר שיעשה האות בלט וכשוף. אלא כל האותות שעשה משה במדבר לפי הצורך עשאם. לא להביא ראיה על הנבואה. היה צריך להשקיע את המצריים קרע את הים והצלילן בתוכו. צרכנו למזון הוריד לנו את המן. צמאו בקע להן את האבן. כפרו בו עדת קרח בלעה אותן הארץ. וכן שאר כל האותות. ובמה האמינו בו במעמד הר סיני שעינינו ראו ולא זר ואזנינו שמעו ולא אחר האש והקולות והלפידים והוא נגש אל הערפל והקול מדבר אליו ואנו שומעים משה משה לך אמור להן כך וכך.
Thus, it is no surprise that the rambam here in hilchos teshuvah offers an entirely different understanding of the nature / purpose of the makkos. I re-copy from above the relevant segment:
ולמה היה שולח לו ביד משה ואומר שלח ועשה תשובה וכבר אמר לו הקב"ה אין אתה משלח שנאמר ואתה ועבדיך ידעתי וגו' ואולם בעבור זאת העמדתיך, כדי להודיע לבאי העולם שבזמן שמונע הקב"ה התשובה לחוטא אינו יכול לשוב אלא ימות ברשעו שעשה בתחילה ברצונו
The same pasuk that the ramban interprets as demonstrating G-d's capabilities / yecholes, the Rambam understands to be demonstrating G-d's hanhaga - not to prove what He can do, but to show what He does do. The purpose of the makkos was to teach the hanhaga that Hashem can take away someone's ability to do teshuva and leave them to die like that - in this world and the next.
The Ramban agrees that we need pesukim to teach us the hanhaga of taking away someone's bechira chofshis, but he would never entertain the notion that that is the purpose of the makkos! Thats because the way the Ramban understands the concept, its not nearly so radical - its not a qualitatively new type of punishment, just a chiddush in the way G-d applies the same old punishments from before. For the Rambam, something much deeper is going on.
The Rambam says that it is because of this lesson from Pharaoh that tzaddikim plead with G-d to prevent their sins from blocking between themselves and Hashem. This is the strongest proof that the rambam is entirely different from the ramban - for the ramban, there is no connection between menias habechira to finish a punishment and a tzaddik's fear of a disconnect between him and hashem. From where did the rambam draw this connection?
The pshat in the rambam is given away by the question we started with. The ramban was only worried about how hashem could punish pharaoh with the makkos after hardening his heart. The rambam wasn't primarily worried about the physical punishments like makkos, although that certainly is a difficulty as well. The heart of the question, however, is much more profound - how could Hashem take away a person's bechira and make them do aveiros?
Answers the Rambam, hashem can only do this if the person no longer deserves to be a human being / a baal bechirah. If someone abuses free will past a certain point, they no longer deserve it, and hence it is taken away and the person is nichras. Menias Habechira must be followed by kares because they together form the ultimate punishment for a person who has no connection to anything good - we strip him of his status as a human being and he is forever cut off and severed from G-d. (The kashya from the makkos is now answered mimeila - if we're giving this guy kares anyways, extra makkos don't really matter anymore.)
The Rambam is saying something frightening - bechira chofshis, to be a human being, is not a "right" - it is a privilege. Someone who abuses it forfeits their status as human - without bechira, there is no difference between them and a behema.
Thus, even if we don't sin quite like pharaoh, the lesson of pharoah applies on our level as well. We daven that our sins should not block between us and Hashem because every aveirah we do makes us unworthy of the bechira we were given with which we performed an aveirah. Every aveirah is pogem in our nature as tzelem elokim - and it is only through the great mercy of G-d that he gives us a chance to do teshuvah and begin again to exercise our bechirah in the way it was meant to be used.
One might wonder why the whole point and lesson of the makkos is to teach us this one random hanhaga of hashem - that he sometimes takes away bechira. But with this background, we understand completely.
The whole point of yetzias mitzraim is freedom - Hashem frees the Jews from their egyptian oppressors. But within that, G-d needs to tell us what freedom is and what it is not. Do we have freedom to go become atheists, or deviants and miscreants?
No! Freedom, says G-d, is not a right. Its a privilege. and when you abuse it, you lose your freedom / bechira, and with it your status as a human being, and you are nichras.
Freedom is the freedom to live with dignity, and to live with dignity is to live with purpose. Thats the freedom of yetzias mitzraim, and that is meaningful.
We should all be zocheh!
Sunday, December 29, 2013
Saturday, December 28, 2013
bechira chofshis 1
Bechira chofshis comes up big time in this week's parsha with the hardening of pharoah's heart - so commonly discussed that it is difficult to imagine having anything interesting to say. Nonetheless, two points:
1. rashi (often overlooked): ג) ואני אקשה - מאחר שהרשיע והתריס כנגדי, וגלוי לפני שאין נחת רוח באומות עובדי עבודה זרה לתת לב שלם לשוב, טוב לי שיתקשה לבו למען הרבות בו אותותי ותכירו אתם את גבורותי. וכן מדתו של הקב"ה מביא פורענות על האומות עובדי עבודה זרה כדי שישמעו ישראל וייראו, שנאמר (צפניה ג ו) הכרתי גוים נשמו פנותם וגו', (שם ז) אמרתי אך תיראי אותי תקחי מוסר, ואף על פי כן בחמש מכות הראשונות לא נאמר ויחזק ה' את לב פרעה, אלא ויחזק לב פרעה:
This Rashi seems to be like the ibn ezra / rambam we quoted last week - how is it just that hashem stole the bechira chofshis of the goyim and then punished them, or brings tzaros upon them with apparently no justification (it is fascinating to note the two possible ways to formulate the question about bechira - are we bothered with the punishment brought afterwards for something which the person did not do, or are we bothered with the very fact that G-d takes someone's bechira / makes them do an aveirah. it seems that rashi is only bothered with the former, but I'm not yet convinced that the other rishonim all agree with rashi's formulation of the question.) Answers Rashi, G-d doesn't care - he does it for klal yisrael. This sounds exactly like the rambam about shechitas behemos.
2. The famous teretz of the ramban / rambam (whom most people put them together) is that pharoah lost his bechira chofshis due to his prior sins. Hashem has the right to take away someone's bechira and keep punishing them as part of what they deserve for their first sins that were done with full free will. Whats fascinating about this answer is its implications for the distinction between persuasion / coercion.
That is, isn't there a much easier way out of this dilemma - just because hashem manipulates a person towards one direction, is that automatically coercion to the point where this person has lost his free will?
The gemara in brachos (10a) has a story where r meir wanted to daven that some people who were really bothering him should die, and his wife told him to daven instead that these people do teshuvah. The maharsha asks, how can you daven for someone to do teshuva - doesn't that impinge upon their bechira? The answer commonly given is that Hashem can manipulate/ persuade people in a way that somehow still leaves them with bechira chofshis - so how do we know that that isn't what hashem did to pharoah?
A similar question comes up in halacha (this is nogea to the news that ba-avonoseinu harabbim keeps coming up) with regards to get meuseh. A get that is forced is invalid. Obviously, however, one is allowed to persuade someone to give their wife a get, as long as the persuasion does not cross the line and become coercion. The question is, where is that line? (If hashem had made pharoah give a get, would it have been kosher?)
1. rashi (often overlooked): ג) ואני אקשה - מאחר שהרשיע והתריס כנגדי, וגלוי לפני שאין נחת רוח באומות עובדי עבודה זרה לתת לב שלם לשוב, טוב לי שיתקשה לבו למען הרבות בו אותותי ותכירו אתם את גבורותי. וכן מדתו של הקב"ה מביא פורענות על האומות עובדי עבודה זרה כדי שישמעו ישראל וייראו, שנאמר (צפניה ג ו) הכרתי גוים נשמו פנותם וגו', (שם ז) אמרתי אך תיראי אותי תקחי מוסר, ואף על פי כן בחמש מכות הראשונות לא נאמר ויחזק ה' את לב פרעה, אלא ויחזק לב פרעה:
This Rashi seems to be like the ibn ezra / rambam we quoted last week - how is it just that hashem stole the bechira chofshis of the goyim and then punished them, or brings tzaros upon them with apparently no justification (it is fascinating to note the two possible ways to formulate the question about bechira - are we bothered with the punishment brought afterwards for something which the person did not do, or are we bothered with the very fact that G-d takes someone's bechira / makes them do an aveirah. it seems that rashi is only bothered with the former, but I'm not yet convinced that the other rishonim all agree with rashi's formulation of the question.) Answers Rashi, G-d doesn't care - he does it for klal yisrael. This sounds exactly like the rambam about shechitas behemos.
2. The famous teretz of the ramban / rambam (whom most people put them together) is that pharoah lost his bechira chofshis due to his prior sins. Hashem has the right to take away someone's bechira and keep punishing them as part of what they deserve for their first sins that were done with full free will. Whats fascinating about this answer is its implications for the distinction between persuasion / coercion.
That is, isn't there a much easier way out of this dilemma - just because hashem manipulates a person towards one direction, is that automatically coercion to the point where this person has lost his free will?
The gemara in brachos (10a) has a story where r meir wanted to daven that some people who were really bothering him should die, and his wife told him to daven instead that these people do teshuvah. The maharsha asks, how can you daven for someone to do teshuva - doesn't that impinge upon their bechira? The answer commonly given is that Hashem can manipulate/ persuade people in a way that somehow still leaves them with bechira chofshis - so how do we know that that isn't what hashem did to pharoah?
A similar question comes up in halacha (this is nogea to the news that ba-avonoseinu harabbim keeps coming up) with regards to get meuseh. A get that is forced is invalid. Obviously, however, one is allowed to persuade someone to give their wife a get, as long as the persuasion does not cross the line and become coercion. The question is, where is that line? (If hashem had made pharoah give a get, would it have been kosher?)
Saturday, December 21, 2013
Does G-d have to play by the rules?
I did not get a chance to research this as much as I would want, but off the cuff, there is a fascinating machlokes in this week's parsha that seems to relate to this question.
וְשָׁאֲלָה אִשָּׁה מִשְּׁכֶנְתָּהּ וּמִגָּרַת בֵּיתָהּ כְּלֵי־כֶסֶף וּכְלֵי זָהָב וּשְׂמָלֹת וְשַׂמְתֶּם עַל־בְּנֵיכֶם וְעַל־בְּנֹתֵיכֶם וְנִצַּלְתֶּם אֶת־מִצְרָיִם: - G-d seems to be promising Moshe that bnei yisrael will ask to "borrow" all the Egyptians stuff, and then never pay it back -- in English, stealing! How is that ok?
Take a look at these two diametrically opposed answers:
Ibn Ezra:
ויש מתאוננים ואומרים כי אבותינו גנבים היו. ואלה הלא יראו, כי מצוה עליונה היתה. ואין טעם לשאול למה, כי השם ברא הכל, והוא נתן עושר למי שירצה ויקחנו מידו ויתננו לאחר. ואין זה רע, כי הכל שלו הוא.
Rashbam:
ושאלה אשה משכנתה - במתנה גמורה וחלוטה, שהרי [כתוב] ונתתי את חן העם. כמו שאל ממני ואתנה גוים נחלתך. זהו עיקר פשוטו ותשובה למינים: - I don't need to tell you that the "minim" he is referring to learn the pasuk like the Ibn Ezra and therefore claimed that G-d is a thief.
Take a look at this peirush hamishnayos of the rambam (bava kamma 4: 3) which I cannot translate here. All I'll say is that the last time I looked at it 3 years ago (a friend of mine showed it to me when we were learning BK), I thought that it put the Rambam on the Ibn Ezra's side in the above debate. Now I'm not so sure (though I recall that there might have been different girsaos that affected the interpretation):
ג] אם אירע דין לישראל עם גוי הרי אופן המשפט ביניהם כמו שאבאר לך, אם היה לנו בדיניהם זכות דננו להם בדיניהם ואמרנו להם כך דיניכם, ואם היה יותר טוב לנו שנדון בדינינו דננו להם לפי דינינו ונאמר להם כך דינינו. ואל יקשה בעיניך דבר זה ואל תתמה עליו כמו שלא תתמה על שחיטת בעלי החיים אף על פי שלא עשו שום רע, לפי שמי שלא נשלמו בו התכונות האנושיות אינו אדם באמת ואין תכליתו אלא לאדם, והדבור על ענין זה צריך ספר מיוחד.
I'm curious as to which side of this machlokes people relate to more, and why. My initial (rational) reaction was to favor the Ibn Ezra - isn't his logic compelling - if G-d created the world, then he owns it and he's allowed to do whatever he wants with it -- including stealing from the mitzrim, killing amalekim, etc. etc. How does the rashbam respond to that?
וְשָׁאֲלָה אִשָּׁה מִשְּׁכֶנְתָּהּ וּמִגָּרַת בֵּיתָהּ כְּלֵי־כֶסֶף וּכְלֵי זָהָב וּשְׂמָלֹת וְשַׂמְתֶּם עַל־בְּנֵיכֶם וְעַל־בְּנֹתֵיכֶם וְנִצַּלְתֶּם אֶת־מִצְרָיִם: - G-d seems to be promising Moshe that bnei yisrael will ask to "borrow" all the Egyptians stuff, and then never pay it back -- in English, stealing! How is that ok?
Take a look at these two diametrically opposed answers:
Ibn Ezra:
ויש מתאוננים ואומרים כי אבותינו גנבים היו. ואלה הלא יראו, כי מצוה עליונה היתה. ואין טעם לשאול למה, כי השם ברא הכל, והוא נתן עושר למי שירצה ויקחנו מידו ויתננו לאחר. ואין זה רע, כי הכל שלו הוא.
Rashbam:
ושאלה אשה משכנתה - במתנה גמורה וחלוטה, שהרי [כתוב] ונתתי את חן העם. כמו שאל ממני ואתנה גוים נחלתך. זהו עיקר פשוטו ותשובה למינים: - I don't need to tell you that the "minim" he is referring to learn the pasuk like the Ibn Ezra and therefore claimed that G-d is a thief.
Take a look at this peirush hamishnayos of the rambam (bava kamma 4: 3) which I cannot translate here. All I'll say is that the last time I looked at it 3 years ago (a friend of mine showed it to me when we were learning BK), I thought that it put the Rambam on the Ibn Ezra's side in the above debate. Now I'm not so sure (though I recall that there might have been different girsaos that affected the interpretation):
ג] אם אירע דין לישראל עם גוי הרי אופן המשפט ביניהם כמו שאבאר לך, אם היה לנו בדיניהם זכות דננו להם בדיניהם ואמרנו להם כך דיניכם, ואם היה יותר טוב לנו שנדון בדינינו דננו להם לפי דינינו ונאמר להם כך דינינו. ואל יקשה בעיניך דבר זה ואל תתמה עליו כמו שלא תתמה על שחיטת בעלי החיים אף על פי שלא עשו שום רע, לפי שמי שלא נשלמו בו התכונות האנושיות אינו אדם באמת ואין תכליתו אלא לאדם, והדבור על ענין זה צריך ספר מיוחד.
I'm curious as to which side of this machlokes people relate to more, and why. My initial (rational) reaction was to favor the Ibn Ezra - isn't his logic compelling - if G-d created the world, then he owns it and he's allowed to do whatever he wants with it -- including stealing from the mitzrim, killing amalekim, etc. etc. How does the rashbam respond to that?
Wednesday, December 18, 2013
chizuk huddle - shema yisrael
Last year, R Twersky's shiur initiated a "chizuk huddle" once a week where we "huddle" in a corner of the bies medrash after seder one day and someone gives chizuk/mussar/divrei hashkafah for five minutes. Today one of the most chashuv of the chavrei hakollel was the "rosh huddle" and he said a mehalech I would like to share.
We know that rashi tells us that when yaakov came down to mitzraim to meet yosef for the first time in 22 years, yosef cried on yaakov's shoulders - but yaakov didn't cry: אבל יעקב לא נפל על צוארי יוסף ולא נשקו, ואמרו רבותינו שהיה קורא את שמע
Obviously Yaakov isn't callous about the tremendous emotional significance of this reunion. But rather, rashi is telling us that Yaakov somehow felt that the most appropriate reaction to this momentous occasion was not to cry, as yosef did, but rather to recite krias shema. why?
Chazal identify krias shema with yaakov avinu in another famous gemara cited by the rambam in hilchos kerias shema 1: 4 (There are some changes from the way the story is presented in the gemara, but not for now): הקורא קריאת שמע כשהוא גומר פסוק ראשון אומר בלחש ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד וחוזר וקורא כדרכו ואהבת את יי' אלהיך עד סופה. ולמה קורין כן מסורת היא בידינו שבשעה שקבץ יעקב אבינו את בניו במצרים בשעת מיתתו ציום וזרזם על יחוד השם ועל דרך ה' שהלך בה אברהם ויצחק אביו ושאל אותם ואמר להם בני שמא יש בכם פסלות מי שאינו עומד עמי ביחוד השם כענין שאמר לנו משה רבינו פן יש בכם איש או אשה וגו' ענו כולם ואמרו שמע ישראל יי' אלהינו יי' אחד, כלומר שמע ממנו אבינו ישראל יי' אלהינו יי' אחד, פתח הזקן ואמר ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד. לפיכך נהגו כל ישראל לומר שבח ששבח בו ישראל הזקן אחר פסוק זה:
So yaakov has this unique association with krias shema because on one level, the yisrael referred to in the pasuk is yaakov avinu. but this story also reveals a deeper level of association. Yaakov, on his deathbead was trying to one last time be mizarez his children in yichud hashem - but he can't do that if one of them isn't in it - there has to be achdus, a unity of purpose amongst the brothers, for them to be able to properly accept ol malchus shamayim / the unity of G-d. Thats why yaakov asked, שמא יש בכם פסלות. and the brothers responded, shema yisrael - we as one accept yichud hashem. This was what caused yaakov avinu to praise hashem with the shevach of baruch shem.
So we see that the statement shema yisrael signifies more than a personal acceptance of kabbalas ol malchus shamayim - it is about klal yisrael unifying, coming together in achdus, to as one be mekabel hashem as one. When yosef wasn't there, yaakov couldn't recite kerias shema - there was no achdus. The reunion with yosef is the ultimate restoration of achdus and hence there is no more appropriate time to recite kerias shema. It is no coincidence that the rashi right before this one emphasizes the connection between the achdus of klal yisrael and yichud hashem: כל הנפש הבאה ליעקב - מצאתי בויקרא רבה (ד ו) עשו שש נפשות היו לו והכתוב קורא אותן (לעיל לו ו) נפשות ביתו, לשון רבים, לפי שהיו עובדין לאלהות הרבה, יעקב שבעים היו לו והכתוב קורא אותן נפש, לפי שהיו עובדים לאל אחד:
The unity of klal yisrael and the unity of g-d are inextricably linked - both in the sense that achdus is meaningful in that it leads to and reflects yichud hashem and in the sense that kabbalas ol malchus shamayim is meaningless if there is strife and discord. I think this idea connects back to our discussion of yaakov avinu lo mes - specifically yaakov didn't die because only in yaakov is there a potential for all his desendants to come together as one to declare yichud hashem - mah zaro bichaim, af hu bichaim. if thats true, then even today, when we say shema yisrael, we can refer not only to klal yisrael, but also to yisrael sabba, yaakov avinu who is still alive with us today by virtue of our recitation of the shema. We should be zocheh to merit ziruz both in yichud /achdus within klal yisrael and yichud hashem.
We know that rashi tells us that when yaakov came down to mitzraim to meet yosef for the first time in 22 years, yosef cried on yaakov's shoulders - but yaakov didn't cry: אבל יעקב לא נפל על צוארי יוסף ולא נשקו, ואמרו רבותינו שהיה קורא את שמע
Obviously Yaakov isn't callous about the tremendous emotional significance of this reunion. But rather, rashi is telling us that Yaakov somehow felt that the most appropriate reaction to this momentous occasion was not to cry, as yosef did, but rather to recite krias shema. why?
Chazal identify krias shema with yaakov avinu in another famous gemara cited by the rambam in hilchos kerias shema 1: 4 (There are some changes from the way the story is presented in the gemara, but not for now): הקורא קריאת שמע כשהוא גומר פסוק ראשון אומר בלחש ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד וחוזר וקורא כדרכו ואהבת את יי' אלהיך עד סופה. ולמה קורין כן מסורת היא בידינו שבשעה שקבץ יעקב אבינו את בניו במצרים בשעת מיתתו ציום וזרזם על יחוד השם ועל דרך ה' שהלך בה אברהם ויצחק אביו ושאל אותם ואמר להם בני שמא יש בכם פסלות מי שאינו עומד עמי ביחוד השם כענין שאמר לנו משה רבינו פן יש בכם איש או אשה וגו' ענו כולם ואמרו שמע ישראל יי' אלהינו יי' אחד, כלומר שמע ממנו אבינו ישראל יי' אלהינו יי' אחד, פתח הזקן ואמר ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד. לפיכך נהגו כל ישראל לומר שבח ששבח בו ישראל הזקן אחר פסוק זה:
So yaakov has this unique association with krias shema because on one level, the yisrael referred to in the pasuk is yaakov avinu. but this story also reveals a deeper level of association. Yaakov, on his deathbead was trying to one last time be mizarez his children in yichud hashem - but he can't do that if one of them isn't in it - there has to be achdus, a unity of purpose amongst the brothers, for them to be able to properly accept ol malchus shamayim / the unity of G-d. Thats why yaakov asked, שמא יש בכם פסלות. and the brothers responded, shema yisrael - we as one accept yichud hashem. This was what caused yaakov avinu to praise hashem with the shevach of baruch shem.
So we see that the statement shema yisrael signifies more than a personal acceptance of kabbalas ol malchus shamayim - it is about klal yisrael unifying, coming together in achdus, to as one be mekabel hashem as one. When yosef wasn't there, yaakov couldn't recite kerias shema - there was no achdus. The reunion with yosef is the ultimate restoration of achdus and hence there is no more appropriate time to recite kerias shema. It is no coincidence that the rashi right before this one emphasizes the connection between the achdus of klal yisrael and yichud hashem: כל הנפש הבאה ליעקב - מצאתי בויקרא רבה (ד ו) עשו שש נפשות היו לו והכתוב קורא אותן (לעיל לו ו) נפשות ביתו, לשון רבים, לפי שהיו עובדין לאלהות הרבה, יעקב שבעים היו לו והכתוב קורא אותן נפש, לפי שהיו עובדים לאל אחד:
The unity of klal yisrael and the unity of g-d are inextricably linked - both in the sense that achdus is meaningful in that it leads to and reflects yichud hashem and in the sense that kabbalas ol malchus shamayim is meaningless if there is strife and discord. I think this idea connects back to our discussion of yaakov avinu lo mes - specifically yaakov didn't die because only in yaakov is there a potential for all his desendants to come together as one to declare yichud hashem - mah zaro bichaim, af hu bichaim. if thats true, then even today, when we say shema yisrael, we can refer not only to klal yisrael, but also to yisrael sabba, yaakov avinu who is still alive with us today by virtue of our recitation of the shema. We should be zocheh to merit ziruz both in yichud /achdus within klal yisrael and yichud hashem.
Sunday, December 15, 2013
pikuach nefesh on shabbos - value education
This is a semi -halachic analysis. As with all halacha I ever write, I put forth the standard disclaimer regarding my lack of halachic authority.
The halacha is that pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos - If there is danger to life, then it is not only permissable, but it is obligatory to violate the shabbos
Not only vadai pikuach nefesh, but even safek pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos. Thus, if you see a person drop suddenly on shabbos and you're not sure if they face a life threatening issue, you should still violate the shabbos to ensure their safety (eg. taking them to a hospital, etc.)
The question becomes, how far does it go - is anything and everything a safek pikuach nefesh? I don't know if people have thought about this much, but from the (thankfully) few situations I've been in it always makes me nervous that I don't really know how to tell if something is pikuach nefesh or not such that we should be mechalel shabbos.
What if someone experiences symptoms that seem most likely to not be anything dangerous, but there is a definite possibility that there is a real sakanah here - (I'm no doctor, so my examples are probably bad, but lets say one has a persistent pain in the stomach that could just be nothing or perhaps it is appendicitis. The point is that the safek is not a safek hashakul - its not 50-50 that this is life threatening, but rather, the odds seem to point to it not being life threatening, despite the possibility that it is indeed dangerous.) If we say that it doesn't have to be 50-50 to save, then how far do we go: 90-10, 99-1, 99.999-0.001?
If there is a community in which there is an epidemic disease spreading, can they eat on yom kippur to protect themselves against the possible life threatening danger of falling ill?
If one hasn't yet received a standard vaccination (no epidemics, just normal circumstances) can one take it on shabbos or should they wait till after shabbos?
If someone does research in medical techniques to treat cancer, can they work on shabbos since their research may ultimately save lives - and the quicker its done, the sooner lives can be saved?
I don't think the halacha is the same in each of those cases - all I'm trying to show is how amorphous the concept of safek pikuach nefesh is.
One approach that I recall R Twersky quoting once to limit the principle of pikuach nefesh being docheh shabbos is that we only apply said principle when there is a "choleh lifanecha" - an actual person we can identify whose life we are trying to save. By the medical research question, there is no choleh lifanecha - these techniques are being developed to treat unknown people at some unknown time in the future. I don't remember if R Twersky also used this principle in the second example concerning eating on yom kippur, possibly arguing that since you aren't ill yet, there is no choleh lifanecha to be mattir achilah on yom kippur.
The problem with this approach is that it doesn't seem to have any source- and it would seem to limit the principle of pikuach nefesh docheh shabbos in cases where common sense says it shouldn't be limited, eg. case 2.
R Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, quoted in a footnote at the beginning of the 32nd perek of shemiras shabbos kehilchasah and originally in a teshuvah (chelek 2:37) I saw today in minchas shlomo, seems to have a different approach:
ולענין עיקר הדבר מה נקרא ספק פקו"נ ומה לא, ועד איפה הוא הגבול, גם אנכי בעניי הסתפקתי טובא בזה, אלא שמצד הסברא נלענ"ד דכל שדרך רוב בני אדם לברוח מזה כבורח מפני הסכנה ה"ז חשיב כספק פקוח נפש וקרינן ביה בכה"ג וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם, אבל אם אין רוב בני אדם נבהלים ומפחדים מזה אין זה חשיב סכנה, קצת דוגמא לכך הרכבת [זריקת] אבעבועות לילדים, אע"ג דמצד הדין אפשר שצריכים באמת להזדרז ולעשותו בהקדם האפשרי אם הרופא אומר שכבר הגיע הזמן לעשותו, אך אעפ"כ אין רגילין כלל לעשותן בבהילות ובזריזות, ולפיכך אף אם באמת יש בזה קצת סכנה הו"ל כמ"ש חז"ל והאידנא שומר פתאים ד' וחלילה לחלל שבת עבור כך, משא"כ אם אחד נמצא במקום כזה שיודע ברור שאם לא ירכיב עכשיו את האבעבועות בשבת יצטרך לחכות ד' או ה' שנים, כיון דבזמן מרובה כזה ודאי נבהלים ומפחדים לשהות, אפשר דשפיר חשיב כפקוח נפש ודוחה שבת. +עי' שש"כ פל"ב הערה ב'.+
loose translation / summary: a safek pikuach nefesh is defined by whatever people perceive as dangerous. thus, since people don't perceive it as a sakanah to delay a vaccination, it is prohibited -- chalilal la-kel that we should be mattir -- recieving a vaccination on shabbos, even though there is a certain element of danger in every day that you delay getting vaccinated. In any case that people perceive as dangerous, however, even if the danger is very remote and there is no "choleh lifanecha", we still are michalel shabbos because we view it as a safek sakanas nefashos.
Thus, the litmus test that a person has to use to determine whether something falls into the category of pikuach nefesh is to ask themselves how they would react during the week. If during the week, they would react as if this were sakanas nefashos, then they have license to do so on shabbos as well, (almost) irregardless of any objective determination of safek sakanas nefashos. The purpose of this test is almost an honesty check - are you being mechalel shabbos right now because you just don't care about kedushas shabbos, or because you really perceive this situation as one of safek sakanas nefashos? To answer this question, you think about how you would perceive this situation without shabbos as a factor - if even then, you would react as if it were a case of pikuach nefesh, then you have license to do so on shabbos as well.
So to answer our original q: how is one supposed to know when they should be michalel shabbos for pikuach nefesh. One answer is that we should take the time to learn some basic medical knowledge so that we can be more confident in ourselves if any situation comes up. But according to r shlomo zalman, there's something else that needs to be done thats critical in hashkafah as well.
The chiddush of r shlomo zalman is that halacha isn't interested as much in the "what" of what you're doing but more in the "why". We don't ask - is there an objective safek pikuach nefesh. Rather, we ask, why is this person being mechalel shabbos - is this situation really perceived as a sakanah, or is it that this person just doesn't care enough about kedushas shabbos. If a person cares enough, he can't be wrong - even if objectively this situation isn't a safek sakanas nefashos, this person cares so much about shabbos that if he was mechalel shabbos, it must be that he really perceived this situation as one of sakanas nefashos - and therefore it was muttar to be mechalel shabbos.
(This ties to what I believe is a general yesod in kol hatorah kulah that the tzurah of an action one does is often more important than the action itself - the way you do something defines an action even more than what you are actually doing.)
So according to r shlomo zalman, the education we need to be more confident in knowing when we should be mechalel shabbos for pikuach nefesh isn't primarily an intellectual one; rather it is to instill within ourselves an appreciation for and a deep caring for kedushas shabbos - only then can we have any confidence that when we feel the need to be mechalel shabbos for pikuach nefesh, its because we actually perceive this case as one of pikuach nefesh and not just because we aren't makpid chas vishalom on kedushas shabbos.
Truth be told, this argument works the other way as well. While I personally feel that for me, the idea of the sanctity of human life is much more obvious than that of shabbos, we do hear of cases where people rachmana litzlan are not mechalel shabbos even to save lives - and people die because of it. For them, the problem is the opposite- they know intellectually that pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos, but they have not properly instilled within themselves how great the value of the sanctity of human life is, and thats what they need to work on to make the right choices.
There is no better way to conclude this idea than with the words of the rambam concerning pikuach nefesh on shabbos, and the values the torah represents in general:
כשעושים דברים האלו אין עושין אותן לא ע"י נכרים ולא ע"י קטנים ולא ע"י עבדים ולא ע"י נשים כדי שלא תהא שבת קלה בעיניהם. אלא על ידי גדולי ישראל וחכמיהם. ואסור להתמהמה בחילול שבת לחולה שיש בו סכנה שנאמר אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם. הא למדת שאין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם אלא רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם.
The halacha that pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos is not only a din in pikuach nefesh, but also in shabbos, and also in kol hatorah kulah: אין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם - rather, רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם.
The halacha is that pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos - If there is danger to life, then it is not only permissable, but it is obligatory to violate the shabbos
Not only vadai pikuach nefesh, but even safek pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos. Thus, if you see a person drop suddenly on shabbos and you're not sure if they face a life threatening issue, you should still violate the shabbos to ensure their safety (eg. taking them to a hospital, etc.)
The question becomes, how far does it go - is anything and everything a safek pikuach nefesh? I don't know if people have thought about this much, but from the (thankfully) few situations I've been in it always makes me nervous that I don't really know how to tell if something is pikuach nefesh or not such that we should be mechalel shabbos.
What if someone experiences symptoms that seem most likely to not be anything dangerous, but there is a definite possibility that there is a real sakanah here - (I'm no doctor, so my examples are probably bad, but lets say one has a persistent pain in the stomach that could just be nothing or perhaps it is appendicitis. The point is that the safek is not a safek hashakul - its not 50-50 that this is life threatening, but rather, the odds seem to point to it not being life threatening, despite the possibility that it is indeed dangerous.) If we say that it doesn't have to be 50-50 to save, then how far do we go: 90-10, 99-1, 99.999-0.001?
If there is a community in which there is an epidemic disease spreading, can they eat on yom kippur to protect themselves against the possible life threatening danger of falling ill?
If one hasn't yet received a standard vaccination (no epidemics, just normal circumstances) can one take it on shabbos or should they wait till after shabbos?
If someone does research in medical techniques to treat cancer, can they work on shabbos since their research may ultimately save lives - and the quicker its done, the sooner lives can be saved?
I don't think the halacha is the same in each of those cases - all I'm trying to show is how amorphous the concept of safek pikuach nefesh is.
One approach that I recall R Twersky quoting once to limit the principle of pikuach nefesh being docheh shabbos is that we only apply said principle when there is a "choleh lifanecha" - an actual person we can identify whose life we are trying to save. By the medical research question, there is no choleh lifanecha - these techniques are being developed to treat unknown people at some unknown time in the future. I don't remember if R Twersky also used this principle in the second example concerning eating on yom kippur, possibly arguing that since you aren't ill yet, there is no choleh lifanecha to be mattir achilah on yom kippur.
The problem with this approach is that it doesn't seem to have any source- and it would seem to limit the principle of pikuach nefesh docheh shabbos in cases where common sense says it shouldn't be limited, eg. case 2.
R Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, quoted in a footnote at the beginning of the 32nd perek of shemiras shabbos kehilchasah and originally in a teshuvah (chelek 2:37) I saw today in minchas shlomo, seems to have a different approach:
ולענין עיקר הדבר מה נקרא ספק פקו"נ ומה לא, ועד איפה הוא הגבול, גם אנכי בעניי הסתפקתי טובא בזה, אלא שמצד הסברא נלענ"ד דכל שדרך רוב בני אדם לברוח מזה כבורח מפני הסכנה ה"ז חשיב כספק פקוח נפש וקרינן ביה בכה"ג וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם, אבל אם אין רוב בני אדם נבהלים ומפחדים מזה אין זה חשיב סכנה, קצת דוגמא לכך הרכבת [זריקת] אבעבועות לילדים, אע"ג דמצד הדין אפשר שצריכים באמת להזדרז ולעשותו בהקדם האפשרי אם הרופא אומר שכבר הגיע הזמן לעשותו, אך אעפ"כ אין רגילין כלל לעשותן בבהילות ובזריזות, ולפיכך אף אם באמת יש בזה קצת סכנה הו"ל כמ"ש חז"ל והאידנא שומר פתאים ד' וחלילה לחלל שבת עבור כך, משא"כ אם אחד נמצא במקום כזה שיודע ברור שאם לא ירכיב עכשיו את האבעבועות בשבת יצטרך לחכות ד' או ה' שנים, כיון דבזמן מרובה כזה ודאי נבהלים ומפחדים לשהות, אפשר דשפיר חשיב כפקוח נפש ודוחה שבת. +עי' שש"כ פל"ב הערה ב'.+
loose translation / summary: a safek pikuach nefesh is defined by whatever people perceive as dangerous. thus, since people don't perceive it as a sakanah to delay a vaccination, it is prohibited -- chalilal la-kel that we should be mattir -- recieving a vaccination on shabbos, even though there is a certain element of danger in every day that you delay getting vaccinated. In any case that people perceive as dangerous, however, even if the danger is very remote and there is no "choleh lifanecha", we still are michalel shabbos because we view it as a safek sakanas nefashos.
Thus, the litmus test that a person has to use to determine whether something falls into the category of pikuach nefesh is to ask themselves how they would react during the week. If during the week, they would react as if this were sakanas nefashos, then they have license to do so on shabbos as well, (almost) irregardless of any objective determination of safek sakanas nefashos. The purpose of this test is almost an honesty check - are you being mechalel shabbos right now because you just don't care about kedushas shabbos, or because you really perceive this situation as one of safek sakanas nefashos? To answer this question, you think about how you would perceive this situation without shabbos as a factor - if even then, you would react as if it were a case of pikuach nefesh, then you have license to do so on shabbos as well.
So to answer our original q: how is one supposed to know when they should be michalel shabbos for pikuach nefesh. One answer is that we should take the time to learn some basic medical knowledge so that we can be more confident in ourselves if any situation comes up. But according to r shlomo zalman, there's something else that needs to be done thats critical in hashkafah as well.
The chiddush of r shlomo zalman is that halacha isn't interested as much in the "what" of what you're doing but more in the "why". We don't ask - is there an objective safek pikuach nefesh. Rather, we ask, why is this person being mechalel shabbos - is this situation really perceived as a sakanah, or is it that this person just doesn't care enough about kedushas shabbos. If a person cares enough, he can't be wrong - even if objectively this situation isn't a safek sakanas nefashos, this person cares so much about shabbos that if he was mechalel shabbos, it must be that he really perceived this situation as one of sakanas nefashos - and therefore it was muttar to be mechalel shabbos.
(This ties to what I believe is a general yesod in kol hatorah kulah that the tzurah of an action one does is often more important than the action itself - the way you do something defines an action even more than what you are actually doing.)
So according to r shlomo zalman, the education we need to be more confident in knowing when we should be mechalel shabbos for pikuach nefesh isn't primarily an intellectual one; rather it is to instill within ourselves an appreciation for and a deep caring for kedushas shabbos - only then can we have any confidence that when we feel the need to be mechalel shabbos for pikuach nefesh, its because we actually perceive this case as one of pikuach nefesh and not just because we aren't makpid chas vishalom on kedushas shabbos.
Truth be told, this argument works the other way as well. While I personally feel that for me, the idea of the sanctity of human life is much more obvious than that of shabbos, we do hear of cases where people rachmana litzlan are not mechalel shabbos even to save lives - and people die because of it. For them, the problem is the opposite- they know intellectually that pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos, but they have not properly instilled within themselves how great the value of the sanctity of human life is, and thats what they need to work on to make the right choices.
There is no better way to conclude this idea than with the words of the rambam concerning pikuach nefesh on shabbos, and the values the torah represents in general:
כשעושים דברים האלו אין עושין אותן לא ע"י נכרים ולא ע"י קטנים ולא ע"י עבדים ולא ע"י נשים כדי שלא תהא שבת קלה בעיניהם. אלא על ידי גדולי ישראל וחכמיהם. ואסור להתמהמה בחילול שבת לחולה שיש בו סכנה שנאמר אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם. הא למדת שאין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם אלא רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם.
The halacha that pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos is not only a din in pikuach nefesh, but also in shabbos, and also in kol hatorah kulah: אין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם - rather, רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם.
Saturday, December 14, 2013
Vayechi - yaakov avinu lo mes
Chazal write in maseches taanis (5b) that yaakov avinu lo mes - he never died:
א"ר יוחנן יעקב אבינו לא מת א"ל וכי בכדי ספדו ספדנייא וחנטו חנטייא וקברו קברייא א"ל מקרא אני דורש שנאמר ואתה אל תירא עבדי יעקב נאם ה' ואל תחת ישראל כי הנני מושיעך מרחוק ואת זרעך מארץ שבים מקיש הוא לזרעו מה זרעו בחיים אף הוא בחיים
Chazal tell us in brachos 18a that, really, all tzaddikim never die: אלו צדיקים שבמיתתן נקראו חיים שנאמר ובניהו בן יהוידע בן איש חי - was yaakov avinu any different than all of the tzaddikim who don't die?
First, what does it mean that tzaddikim are called "alive" even after they're dead? The rambam, quoting a well known yerushalmi, writes: ומציינין את כל בית הקברות ובונין נפש על הקבר. והצדיקים אין בונים להם נפש על קברותיהם שדבריהם הם זכרונם. ולא יפנה אדם לבקר הקברות:
The simple read of the rambam (see radbaz who is meyashev our minhag; the pashtus is that our minhag is just against the rambam) is that we dont build a matzevah for tzaddikim - because they need no matzevah to be memorialized - their good deeds live on as their memorial. The natural follow up is to not visit kevarim - thats not the way to remember the dead. If the person is worthy of being remembered, then there is no need to take away from the meaningful remembrance of their actions by going to the cemetery to remember the 'meaningless' dead body.
If this connects to the previous maamar chazal (which I believe it does), it means that tzaddikim are called living even when they have died because of the legacy of their words of torah and the mitzvos they performed.
One way to explain that yaakov's "lo meis" is different than that applied by chazal to other tzaddikim is literally: Other tzaddikim experienced physical death, even if their legacy lives on - not so with yaakov avinu.
Despite the immense difficulty with interpreting the pesukim this way, this seems to be the approach of rashi in taanis and the last ramban in parshas vayechi.
Based on the maharsha, I think one can suggest another approach. Note that there is another figure whom chazal seem to claim never died, despite the fact that he most definitely seems to die in tanach: dovid hamelech. as the song goes, dovid melech yisrael chai vikayam (the phrase is used in rosh hashanah 25a, credit to wikipedia).
So what is different about yaaov and dovid as opposed to all the other tzaddikim?
The gemara's source that yaakov avinu lo meis was a hekesh between yaakov and his descendants. Unlike avraham and yitzchak, yaakov's descendants all remained within the fold -mitaso sheleimah.
Zaro shel dovid also has a unique significance to it - that line will never be broken, and the melech hamashioch will one day come out of it.
Thus, Yaakov and Dovid live on through their children in a way that in a sense is perhaps more real than the way most tzaddikim live on through their actions. Bra kara di-avuha - If one's children truly fulfill one's destiny and purpose than we don't just say that that person is called alive when he is dead - such a person is truly alive.
In Hamalach hagoel, yaakov blesses ehpraim and menashe by saying "viyikarei bahem shemi" - my name should be called upon them - Yaakov is alive because of this brachah - his children, that is, us, are called by his name because we fulfill the mission and purpose that he began.
This is important on two levels: First, the yartzheits of my mother's parents both fall out right around now, and to know that they live on because I live on is to carry a burden - it obligates one to live with purpose, lest one throw not only one's own life, but theirs too by the wayside.
Second, we all want to be able to (one day) give our descendants the bracha given to them by yaakov avinu - viyikarei bahem shemi. But thats only a bracha if shemi - our names - are something worthy to be carried on by future generations.
Shavua tov!
א"ר יוחנן יעקב אבינו לא מת א"ל וכי בכדי ספדו ספדנייא וחנטו חנטייא וקברו קברייא א"ל מקרא אני דורש שנאמר ואתה אל תירא עבדי יעקב נאם ה' ואל תחת ישראל כי הנני מושיעך מרחוק ואת זרעך מארץ שבים מקיש הוא לזרעו מה זרעו בחיים אף הוא בחיים
Chazal tell us in brachos 18a that, really, all tzaddikim never die: אלו צדיקים שבמיתתן נקראו חיים שנאמר ובניהו בן יהוידע בן איש חי - was yaakov avinu any different than all of the tzaddikim who don't die?
First, what does it mean that tzaddikim are called "alive" even after they're dead? The rambam, quoting a well known yerushalmi, writes: ומציינין את כל בית הקברות ובונין נפש על הקבר. והצדיקים אין בונים להם נפש על קברותיהם שדבריהם הם זכרונם. ולא יפנה אדם לבקר הקברות:
The simple read of the rambam (see radbaz who is meyashev our minhag; the pashtus is that our minhag is just against the rambam) is that we dont build a matzevah for tzaddikim - because they need no matzevah to be memorialized - their good deeds live on as their memorial. The natural follow up is to not visit kevarim - thats not the way to remember the dead. If the person is worthy of being remembered, then there is no need to take away from the meaningful remembrance of their actions by going to the cemetery to remember the 'meaningless' dead body.
If this connects to the previous maamar chazal (which I believe it does), it means that tzaddikim are called living even when they have died because of the legacy of their words of torah and the mitzvos they performed.
One way to explain that yaakov's "lo meis" is different than that applied by chazal to other tzaddikim is literally: Other tzaddikim experienced physical death, even if their legacy lives on - not so with yaakov avinu.
Despite the immense difficulty with interpreting the pesukim this way, this seems to be the approach of rashi in taanis and the last ramban in parshas vayechi.
Based on the maharsha, I think one can suggest another approach. Note that there is another figure whom chazal seem to claim never died, despite the fact that he most definitely seems to die in tanach: dovid hamelech. as the song goes, dovid melech yisrael chai vikayam (the phrase is used in rosh hashanah 25a, credit to wikipedia).
So what is different about yaaov and dovid as opposed to all the other tzaddikim?
The gemara's source that yaakov avinu lo meis was a hekesh between yaakov and his descendants. Unlike avraham and yitzchak, yaakov's descendants all remained within the fold -mitaso sheleimah.
Zaro shel dovid also has a unique significance to it - that line will never be broken, and the melech hamashioch will one day come out of it.
Thus, Yaakov and Dovid live on through their children in a way that in a sense is perhaps more real than the way most tzaddikim live on through their actions. Bra kara di-avuha - If one's children truly fulfill one's destiny and purpose than we don't just say that that person is called alive when he is dead - such a person is truly alive.
In Hamalach hagoel, yaakov blesses ehpraim and menashe by saying "viyikarei bahem shemi" - my name should be called upon them - Yaakov is alive because of this brachah - his children, that is, us, are called by his name because we fulfill the mission and purpose that he began.
This is important on two levels: First, the yartzheits of my mother's parents both fall out right around now, and to know that they live on because I live on is to carry a burden - it obligates one to live with purpose, lest one throw not only one's own life, but theirs too by the wayside.
Second, we all want to be able to (one day) give our descendants the bracha given to them by yaakov avinu - viyikarei bahem shemi. But thats only a bracha if shemi - our names - are something worthy to be carried on by future generations.
Shavua tov!
Wednesday, December 4, 2013
chanukah dvar torah from last yr
I said this at my sister's shabbos sheva brachos, with a few additions and changes.
so i was learning the halachos of chanuka, and i had a few questions.
1. i saw brought down that rav soloveitchik had a diyuk in rashi that the persumei nisa we do on chanuka by lighting the menora is not only for jews, but for non-jews as well. based on that, he asked, why specifically by chanuka do we do persumei nisa to non-jews, when by purim (krias hamegilah) and pesach (arba kosos), the pirsumei nisa is only for jews. i would add to the question one point- do we really think we will accomplish anything productive in our pirsumei nisa to the goyim. as the rambam emphasizes in several places, the point of persumei nisa is not just to remember a historical event - it is to recognize yad hashem in our lives and give thanks for his saving us bayamim haheim bazman hazeh - do we really succeed at all in accomplishing that.
2. the gemara writes as follows: the mitzvah of ner chanuka is to light it outside next to one's door. if one lives on a higher floor of a building, one may light in the window and be mikayem persumei nisa that way. bishaas hasakanh, one may light on their table and that suffices. ignoring why we dont light outside nowadays, this gemara is very difficult. most rishonim understand that shelo bishaas hasakanah, one is not yotzeh at all by lighting on their table, because there is no persumei nisa there. (tosfos is michadeish that even on the table, there is persumei nisa for bnei beiso, but thats a big chiddush -- unclear if most rishonim agree). if so, then why bishaas hasakanah do we light on the table - we just shouldnt light at all. if we cant be mikayem the mitzvah, so its very sad, but why "pretend" that were doing it when in reality, theres no persumeinisa being accomplished and in normal circumstances, one wouldnt even be yotzeh bdieved with what one is doing now?
it is noted quite often that a distinction between the nisim of purim and chanuka is that on purim, we faced a physical tragedy - death. on chanuka, we faced a spiritual enemy - the greeks didnt want to kill us, they wanted to convert us. i think that there is something very important hidden in that distinction:
when facing death, there is no choice but to fight. if you dont fight, you definitely die, if you fight, maybe you'll live - its a very simple cost benefit analysis. however, in a state of spiritual danger, the decision to fight or not is not always so clear cut. sometimes, you'll lose more by fighting than not, and it would be better to just accept the bad circumstances you're in and make the best of them. as chazal say, tafasta merubah lo tafasta, tafasta muat tafasta. (as a mashal, a person who isnt cut out for learning shouldnt try to force himself to learn 16 hrs in the beis medrash every day, because he'll end up making things worse by driving himself insane and killing himself. he should accept the circumstances he is in, and make the best of them).
a half- truth is always the strongest lie. when the yetzer hara persuades us to not fight a spiritual battle, but to accept things as they stand, he uses this argument and makes a compelling case because there are many times when this argument is actually correct. but, too often, we may accept this argument in cases where it should not be applied -- where we should fight -- out of a sense of spiritual complacency - we feel comfortable where we are spiritually, and dont feel the burning desire to push forward and grow. hence, it becomes easy to justify our inaction by saying, well, if we fight the greeks, we'll just make it worse.
the miracle of chanuka is not only that we won, but that we chose to fight. we were able to throw off this sense of complacency and say that we will not accept the spiritual state of affairs as it stands. because we kept our ideals, and our constant desire to grow in spirituality, we were able to recognize that chanuka was a time when we did need to fight for our beliefs, and not say that we should do the mitzvos as best as we can given the circumstances.
going back to question 2, i had an interesting inference in the rambam. there is a halacha that one needs to put another light next to the menorah to use, so that one will not use the ner chanuka which, as we say in haneros halalu is kodesh and hence forbidden to derive benefit from (this is the source of the minhag of the shamash). the rambam only mentions this halacha in the context of lighting al shulchano, but not in the context of lighting outside or by the window. it is easy to understand why one would not need a shamash when lighting outside - after all, one will not use the light of the menorah there since people generally dont hang out outside. but why when lighting by the window do we not need a shamash - isnt there a chashash there too that one will use the ner chanuka?
rashi writes that the purpose of a shamash is not just to avoid accidentally using ner chanuka, but as a heker - to make it obviously recognizable that the ner chanuka is not there for lighting purposes, but rather, for leshem mitzvas ner chanuka.
we asked - why bother lighting at all al shulchano bishaas hasakanah - after all, you're not accomplishing pirsumei nisa. but the whole point of chanuka is to recognize that we cant be complacent about the negatives in the current spirtual state of affairs. we have to try to push to accomplish our goals and objectives, even if we will not succeed at doing so much. davka when one lights on the table, and they think theyre not really being mekayem mitzvas ner chanuka, thats when chazal said make a heker to recognize that this is ner chanuka. ner chanuka is about not giving up and doing whatever one can to not be complacent in their spiritual state.
going back to our first question, the answer is very similar. davka on chanuka is the time to focus on our ultimate spiritual goals - vihayah hashem limelech al kol haaretz, bayom hahu yihyeh hashem echad ushmo echad. normally, we dont focus on that so much, because we cant win that battle now - halvai that we make hashem a melech over us personally. but chanuka is the time to remember what we truly want, and to not accept the lowly spiritual state we are in now. even though it may have little effect now, we ultimately have faith that one day, hashem will be the melech al kol haaretz, and all the nations will appreciate the persumei nisa of chanuka, lichsheyibaneh beis hamkidsah bimheirah biyameinu.
after thinking this through, i think it answers some other questions as well: theres a famous kashya of the pnei yeshoshua i believe, why couldnt they light shemen tamei - dont we have a principle that tumah is hutrah bitzibbur? lidvareinu, it doesnt matter if technically you're allowed to light with shemen tamei in certain circumstances. the whole point of chanuka is to rise above the "circumstance excuse", and to live in the ideal world.
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