Saturday, December 21, 2013

Does G-d have to play by the rules?

I did not get a chance to research this as much as I would want, but off the cuff, there is a fascinating machlokes in this week's parsha that seems to relate to this question.

וְשָׁאֲלָה אִשָּׁה מִשְּׁכֶנְתָּהּ וּמִגָּרַת בֵּיתָהּ כְּלֵי־כֶסֶף וּכְלֵי זָהָב וּשְׂמָלֹת וְשַׂמְתֶּם עַל־בְּנֵיכֶם וְעַל־בְּנֹתֵיכֶם וְנִצַּלְתֶּם אֶת־מִצְרָיִם: - G-d seems to be promising Moshe that bnei yisrael will ask to "borrow" all the Egyptians stuff, and then never pay it back -- in English, stealing!  How is that ok?

Take a look at these two diametrically opposed answers:

Ibn Ezra:

 ויש מתאוננים ואומרים כי אבותינו גנבים היו. ואלה הלא יראו, כי מצוה עליונה היתה. ואין טעם לשאול למה, כי השם ברא הכל, והוא נתן עושר למי שירצה ויקחנו מידו ויתננו לאחר. ואין זה רע, כי הכל שלו הוא.

Rashbam:

ושאלה אשה משכנתה - במתנה גמורה וחלוטה, שהרי [כתוב] ונתתי את חן העם. כמו שאל ממני ואתנה גוים נחלתך. זהו עיקר פשוטו ותשובה למינים: - I don't need to tell you that the "minim" he is referring to learn the pasuk like the Ibn Ezra and therefore claimed that G-d is a thief.

Take a look at this peirush hamishnayos of the rambam (bava kamma 4: 3) which I cannot translate here.  All I'll say is that the last time I looked at it 3 years ago (a friend of mine showed it to me when we were learning BK), I thought that it put the Rambam on the Ibn Ezra's side in the above debate.  Now I'm not so sure (though I recall that there might have been different girsaos that affected the interpretation):

ג] אם אירע דין לישראל עם גוי הרי אופן המשפט ביניהם כמו שאבאר לך, אם היה לנו בדיניהם זכות דננו להם בדיניהם ואמרנו להם כך דיניכם, ואם היה יותר טוב לנו שנדון בדינינו דננו להם לפי דינינו ונאמר להם כך דינינו. ואל יקשה בעיניך דבר זה ואל תתמה עליו כמו שלא תתמה על שחיטת בעלי החיים אף על פי שלא עשו שום רע, לפי שמי שלא נשלמו בו התכונות האנושיות אינו אדם באמת ואין תכליתו אלא לאדם, והדבור על ענין זה צריך ספר מיוחד.

I'm curious as to which side of this machlokes people relate to more, and why.  My initial (rational) reaction was to favor the Ibn Ezra - isn't his logic compelling - if G-d created the world, then he owns it and he's allowed to do whatever he wants with it -- including stealing from the mitzrim, killing amalekim, etc. etc.   How does the rashbam respond to that?

3 comments:

  1. Seems to be the old question of whether ethics exist outside halacha, or does halachic define the ethical -- R' Aharon Lichtenstein has an essay on this.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. I was thinking that as well (hence the throwing in of mechias amalek), but I'm not sure. Its one thing for G-d to have created an ethical system not 100% contained in the halacha / strict letter of the law and expect us to follow that as well. Its entirely another thing for the rashbam to have a kashya on Hashem being mattir stealing - how is the Ibn Ezra not correct?

      Delete
  2. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought this was seen as the subject of debate between Maimonides and Nachmanides about whether the Egyptians can be held accountable for their adherence to a Divine prophecy. Nachmanides and the Raavad seem to believe that fulfilling the prophecy, even if not specifically mandated, gives legitimacy to the actions used to achieve that end. The Rambam, by positing his explanation faulting specific Egyptians for their enslavement of the Jews, seems to be claiming that mere Divine expectation of an outcome does not give its executors an implicit Divine mandate. In Maimonides's world, a Divine prophecy does not grant ethical immunity to those executing it - they are still bound by ethical norms and can be held accountable for violation. Nachmanides and Raavad required that the Egyptians went beyond the necessary actions for fulfillment of the Divine prophecy in order to punish them.
    R' Aharon Lichtenstein quotes a Christian theologian who uses Abraham's pleas on behalf on Sodom and Gommorah to prove the existence of an independent ethical ideal. There, God had specifically decided to destroy those cities, yet Abraham was given the chance to intercede using a natural moral code. This contrasts with Abraham's behavior at the Akeidah, which is always used as an example of passive compliance with a higher will. This dialectic is definitely thought-provoking, and noticing one element while ignoring the other gives (some Mussar speeches) an unbalanced viewpoint of our independence in ethical decisions.

    ReplyDelete