Just saw this mildly depressing Ran I thought I would share.
First the mishna / gemara, shabbos 121a. If a non-Jew comes to put out a fire at the house of a Jew on shabbos, we are not required to stop him. But if a (Jewish) child comes to put out the fire, we must stop him. Why the difference? The gemara explains that while we assume a katan will be עושה לדעת אביו, by a nachri we assume נכרי לדעתיה דנפשיה עביד.
The Ran (quoted in full, but the bold is what's strictly necessary): אבל קטן שבא לכבות אין שומעין לו מפני ששביתתו עליהם. ומתמהינן עלה בגמרא שמעת מינה קטן אוכל נבלות ב"ד מצווין עליו להפרישו כלומר ותקשי לרבי יוחנן דאמר בפ' חרש (דף קיד א) דאין ב"ד מצווין עליו להפרישו וקיימא לן כוותיה ומפרקינן בקטן העושה על דעת אביו ומקשינן אי הכי נכרי נמי ומפרקינן נכרי אדעתא דנפשיה קא עביד כלומר שכל שהוא בן דעת אפילו כשהוא מכוין להנאתו של ישראל אדעתא דנפשיה מיקרי לפי שהוא שוקל בעצמו שראוי לו לעשות כך מפני שישתכר בו עכשיו או לאחר זמן אבל קטן שאין לו שקול הדעת ואינו עושה אלא מפני שמכיר דאבוה ניחא ליה בהכי אדעתא דאבוה מיקרי הלכך אסור
True altruism dies when we get smart. Even when you're nice to somebody, you can't help but realize that it is advantageous to one's own self to be nice to others. Rashi quotes in chumash that the only chesed shel emes is one performed for a meis - there you don't expect any return favor. Kol haposel bimumo posel, but I identify all too much with the truth of what the Ran says.
And one more point: We have this seemingly contradictory attitude towards children. On the one hand, we say that a child is born immediately with the yetzer hara, but doesn't get a yetzer tov until he becomes a bar daas. Babies / children are commonly described as the most selfish human beings possible - they care only about their eating, sleeping, and functioning without any regard to the other. But on the other hand, we all know of "the innocence of childhood" - the descriptions in chazal of how great children are "shelo taamu taam cheit". We even have stories in chazal of the great sacrifices made by children - channah's children who all died before worshipping avodah zarah, the children in gittin who jumped out of the ship to drown in the sea, etc. I've seen how the same child can go in an instant from acting in the most selfish way possible to being totally selfless and giving. I'll be the first to admit that I understand nothing of children's psychology (and have no faith in 99% of psychologists / students of psychology who claim they do), but I find this to be a fascinating tension - and I think it exists (albeit to a lesser extent) even as we grow up.
Dear Sar Hamashkim,
ReplyDeleteDo you also denigrate those who feel a sense of satisfaction when they perform a religious act? I'm sure Rav Soloveitchik would, like Freud, dismiss all such feelings as the emotional elements of a person attempting for some sense of broader significance. I'm not sure why deriving pleasure from kind acts makes one a bad person.
Let us apply this Ran to a practical example. A philanthropist gives money to a charitable cause. The fact that this individual sees the charity as a worth cause is definitely something to praise him about, regardless of the particular psychological needs he is filling. The fact that these needs are being filled by appropriate means is alone commendable. Similarly, if I have molded myself so that when poor people ask for money, I can't help but give, I have changed myself from someone who does chesed to a ba'al chesed. I'm a merachem, not someone who acts with rachamim. I don't see the fact that it's my own discomfort with not giving which is currently compelling me to give as disqualifying the overall act. That's just my humble opinion.
The Gemara in Gitin wonders whether the takana of not collecting from purchased lands when there are unpurchased lands in the hands of the debtor applies to gifts as well. The reason it would is that if it wouldn't, people wouldn't do others any favors because they wouldn't assume they'd receive retribution in the form of getting a permanent present later.
It doesn't surprise me that Hume's description of all human acts emanating from pleasure and running from pain was adopted by Rav Shlomo Wolbe and Rav Yaakov Weinberg. It's so true. Too true.
Baal Hachalomos
Someone else I told this too also applied what I said as you did, to experiencing pleasure after doing good. I don't agree with the comparison.
DeleteI don't believe that all we do is motivated by pleasure / pain. I certainly do not deny that we are motivated to a great extent by these drives - they form the basis and foundation of the yetzer hara (not to say they are inherently bad - that is not at all the case - as chazal say, we must do avodas hashem with both yetzarim.) But there also exists a yetzer tov, a part of a human being which desires to do what is right because it is right. People mistake the feeling of "satisfaction" they get after fulfilling the "urges" of the yezter tov as a "pleasure" that they feel because of their yetzer hara. I do not believe that to be the case.
So if one feels good about doing a mitzvah, that means they have fulfilled their natural desire to do what is right because it is right - and that is altruism in its purest form. But if there is calculation that by helping someone else, I will be helped when I am down one day, then that is selfish. The mitzvah is still a great mitzvah, but there is something missing in its altruism and in its being "lishmah". That is what the ran is talking about, and thats where I lament the increased selfishness that intelligence necessarily brings.
Dear Sar,
ReplyDeleteKant definitely emphasized the role of intentions in deeming the good of an action, the positive results notwithstanding. This is contrasted with Aristotle's ideal of molding character to fit with good things. Aristotle (and I think Rambam as well) thought that one should perform good acts because they are compelled to by their own reason. Kant thought that only acts performed out of a sense of duty are good.
Rav Lichtenstein says that the reason for the tzivui on the Mikol eitz hagan achol tocheil is that our life should be lived in a context of being commanded. This idea is also in the Milton poem he always quotes on his 21st birthday.
I agree that the Rambam says the reason for chukim is to ensure you follow even the commandments whose reasons aren't clear to us. But to define the whole context that way, from beyond a mussar perspective, I'm not sure how accurate that is. There are better ways to relate to life that lead to more of an internalization of ideals.
Baal Hachalomos
Mr. Mashkim,
ReplyDeleteI think that you have a completely skewed perspective. Altruism is overrated. What we need is an ethics of action, not of intention. Would you like us all to be sitting in our Kantian caves thumping our chests, while chaos is wreaking havoc outside in the world, to fearful to help, heaven forfend we will not be acting out of purity of motivation. It is warped thinking like yours (along with Western philosophy and Jewish thought since Kant) which is the cause behind the massive amount of blood shed in modern times. Ethical behavior is not between an individual and his mind, but rather exists in society, and consequently history. What matters more then, is not so much what your primary intention was, but rather whether the intended outcome was achieved. Eliezer Berkovits has argued (and in my mind, convincingly) that Hazal's conception of Jewish ethics focused predominantly on the actual achievement of good. The idea of "mishpat" in his read is about " an appropriateness, determined not by abstract consideration, but by the the reality of man's condition and subserving the meaningful preservation of human life.." Ethical action like any other behavior is acquired though training and parctice, not contemplation. Just like you learned to rant by ranting, rather than by reading mein kampf, or how Baal Hachalomos excels at blogging pseudonymously, by doing so, so to one will only act ethically if he habituates himself. Looking at ethical action from this vantage point, I would contend, attenuates the moral worth you ascribed to the youngster, while placing the adult on a far higher pedestal.As for you Baal Hacholomos, I am astounded that you could say ex cathedra that "I'm sure Rav Soloveitchik would, like Freud, dismiss all such feelings as the emotional elements of a person attempting for some sense of broader significance." Have you ever evenv bothered to read Uvikashtem Misham? In a number of passages there he explicitly says that motivations stemming for psychological needs have value in the realm of religious experience.
Tzafnas Paneach
I agree that it is critical to have an ethics of action. And I don't want people to worry about intentions to the point where it limits their actions. I totally disagree, however, with your view that an ethics of intention is insignificant. Have you forgotten the uncountable number of chazals where we emphasize the concept of doing mitzvos "lishmah", and the rambam who codifies this all and takes it very seriously? You're right; the rambam says that for "nashim and ketanim" we shouldn't encourage them to do things lishmah - it will just confuse them (feminism aside here). For them, an ethics of action is enough. I thought (and still think) you, my dear friend, mr. tzafnas paneach, were better than that.
DeleteMr. mashkim (it is extremely unfair that you guys get to pick cool names like baal hachalomos and tzafnas paneach and I am stuck with "mr. mashkim")
Mr. Mashkim, you completely misunderstood my point. I was in no way saying that intentions are inconsequential but rather that they are secondary. This is especially true by ethical behavior where what is most important is the outcome. You blur ethics with all other mitzvoth in terms of the necessity of lishma (which although you make it sound simple, is actually at hotly contested issue). While it is more than reasonable to assume that ritual mitzvoth should be performed with purity of motivation (i.e lo al manas liqable sakhar), this is most likely because these rituals in it of themselves are meaningless, except as a means to serve G-d. However, ethics transcend the personal plane of service, and is active on the higher plane of helping implement the vision of society Hazal and G-d had for man, this can be accomplished with or without purity of motivation. Also I think your quotation of the Rambam distinguishing between men and women is somewhat anachronistic, especially in our post-gender age.
ReplyDeleteTzafnas Paneach
The rambam I quoted was in hilchos teshuva perek yud. ayen sham, and you are clearly incorrect. The rambam does not and cannot differentiate with respect to lishmah between mitzvos bein adam lachaveiro and bein adam lamakom.
DeleteThe rambam's point is that everything we do (and everything means everything) should be motivated by ahavas hashem - not redifas hamamon, redifas hakavod, or anything else. That point stands - we shouldn't be altruistic because we know we will get something in return, but rather we should be altruistic out of ahavas hashem. This is clear and it is a waste of time to debate it further.
You are correct that this is a very lofty ideal; on a lower level, it suffices to simply do good. and you are correct that on this level, bein adam lachaveiro takes on an even more important role than bein adam lamakom for the reason you nicely sketched. But that doesn't take away one bit from the point I made. Ahavas hashem and lishmah are not "secondary" - to the contrary, they are really the devarim ha-omdim birumo shel olam.
Mr. Tzafnas: I don't know if you are being facetious in your "post gender age" comment, but I will be dan lekaf zechus. The rambam clearly had a different view of the intelligence of women than we do - there is no other way to put it. Maybe his stereotype was true in his time - you are correct that it is not true in ours. My quotation wasn't to discuss women or anything related to that topic, so I didn't feel the need to elaborate on this point. Let this serve as an apology for my previous lack of clarification.
Kol Tuv,
E. Mashkim
Mr Mashkim,
ReplyDeleteI appreciate you taking the time to discuss this topic with me, I think we both agree that while altruism is important, it is not singularly so, and therefore more effort should be focused on accomplishing good acts regardless. I admire your steadfastness and intelligence, and I hope we continue having enjoyable dialogue on this blog.
Tzafnas Paneach
The pleasure was mine! Thank you!
Delete