chanukah and aharon hakohen

This is partially built off of last year's Chanukah dvar torah.

Rashi at the beginning of parshas behaaloshcha quotes a famous medrash:

בהעלתך - למה נסמכה פרשת המנורה לפרשת הנשיאים, לפי שכשראה אהרן חנוכת הנשיאים חלשה דעתו, שלא היה עמהם בחנוכה, לא הוא ולא שבטו, אמר לו הקב"ה חייך, שלך גדולה משלהם, שאתה מדליק ומטיב את הנרות

Aharon saw the chanukas ha-nesiim, and he had a chalishus hadaas. Hashem tells him to not worry because his portion is greater than theirs: he has the menorah.  The Ramban famously explains that this refers not to the menorah in the beis hamikdash, but to the menorah of chanukah.

I thought it was interesting to contrast Aharon's reaction here to his reaction when he meets Moshe Rabbeinu returning to Midyan.  There the torah says: גַם הִנֵּה־הוּא יֹצֵא לִקְרָאתֶךָ וְרָאֲךָ וְשָׂמַח בְּלִבּוֹ - Aharon will see Moshe's greatness, but there won't be any chalishus daas or jealousy!  To the contrary, וְשָׂמַח בְּלִבּוֹ, Aharon will share in Moshe's happiness, not thinking of or caring if he personally has any role to play in this story.  As far as Aharon knew, he could come out of this story with nothing: not even as a kohen. In fact, only because of this total lack of jealousy was Aharon zocheh to the choshen: ומשם זכה אהרן לעדי החשן הנתון על הלב.

Why in the one story does Aharon not get jealous at all (and therefore is zocheh to the choshen), and in the other story Aharon experiences chalishus hadaas (and because of that is zocheh to the menorah)?

Last year we discussed a deeper understanding of the Bach's distinction between chanukah and purim.  To review, from a slightly different angle:

On Purim, the primary danger facing the Jews was a physical danger: Haman wanted to wipe the Jewish people off the face of the earth.  The danger of Chanukah, however, was a spiritual battle: While there were many tzaros caused by the Greeks, the primary battle was against the Greek  desire to convert us and erase G-d's name from his people.

On Purim, the decision to fight was obvious and inevitable.  If you don't fight, you definitely die, if you fight, maybe you'll live - its a very simple cost benefit analysis.  But on Chanukah, the Chasmonaim had to be מקנא לה to fight against the Greeks and the Misyavnim.  And in being מקנא לה, there lies a great danger:  How does a person know that their קנאה לה is genuine and stems from an authentic passion to be mikayem dvar hashem?  Kinah is a dangerous middah - it is מוציא את האדם מן העולם - and 99% of the time, is a middah raah.  מי יעלה בהר ה  - who can say that their kinah for Hashem is authentic and justified?

What we celebrate on Chanukah then, is not just that the Chashmonaim fought this spiritual war, but that they fought a genuine spiritual war - their kinah for hashem was authentic.  How did they reach this madregah?

There may not be a complete answer to this question, but we can say this:  A person who has even an ounce of kinah in his bones that is shelo lishma, a kinah bein adam lachaveiro that is not pure, such a person CANNOT be mikaneh for Hashem.  If a person has not been completely misgaber over the yetzer hara of kinah, then his kinah for Hashem will be tainted with the impure kinah that spills over from his middos raos. Only a person who has risen above impure kinah can even think of being mikaneh lashem.

Thus, there is no contradiction between the two stories regarding Aharon hakohen: To the contrary, Aharon only had a hetter to have a  chalishus daas over his not being part of the chanukas hamizbeach in the mishkan because he didn't have even an ounce of kinah within him: proof positive, how he was able to be happy with Moshe Rabbeinu when his younger brother stole the show and left him to be a translator.  Through this chalishus hadaas, Aharon was zocheh that his descendants, the chashmonaim, would continue his legacy with an authentic קנאה for Hashem.

This tension lies at the heart of קנאות: kinah for Hashem can only be genuine if a person ultimately wants not קנאות, but shalom.  Thus, it makes perfect sense that the Kohanim are on the one hand described as the ultimate lovers of shalom (בשלום ובמישור הלך אתי), and yet are also involved so many times in kinah for Hashem (Pinchas, the Chashmonaim).  Only the people who are ohev shalom virodef shalom have the right to be mikaneh for Hashem.

The Rambam ends hilchos chanukah with this idea:

היה לפניו נר ביתו ונר חנוכה או נר ביתו וקדוש היום נר ביתו קודם משום שלום ביתו שהרי השם נמחק לעשות שלום בין איש לאשתו. גדול השלום שכל התורה ניתנה לעשות שלום בעולם שנאמר דרכיה דרכי נעם וכל נתיבותיה שלום

Ner Chanukah represents our kinah for Hashem -- our zealotry and passion to be mikayem dvar Hashem.  That passion and zealotry is a critical part of what we are as Jews, and Chanukah is the time to be mischazek, to keep the flame of passion for dvar Hashem burning brightly and constantly (ner tamid).  But, says the Rambam, that passion and zealotry is only meaningful in the context of דרכיה דרכי נעם וכל נתיבותיה שלום - it has to be with an ultimate desire for shalom.  We should all be zocheh to internalize both of these middos!

A freilichen Chanukah.

Kevuras Sarah

(see last year's piece for a different angle).

The rabbeinu yonah writes that Kevuras Sarah was Avraham's tenth nisayon:

העשירי קבורת שרה. שנאמר לו קום התהלך בארץ לארכה ולרחבה כי לך אתננה. וכשמתה אשתו לא מצא מקום לקברה עד שקנאו ולא הרהר


Ironically, the Ibn Ezra seems to view the story of kevuras sarah in almost the exact opposite light:

ונזכרה זאת הפרשה להודיע מעלת ארץ ישראל על כל הארצות לחיים ולמתים. ועוד לקיים דבר ד' לאברהם להיות לו נחלה

Rabbeinu Yonah thinks that making Avraham pay for the land, after he was already promised it, is in some sense a violation of that havtacha.  The Ibn Ezra, on the other hand, thinks that hi gufa - this was the fulfillment of Hashem's promise to Avraham.

Parenthetically, the Ramban argues on both Rabbeinu Yonah and the Ibn Ezra:

ולא ידעתי טעם לדברי רבי אברהם שאומר להודיע מעלת ארץ ישראל לחיים ולמתים, ועוד לקיים לו דבר השם להיות לו נחלה, כי מה מעלה לארץ בזה כי לא יוליכנה אל ארץ אחרת לקברה, ודבר השם לאברהם על כל הארץ היה ונתקיים רק בזרעו

For the Ramban, Avraham's purchase of machpela was neither an abnegation nor a fulfillment of Hashem's havtacha, because that havtacha was only meant to be fulfilled generations later through zera Avraham.  This machlokes rishonim seems to parallel the machlokes between the respective shepherds of Lot and Avraham, which does seem a little strange.

Getting back to the Ibn Ezra and his dispute with R Yonah, I suggest that the Ibn Ezra's approach has historically been an important part of Zionist history.  When we began to return to EY in the 19th and 20th centuries, we had to buy the land back from its inhabitants.  We've had to fight for it, and it has come (and continues to come) at a heavy price.  All this shouldn't be seen as a violation of Hashem's havtacha -- to the contrary, it is a fulfillment thereof.  Hashem promised us the land, but he didn't promise that it would come free.

Nonetheless, the words of the Rabbeinu Yonah echo - if Hashem promised us the land, why is there so much suffering for our brothers and sisters who live there?  Let us pray for the security and safety of our brethren in Israel, and all around the world.

mitzvas milah and its origins

last year i raised the question concerning the origins of mitzvas milah.  i stumbled across a teshuva of the rambam that directly addresses this topic (start at top right column):

 

mabul - will hashem really never bring another one

We are familiar with the story of the mabul.  This question sometimes gets a bad rap, but it must be asked.  Everything in the Torah teaches us some halacha, hashkafa, or mussar. What does the mabul  teach us?

The Rambam explains that the mabul is fundamental to Judaism - in fact - it is the basis for one of the thirteen cardinal principles of faith:

והיסוד העשירי שהוא יתעלה יודע מעשה בני אדם ולא הזניחם, ולא כדעת האומר עזב ה' את הארץ, אלא כמו שאמר גדול העצה ורב העליליה אשר עיניך פקוחות על כל דרכי בני האדם, ואמר וירא ה' כי רבה רעת האדם בארץ, ואמר זעקת סדום ועמורה כי רבה, הרי אלו מורים על היסוד העשירי הזה.

The tenth principle of faith, commonly misunderstood to be that Hashem knows what goes on in this world, is actually much more than that.  (Hashem's knowledge of what goes on is really assumed by the first few ikkarim of G-d's existence and ultimate perfection.)  The tenth ikkar is that Hashem cares about, and therefore reacts to what we do.  Hashem is not, as per the deistic conception, a watchmaker who leaves his creations to do as they please - rather, he cares that we behave in certain ways, and will react to encourage obedience and discourage rebellion.

The proof is the mabul - Hashem saw the evil of man in the time preceding the mabul - and he didn't just shrug it off.  To the contrary, Hashem destroyed the entire world because of it.

How ironic, then, that the force of this ikkar seems to be blunted by Hashem's subsequent promise to never destroy the world, (seemingly) even if we were to deserve it.  Are we then back to the watchmaker model, where Hashem is no longer mashgiach in the happenings of the world, or at least, only to a much lesser extent?

The question is really stronger than that, though, because the rambam takes the lesson of the mabul further in his yad hachazaka (teshuva 3:1):

אדם שעונותיו מרובין על זכיותיו מיד הוא מת ברשעו שנאמר על רוב עונך. וכן מדינה שעונותיה מרובין מיד היא אובדת שנאמר זעקת סדום ועמורה כי רבה וגו'. וכן כל העולם כולו אם היו עונותיהם מרובין מזכיותיהן מיד הן נשחתין שנאמר וירא ה' כי רבה רעת האדם. ושקול זה אינו לפי מנין הזכיות והעונות אלא לפי גודלם. יש זכות שהיא כנגד כמה עונות שנאמר יען נמצא בו דבר טוב. ויש עון שהוא כנגד כמה זכיות שנאמר וחוטא אחד יאבד טובה הרבה. ואין שוקלין אלא בדעתו של אל דעות והוא היודע היאך עורכין הזכיות כנגד העונות:

The Rambam writes that an individual who sins will inevitably die from his sins.  (The hebrew is miyad -- see here where they explain that as inevitably.  Its the best explanation I've seen so far, though I'm certainly open to other possibilities.)  Similarly, a wicked province will inevitably be destroyed, and if the world were to become more bad than good, the world would inevitably be destroyed.  Proof: the mabul - but Hashem promised to never destroy the world again?

Its important to understand where the Rambam is coming from, and why the question is more on the havtacha of the keshes than on the rambam himself.  Sevara is squarely with the rambam:  If we believe in hashgacha, and we believe in din, how can Hashem promise to not destroy the world even if it deserves it?  That violates the Rambam's ikkarim of hashgacha and tzedek!

In the back of the frankel rambam they ask this question, and suggest that perhaps Hashem's havtacha was only to not destroy the world through water - but he could still destroy it through other means.  This is certainly a possible answer, but it makes G-d's havatcha and seeming consolation to Noach a farce -- who cares that Hashem won't bring a mabul if he will instead just bring a giant volcano?

I'm still looking for answers, and I'm open to suggestions.  But I think the following might be the answer.

The Chayei Adam brings that because the keshes is a siman that Hashem really wants to destroy the world, it is a siman ra and one who sees it shouldn't point it out to his friend.  Its not obvious that the keshes is a siman ra; even if it is, I still believe the chayei adam is incorrect.

The Seforno writes:  והיתה לאות ברית. בהיות הקשת כפולה כי אמנם נלאו חכמי המחקר לתת טעם לסדר צבעי הקשת השנית, אשר הוא על הפך סדר צבעי הקשת הראשונה המורגלת, והיא תהיה אות לצדיקי הדור שדורם חייב, כאמרם "כלום נראתה הקשת בימיך" (כתובות עז ב), ויתפללו ויוכיחו וילמדו דעת את העם:

The whole point of the keshes is to inspire teshuva - because of that, it davka is important to spread the news of a rainbow so that people know that Hashem is angry and we need to do teshuva.

The seforno goes a step further in his understanding of the keshes, and this I think will answer for the rambam:   וראיתיה לזכור ברית עולם. אשגיח במסובב ממנה, והוא תפלת הצדיקים ועמדם בפרץ למען אשיב חימה מהשחית, כמו זוכר "ברית עולם":

Hashem didn't make any blanket promise to not destroy the world.  The keshes inspires teshuva - Hashem will see that teshuva, and because of that teshuva, he won't destroy the world.  If c''v that teshuva would not materialize, then it is scary to think about what could happen.  Because as the Rambam told us: וכן כל העולם כולו אם היו עונותיהם מרובין מזכיותיהן מיד הן נשחתין שנאמר וירא ה' כי רבה רעת האדם.

Whats the moral of the story?  The next halacha in rambam:

לפיכך צריך כל אדם שיראה עצמו כל השנה כולה כאילו חציו זכאי וחציו חייב. וכן כל העולם חציו זכאי וחציו חייב. חטא חטא אחד הרי הכריע את עצמו ואת כל העולם כולו לכף חובה וגרם לו השחתה. עשה מצוה אחת הרי הכריע את עצמו ואת כל העולם כולו לכף זכות וגרם לו ולהם תשועה והצלה שנאמר וצדיק יסוד עולם זה שצדק הכריע את כל העולם לזכות והצילו. ומפני ענין זה נהגו כל בית ישראל להרבות בצדקה ובמעשים טובים ולעסוק במצות מראש השנה ועד יום הכפורים יתר מכל השנה. ונהגו כולם לקום בלילה בעשרה ימים אלו ולהתפלל בבתי כנסיות בדברי תחנונים ובכיבושין עד שיאור היום

(parenthetically, this rambam answers a question people always ask:  why do we act differently during aseres yemei hateshuva - isn't it just a game?  The answer is that we're trying to chap one more mitzvah, one more zechus, to save the world.  Do we appreciate that?  We should --  its not a joke).

This is hard to internalize - its quite harsh.  But with G-d's help, we should all merit to be a tzaddik yesod olam.

end of yom tov season

its always sad - though I dont know whether that stems from a reluctance to again face reality (bad) or something more genuine.

Over this sukkos, I theorized that the minhag to dance before the torah on simchas torah and the hakafos of simchas torah are in reality two separate minhagim - i believe this is meduyak in shulchan aruch and in the darchei moshe, and if you think about, theres one point which clinches this argument:  since when do you 'dance' with the torah by walking it around the bimah in a circle -- thats not dancing!

Hakafos, it is clear, stem from hoshanos - as we say in hakafos, ana hashem hoshia na...  We do hoshanos with lulav and esrog, and simcha is an inherent part of the daled minim (as per the pasuk usmachtem lifnei hashem shivas yomim).  While on rosh hashana and yom kippur, we cry out to g-d to save us out of yirah, in the hoshanos of sukkos, which culminate in the hoshanos / hakafos of simchas torah, we daven for hashem to save us with simcha. (I think the excessive emphasis on 'dancing' really takes away from this powerful point.)

G-d should grant us all meaningful and successful months ahead, and a speedy rebuilding of the beis hamkidash in our days.

Back to Mishkan, relationship to sukkos

Some while ago I wrote this piece about mishkan and the real machlokes between rashi an the ramban.  This is a short addendum to that connecting it to sukkos.

This also relates to my speech last year sukkos (here) about why sukkos is in tishrei and not in nissan.

I have a simple question:  we just had yom kippur 3 days ago. What do you think - did Hashem forgive us, or not forgive us?

People sometimes get so caught up in their personal sins / forgiveness, that they forget that yom kippur is equally (if not more) important as a day of atonement for klal yisrael as a whole.  So did Hashem forgive us, klal yisrael?  Did he, or did he not, say salachti kidvarecha as we prayed that he would at the very onset of yom kippur?

Well, on the one hand, there are so many midrashim about the confidence klal yisrael has going into din.  Lech echol bisimcha lachmecha - rejoice, for surely kvar ratza ha-elokim es maasecha.  But lets look again at the ramban from the mishkan piece above:

ואמר לכולם ענין המשכן אשר נצטוה בו מתחלה קודם שבור הלוחות, כי כיון שנתרצה להם הקב"ה ונתן לו הלוחות שניות וכרת עמו ברית חדשה שילך השם בקרבם, הנה חזרו לקדמותם ולאהבת כלולותם, ובידוע שתהיה שכינתו בתוכם כענין שצוהו תחלה, כמו שאמר (לעיל כה ח) ועשו לי מקדש ושכנתי בתוכם, ולכן צוה אותם משה עתה בכל מה שנצטוה מתחלה:

'Once Hashem forgave them, it is clear and obvious that his shechinah will again rest among them as originally intended, and thus Moshe immediately preceded to begin mileches hamishkan.'

If Hashem forgave us, then wouldn't we have a beis hamikdash?  After all, we believe that the reason we don't have a beis hamikdash is due to our sins - so if we have no sins, then where is our beis hamikdash?!

I believe this is a tremendous raayah to shittas rashi (again from the mishkan piece).  Yes, Hashem forgave us, and wasn't meifer his bris with us.  But that doesn't mean we're back to where we were before, with Hashem coming to be mashreh his shechinah amongst us with a beis hamikdash.  The fact that bnei yisrael were able to recover from cheit ha-egel to the extent that they were able to build the mishkan was special above and beyond ordinary teshuvah -- as rashi said, it was a special eidus that hashem truly forgave the cheit ha-egel.  We, li-daavoneinu, don't seem to be zocheh to this special kapparah.

Thinking in this way really transforms the way I view a large segment of the Jewish calendar.   (Just as a hakdamah, there is a machlokes in chazal how many times moshe went up to har sinai.  rashi says 3, but the ramban quotes a deah in chazal which the gra accepts as correct that moshe went up two times.  it doesn't fundamentally change what I'm about to say, but its definitely easier to assume like the gra.  So we will).

On the 17th of tammuz, bnei yisrael do the unthinkable and break the bris they made just a few weeks earlier at har sinai, and worship a golden calf.  Every year, shiva assar bitammuz heralds in a bad time for the Jewish people.  We go through a three weeks, culminating in tisha b'av, when bnei yisrael did cheit hameraglim (not the same year -but not important for now).  This three week period doesn't exist in isolation - it really is (unfortunately) the culmination of a year of sin, a year in which the beis hamikdash has not been rebuilt because of our aveiros.  And after such a year of sin, like klal yisrael in the midbar, we may very well (chas vishalom) deserve death.

Rosh Chodesh Elul: Moshe Rabbeinu goes up to har sinai to plead with Hashem for 40 days to spare the Jewish people.  And every year, on rosh chodesh elul, we begin with extra davening (and selichos for some) to also plead for our lives.  When Moshe goes up to har sinai, the kol shofar is heard: as the rambam writes: עורו ישינים משנתכם ונרדמים הקיצו מתרדמתכם וחפשו במעשיכם וחזרו בתשובה וזכרו בוראכם -the shofar was a wake up call:  Moshe is going to daven, but if the people don't do teshuvah, it will all be in vain.  We begin blowing the shofar on rosh chodesh elul, culminating in our tekios on rosh hashanah, for the same reason: we need to do teshuvah so that hashem wont destroy us after the year of sin and its culmination in the three weeks.

Yom Kippur: Hashem teaches Moshe the yud gimmel middos harachamim and grants atonement: salachti kidvarecha.  Every year, our selichos culminate in the selichos of neilah - kimo shehodata le-anav mikedem... We beg Hashem to remember the yud gimmel middos he taught Moshe Rabbeinu and to forgive us with them.

And here, as we mentioned, the parallel breaks.  If we had truly succeeded on yom kippur, we should have been zocheh to a beis hamikdash.  But we didn't  truly succeed - and that should leave us broken.  Is there any consolation, a small ray of light that we can cling to?

Thats where sukkos comes in.  The Gra explains that sukkos is in tishrei and not in nissan because it is a zecher to the return of the ananei hakavod after Hashem forgave us on yom kippur.   We don't have a mishkan / beis hamikdash.  But we do have the ananei hakavod - the sukkah in your backyard.

כֹּה אָמַר יְקֹוָק זָכַרְתִּי לָךְ חֶסֶד נְעוּרַיִךְ אַהֲבַת כְּלוּלֹתָיִךְ לֶכְתֵּךְ אַחֲרַי בַּמִּדְבָּר בְּאֶרֶץ לֹא זְרוּעָה - the mishkan is hashem's way of coming to live with the Jewish people - that we don't have.  So instead we say, "fine.  If Hashem won't come to live with us, we'll have to follow after him"  לֶכְתֵּךְ אַחֲרַי בַּמִּדְבָּר - we build a sukkah to go out and follow Hashem in the desert.  The return of the ananei hakavod after the cheit ha-egel is our ray of hope thats left with no beis hamikdash - it's Hashem's hand, beckoning us to follow after him.  He's not yet willing to come live with us, but he's not leaving us behind - he gives us the ananei hakavod so that we will follow after him, and one day,  catch up with him.   That day should come very soon.

Chag kasher visameach!

 

Misah and Misah bidei shamayim

There is a fascinating machlokes on the last pasuk of parshas bamidbar - The Ramban and the Behag use the pasuk in the minyan hamitzvos as a lav for stealing from the klei shares.  The Rambam, however, thinks the pasuk is only a "remez" to stealing klei shares, but in the minyan hamitzvos, there is no such lav:

ואף על פי שאמרו (סנה' פא ב) רמז לגונב את הקסוה לא יבואו לראות, ויש די ספוק באמרם רמז ושפשטיה דקרא אינו כן. ואינו גם כן מכלל מחוייבי מיתה בידי שמים כמו שהתבאר בתוספתא (זבחים ספי"ב וכריתות פ"א ה"ב) ובסנהדרין (פג א

The Rambam defends his claim that there is no full-fledged lav for stealing klei shares by noting that there is no official punishment / misah bidei shamayim for this action.  Were one to be chayav misah bidei shamayim, then for sure it would be a full fledged lav - with no such chiyuv, its entirely possible / very plausible that while of course it is prohibited to steal klei shares, it is not a lav in its own right.

The Ramban jumps on this Rambam:  what do you mean that theres no chiyuv misah bidei shamayim?  The mishnah in sanhedrin lists 3 cases that kanain pogin bo - and stealing klei shares is one of them!  The mishnayos which list those issurim which have a chiyuv misah bidei shamayim leave out stealing klei shares not because it is less chammur - but rather because it is more chammur:  the list only includes those prohibitions whose sole punishment is misah bidei shamayim, not those, like stealing klei shares, which have an additional punishment of kanain pogin bo.

In the above formulation, the Ramban (based on gemara sanhedrin 82b) makes a global claim:  Chiyuv misah bidei adam, in all its forms (beis din, kanain pogin bo, kipah, etc.) includes within itself chiyuv misah bidei shamayim.  More strongly formulated: chiyuv misah bidei adam is predicated on and justified solely by the fact that this person is chayav misah bidei shamayim.  Otherwise, what right would we have to kill him?

The Megillas Esther points out that the rambam, based on another opinion in the gemara, seems to hold almost the entirely opposite position:  To the contrary, if one is chayav misah bidei shamayim, then it would be redundant to also have them be chayav bidei adam - let Hashem take care of giving his promised misah bidei shamayim.  The only role of misah bidei adam is in a case where a person is NOT chayav misah bidei shamayim - that is where it is sometimes constructive to have misah bidei adam.

This might just be a cute cheshbon, but this could explain an interesting lashon of the rambam in the peirush hamishnayos.  Another of the three cases of kanain pogin bo is a boel aramis - in that case, the gemara limits the right of the kanain to kill the boel aramis to the shaas maaseh aveirah - once the aveirah is over, the kanain cannot kill him anymore.  Some acharonim believe that this limitation only applies to boel aramis -- but by stealing klei shares, one can kill the ganav even after he has finished the maaseh gneivah.  Why the difference?

The Rambam says in peirush hamishnayos:
ו] קסוה, כלי שרת נגזר מן קשות הנסך. ומקלל בקוסם, הוא שיברך השם בשם עבודה זרה. ובועל ארמית, הוא שיבעול בת עובדי עבודה זרה בפרהסיא בעשרה ישראל או יותר, ובשעת מעשה דוקא כמעשה פינחס, אבל אחר שפירש, או שלא היה בקהל מישראל, או שלא היתה עובדת עבודה זרה, אסור להרגו. אבל הוא מחוייב כרת על בת עובד עבודה זרה ואף על פי שלא נזכר בתורה ולא נמנה מכלל הכרתות, אלא שהוא קבלה. ונתפרש במקרא במה שנאמר ובעל בת אל נכר יכרת ה' לאיש אשר יעשנה וכו'.

If I am correct, the rambam is saying the following:  By boel aramis, you cant kill him once the maaseh aveirah is finished because now he is chayav kares / misah bidei shamayim - and that we leave to Hashem to fulfill.  In the other cases, however, even after the maaseh aveirah, the person is not chayav misah bidei shamayim - therefore the kanain can still kill the avaryan. (the diyuk is better in the translations in the back of the gemara)

I think this machlokes Rambam / Ramban plays out lishitasam in a few other places:

In parshas lech lecha, the Ramban famously disagrees with the Rambam and says that if a navi prophesies that someone deserves to die, it is a mitzvah to kill them.  The Rambam, on the other hand, thinks that you're chayav misah if you kill someone due to such a nevuah.  The Ramban, lishitaso, thinks misah bidei adam is a function of misah bidei shamayim - if Hashem wants a person dead, as evidenced by nevuah, then that "chiyuv misah bidei shamayim" translates into a hetter of misah bidei adam.  But the Rambam thinks that misah bidei shamayim and misah bidei adam are two disjoint concepts - one does not lead to the other - so why should this prophecy translate into a misah bidei adam - if hashem wants to kill this guy, let Hashem kill him.

There is a famous din by eidim zomimin of kaasher zamam vilo kaasher asah.  That is, if witnesses perjure in an attempt to have someone executed by the courts and get found out before the guy is executed, then they themselves are killed.  After the fact, however, they're let off the hook.  The Ramban has a very fascinating explanation for why this should be:  Bikerev elokim yishpot - Hashem steers the hands of the sanhedrin - if the witnesses were found false before the execution of their victim, thats because Hashem is trying to save the innocent victim - therefore the 2 witnesses are guilty and liable to the death penalty.  If however, Hashem allowed the execution of the 'victim' to go through, it must be because the 'victim' wasn't really so innocent after all, and therefore the eidim did not kill an innocent man and are let off the hook.  This assumes the Ramban's shittah about the nature of chiyuv misah bidei adam- namely, that it is predicated on and built off misah bidei shamayim.  This does not even get off the ground, however, in the Rambam's opinion (and indeed, if I recall correctly, when the kesef mishnah tries to explain the rationale of kaasher zamam in the Rambam, he does not even mention shittas haramban.)

I don't know where exactly to go with this machlokes, but at least I'll end with the following observation. How does the Rambam answer the strong kashya of the Ramban: what could be the mechayev / justification to give misah bidei adam if not misah bidei shamayim?  I think the point is that when we seek justice here in this world, we don't attempt to play G-d - we can't know what G-d knows or take his global perspective in our justice system.  Misah bidei shamayim, we leave to shamayim.  What we can do is din bidei adam - and as long as we use the dinei hatorah to implement our dinei adam, then our din will also ultimately reach the level of being a true din tzedek.

behar -- liolam bahem taavodu

I've been a little stressed recently, so no write.  This also isn't really anything special - but maybe food for thought.

There is a mitzvah in this weeks parsha,  liolam bahem taavodu:

והמצוה הרל"ה היא שצונו בדין עבד כנעני. והוא שנעבוד בו לעולם ושאין לו חירות אלא בשן ועין. והוא הדין לשאר ראשי אברים שאינם חוזרים כמו שבא בו (שם כד ב מכיל') הפירוש המקובל. והוא אמרו יתעלה (ס"פ בהר) לעולם בהם תעבודו ואמר (משפטי' כא) וכי יכה איש וכו'. ולשון גמר גיטין (לח א) כל המשחרר עבדו עובר בעשה דכתיב לעולם בהם תעבודו.
(Rambam, mitzvah 235)

There is a machlokes in the rishonim with regards to the taam hamitzvah.  The Ramban in gittin (38b) writes that it really is just an extension of li sichanem.  Were you to be meshachrer the eved, however, for the purpose of making a minyan, thats not a matnas chinam and hence is completely muttar.  (See the rashba there, however, for the difficulties in this approach, and the maggid mishnah avadim 9:6)

 the sefer hachinuch has quite a different way of understanding it:

משרשי המצוה, לפי שעם ישראל הם מבחר המין האנושי ונבראו להכיר בוראם ולעבוד לפניו, וראויים להיות להם עבדים לשמש אותם, ואם אין להם עבדים מן האומות, עכ"פ יצטרכו להשתעבד באחיהם ולא יוכלו להשתדל בעבודתו ברוך הוא, על כן נצטוינו להחזיק באלו לתשמישנו אחר שהוכשרו ונעקרה עבודה זרה מפיהם ולא יהיו למוקש בבתינו.
...
  ומהיות יסוד המצוה כדי שירבו בני אדם בעבודת בוראם ברוך הוא, התירו חכמים זכרונם לברכה לעבור על מצוה זו בכל עת שביטול מצוה זו יהיה גורם למצוה אחרת, ואפילו בשביל מצוה דרבנן אם היא מצוה דרבים, כגון שלא היו עשרה בבית הכנסת וצריכין לשחרר העבד ולהשלים המנין. ואל יקשה עליך, ואיך נדחה מצות עשה זו דאורייתא בשביל מצוה דרבנן, כי מפני שיסוד המצוה אינו אלא כדי להרבות עבודתו ברוך הוא, אחר שבשחרורו עכשיו נעשית מצוה, ועוד שגם הוא מתרבה בגופו במצוות שלא היה חייב קודם השחרור, בין זה וזה אמרו זכרונם לברכה שמותר לשחררו, שכן קיבלו הענין.

For the sefer hachinuch, the mitzvah stems not out of a prohibition of giving a matnas chinam, but rather, out of the broader perspective of G-d's greater plan.  (This approach neatly avoids the questions of the rashba and maggid mishnah on the Ramban, ayen sham).

Please forgive my modern sentiments, but what type of rationale is that for keeping people forever enslaved?

To strengthen the question, the Rambam emphasizes in various places how the torah is very makpid that we should have rachmanus on our avadim.  Particularly in the moreh this clash becomes very ironic:

וכן כל המצות אשר ספרנום בהלכות עבדים כולם חמלה רחמנות וחנינה לאביונים, ומרוב הרחמנות יציאת עבד כנעני חפשי בחסרון אחד מאבריו, שלא יתחברו בו העבדות והבטול ואפילו בהפלת שן כ"ש על זולת מהאברים,

So if the torah has such a rachmanus on the avadim that they immediately go free upon hakaas shein vi-ayen, then why did the torah insist that they cannot go free otherwise?  Shouldn't this rachamanus carry over to at least allow a master to free his avadim if he so chooses?

Whether or not I have a good answer to this, kabalah hi u-nikabel.  But I thought maybe this twist might help explain it.

The torah emphasizes one theme again and again, throughout parshas behar:  ki avadai heim - avdus isnt tofes on bnei yisrael because we already are avadim - shtari kodem, Hashem's claim on us is first.  You have to free an eved ivri by yovel - ki avadai hem.  You can't work him with avodas perech - ki avadai hem.  There is no reference to a right to be free or anything of the sort.  Who made up such a thing?  The reason why we cannot enslave bnei yisrael is solely because bnei yisrael already belong to another master.

Its nothing against the eved that we can't free him.  But unlike by bnei yisrael, this eved has no shtar kodem - mimeila, his avdus is liolam.

The take-away message, then, is that if we neglect to fulfill our obligations in our shtar to Hashem, we c''v open the door for a new shtar which we don't like.  On the positive side, if we fulfill our obligations to G-d, then no new claims can take effect against us.

Shavua tov!

pesach-- sippur and zechira take 3 - seriously updated version

long time no write, due to a combination of busyness and writers block.

But the pressure is on.  I think I'm speaking again over pesach, so b''h I'm forced to come up with something.

Last year I wrote about R' Chaim's distinction between zechiras yetzias mitzraim and sippur yetzias miztraim.  After further reflection, I think we need to go back to the drawing board.  Allow me to begin by re-formulating a quick summary of R' Chaim's key ideas.

There are two principle questions R Chaim deals with:

1.  If there is an obligation min hatorah to remember yetzias mitzraim every morning and every night, why is that obligation not listed as one of the taryag mitzvos?
2.  The obligation to discuss yetzias mitzraim bi-leil haseder is one of the taryag mitzvos - but why do we need such an obligation if we already are obligated to discuss yetzias mitzraim every night of the year?

R Chaim explains that there is a fundamental distinction between the zechiras yetzias mitzraim of the rest of the year and the sippur yetzias mitzraim of leil haseder.  Zechirah isn't about remembering yetzias mitzraim qua the event itself - notice that we do zechiras yetzias mitzraim in krias shema, as part of kabbalas ol malchus shamayim.  There is a din that the tzurah of kabbalas ol malchus shamayim must be through remembering that hashem was koneh us as avadim when he freed us from Egypt, but the zechirah isn't a mitzvah in and of itself.  Thus it isn't included in the taryag - its nichlal in mitzvas krias shema / kabbalas ol malchus shamayim.

This allows us to understand how zechira is fundamentally different from sippur.  Sippur bilel haseder is to remember the event of the exodus qua the event itself - the mitzvah is to re-live and re-experience the entire saga of yetzias mitzraim.  This distinction, claims R Chaim leads to several halacha limaaseh differences between sippur and zechira:
       a. zechira is only mechayev a hazkarah kol dihu - a brief mention of yetzias mitzraim.  sippur requires a more detailed explanation of the "nissim viniflaos shenaasu lavoseinu bimitzraim".
      b.  every night, the mitzvah is to talk to oneself.  on leil haseder, we have a din of vihigadta libincha - to tell the story to others.
     c.  the mitzvah every other night is just to remember.  tonight, the mitzvah to say hallel/shirah is part of the mitzvah of sippur yetzias mitzraim.

Again, all these differences arise, according to R Chaim, because tonight we don't just remember yetzias mitzraim as part of kabbalas ol malchus shamayim - we re-live the experience.

Last yr, I attacked this R' Chaim.  I retract the attack as a hasaga.  I think R' Chaim is the correct pshat in the Rambam.  What was correct in my hasaga is that the Rambam is a daas yachid (kidarko bakodesh). Most Rishonim, however, disagree with the distinction he makes.  (See last yrs article for the list of questions on R Chaim's mehalech).

One of the big questions that we grappled with last year was that when the Ramban lists all the mitzvos that we do as a zecher leyetzias mitzraim, he leaves out the one we would have put first: sippur yetzias mitzraim.

I think we can understand this better by looking at the Rambam's formulation and derivation of the mitzvah of sippur yetzias mitzraim:

מצות עשה של תורה לספר בנסים ונפלאות שנעשו לאבותינו במצרים בליל חמשה עשר בניסן שנאמר זכור את היום הזה אשר יצאתם ממצרים כמו שנאמר זכור את יום השבת. ומנין שבליל חמשה עשר תלמוד לומר והגדת לבנך ביום ההוא לאמר בעבור זה בשעה שיש מצה ומרור מונחים לפניך. ואף על פי שאין לו בן. אפילו חכמים גדולים חייבים לספר ביציאת מצרים וכל המאריך בדברים שאירעו ושהיו הרי זה משובח:

The Rambam connects the mitzvos of sippur yetzias mitzraim and kiddush on shabbos - in both places the torah uses the word zachor, and in both places, the word zachor means to verbalize and discuss something - by shabbos, it is the kedushas hayom of shabbos, and by pesach, it is the story of our slavery and subsequent redemption.

Moreover, just like by the case of shabbos, the zachor commandment is fulfilled on shabbos itself, so too by the zachor of pesach, the commandment is fulfilled on pesach itself.

Whats very interesting, then, is that the Ramban disagrees with the Rambam with regards to the zachor of shabbos.  Of course, part of what it means is the kiddush we make on shabbos itself.  But the Ramban (al hatorah in the aseres hadibros) claims that the zachor of shabbos applies as much during the week as it does on shabbos itself:

שהיא מצוה שנזכור תמיד בכל יום את השבת שלא נשכחהו ולא יתחלף לנו בשאר הימים, כי בזכרנו אותו תמיד יזכור מעשה בראשית בכל עת, ונודה בכל עת שיש לעולם בורא, והוא צוה אותנו באות הזה כמו שאמר (להלן לא יג) כי אות היא ביני וביניכם. וזה עיקר גדול באמונת האל:

So I don't think its a big stretch at all to make a lishitasam here:  The same way the Ramban extends the zachor of shabbos past shabbos itself, he would similarly extend the zachor of pesach: while of course it has a special role on leil haseder, it really is a mitzvah that applies all year round - sippur yetzias mitzraim and zechiras yetzias mitzraim are really all part of one mitzvah (against R' Chaim).  That would explain Rashi's comment on the pasuk of zachor: זכור את היום הזה - למד שמזכירין יציאת מצרים בכל יום.   (And thats why sippur didn't make it to the Ramban's list; its already there in the guise of zechiras yetzias mitzraim.)

Someone showed me a Ramban this morning that I thought contradicted the above, but it really doesn't.  The Ramban claims that the Rambam is incorrect in leaving out the mitzvah of birchas hatorah from the minyan hamitzvos.  Says the Ramban:  Just like mikra bikkurim and bikkurim itself are counted as two mitzvos, and just like sippur yetzias mitzraim and korban pesach are counted as two mitzvos, so too birchas hatorah and limmud hatorah should be counted as two separate mitzvos.

As a parenthetical note, I believe this Ramban offers a new approach to understanding why no bracha is recited on the haggada - everyone loves making up answers to this question but this seems to actually be a good one.  But does this contradict what we said by implying that sippur yetzias mitzraim is limited to a type of "mikra korban pesach"?

No.  Just like by zachor es yom hashabbos, the mitzvah is multi-faceted.  A major facet of the mitzvah is obviously its role in the seder - no one is trying to deny that.  But whats important is that the mitzvos of the seder don't stop at the seder.  They extend all year long, every day, 24/7.  We conclude then, with the following:

בכל דור ודור חייב אדם להראות את עצמו כאילו הוא בעצמו יצא עתה משעבוד מצרים שנאמר +דברים ו'+ ואותנו הוציא משם וגו', ועל דבר זה צוה הקב"ה בתורה +דברים ה'+ וזכרת כי עבד היית כלומר כאילו אתה בעצמך היית עבד ויצאת לחירות ונפדית.

Look at the 2 proof pesukim the rambam quoted to demonstrate this halacha that bileil haseder, one should feel as if he himself went out of mitzraim.   the first one, which is from the gemara, makes sense.  its one of the pesukim in the answer to the question of the ben hachacham - the pasuk is in the context of the mitvzah of sippur yetzias mitzraim, and in that context, the father talks about him himself going out of mitzraim, even if this father is from later generations.

but in quoting that second pasuk (which the gemara does not mention to my limited knowledge), the rambam is saying a tremendous chiddush.  the phrase vizacharta ki eved hayisa  comes up a few times in chumash, so its not clear exactly which one the rambam is referring to.  but I dont think it comes up in the context of sippur yetzias mitzraim.  in the aseres hadibros, it comes up when hashem commands us about shabbos.  in parshas reeh, it comes up when hashem commands us about haanaka (you have to send an eved ivri off with presents), and also during the discussion of shavuos.  in ki seitzei, it comes up by the prohibition to pervert justice against widows and orphans; a few pesukim later, the phrase is used in context of the command to leave peah.  so if you're trying to prove to me that there is a chiyuv on leil haseder to feel like i left mitzraim, how did you prove it by quoting a pasuk that has nothing to do with leil haseder?

Obviously, the mitzvah to feel like we left mitzraim right now - even the mitzvah of leil haseder -- is not limited to leil haseder - rather, we're supposed to feel that way the entire year, when we're keeping shabbos, leaving peah, pursuing justice, etc.

Allow me to ask a klutz kashya:  If leil haseder is the ultimate time of cheirus, then tisha b'av is its complete antithesis - zman galuseinu, one might say.  This contrast is recognized in the kinnos - one of the most famous kinnos contrasts the glory and grandeur of "bitzeisi mi-mitzraim" to the degradation and lowliness of "bitzeisi mi-yerushalayim".   So I ask you:  I understand the phrase "bitzeisi mi-mitzraim" - there is a halacha that we all must feel as if we ourselves left Egypt.  But "bitzeisi mi-yerushalayim" - my ancestors were exiled from Yerushalaim 2000 years ago - was I there?

 It is clear to me that the halacha to feel as if one left Egypt is not limited solely to that event.  Because the mitzvah isn't to make believe and pretend for a night that I was there when bnei yisrael left Egypt.  That's just stupidity.  It's not, as R Chaim would (might) have it, an experiential mitzvah, but rather, an identification mitzvah.  There is no us vs them when it comes to our ancestors.  Its all about the we - if we identify with klal yisrael, then we're all one -- past, present, and future Jews --  and mimeila, we feel that whatever happened to our ancestors (yetzias mitzraim), happened to us. We were there every step of the way through Jewish history -- through the highs of yetzias mitzraim and the lows of yetzias yerushalayim -- we carry the burden, the torch of Jewish history, and we can identify with it personally because it happened to our people - that is, to us.

The worst sin, the greatest crime,  that a person can do on leil haseder is mefurash in the haggada - and its not the multiple possible chiyuvei kares that involve chametz or the korban pesach.

רשע מה הוא אומר:  מה העבודה הזאת לכם, לכם ולא לו, ולפי שהוציא את עצמו מן הכלל כפר בעיקר

Leil Haseder revolves around identifying with klal yisrael - thats the only way to fulfill the mitzvah of feeling as if you yourself left Egypt.  A person who comes and separates himself -- לכם ולא לו -- he has no place at leil haseder.

The mitzvos of leil haseder cant be limited to leil haseder - one's identity of self does not go through a magical metamorphosis for a day and then revert back to a normal - thats a big joke!  We identify constantly with yetzias mitzraim - we remember that we were there from the beginning, at the formative experience in the creation of our nation, and mimeila, we were there throughout the rest.  Please G-d we should all merit to identify with the mitzvos haseder and through them, with all of klal yisrael.

purim -- derabanan or deoraysa?

This is a little late, but better late than never.

I think there is a fascinating machlokes about this topic.

First, an explanation of the question:  I'm less concerned with whether megillah is treated in halacha as deoraysa or drabanan and more with the origins of the mitzvah of megillah - did it begin as a takana drabanan or is megillah a tzivuy hashem.

I think everyone would probably assume that the former option is correct.  But the Ramban assumes otherwise.  Take a look at this ramban al hatorah (devarim 4):

ולפי דעתי אפילו בדא לעשות מצוה בפני עצמה כגון שעשה חג בחדש שבדא מלבו כירבעם (מ"א יב לג), עובר בלאו. וכך אמרו (מגילה יד א) לענין מקרא מגלה, מאה ושמונים נביאים עמדו להם לישראל ולא פחתו ולא הוסיפו על מה שכתוב בתורה אפילו אות אחת חוץ ממקרא מגילה מאי דרוש וכו'. ובירושלמי (מגילה פ"א ה"ה) שמונים וחמשה זקנים ומהם כמה נביאים היו מצטערים על הדבר, אמרו כתוב אלה המצות אשר צוה ה' את משה, אלו המצות שנצטוו מפי משה, כך אמר לנו משה ואין נביא אחר עתיד לחדש דבר לכם, ומרדכי ואסתר רוצים לחדש לנו דבר, לא זזו משם נושאין ונותנין בדבר עד שהאיר הקב"ה עיניהם וכו'. הרי שהיתה המצוה הזו אסורה להם, א"כ היא בכלל לא תוסיף עליו, אלא שלא למדנו למוסיף על פי נביא אלא מן הכתוב שאמר "אלה המצות" אין נביא רשאי לחדש בו דבר מעתה. ומה שתקנו חכמים משום גדר, כגון שניות לעריות וכיוצא בהן, זו היא מצוה מן התורה, ובלבד שידע שהם משום הגדר הזה ואינן מפי הקב"ה בתורה:

To summarize:  The Ramban quotes from chazal that when the idea of mikra megillah as a mitzvah ledoros was initially proposed, the chachamim at the time were very disturbed by the notion of adding a mitzvah ledoros to the torah.   They felt, claims the Ramban, that to add a new mitzvah to the torah of mikra megillah would be a violation of baal tosif.  Asks the Ramban, if the issur that chazal were worried about was the issur of baal tosif, then why did chazal not quote the pesukim of baal tosif, and instead quote a derasha of  אלה המצות אשר צוה ה' את משה to teach that אין נביא אחר עתיד לחדש דבר לכם.  Explains the Ramban:  While baal tosif does assur adding new mitzvos to the torah, you might have thought that this prohibition does not apply when the new mitzvah is being added through nevuah, because there Hashem is commanding you to add this new mitzvah!  Comes אלה המצות and teaches you that even then, we don't believe the navi and disallow adding a mitzvah to the torah (midin baal tosif).  The Ramban is clearly assuming, then, that mikra megillah was commanded al pi navi.  (So why was mikra megillah allowed to be added in the end -- we'll get it to it).

The Ramban goes further in parshas re'eh by the parsha of navi sheker (devarim 13):

ונראה, שאם יתנבא בשם ה' לצוות מצוה שיחדש, כגון שהיה במקרא מגלה (מגילה יד א), שאינו חייב מיתה, אלא שאין לנו לשמוע אליו, דכתיב אלה המצות (ויקרא כז לד) אין נביא רשאי לחדש בהם דבר מעתה. ואולי כיון שלא נאמין לו הנה הוא נביא השקר, ומיתתו בחנק:

Again:  Chazal's initial reaction to mikra megillah was that it would be a violation of אלה המצות אשר צוה ה' את משה to add it to the torah.  This assumption was so strong that if not ultimately found to be false, Mordechai and Esther might have have been put to death midin navi sheker.  This obviously assumes that the origin of mikra megillah is deoraysa in nature- Hashem directly commanded us to read the megillah on purim as a mitzvah ledoros.

The Rambam disagrees with the Ramban, and claims that mikra megillah is only derabanan in nature:

ויש מצוות אחרות שנתחדשו אחר מתן תורה וקבעו אותן נביאים וחכמים ופשטו בכל ישראל כגון מקרא מגלה ונר חנוכה ותענית תשעה באב וידים ועירובין. ויש לכל מצוה מאלו פירושין ודקדוקין. והכל יתבאר בחבור זה: כל אלו המצוות שנתחדשו חייבין אנו לקבלם ולשמרם שנ' לא תסור מכל הדבר וכו', ואינם תוספת על מצוות התורה. ועל מה הזהירה תורה לא תוסף ולא תגרע, שלא יהיה נביא רשאי לחדש דבר ולומר שהקב"ה צוהו במצוה זו להוסיפה למצוות התורה או לחסר אחת מאלו השש מאות ושלש עשרה מצוות: אבל אם הוסיפו בית דין עם נביא שיהיה באותו הזמן מצוה דרך תקנה או דרך הוראה או דרך גזרה אין זו תוספת שהרי לא אמרו שהקב"ה צוה לעשות ערוב או לקרות המגלה בעונתה, ואילו אמרו כן היו מוסיפין על התורה: אלא כך אנו אומרין, שהנביאים עם בית דין תקנו וצוו לקרות המגלה בעונתה כדי להזכיר שבחיו של הקב"ה ותשועות שעשה לנו והיה קרוב לשועינו, כדי לברכו ולהללו וכדי להודיע לדורות הבאים שאמת מה שהבטיחנו בתורה כי מי גוי גדול אשר לו אלהים קרובים אליו כי"י אלהינו בכל קראנו אליו. ועל דרך זו היא כל מצוה ומצוה שהיא מדברי סופרים בין עשה בין לא תעשה:

But while the Rambam may on the surface seem to be the simpler understanding, the truth is that in fact this is very problematic.  Recall the maamarei chazal brought by the ramban where it was clear that chazal originally thought that to establish the mitzvah of mikra megillah would be a violation of baal tosif.  This is easy to understand according to the ramban: Mordechai and Esther were trying to add a mitzvah deoraysa to the torah – something that is clearly not allowed midin אלה המצות אשר צוה ה' את משה.  Thus, they faced a potential violation of baal tosif.  But according to the rambam, Mordechai and Esther were just trying to establish a mitzvah drabanan – something which chazal have the right to do based on the pseukim in parshas shoftim (lo tassur).  Why would anyone think that that would be a violation of bal tosif?

Comes the Rambam and says a tremendous chiddush:  Really, all drabanans should be a violation of bal tosif.  Why should that be?  Shouldn’t we say that the same Torah which assured bal tosif also allowed chazal to make takanos, and thus clearly the torah does not consider said takanos to be a violation of bal tosif.

The Rashba says exactly that sevara, and I’m sure the Ramban would say it as well.  My Rebbe, R’ Twersky, asked this question, and I wrote up a piece about his answer here.  But hopefully we’ll do it better now.

Lets leave that for a second.  There is a machlokes between the Rambam and the Ramban in sefer Hamitzvos that connects to this machlokes about whether megillah is deoraysa or drabanan.  The Rambam attacks the Behag, who counts mikra megillah as one of the taryag mitzvos.  After all, says the Rambam, the taryag mitzvos are described in chazal as "nitnu limoshe misinai" - does anyone think that Hashem commanded Moshe about the din of mikra megillah that will be instituted thousands of years later?  The Rambam claims that to believe that would be ridiculous.

But the Ramban (in his hasagos to shoresh 1) bites the bullet, citing the following yerushalmi:

  רב ור' חנינה ור' יונתן ובר קפרא ור' יהושע בן לוי אמרו המגילה הזאת נאמרה למשה מסיני אלא שאין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה

  Yes, Hashem did already tell Moshe about mikra megillah.  Lishitaso, this must be the case, because that is the only reason why mordechai and esther's new mitzvah wasn't a violation of  אלה המצות אשר צוה ה' את משה - mikra megillah was already given to moshe!

I looked up the yerushalmi cited above, and it is no coincidence that it is immediately preceded by the yerushalmi which had chazal attacking mordechai and esther for violating אלה המצות אשר צוה ה' את משה.  The Ramban reads these 2 gemaras as being 2 sides of the same coin: Because mikra megillah was already given to moshe, it was not a violation of eleh hamitzvos / baal tosif for a later navi to come along and teach us that Hashem wants us to institute a "new" mitzvah lidoros of mikra megillah.

 

But all this gives us another question on the Rambam:  If the gemara’s answer as to why mikra megillah isn’t baal tosif is that it was already nitna limoshe misinai, how can the Rambam come along and claim that to believe such an idea would be “ridiculous”.  Is he arguing on chazal?  How does he answer why mikra megillah isn’t a violation of baal tosif, then?

It is now appropriate to cite some relevant sections of the previous piece on this topic:

“The answer [to our first question] lies in the rambam's formulation of the ninth ikkar emunah: ויסוד התשיעי הבטול. והוא שזו תורת משה לא תבטל, ולא תבוא תורה מאת ה' זולתה, ולא יתוסף בה ולא יגרע ממנה לא בכתוב ולא בפירוש, אמר לא תוסף עליו ולא תגרע ממנו.
 The source of the ikkar emunah that the torah won't change is the mitvah of bal tosif and bal tigra.  What this means is that bal tosif and bal tigra are much more than just technical mitzvos - but rather, they frame the Jewish worldview by being part of our ikkarei emunah - our principles of faith.
 Its not just a plain old issur to add to the torah - to add to the torah reflects heresy.   Part of our faith is that G-d gave us a perfect Torah.  Perfect means that it doesn't need improvement, it doesn't need the Christians, or Muslims, or anyone else, to come along and make changes and "refine" it.  To add to the torah is to deny its, and in a sense, G-d's perfection, by implying that the torah needs your human input to be better / complete.
 If bal tosif were a regular issur, our comparison to shechita on shabbos would hold.  Just like we said by shechita, we would say the torah can make exceptions to the rules it itself made (and allow chazal to be mosif al hatorah).  But bal tosif is an idea - the torah is perfect and cannot be added to.  If thats true, what room is there for chazal to add to / improve upon the torah?  Doesn't the torah itself imply that it is not perfect since it leaves room for chazal to add to the torah - but that can't be?”

How does the Rambam, then, answer why all drabanans are not baal tosif? Again I quote:

With this perspective, we look at the Rambam's answer in an entirely new light.  The hashkafic drush now becomes an integral part of the point the rambam is driving out.  Says the rambam, chazal's license to enact new legislation doesn't violate the perfection of the torah as long as chazal recognize their limits - if they try to pass off their new law as a deoraysa, that reflects that they think the torah is imperfect - it needs their addition to be complete, which would be heretical.  What chazal can do, however, is enact a law to apply the eternal, non-changing values of the torah to the new situations and circumstances of today.  Thus, an enactment of chazal is not a violation of bal tosif if 1) chazal don't pass it off as deoraysa and (perhaps even more importantly) 2) the legistlation is a 'kiyum deoraysa' - it is an application of Torah values to new circumstances / realities.  Mikra megillah isnt bal tosif because it reflects a value in the torah itself - to recognize the truth of the pasuk כי מי גוי גדול אשר לו אלהים קרובים אליו כי"י אלהינו בכל קראנו אליו.  Thus, all chazal did when they legislated mikra megillah was to apply the values of the torah to the new historical reality of purim.  That is the role G-d gave chachamim, and that doesn't conflict with the Torah's perfection. ועל דרך זו היא כל מצוה ומצוה שהיא מדברי סופרים בין עשה בין לא תעשה

When the Rambam saw the Ramban’s yerushalmi about the megillah being nitna limoshe misinai, the Rambam saw his own answer in the yerushalmi!  It doesn’t mean that the megillah was literally given to Moshe; that, the Rambam thinks, would be ridiculous. Instead, it reflects that the ideals and values expressed in krias hamegillah are deoraysa values – they are rooted in the torah that was nitna limoshe misinai.

The machlokes Rambam / Ramban extends to the next yerushalmi there:

 ר' יוחנן ורשב"ל ר' יוחנן אמר הנביאים והכתובים עתידין ליבטל וחמשת סיפרי תורה אינן עתידין ליבטל מה טעמא [דברים ה יט] קול גדול ולא יסף רשב"ל אמר אף מגילת אסתר והלכות אינן עתידין ליבטל נאמר כאן קול גדול ולא יסף ונאמר להלן [אסתר ט כח] וזכרם לא יסוף מזרעם

For the Ramban, this mean the following: Megillas Esther, unlike all the rest of Nach, will never lose its status as kisvei hakodesh, and its story will never be forgotten, because it is part of a mitzvah deoraysa - it is part of the torah shebaal peh that was nitna limoshe misinai - just like the rest of the torah that was given at sinai is eternal, so too mikra megillah is eternal and will never be battel.  If Mikra megillah were to be drabanan, then this statement of chazal would clearly not hold (according to the Ramban).

But while the Rambam clearly does not buy in whatsoever to shittas haramban, he does quote this last part of the yerushalmi:

כל ספרי הנביאים וכל הכתובים עתידין ליבטל לימות המשיח חוץ ממגילת אסתר והרי היא קיימת כחמשה חומשי תורה וכהלכות של תורה שבעל פה שאינן בטלין לעולם. ואע"פ שכל זכרון הצרות יבטל שנאמר כי נשכחו הצרות הראשונות וכי נסתרו מעיני. ימי הפורים לא יבטלו שנאמר וימי הפורים האלה לא יעברו מתוך היהודים וזכרם לא יסוף מזרעם

For the Rambam, this is expressing a very powerful idea.  Megillah is only derabanan, and by all logic it should therefore be battel – especially according to the Rambam who limits drabanans more than all the other rishonim with his baal tosif – what room is there for a permanent addition to the torah if the torah is really perfect?  But that’s exactly the point.  Because every drabanan, and mikra megillah in particular, express a kiyum deoraysa, even the actions and ideas that we add to the torah can become a permanent part of the torah itself, as long as we are rooted 100% in torah principles.  Halevai we should all be zocheh!

purim

I have to do teshuvah from my ridiculous dvar torah for purim last year, so hopefully this will be better.  I'm still looking for help with this, so any ideas would be really appreciated. I prefer, at least for now, to keep the harsh rhetoric down a level or two, so lets keep it nice.  Thank you.

There are a few questions I had in the rambam concerning purim.

1.  The Rambam names theses halachos hilchos megillah vichanukah - why not hilchos purim vichanuka?  Wouldn't that make more sense, especially given the parallel with chanukah?

2.  The Rambam, in the koteres, says that hilchos megillah vichanukah contains two mitzvos midivrei sofrim.  Presumably, these two mitzvos are mikrah megillah and ner chanukah.  What about the other mitzvos of purim, i.e. mishloach manos, matanos laevyonim, the seudah.  Aren't they also mitzvos midivrei sofrim included in these halachos and therefore they should also be counted in the koteres?

3.  Why don't we make a bracha on the other mitzvos of purim?  Maybe you can kvetch and get out of a birchas hamitzvah on mishloach manos and matanos laevyonim, but you still have to deal with shehechiyanu (and yes, I know that you're supposed to have in mind the other mitzvos of the day when you say shehechiyanu on purim day, but that doesn't answer the question.)

4. The hagahos maymonios brings down from Rav Amram Gaon that one should not say al hanissim in maariv on purim night, because at that point we have not yet lained megillah.  On this the hagahos maymonios asks, why is purim different than any other yom tov, where you say yaaleh viyavo at night even if you havent yet had the seder/ shaken lulav / been mekadesh the chodesh.  The very day of purim is mechayev in al hanissim, so what difference does it make if we have not yet read the megillah.  Can we answer this question?

From all the above, it seems clear that there is really only 1 mitzvah on purim  - and that is megillah.  Everything else - mishloach manos, matanos laevyonim, seudah, and even the entire "kedushas hayom" of purim itself (al hanissim), all stem only from the chiyuv of megillah.

Lets switch focus for a second.  We know that simcha on purim is elevated to an extreme.  And I quote the famous rambam:

...מצות יום י"ד לבני כפרים ועיירות ויום ט"ו לבני כרכים להיותן יום שמחה ומשתה ומשלוח מנות לריעים ומתנות לאביונים.
כיצד חובת סעודה זו שיאכל בשר ויתקן סעודה נאה כפי אשר תמצא ידו. ושותה יין עד שישתכר וירדם בשכרותו.

So a very chashuv person brought to my attention the following question (its well known, but somehow he put a fresh perspective on it that helped me to understand):  There is a stark contrast between the rambam's description of simchah in hilchos lulav and hilchos megillah.  In hilchos lulav, the rambam emphasizes how simcha ba-avodas hashem is "avodah gedolah hi".  Not everyone who wants to participate in this simcha is rauy to do so:

מצוה להרבות בשמחה זו. ולא היו עושין אותה עמי הארץ וכל מי שירצה. אלא גדולי חכמי ישראל וראשי הישיבות והסנהדרין והחסידים והזקנים ואנשי מעשה הם שהיו מרקדין ומספקין ומנגנין ומשמחין במקדש בימי חג הסוכות. אבל כל העם האנשים והנשים כולן באין לראות ולשמוע:

So how can it be that comes purim, and all of a sudden every Tom Dick and Harry is rauy to be misameach and drink until he doesn't know the difference between arur haman and baruch mordechai?  Something just doesn't add up.

It must be that the source of our simcha on yom tov is very different from the source of our simcha on purim. There is more to say about this, but the simcha of yom tov is the simcha in " עשיית המצוה ובאהבת האל שצוה בהן"  - its the simcha that we have taken our lives and transformed them into something meaningful through torah and mitzvos.  Thats not a simcha that anyone can just wake up one day and experience.  Its a simcha that requires years, and really, a full lifetime of effort to be able to truly appreciate - only the true gedolei yisrael can dance at the simchas beis hashoevah.  The rest of us watch the dancing, aspiring to one day have an inkling of what it means to feel a true simcha in עשיית המצוה ובאהבת האל.

What is the simcha of purim?  On purim, klal yisrael faced an existential threat to our existence - we really thought that we were all going to die.  And unfortunately thats what it took, but it brought us all together.  We gathered as one - lech kenos es kol hayehudim - and we begged G-d to spare us.  And G-d answered our prayers, and vinahafoch hu - everything turned upside down, and we were saved.  What a simcha - to appreciate the life that Hashem has given us - to appreciate our fellow Jews, to all come together and rejoice in our salvation -- its really a tremendous simcha.

Its a simcha that, by definition, cannot be limited to only gedolim or yechidei segulah - because its all about achdus and appreciation of all that G-d has given to each and every one of us.  Every year, we come together and we relive our shared history: the mitzvah isn't to simply read the megillah - its to relive it.  As explained above, megillah is the only mitzvas hayom - we relive the story, and mimeila we come together again with mishloach manos, matanos laevyonim, and a joyous seudah.

Don't get me wrong - seudas purim is an integral part of the day, and it is a joyous and (slightly) over the top experience.  But purim is NOT chas vishalom about simcha shel הוללות (the way a certain talmid chacham described it, hashem yerachem.)   It is a simcha because we are so thankful for just our lives, our families, our friends.  The Rambam's penultimate halacha in hilchos megillah almost follows automatically:

מוטב לאדם להרבות במתנות אביונים מלהרבות בסעודתו ובשלוח מנות לרעיו. שאין שם שמחה גדולה ומפוארה אלא לשמח לב עניים ויתומים ואלמנות וגרים. שהמשמח לב האמללים האלו דומה לשכינה שנאמר להחיות רוח שפלים ולהחיות לב נדכאים:

When we appreciate all that G-d has given us, we cant forget those less fortunate.  And the real simcha of purim, says the rambam, is to make even those people happy - to give them too a taste of simchas purim, of the joy in coming together with achdus and hakaras hatov to hashem for everything.  If we do that, then we are truly דומה לשכינה.

We should all be zocheh!

A freilichen purim to all.

gedolah hachnasas orchim

 I know what I'm about to say might set my serial commenters off for its ridiculousness (in their eyes), but so be it.

We are all familiar with the famous chazal, אמר רב יהודה אמר רב גדולה הכנסת אורחין מהקבלת פני שכינה.   Chazal learn this out from avraham - in the middle of hakbalas pnei hashechinah, avraham gets up and puts G-d on hold to go perform the mitzvah of hachnasas orchim.  From here we learn that hachnasas orchim is "greater" than hakbalas pnei hashechinah.

I think it is criminal to learn a chazal like this without being attentive to its normative implications.  Chazal are saying a halacha: hachnasas orchim is docheh hakbalas pnei hashechinah.

But that leads to a question:  Is only hachnasas orchim docheh hakbalas pnei hashechinah?

Suppose you lived in a city with no lulav and esrog, and in the middle of having a conversation with G-d, you saw a man passing by with lulav and esrog - if you don't interrupt the "conversation", you miss lulav and esrog.  If chazal only said that hachnasas orchim is docheh hakbalas pnei hashechinah, are other mitzvos not?  Why not?  And if other mitzvos are docheh hakbalan pnei hashechinah, then whats so special about the fact that hachnasas orchim is also docheh it?

I think the latter option is correct.  What halachic justification could one offer to be mevatel a mitzvah for hakbalas pnei hashechinah (which, as far as I know, is not a mitzvah whatsoever)?  Furthermore, it seems unlikely that hachnasas orchim would be the only mitzvah to be docheh hakbalas pnei hashechinah, when there are other mitzvos that would seem to be greater.

So why did chazal single out hachnasas orchim?  I don't know.  But a possible suggestion:

There is a clear parallel between hachnasas orchim, inviting a guest into your home, and hakbalas pnei hashechinah, inviting the shechinah into your home.  From a strict halachic perspective, as we mentioned before, all mitzvos should be docheh hakbalas pnei hashechinah.  But specifically by hachnasas orchim, there was a counter sevara - what a chutzpa to Hashem to prioritize inviting some random guest into your house over inviting in the shechina!  It was that sevara that chazal had to counter: to the contrary: Hashem himself would rather you give precedence to the mortal guest over the shechinah.

The most real way to be makbil pnei shechinah, chazal are telling us, is not through lofty prophetic vision, but through the down to earth, mundane, helping someone out and making people, tzelem elokim, feel welcome.

Shavua tov!

Seforno on mishkan / cheit ha-egel

(Check out the previous post (link) where we discuss the opinions of Rashi and the Ramban.)

While it is commonly believed that Rashi holds that the tzivuy of mishkan was only given in response to the cheit ha-egel, we showed last time that this is not the case.  Both Rashi and the Ramban agree that Hashem intended for there to be a mishkan all along.  As the Mizrachi explains, the point of contention between the 2 is solely whether Bnei Yisrael needed a new tzivuy after cheit ha-egel to allow them to build the mishkan even though they had sinned so egregiously, or whether they could rely on the first tzivuy and G-d's original plan.

The seforno, however, does say something along the lines of what is commonly understood in rashi.

Seforno (31:18) : יח) ויתן אל משה ככלותו. אחר שספר מה היה הטוב שהושג בסוף כל הפעמים ששהה משה בהר ארבעים יום, פירש הטעם מפני מה לא הושג התכלית שיעד האל יתברך במתן תורה, באמרו ואתם תהיו לי ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש (לעיל יט, א) ובאמרו מזבח אדמה תעשה לי בכל המקום אבא אליך (שם כ, כא) עד שהוצרך לעשות משכן, והודיע שקרה זה בסבת רוע בחירת ישראל. כי אמנם בסוף ארבעים יום הראשונים נתן הלוחות מעשה אלקים לקדש את כלם לכהנים וגוי קדוש ככל דברו הטוב. והמה מרו והשחיתו דרכם ונפלו ממעלתם, כמו שהעיד באמרו ויתנצלו בני ישראל את עדים מהר חורב:

The difficulty, as we asked in the previous post, is that the mitzvah of binyan mishkan / beis hamikdash was clearly given before cheit ha-egel.  Even if you are a kofer and don't accept Chazal's say so, there are several pretty compelling remazim in the torah to the concept of a beis hamikdash: amongst them, the mitzvah of aliyah liregel, which appears in parshas mishpatim, which everyone agrees was said before cheit ha-egel.

The seforno addresses this question partially (20:21): כא) מזבח אדמה תעשה לי. וגם כן לא תצטרך לעשות היכלות של כסף וזהב ואבנים יקרות למען אקרב אליכם, אבל יספיק מזבח אדמה:
  בכל המקום אשר אזכיר את שמי. שאבחר לבית ועד לעבדי, כענין הזכירו כי נשגב שמו (ישעיהו יב, ד:
  אבא אליך וברכתיך. לא תצטרך למשוך השגחתי אליך באמצעיים של כסף וזהב וזולתם כי אמנם אני אבא אליך וברכתיך:

Even the seforno agrees that the concept of a place that would be meyuchad for karbanos and avodas hashem always existed - there always was a plan to have a mishkan and beis hamikdash, in that sense.  What changed was the nature of such a place.  Before cheit ha-egel, the mishkan wouldn't have been a היכל של כסף וזהב ואבנים יקרות - it would have been just a simple mizbeach.  There wouldn't be a special group of people in fancy clothes serving in this original beis hamikdash - we would all be a mamleches kohanim.

I saw cited this seforno (38:24): כל הזהב. העיד על קצבת הזהב והכסף והנחשת שנכנסה במלאכת המשכן שהיה דבר מועט מאד בערך אל העושר שהיה בבית ראשון כמבואר בספר מלכים (מ"א ו, כ - לה. ז, מח - נ) ויותר ממנו העושר שהיה בבנין הורדוס (בסוטה פ' היה נוטל). ועם כל זה יותר התמיד מראה כבוד ה' במשכן של משה ממה שהתמיד במקדש ראשון, ולא נראה כלל במקדש שני. ובזה הורה שלא קצבת העושר וגודל הבנין יהיו סבה להשרות השכינה בישראל, אבל רוצה ה' את יריאיו ומעשיהם לשכנו בתוכם:

The seforno, lishitaso, thinks that the gold / splendor of the mishkan was all bdieved - really G-d didn't want any of that - He just wanted a simple mizbeach.  All the gold, fancy clothing, special people, etc. came about because bnei yisrael, by sinning with a golden calf, showed that they weren't on the level to be so pure and spiritual.  They needed a fancy and expensive mishkan, with fancy kohanim serving in it, to be able to appreciate and respect the sanctity of the beis hamikdash.  Thus, the seforno notes that there was an inverse correlation between the splendor of a mishkan / beis hamikdash and the hashraas hashechinh associated with it.  The splendor of the beis hamikdash was a necessary evil - and it had negative consequences.

This has tremendous implications (maybe even lihalacha, I need to do more research) for the way we should build shuls.  There is a halacha, patterning off of the beis hamikdash, to make a shul beautiful - but the seforno would tell us that this is really a "bdieved" halacha.  Hashem doesn't want fancy shuls - he wants our hearts.

Good shabbos!

The hoax of a machlokes between rashi and the ramban

Everyone knows that there is apparently a big machlokes between rashi and the ramban in these parshios.

 Rashi, supposedly, thinks that although parshios terumah and tetzaveh appear before cheit ha-egel in the torah, this is just an application of the principle "ein mukdam u-meuchar batorah".  Really cheit ha-egel came first, and only afterwards did Hashem command on the building of a mishkan.  Had bnei yisrael never sinned, there wouldn't have been a mishkan.  Why does the torah mention the mishkan then, before cheit ha-egel?  Presumably it is something along the lines of "hikdim refuah limachalah".

Ramban, on the other hand, believes that the torah is kiseder.  Hashem always planned a mishkan - we needed a mishkan as a "transportable har sinai".  Cheit ha-egel was a rude interruption to G-d's lofty plans -- but those plans never changed.

There is a fatal flaw with this whole thinking:  The torah never changed!  Moshe did not receive one torah the first time with many, many less mitzvos than 613 (The mitzvah to build a mishkan / beis hamikdash is in parshas terumah, the parshah which apparently was only said in response to cheit ha-egel), and only receive the full torah as we know it the second time around - it is impossible that the original plan was to have no mishkan.

Lets look at the actual rashi:

ויתן אל משה וגו' - אין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה. מעשה העגל קודם לצווי מלאכת המשכן ימים רבים היה, שהרי בשבעה עשר בתמוז נשתברו הלוחות, וביום הכפורים נתרצה הקב"ה לישראל, ולמחרת התחילו בנדבת המשכן והוקם באחד בניסן:

Rashi proves that the torah is using ein mukdam umeuchar as follows:  The tzivuy of mileches hamishkan could not have taken place before cheit ha-egel, because there simply was no time for it -- all the time between mattan torah and yom kippur is accounted for by the three periods of forty days.  Mimeila, the tzivuy could not have been until the day after yom kippur, after cheit ha-egel.

This proof is very difficult to understand.  Take a look at the daas zekeinim:

ויקחו לי תרומה. פרשה זו נאמרה בתוך ארבעים יום שהיה ממתן תורה וצוהו הקב"ה להיכן מניח' שיעשו משכן ובית קדשי הקדשים ובתוכו ארון ובתוך הארון לוחות ושם תשרה שכינה וישראל סביב כמו המלאכים סביב כסא הכבוד ושכינה ביניהם וכן כתוב ושכנתי בתוכם כמו בתוך המלאכים ועל זה נאמר אמרתי אלהים אתם ובני עליון כלכם להיות שכינתי ביניהם:

Why did rashi need to apply ein mukdam...?  Along the lines of the daas zekeinim, just say that the tzivuy in terumah tetzaveh was the tzivuy hashem said to moshe during the first forty days when moshe was on har sinai, and moshe was just unable to communicate that tzivuy to bnei yisrael due to the cheit ha-egel and time constraints until after yom hakippurim?  Isn't this an easy pshat that gets us out of Rashi's "proof" that we must apply ein mukdam umeuchar??

The meforshei rashi ask this question, and they all (maharal, mizrachi) peh echad assume against the commonly held pshat in rashi:  No one thinks this rashi means that there wouldn't have been a mishkan had Bnei Yisrael not sinned.

The mizrachi gives a powerful answer:

שאי אפשר לומר שצווי ה' למשה על מלאכת המשכן היה קודם מעשה העגל, וצווי משה לישראל על המשכן היה אחר שנתרצה על מעשה העגל, שאם כן איך ידע משה אם נתרצה הקב"ה לישראל על דבר המשכן עד שצוה אותם על נדבת המשכן, שמא לא נתרצה רק על נתינת הלוחות לישראל, שנאמר לו בפירוש (לד, א): "פסל לך שני לוחות אבנים כראשונים" מפני קיום הדת, שלא היה אפשר לדחותן מן הדת אחר שכבר נתגיירו וקבלו עליהן עול התורה והמצות, שאף על פי שחזרו לסורן הראשון, הרי הן כישראל שנשתמד, שהוא כישראל לכל דבריו, כדאיתא בפרק החולץ (יבמות מז ב), אבל לעשות גם המשכן לשכון בתוכם, שהיא חבה יתרה, לא, שהרי לא מחל להם רק שלא לכלותם יחד, ולא מחילה גמורה, כדכתיב (לב, לד): "וביום פקדי ופקדתי עליהם חטאתם" ש"אין פורענות באה לישראל שאין בה מפורענות עון העגל", כדכתב רש"י ז"ל. ואף על פי שהסכים ה' ללכת בקרבם להנהיגם בעצמו ובכבודו, ולא על ידי מלאך, לא יחוייב מזה שישרה שכינתו בתוכם, כעניין שצוהו תחלה (כה, ח): "ועשו לי מקדש ושכנתי בתוכם", שהרי גם קודם המשכן כבר היה "הולך לפניהם יומם בעמוד ענן... ולילה בעמוד אש" (יג, כא), ועם כל זה לא היה משרה שכינתו בתוכם, ואם כן איך סמך משה על המחילה הזאת שנתרצה לישראל ביום הכפורים, לצוותם על נדבת המשכן, לפיכך חייבו מזה, שגם צווי ה' למשה במלאכת המשכן לא היה רק אחר מעשה העגל, ופרשת העגל קודמת בהכרח מצווי ה' למשה למלאכת המשכן, ואין מוקדם ומאוחר בתורה, וזהו שכתב רש"י גבי (לג, יא): "ודבר ה' אל משה פנים אל פנים וגו' ושב אל המחנה - בעשרה בתשרי נתרצה הקדוש ברוך הוא לישראל ואמר לו (במדבר יד, כ): 'סלחתי כדבריך' ומסר לו לוחות האחרונות וירד והתחיל לצוותו על מלאכת משכן".

To summarize (but its powerful, so dont let this stop you from reading it):  If moshe was only commanded about the mishkan before cheit ha-egel, he would never have been allowed to assume that he could continue with this project afterwards.  Hashem was mochel, true.  But that doesn't necessarily mean that we're back together as if nothing ever happened.  Maybe Hashem agrees now to let us have the torah again, but he still does not want to live together with us in the mishkan.  It must be, says the mizrachi, that the tzivuy of mileches hamishkan came after cheit ha-egel.

(So to clarify:  Moshe learned the whole torah on har sinai in the first 40 days, and that obviously included the mitzvos of mishkan / beis hamikdash. Parshas Terumah, however, records Hashem's repetition of this tzivuy after cheit ha-egel to allow Moshe to build the mishkan even though bnei yisrael sinned.  Thats shittas rashi.  The Ramban learns like the daas zekeinim above.)

Its here that the ramban argues: The Ramban (first ramban in vayakhel) thinks that Moshe did not need a new tzivuy to be allowed to build the mishkan after cheit ha-egel:

ואמר לכולם ענין המשכן אשר נצטוה בו מתחלה קודם שבור הלוחות, כי כיון שנתרצה להם הקב"ה ונתן לו הלוחות שניות וכרת עמו ברית חדשה שילך השם בקרבם, הנה חזרו לקדמותם ולאהבת כלולותם, ובידוע שתהיה שכינתו בתוכם כענין שצוהו תחלה, כמו שאמר (לעיל כה ח) ועשו לי מקדש ושכנתי בתוכם, ולכן צוה אותם משה עתה בכל מה שנצטוה מתחלה:

But rashi clearly disagrees.  In the beginning of parshas pekudei, rashi writes:

משכן העדת - עדות לישראל שויתר להם הקדוש ברוך הוא על מעשה העגל, שהרי השרה שכינתו ביניהם:

The maharal asks, why is the mishkan more of a testimony to Hashem's forgiveness of klal yisrael than the luchos shnios?  According to the mizrachi, the answer is obvious.  Even though Hashem was "mochel" and gave us luchos shnios, he still might not have wanted to come back to klal yisrael and live in their midst in the mishkan - that he did so shows that Hashem really did forgive us and really came back to loving us like he did before.

The lesson from the mizrachi and this mehalech in rashi is powerful:  Mi yaaleh bihar hashem, mi yakum bimkom kadsho?  Even if there is a tzivuy to build a mishkan, it requires a certain audacity to think that we can live together with G-d, that there can exist a concept such as hashraas hashechinah.  Even the slightest wrongdoing, and kol shekain a cheit ha-egel, throws the potential for such an idea into jeopardy.  Who has the audacity to build a mishkan?

More generally, we all have a spiritual side and want to connect to G-d.  But we have to approach this with humility - we cannot just arrogantly assume we can just walk right in and take on new hanhagos that will make us closer to G-d.  Are we rauy for such hanhagos, or are we climbing har hashem with arrogance?  When people just decide to put on tefillin, or to wear their tefillin after davening, where did they get this audacity from to take on these new hanhagos?

We should approach our avodas hashem (and I speak to myself as much as to everyone else) with humility and fear.  Living with G-d is a scary idea, and we should therefore treat it as such.

Guest Post by Y.S. (Guess if we're related)

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fbrO3_kp6bgj9XvOlNznZFWq0hPWfeTZdccQ4BLt0xQ/edit

Bio:  Y.S. is a seventh grader at Y.S.T.  In his free time, Y.S. likes to read all sorts of interesting things and ask thoughtful and penetrating questions.

war ethics -- melachim beis perek vav

This is anything but a comprehensive discussion of this topic.  I just want to throw out an interesting machlokes I came across.

In melachim beis (perek 6), melech aram sends an army to kill elisha.  Elisha uses his miraculous powers and basically has them march right into shomron into the hands of melech yisrael:

 כא) וַיֹּאמֶר מֶלֶךְ־יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶל־אֱלִישָׁע כִּרְאֹתוֹ אוֹתָם הַאַכֶּה אַכֶּה אָבִי:    (כב) וַיֹּאמֶר לֹא תַכֶּם הַאֲשֶׁר שָׁבִיתָ בְּחַרְבְּךָ וּבְקַשְׁתְּךָ אַתָּה מַכֶּה שִׂים לֶחֶם וָמַיִם לִפְנֵיהֶם וְיֹאכְלוּ וְיִשְׁתּוּ וְיֵלְכוּ אֶל־אֲדֹנֵיהֶם:

Melech Yisrael asks elisha, "should I kill them all".  Elisha responds that he should not.  why not?

Rashi:  (כב) האשר שבית וגו' - וכי דרכך להרוג אותם שאתה מביא שבייה (ומשבית אותם  -- Do you kill prisoners of war?  Of course not!!

Radak: כב) האשר שבית - מה דין יש לך בהם שתכה אותם וכי אתה שבית אותם בחרבך ובקשתך:  You have no claim on these people such that you should kill them.  If you had beaten them in war and taken them as POWs, then of course you should kill them.  Since that was not the case, however, you should let them go.

Two opposite reads of the same pasuk, with major implications for the ethics of war!  Anyone who knows me knows where I stand on this issue...

Corollary to bechira 2

I don't want to scare anyone off by saying first check out some other long article, but first, check out bechira 2.  Two friends of mine pointed out a fascinating corollary to this chiddush.

To summarize: we discussed how the rambam and ramban fundamentally differ on what the primary lesson of yetzias mitzraim is.  The ramban focuses on how yetzias mitzraim demonstrates the existence and omnipotence of G-d.  It prove to us what G-d can do.  The Rambam however, disagrees; for him, yetzias mitzraim shows us what G-d does do; yetzias mitzraim teaches us about the hanhagos of G-d and the ways in which he runs the world.  We explained that the particular hanhaga about which yetzias mitzraim centers is free will / freedom, namely that Hashem gives humanity the bechira to do as they will, choosing either tov or ra.

There is another place where this machlokes plays out.

The Torah tells us that shabbos is zecher leyetzias mitzraim:  וְזָכַרְתָּ כִּי־עֶבֶד הָיִיתָ בְּאֶרֶץ מִצְרַיִם וַיֹּצִאֲךָ יְקֹוָק אֱלֹהֶיךָ מִשָּׁם בְּיָד חֲזָקָה וּבִזְרֹעַ נְטוּיָה עַל־כֵּן צִוְּךָ יְקֹוָק אֱלֹהֶיךָ לַעֲשׂוֹת אֶת־יוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת:

How is shabbos zecher leyetzias mitzraim?

The Ramban explains: בעבור היות יציאת מצרים מורה על אלוה קדמון מחדש חפץ ויכול כאשר פירשתי בדבור הראשון (שם שם ב), על כן אמר בכאן אם יעלה בלבך ספק על השבת המורה על החדוש והחפץ והיכולת תזכור מה שראו עיניך ביציאת מצרים שהיא לך לראיה ולזכר. הנה השבת זכר ליציאת מצרים, ויציאת מצרים זכר לשבת כי יזכרו בו ויאמרו השם הוא מחדש בכל אותות ומופתים ועושה בכל כרצונו, כי הוא אשר ברא הכל במעשה בראשית, וזה טעם על כן צוך ה' אלהיך לעשות את יום השבת.

This is obviously lishitaso.  But there is another approach here. the ramban quotes the rambam in moreh nevuchim:

והרב אמר בספר המורה ... בעבור היותנו עבדים במצרים עובדים כל היום על כרחנו ולא היתה לנו מנוחה, והוא יצונו עתה לשבות ולנוח, כדי שנזכיר חסדי השם עלינו בהוציאו אותנו מעבדות למנוחה:

Shabbos is zecher leyetzias mitzraim in the freedom shabbos gives us to rest from work; this freedom reminds us of the primary lesson / goal of yetzias mitzraim: freedom.  I think the rambam is much more "pashut pshat"; we much more readily understand the direct connection between shabbos and yetzias mitzraim.

With this in mind, we can reach a new understanding of the last rambam in hilchos shabbos:

השבת ועבודת כוכבים ומזלות כל אחת משתיהן שקולה כנגד שאר כל מצות התורה. והשבת היא האות שבין הקב"ה ובינינו לעולם. לפיכך כל העובר על שאר המצות הרי הוא בכלל רשעי ישראל. אבל המחלל שבת בפרהסיא הרי הוא כעובד עבודת כוכבים ומזלות ושניהם כעובדי כוכבים ומזלות לכל דבריהם. לפיכך משבח הנביא ואומר אשרי אנוש יעשה זאת ובן אדם יחזיק בה שומר שבת מחללו וגו'. וכל השומר את השבת כהלכתה ומכבדה ומענגה כפי כחו כבר מפורש בקבלה שכרו בעולם הזה יתר על השכר הצפון לעולם הבא. שנאמר אז תתענג על ה' והרכבתיך על במותי ארץ והאכלתיך נחלת יעקב אביך כי פי ה' דבר:

The classical understanding is that a mechalel shabbos is nidon like an oved avodah zarah because by being mechalel shabbos, one is essentially denying chiddush haolam - such a person does not accept the creation narrative of the bible and is thus a heretic.  Notice, however, that the rambam does not reference this idea at all.

Indeed, what if someone were to come along and say that he does believe hashem created the world in 6 days etc., but still will not keep shabbos because he is too lazy.  Do we still apply the categorical rule that a mechalel shabbos is dino ki-akum?  (And if not, then doesn't the rule fall apart: in every case, jut ask the guy if he's a kofer).

According to the rambam, perhaps there is another element in shabbos that could avoid this last question and make all mechaleli shabbos kofrim categorically (not sure we should be so excited about that).

To be mechalel shabbos is to reject the freedom G-d gave us when he took us out of Egypt.  Chilul shabbos requires one to say: I am not grateful for the freedom Hashem gave us, I do not care to mark it on my calendar or celebrate it in any meaningful way.  That is kefirah in kol hatorah kulah.

For us, who please G-d strive to be shomrei shabbos, this adds an important facet to our avodah.  We are grateful to G-d for our freedom / bechira chofshis, and we do take time to celebrate that in a meaningful way.  We pray that G-d should help us use our bechira to continue to do good, such that we will see the geulah speedily in our days.

Shavua tov!