I have two things to say about lo bashamyim hi - one from rashi and the other from the rambam, but I don't think they're really connected. the one from the rambam is better, so I'll say that second (and if you only read 1, read that 1).
1. rashi comments: לא בשמים היא - שאלו היתה בשמים היית צריך לעלות אחריה וללומדה. I think this speaks to a tension we face as a religion. On the one hand, we view G-d as master and ourselves as slaves - as such, we expect absolute obedience to G-d no matter how difficult and unpleasant it might be. On the other hand, we know that Judaism isn't about sacrificing / destroying ourselves in order to worship G-d - we believe that G-d gave us the torah as a tovah for us - the torah makes this world a good and beautiful place to live in - and this emphasis seems to contradict that of viewing humanity as slaves whose only focus is the will of our master G-d. I was thinking about this tension when I read a few articles recently about distortions certain sects of judaism make to the high holiday davening in order to make it more appealing to the less observant. The orthodox response was, Judaism isn't about what makes you feel good - its about the will of G-d. I agree. But you do have this other side (obviously its misapplied by the reform) that the torah isn't just about slavery to G-d, but also close to our hearts and for our good. so the pasuk says, lo bashamayim hi - torah isn't hard and about slavery and back breaking labor - karov eilecha - its close to you. but chazal jump in - dont forget the slavery aspect - if it would be bashamayim, and involve back breaking labor, you still have to do it. obedience has to be unconditional, but that fact is tempered by the fact that in reality, torah isn't bashamyim.
the better vort
2. the rambam quotes lo bashamyim hi in hilchos talmud torah: כתוב בתורה לא בשמים היא ולא מעבר לים היא. לא בשמים היא לא בגסי הרוח היא מצויה ולא במהלכי מעבר לים היא. לפיכך אמרו חכמים לא כל המרבה בסחורה מחכים. וצוו חכמים הוי ממעט בעסק ועסוק בתורה :
its interesting that the halacha starts about gasei haruach, arrogance, and then switches to talk about people who spend too much time in business and not enough time learning. This becomes even more strange when we look at the next halacha:
דברי תורה נמשלו כמים שנאמר הוי כל צמא לכו למים. לומר לך מה מים אינם מתכנסין במקום מדרון אלא נזחלין מעליו ומתקבצים במקום אשבורן כך דברי תורה אינם נמצאים בגסי הרוח ולא בלב כל גבה לב אלא בדכא ושפל רוח שמתאבק בעפר רגלי החכמים ומסיר התאוות ותענוגי הזמן מלבו ועושה מלאכה בכל יום מעט כדי חייו אם לא היה לו מה יאכל ושאר יומו ולילו עוסק בתורה
the rambam goes back to talking about gaavah, and then goes back again to talking about people who waste time with other pursuits and dont learn. there must be a connection between these two concepts, or else the rambam is doing a terrible job organizing his sefer.
we've discussed part of this before (http://doleh-u-mashkeh.blogspot.com/2013/07/extension-of-balaks-dvar-torah.html). but i really think this is a powerful idea, so I'm going to write it again.
the mishnah compares bilaam harasha to avraham avinu - while bilaam had a ruach gevoha, avraham had a ruach shefala - bilaam was a baal gaavah, while avraham was an anav.
we quoted that rashi writes that bilaam's gaavah was reflected by his refusal to go to balak with lowly officers - he needed a more respectable accompaniment. but the rambam says something much deeper: bilaam's gaavah was in his calling himself one who is shomea imrei kel and yodea daas elyon - a man who hears the word of G-d and understands G-d's will. avraham's anavah was the opposite - when he speaks to G-d, he says he knows nothing and is nothing but dust and ashes.
The first thing to notice is that the rambam thinks gaavah centers around spiritual matters - its not gaavah to want to be accompanied by higher ranking officers - caring about such unimportant things is too stupid to be gaavah. only concerning spiritual matters, such as knowledge of G-d, can we be begin to discuss gaavah and anavah.
but whats critical to notice is the context of the statements of both bilaam and avraham: true avraham calls himself dust and ashes, but that is in the middle of fighting with G-d! what greater arrogance can there be? True Bilaam says he is yodea daas elyon, but he is in the middle of the ultimate submission to G-d - although he wants to curse bnei yisrael, he will only say exactly what hashem commands him to, even if it is the exact opposite of what he wants- doesn't that reflect humility in the face of G-d?
you see that one can fight with G-d and still be humble - or submit to G-d, and still be the paradigm of arrogance. because gaavah is when you think you are like g-d - even if you obey, it is out of understanding g-d's will - which you are able to do because you are so godly. anavah doesn't mean not caring about emes - to the contrary, anavah is about fighting for emes because you realize that thats the only thing that makes anything worthwhile - without that you are just dust and ashes.
in other words, gaavah = spiritual complacency. you might keep the mitzvos, but if you are comfortable with where you are spiritually, that means you think that as you are right now, you are shomea imrei kel and yodea daas elyon - hence you don't need to improve. and anavah is the opposite - its when you constantly seek to grow. fighting with G-d is not a contradiction to, but actually a reflection of avraham's humility. he wasn't spiritually complacent - he knows that after all he has accomplished, he is still but dust and ashes, and hence must continue to grow spiritually and do the right thing - even if he has to fight with G-d to do it.
the rambam in hilchos talmud torah is now very powerful. a person who is osek in other things instead of talmud torah reflects spiritual complacency - he is happy with his level of shmiras hamitzvos right now and doesn't need to learn more and grow more - that is lo bashamayim hi - the torah isnt found by gasei haruach who think they are bashamayim - shomea imrei kel and yodea daas elyon.
as the high holy days rapidly approach, we have to root this complacency out. G-d should help us all grow higher and higher and higher in torah and yiras shamayim.
shavua tov, and kesiva vachasima tova to everyone!
Saturday, August 31, 2013
Thursday, August 22, 2013
summer is over
I'm at the airport right now to leave Israel, which is very sad. ( I guess to look at the bright side, my sister got engaged!! (ayen the comments - baruch shelo asani isha :) ) ) So my summer here is over. I want to reflect on some things.
1. So you might remember my atheist debates. Our atheist remains stout in his heretical denial of the existence of G-d. He wasn't the only atheist here; as the program went on I had the "zchus" to discuss these issues with several more atheists. And there is one part of these debates that disturbs me more than anything else: I have asked each atheist the same question, to which they have no satisfactory answer. Suppose I am the only thing standing between you and a million dollars - is there any good reason that you should not kill me for your self benefit. If the world is just a bunch of random collisions of matter with no meaning and no purpose - nothing has any sanctity or meaning - so who cares if you kill me - you haven't destroyed anything meaningful - all I am is a bunch of dirt anyways. While not philosophers, these people are some of the smartest people I have ever met, but they have not given (some of them even admit it) a satisfactory answer to this question.
I don't think there is a good answer to this question if you don't believe in G-d, and herein lies an important truth: I posit that it is impossible for a society to maintain itself with any standards of morality without belief in G-d. Atheists such as Steven Weinberg point to the existence of moral atheists and immoral theists to prove that you don't need a G-d to be moral. I don't think the argument follows because of the following: people many times don't practice what they preach - despite the fact that they believe x, they act in a way inconsistent with x. That's human nature, to not be fully consistent and to allow a certain "cognitive dissonance". Hence some theists, despite believing in G-d, sin and act immorally. And some atheists, despite claiming to not believe in G-d, recognize deep down that there is meaning to this world and we aren't just giant masses of random atoms - these people act morally. But while individuals can maintain "cognitive dissonance", I believe that this would not hold on a societal level. If you don't have any rational basis for morality, society is doomed to crumble. (thank G-d most people believe in G-d)
This I think gives deeper insight into 2 rambams. a. (last rambam in zmanim) גדול השלום שכל התורה ניתנה לעשות שלום בעולם שנאמר דרכיה דרכי נעם וכל נתיבותיה שלום - torah is about fixing this world and making it a good place - without g-d, there is no morality and this world descends into chaos.
b. cant find the lashon i was looking for right now, but the point is that there is a halacha (which probably is not noheg bizman hazeh) of moridin vilo maalin for an apikores, and I think the rambam says the reason is li-hasir michshol. whats so dangerous about an atheist - I think this perspective allows us to answer that question. In particular, sometimes you might wonder why we can't be more tolerant of differing ideologies. Atheism isn't just a different ideology - it, by necessity, preaches immorality. I felt violated (to a certain extent) when I would ask people if they had any good reasons to not kill me and they couldn't answer - they essentially denied that my life (and anyone's life) has any sanctity or meaning. That is intolerable.
2. in addition to the atheists, i had some more positive discussions with a guy whose family goes to shul twice a year and fasts on yom kippur. And this has changed my perspective on the whole chiloni - dati relations situation. As an example, it used to be obvious to me that if possible, one should live in a totally dati neighborhood - why mix with chilonim who don't share our values and life goals? but take the other side - this is an unnatural situation, that there exist communities of jews who arent religious. while there were always yechidim, they in general left the jews and became goyim. now we have communities which, although the assimilation rate is high, are by and large long-term non-religious jewish communities. we cant just abandon our brothers and leave them like this - something needs to be done. what exactly, I don't know.
i've also learned through these discussions more about the degree of strength of my own religious convictions in different areas. If i am not comfortable with an idea, i will not be able to defend it well to others. maybe more about this some other time.
3. my (charedi) cousin started yeshiva gedolah this zman and is learning in ponevezh (by all accounts, one of the top charedi yeshivos in eretz yisrael). I was there for shabbos and they joked with me, "eliezer, next time you come, you can visit chaim in jail " - they just got a draft notice in the mail and while they were joking about it, the tension behind the joke was very real. also, while they were never rich (and thats an understatement, seeing as the father is a rosh kollel), finances weren't doing great either (the kollel wasn't paying anyone until it got more funds.) its easy to bash charedim for not going to the army / not working when you dont put a name to the face - its a lot harder when you know that these people are some of the nicest and best people you know. I still dont agree with what they do - in fact, im really appalled by some of it. but they really do think they're doing what g-d wants, and they are honest and good people. i don't want to see my cousin in jail, even if he doesn't go to the army, and i want my cousins to be able to put food on the table, even if they refuse to go to work. again, i dont know how to resolve this issue - all i know is that the current approach of war between the chilonim and charedim is not a mehalech.
(you might claim that my attitude towards other "enemies of the jewish people" might change if i would put a name to the face as well. very true. thats why i hate it when people have a friendly conversation with those i deem "enemy of the jewish people". it makes it harder to have blind hatred towards them and to dehumanize them - which in this extreme situation, is unfortunately necessary.)
I will leave off with a question to which I dont have a good answer: Fact: the only place in the torah where there is a remez to the idea that all of avodas hashem should be bisimcha (obviously there are specific mitzvos of simcha for yom tov, bikkurim, etc.) is in the tochacha this week - tachas asher lo avadta es hashem elokecha bisimcha - implication being that one should be oved es hashem bisimcha. see rabbeinu bichaye and the rambam who discuss how important simcha is in avodas hashem - isnt it odd that this is the only place it makes it into the torah?
wishing you from israel for the last time until i dont know when but hopefully very soon,
shabbat shalom.
1. So you might remember my atheist debates. Our atheist remains stout in his heretical denial of the existence of G-d. He wasn't the only atheist here; as the program went on I had the "zchus" to discuss these issues with several more atheists. And there is one part of these debates that disturbs me more than anything else: I have asked each atheist the same question, to which they have no satisfactory answer. Suppose I am the only thing standing between you and a million dollars - is there any good reason that you should not kill me for your self benefit. If the world is just a bunch of random collisions of matter with no meaning and no purpose - nothing has any sanctity or meaning - so who cares if you kill me - you haven't destroyed anything meaningful - all I am is a bunch of dirt anyways. While not philosophers, these people are some of the smartest people I have ever met, but they have not given (some of them even admit it) a satisfactory answer to this question.
I don't think there is a good answer to this question if you don't believe in G-d, and herein lies an important truth: I posit that it is impossible for a society to maintain itself with any standards of morality without belief in G-d. Atheists such as Steven Weinberg point to the existence of moral atheists and immoral theists to prove that you don't need a G-d to be moral. I don't think the argument follows because of the following: people many times don't practice what they preach - despite the fact that they believe x, they act in a way inconsistent with x. That's human nature, to not be fully consistent and to allow a certain "cognitive dissonance". Hence some theists, despite believing in G-d, sin and act immorally. And some atheists, despite claiming to not believe in G-d, recognize deep down that there is meaning to this world and we aren't just giant masses of random atoms - these people act morally. But while individuals can maintain "cognitive dissonance", I believe that this would not hold on a societal level. If you don't have any rational basis for morality, society is doomed to crumble. (thank G-d most people believe in G-d)
This I think gives deeper insight into 2 rambams. a. (last rambam in zmanim) גדול השלום שכל התורה ניתנה לעשות שלום בעולם שנאמר דרכיה דרכי נעם וכל נתיבותיה שלום - torah is about fixing this world and making it a good place - without g-d, there is no morality and this world descends into chaos.
b. cant find the lashon i was looking for right now, but the point is that there is a halacha (which probably is not noheg bizman hazeh) of moridin vilo maalin for an apikores, and I think the rambam says the reason is li-hasir michshol. whats so dangerous about an atheist - I think this perspective allows us to answer that question. In particular, sometimes you might wonder why we can't be more tolerant of differing ideologies. Atheism isn't just a different ideology - it, by necessity, preaches immorality. I felt violated (to a certain extent) when I would ask people if they had any good reasons to not kill me and they couldn't answer - they essentially denied that my life (and anyone's life) has any sanctity or meaning. That is intolerable.
2. in addition to the atheists, i had some more positive discussions with a guy whose family goes to shul twice a year and fasts on yom kippur. And this has changed my perspective on the whole chiloni - dati relations situation. As an example, it used to be obvious to me that if possible, one should live in a totally dati neighborhood - why mix with chilonim who don't share our values and life goals? but take the other side - this is an unnatural situation, that there exist communities of jews who arent religious. while there were always yechidim, they in general left the jews and became goyim. now we have communities which, although the assimilation rate is high, are by and large long-term non-religious jewish communities. we cant just abandon our brothers and leave them like this - something needs to be done. what exactly, I don't know.
i've also learned through these discussions more about the degree of strength of my own religious convictions in different areas. If i am not comfortable with an idea, i will not be able to defend it well to others. maybe more about this some other time.
3. my (charedi) cousin started yeshiva gedolah this zman and is learning in ponevezh (by all accounts, one of the top charedi yeshivos in eretz yisrael). I was there for shabbos and they joked with me, "eliezer, next time you come, you can visit chaim in jail " - they just got a draft notice in the mail and while they were joking about it, the tension behind the joke was very real. also, while they were never rich (and thats an understatement, seeing as the father is a rosh kollel), finances weren't doing great either (the kollel wasn't paying anyone until it got more funds.) its easy to bash charedim for not going to the army / not working when you dont put a name to the face - its a lot harder when you know that these people are some of the nicest and best people you know. I still dont agree with what they do - in fact, im really appalled by some of it. but they really do think they're doing what g-d wants, and they are honest and good people. i don't want to see my cousin in jail, even if he doesn't go to the army, and i want my cousins to be able to put food on the table, even if they refuse to go to work. again, i dont know how to resolve this issue - all i know is that the current approach of war between the chilonim and charedim is not a mehalech.
(you might claim that my attitude towards other "enemies of the jewish people" might change if i would put a name to the face as well. very true. thats why i hate it when people have a friendly conversation with those i deem "enemy of the jewish people". it makes it harder to have blind hatred towards them and to dehumanize them - which in this extreme situation, is unfortunately necessary.)
I will leave off with a question to which I dont have a good answer: Fact: the only place in the torah where there is a remez to the idea that all of avodas hashem should be bisimcha (obviously there are specific mitzvos of simcha for yom tov, bikkurim, etc.) is in the tochacha this week - tachas asher lo avadta es hashem elokecha bisimcha - implication being that one should be oved es hashem bisimcha. see rabbeinu bichaye and the rambam who discuss how important simcha is in avodas hashem - isnt it odd that this is the only place it makes it into the torah?
wishing you from israel for the last time until i dont know when but hopefully very soon,
shabbat shalom.
Wednesday, August 14, 2013
Stirah in rambam taamei hamitzvos
The Ramban has a lengthy discussion about taamei hamitzvos in this week's parsha. He begins by citing the rambam, who posits in moreh nevuchim that every mitzvah has a reason. The rambam asks, if this is correct how do we explain the mishna האומר על קן צפור יגיעו רחמיך ומשתקין אותו, and the gemara which explains, מפני שעושה מדותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא רחמים ואינן אלא גזרות? The rambam answers that it is actually a machlokes in the gemara as to why it is prohibited to daven in this fashion - while one opinion thinks it is because we shouldn't assume that there are reasons for mitzvos, we paskin like the other opinion, who thinks there are reasons for mitzvos. according to him, we cannot daven in this fashion for another reason - מפני שמטיל קנאה במעשה בראשית.
This is well known. But I checked up how the Rambam quotes this mishna in the yad hachazaka, and look what he says: מי שאמר בתחנונים מי שריחם על קן ציפור שלא ליקח האם על הבנים או שלא לשחוט אותו ואת בנו ביום אחד ירחם עלינו וכיוצא בענין זה משתקין אותו. מפני שמצות אלו גזרת הכתוב הן ואינן רחמים. שאילו היו מפני רחמים לא היה מתיר לנו שחיטה כל עיקר. - the rambam paskins like the guy who says there are NO reasons for mitzvos!?!
Truth be told, while I have not seen it inside, I have been told that R Soloveitchik held that the rambam explains taamei hamitzvos very differently in the yad and in the moreh. In particular, the rav pointed to something m'inyana diyoma - a rambam in hilchos teshuva: אע"פ שתקיעת שופר בראש השנה גזירת הכתוב רמז יש בו כלומר עורו ישינים משנתכם ונרדמים הקיצו מתרדמתכם וחפשו במעשיכם וחזרו בתשובה וזכרו בוראכם. אלו השוכחים את האמת בהבלי הזמן ושוגים כל שנתם בהבל וריק אשר לא יועיל ולא יציל הביטו לנפשותיכם והטיבו דרכיכם ומעלליכם ויעזוב כל אחד מכם דרכו הרעה ומחשבתו אשר לא טובה. - what we see in this rambam is that even though there is a "taam" for tekias shofar, the rambam refuses to label it as such. rather, the mitzvah is a "gezeiras hakasuv" and the rationale is only a "remez".
Is this really a contradiction - I am not so comfortable with that. Or is there some way to be meyashev?(suggestions much appreciated as always.)
This is well known. But I checked up how the Rambam quotes this mishna in the yad hachazaka, and look what he says: מי שאמר בתחנונים מי שריחם על קן ציפור שלא ליקח האם על הבנים או שלא לשחוט אותו ואת בנו ביום אחד ירחם עלינו וכיוצא בענין זה משתקין אותו. מפני שמצות אלו גזרת הכתוב הן ואינן רחמים. שאילו היו מפני רחמים לא היה מתיר לנו שחיטה כל עיקר. - the rambam paskins like the guy who says there are NO reasons for mitzvos!?!
Truth be told, while I have not seen it inside, I have been told that R Soloveitchik held that the rambam explains taamei hamitzvos very differently in the yad and in the moreh. In particular, the rav pointed to something m'inyana diyoma - a rambam in hilchos teshuva: אע"פ שתקיעת שופר בראש השנה גזירת הכתוב רמז יש בו כלומר עורו ישינים משנתכם ונרדמים הקיצו מתרדמתכם וחפשו במעשיכם וחזרו בתשובה וזכרו בוראכם. אלו השוכחים את האמת בהבלי הזמן ושוגים כל שנתם בהבל וריק אשר לא יועיל ולא יציל הביטו לנפשותיכם והטיבו דרכיכם ומעלליכם ויעזוב כל אחד מכם דרכו הרעה ומחשבתו אשר לא טובה. - what we see in this rambam is that even though there is a "taam" for tekias shofar, the rambam refuses to label it as such. rather, the mitzvah is a "gezeiras hakasuv" and the rationale is only a "remez".
Is this really a contradiction - I am not so comfortable with that. Or is there some way to be meyashev?(suggestions much appreciated as always.)
Monday, August 12, 2013
First (and hopefully last) foray into politics in this venue
The only reason I'm doing this is because I think its connected to a Ramban in this week's parsha.
Also, I realize there's a lot more to say about this issue than I will say in 1 soundbite. But I want to offer an alternative to the way the debate is framed by many people.
The topic (which I was too embarrassed to put in the title): homosexuality - legal or illegal?
That's not really the question nowadays - homosexuality used to be illegal. Now its definitely legal, and the only question is whether we should recognize such a relationship as marriage. But let's go back to the primary question: as religious Jews, do we want / should we advocate for homosexuality to be illegal in America.
See here (http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/General+News/181249/Erick-Salgado-Wins-%27Halachic%27-Letter-of-Support-.html) where numerous rabbanim (including 2 roshei yeshiva at YU), sign a letter that it is halachically obligatory to vote for the candidate who is against legalizing gay marriage - and they would probably say the same if any candidate would have the guts nowadays to try to outlaw homosexuality in its entirety.
I have 2 comments. Number 1 is the ramban in this week's parsha (23: 18). The pasuk says, לֹא־תִהְיֶה קְדֵשָׁה מִבְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלֹא־יִהְיֶה קָדֵשׁ מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל: - there should not be people who are mukdash (not holy, but separated or designated) for znus amongst bnei yisrael.
Says the Ramban: אבל נראה שדעת בעל הברייתא הזו כענין שהזכרנו, יזהיר לב"ד שלא תעמוד האשה על אם הדרך לזנות, ... וכן יזהיר לב"ד על המזומן להיות נשכב מן הזכרים, ... ומלבד האזהרה בעושי העבירה יזהיר כאן בבית דין שלא יניחו להיות קדש בעינים על הדרך, כידוע מהם בארץ מצרים שעומדים על הדרך מכוסי הפנים כנשים לעשות התועבה הזאת. ודרשו בברייתא הזו, שאין אנו מוזהרים באחרים זולתנו אם יעשו עם רעיהם כן, שלא הוזהרנו אנחנו בגוים אלא בענין ע"ז בלבד: - We are not commanded to enforce sexual morality amongst the other nations - the extra words in the pasuk מִבְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל and מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל teach us that beis din should only enforce sexual morality amongst bnei yisrael. So its hard for me to imagine that it is halachically obligatory to vote for a candidate solely because of the issue of homosexuality when it seems to be explicit that we are not metzuveh to enforce this issue for goyim.
Ok. But the rabbonim aren't against legalizing homosexuality because they care about the goyim. To quote their letter, "The moral climate of the city we live in, affects the Jewish community as seen many times in the
Torah." So whether or not we are metzuveh to enforce morality in America, we should do so to enable ourselves to live in a better moral climate.
Which brings me to my second point. I think we would act very differently in American politics if we realized that we are in galus - we don't belong, and should feel uncomfortable, in a certain sense, in America.
If we felt like "strangers in the land", would we be comfortable enforcing our standards of morality upon others so that we could live in a better moral climate? Take as a parable the way you act as a guest in someone's house vs in your own house - in your own house, you'll make rules - you might not let TV in the house, or at least not allow certain shows to be watched, etc. But if you are a guest at someone's house, you're not going to come in and throw out their TV, or forcibly change the channel on them if they are watching a show you deem to be inappropriate. In an abstract sense, it might be morally correct to do so - you save both them and yourself from a corrupting moral influence. But even if you're in the right, you're not the boss - to try to enforce moral standards in someone else's house reflects a certain belief of ownership and privileges on your part - I have the right to be here as much as you do, and therefore I have a say in the moral running of your household.
We think we're Americans, and therefore we have the right to dictate morality in america just like every other citizen. But are we Americans or Israelis in galus?
In Israel, we should fight to make homosexuality illegal. But I think the issue is much more murky in America.
Which brings me to my final point. The Jewish community has a diverse range of needs in America, some more important than others, some which we should feel comfortable lobbying for, and others which we shouldn't. Can it really be so clear cut that it is halachically obligatory to vote for this 1 candidate? There isn't some shikul hadaas neccesary to determine who overall serves our interests the best which cannot be translated into a black and white psak halacha?
I'm done with the politics.
Also, I realize there's a lot more to say about this issue than I will say in 1 soundbite. But I want to offer an alternative to the way the debate is framed by many people.
The topic (which I was too embarrassed to put in the title): homosexuality - legal or illegal?
That's not really the question nowadays - homosexuality used to be illegal. Now its definitely legal, and the only question is whether we should recognize such a relationship as marriage. But let's go back to the primary question: as religious Jews, do we want / should we advocate for homosexuality to be illegal in America.
See here (http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/General+News/181249/Erick-Salgado-Wins-%27Halachic%27-Letter-of-Support-.html) where numerous rabbanim (including 2 roshei yeshiva at YU), sign a letter that it is halachically obligatory to vote for the candidate who is against legalizing gay marriage - and they would probably say the same if any candidate would have the guts nowadays to try to outlaw homosexuality in its entirety.
I have 2 comments. Number 1 is the ramban in this week's parsha (23: 18). The pasuk says, לֹא־תִהְיֶה קְדֵשָׁה מִבְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלֹא־יִהְיֶה קָדֵשׁ מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל: - there should not be people who are mukdash (not holy, but separated or designated) for znus amongst bnei yisrael.
Says the Ramban: אבל נראה שדעת בעל הברייתא הזו כענין שהזכרנו, יזהיר לב"ד שלא תעמוד האשה על אם הדרך לזנות, ... וכן יזהיר לב"ד על המזומן להיות נשכב מן הזכרים, ... ומלבד האזהרה בעושי העבירה יזהיר כאן בבית דין שלא יניחו להיות קדש בעינים על הדרך, כידוע מהם בארץ מצרים שעומדים על הדרך מכוסי הפנים כנשים לעשות התועבה הזאת. ודרשו בברייתא הזו, שאין אנו מוזהרים באחרים זולתנו אם יעשו עם רעיהם כן, שלא הוזהרנו אנחנו בגוים אלא בענין ע"ז בלבד: - We are not commanded to enforce sexual morality amongst the other nations - the extra words in the pasuk מִבְּנוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל and מִבְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל teach us that beis din should only enforce sexual morality amongst bnei yisrael. So its hard for me to imagine that it is halachically obligatory to vote for a candidate solely because of the issue of homosexuality when it seems to be explicit that we are not metzuveh to enforce this issue for goyim.
Ok. But the rabbonim aren't against legalizing homosexuality because they care about the goyim. To quote their letter, "The moral climate of the city we live in, affects the Jewish community as seen many times in the
Torah." So whether or not we are metzuveh to enforce morality in America, we should do so to enable ourselves to live in a better moral climate.
Which brings me to my second point. I think we would act very differently in American politics if we realized that we are in galus - we don't belong, and should feel uncomfortable, in a certain sense, in America.
If we felt like "strangers in the land", would we be comfortable enforcing our standards of morality upon others so that we could live in a better moral climate? Take as a parable the way you act as a guest in someone's house vs in your own house - in your own house, you'll make rules - you might not let TV in the house, or at least not allow certain shows to be watched, etc. But if you are a guest at someone's house, you're not going to come in and throw out their TV, or forcibly change the channel on them if they are watching a show you deem to be inappropriate. In an abstract sense, it might be morally correct to do so - you save both them and yourself from a corrupting moral influence. But even if you're in the right, you're not the boss - to try to enforce moral standards in someone else's house reflects a certain belief of ownership and privileges on your part - I have the right to be here as much as you do, and therefore I have a say in the moral running of your household.
We think we're Americans, and therefore we have the right to dictate morality in america just like every other citizen. But are we Americans or Israelis in galus?
In Israel, we should fight to make homosexuality illegal. But I think the issue is much more murky in America.
Which brings me to my final point. The Jewish community has a diverse range of needs in America, some more important than others, some which we should feel comfortable lobbying for, and others which we shouldn't. Can it really be so clear cut that it is halachically obligatory to vote for this 1 candidate? There isn't some shikul hadaas neccesary to determine who overall serves our interests the best which cannot be translated into a black and white psak halacha?
I'm done with the politics.
Sunday, August 11, 2013
shoftim - lo tassur and bal tosif
I've been AWOL for a while, but I'm back. This dvar torah is (loosely) based off shiurim R Twersky gave on yevamos (and a mussar shmooze he gave before purim) - but I warn you that I make no attempt to remain faithful to what he said and extend several concepts beyond where he went.
One of the most famous mitzvos in parshas shoftim is that of lo tassur - the mitzvas aseh and lo taaseh to listen to chachamim. In the words of the rambam - והמצוה הקע"ד היא שצונו לשמוע לבית דין הגדול ולעשות כל מה שיצוו בו מאיסור והיתר. ואין הבדל בזה בין הדבר שיסברוהו או הדבר שיוציאוהו בהקש מן ההקשים שהתורה נדרשת בהן או הדבר שיסכימו עליו שהוא סוד התורה או לפי ענין מן הענינים שיהיה דעתם שהוא ישר ושבו חזוק לתורה. הכל אנו חייבים לשמוע אותו ולעשותו ולעמוד על פיהם לא נעבור ממנו. והוא אמרו יתעלה (ר"פ שופטי') על פי התורה אשר יורוך. ולשון ספרי ועל המשפט אשר יאמרו לך תעשה זו מצות עשה. וכבר התבארו משפטי מצוה זו בסוף סנהדרין (פו ב - פט א
One rule that is part of this mitzvah is that while chazal have the right to make gezeiros, it is forbidden for chazal to make a "gezeirah ligzeirah" - a decree to protect another decree. Rashi in beitzah 2b tells us the source for this rule: והא דאמרינן בכולי תלמודא שאין גוזרין גזרה לגזרה - מהאי קרא נפקא: ושמרתם את משמרתי - עשו משמרת, כלומר גזרה, למשמרתי - לתורתי, ולא משמרת למשמרת, שלא יעשו גזרה לגזרה
Question: Without getting into the sources, there are numerous examples in Shas where chazal DO make gezeiros for gezeiros. (eg. beitzah 18a and rashi there "gezeirah legzeirah). If this is a real rule then how can we waive it whenever we feel like it?
Put that question on hold for now. Lets look at a fascinating Rambam at the very beginning of the yad hachazaka where he discusses the existence / nature of mitzvos derabanan.
ויש מצוות אחרות שנתחדשו אחר מתן תורה וקבעו אותן נביאים וחכמים ופשטו בכל ישראל כגון מקרא מגלה ונר חנוכה ותענית תשעה באב וידים ועירובין. ויש לכל מצוה מאלו פירושין ודקדוקין. והכל יתבאר בחבור זה: כל אלו המצוות שנתחדשו חייבין אנו לקבלם ולשמרם שנ' לא תסור מכל הדבר וכו', ואינם תוספת על מצוות התורה. ועל מה הזהירה תורה לא תוסף ולא תגרע, שלא יהיה נביא רשאי לחדש דבר ולומר שהקב"ה צוהו במצוה זו להוסיפה למצוות התורה או לחסר אחת מאלו השש מאות ושלש עשרה מצוות: אבל אם הוסיפו בית דין עם נביא שיהיה באותו הזמן מצוה דרך תקנה או דרך הוראה או דרך גזרה אין זו תוספת שהרי לא אמרו שהקב"ה צוה לעשות ערוב או לקרות המגלה בעונתה, ואילו אמרו כן היו מוסיפין על התורה: אלא כך אנו אומרין, שהנביאים עם בית דין תקנו וצוו לקרות המגלה בעונתה כדי להזכיר שבחיו של הקב"ה ותשועות שעשה לנו והיה קרוב לשועינו, כדי לברכו ולהללו וכדי להודיע לדורות הבאים שאמת מה שהבטיחנו בתורה כי מי גוי גדול אשר לו אלהים קרובים אליו כי"י אלהינו בכל קראנו אליו. ועל דרך זו היא כל מצוה ומצוה שהיא מדברי סופרים בין עשה בין לא תעשה
Question 1: The Rambam makes out this great tension between the mitzvah to listen to chachamim and the mitzvah of bal tosif - the prohibition to add on to the torah. He asks, shouldn't all mitzvos midrabanan be a violation of bal tosif, of adding to the torah? So he answers that since chazal don't pass off their mitzvos as mitzvos mideorysa, but rather, admit that their mitzvos are rabbinic in origin, they haven't violated bal tosif. But why does the question even start? Since the same torah that said bal tosif is assur allowed (and mandated) chazal to make gezeiros / takanos, shouldnt those gezeiros by definition not be a violation of bal tosif?
An example to make this clearer: The torah prohibits shechita on shabbos. The same torah commands us to shecht karbanos in the beis hamikdash on shabbos. Is that a contradiction - a question that needs answering? No! By allowing karbanos, the torah is making an exception to the rule it itself made.
The same logic can be applied here - the torah assurs adding new mitzvos - but the same torah commands chazal to make new mitzvos. So when chazal make new mitzvos, it is by definition a kiyum of lo tassur and not a violation of bal tosif.
In fact, the Rashba actually says this exact sevara, and I quote: דלא אמרו דאיכא משום בל תוסיף אלא במה שהוא מוסיף מדעת עצמו כגון כהן שהוסיף ברכה משלו ואי נמי ישן בשמיני בסוכה במתכוין למצוה ואי נמי במה שאירע במקרה שנתערב מתן אחת במתן ארבע וכיוצא באלו, אבל במה שעמדו חכמים ותקנו לצורך אין כאן בל תוסיף דכבר אמרה תורה על פי התורה אשר יורוך. - anything chazal command is by definition not bal tosif since the torah commanded us to listen to chachamim.
Another point to observe in the rambam: The rambam seems to go off on a hashkafic tangent in the middle of a halachic discussion (by the second bolding). The rambam is in the middle of differentiating between what type of mitzvos midrabanan would or would not violate bal tosif. Paraphrasing: 'If chazal pass their mitzvah off as deoraysa, they violate bal tosif. But if they admit that their mitzvah is drabanan, eg. by mikra megillah, where chazal admit that the mitzvah is derabanan and chazal enacted it to show that G-d is close to us whenever we call, etc etc on the drush, there is no violation of bal tosif.' Why is it here? Its obviously very important, but what does it have to do with the rambam's distinction concerning which mitzvos derabanan violate bal tosif?
The answer lies in the rambam's formulation of the ninth ikkar emunah: ויסוד התשיעי הבטול. והוא שזו תורת משה לא תבטל, ולא תבוא תורה מאת ה' זולתה, ולא יתוסף בה ולא יגרע ממנה לא בכתוב ולא בפירוש, אמר לא תוסף עליו ולא תגרע ממנו.
The source of the ikkar emunah that the torah won't change is the mitvah of bal tosif and bal tigra. What this means is that bal tosif and bal tigra are much more than just technical mitzvos - but rather, they frame the Jewish worldview by being part of our ikkarei emunah - our principles of faith.
Its not just a plain old issur to add to the torah - to add to the torah reflects heresy. Part of our faith is that G-d gave us a perfect Torah. Perfect means that it doesn't need improvement, it doesn't need the Christians, or Muslims, or anyone else, to come along and make changes and "refine" it. To add to the torah is to deny its, and in a sense, G-d's perfection, by implying that the torah needs your human input to be better / complete.
If bal tosif were a regular issur, our comparison to shechita on shabbos would hold. Just like we said by shechita, we would say the torah can make exceptions to the rules it itself made. But bal tosif is an idea - the torah is perfect and cannot be added to. If thats true, what room is there for chazal to add to / improve upon the torah? Doesn't the torah itself imply that it is not perfect since it leaves room for chazal to add to the torah - but that can't be?
With this perspective, we look at the Rambam's answer in an entirely new light. The hashkafic drush now becomes an integral part of the point the rambam is driving out. Says the rambam, chazal's license to enact new legislation doesn't violate the perfection of the torah as long as chazal recognize their limits - if they try to pass off their new law as a deoraysa, that reflects that they think the torah is imperfect - it needs their addition to be complete, which would be heretical. What chazal can do, however, is enact a law to apply the eternal, non-changing values of the torah to the new situations and circumstances of today. Thus, an enactment of chazal is not a violation of bal tosif if 1) chazal don't pass it off as deoraysa and (perhaps even more importantly) 2) the legistlation is a 'kiyum deoraysa' - it is an application of Torah values to new circumstances / realities. Mikra megillah isnt bal tosif because it reflects a value in the torah itself - to recognize the truth of the pasuk כי מי גוי גדול אשר לו אלהים קרובים אליו כי"י אלהינו בכל קראנו אליו. Thus, all chazal did when they legislated mikra megillah was to apply the values of the torah to the new historical reality of purim. That is the role G-d gave chachamim, and that doesn't conflict with the Torah's perfection. ועל דרך זו היא כל מצוה ומצוה שהיא מדברי סופרים בין עשה בין לא תעשה
Going back to where we started, rashi explained that gezeirah ligzeirah is assur because the torah only allows mishmeres latorah, but not a mishmeres limishmeres. This isn't just some technical rule - this goes to the heart of what we just discussed. To make a gezeirah to protect the torah is within the limits of chazal's authority. But to treat the means to an end as an end in and of itself -- to take a drabanan and treat it as if it has inherent value such that we should make another gezeirah to protect this drabanan is to violate bal tosif - to add to the torah.
But if we make a gezeirah ligzeirah, and our intent is not to protect the first gezeirah, but rather to even further protect the original din dioraysa the first gezeirah was meant to protect, then there is no issur of gezeirah ligzeirah. We aren't making a mishmeres limishmeres - we are just continuing to make a mishmeres latorah.
Shavua tov!
One of the most famous mitzvos in parshas shoftim is that of lo tassur - the mitzvas aseh and lo taaseh to listen to chachamim. In the words of the rambam - והמצוה הקע"ד היא שצונו לשמוע לבית דין הגדול ולעשות כל מה שיצוו בו מאיסור והיתר. ואין הבדל בזה בין הדבר שיסברוהו או הדבר שיוציאוהו בהקש מן ההקשים שהתורה נדרשת בהן או הדבר שיסכימו עליו שהוא סוד התורה או לפי ענין מן הענינים שיהיה דעתם שהוא ישר ושבו חזוק לתורה. הכל אנו חייבים לשמוע אותו ולעשותו ולעמוד על פיהם לא נעבור ממנו. והוא אמרו יתעלה (ר"פ שופטי') על פי התורה אשר יורוך. ולשון ספרי ועל המשפט אשר יאמרו לך תעשה זו מצות עשה. וכבר התבארו משפטי מצוה זו בסוף סנהדרין (פו ב - פט א
One rule that is part of this mitzvah is that while chazal have the right to make gezeiros, it is forbidden for chazal to make a "gezeirah ligzeirah" - a decree to protect another decree. Rashi in beitzah 2b tells us the source for this rule: והא דאמרינן בכולי תלמודא שאין גוזרין גזרה לגזרה - מהאי קרא נפקא: ושמרתם את משמרתי - עשו משמרת, כלומר גזרה, למשמרתי - לתורתי, ולא משמרת למשמרת, שלא יעשו גזרה לגזרה
Question: Without getting into the sources, there are numerous examples in Shas where chazal DO make gezeiros for gezeiros. (eg. beitzah 18a and rashi there "gezeirah legzeirah). If this is a real rule then how can we waive it whenever we feel like it?
Put that question on hold for now. Lets look at a fascinating Rambam at the very beginning of the yad hachazaka where he discusses the existence / nature of mitzvos derabanan.
ויש מצוות אחרות שנתחדשו אחר מתן תורה וקבעו אותן נביאים וחכמים ופשטו בכל ישראל כגון מקרא מגלה ונר חנוכה ותענית תשעה באב וידים ועירובין. ויש לכל מצוה מאלו פירושין ודקדוקין. והכל יתבאר בחבור זה: כל אלו המצוות שנתחדשו חייבין אנו לקבלם ולשמרם שנ' לא תסור מכל הדבר וכו', ואינם תוספת על מצוות התורה. ועל מה הזהירה תורה לא תוסף ולא תגרע, שלא יהיה נביא רשאי לחדש דבר ולומר שהקב"ה צוהו במצוה זו להוסיפה למצוות התורה או לחסר אחת מאלו השש מאות ושלש עשרה מצוות: אבל אם הוסיפו בית דין עם נביא שיהיה באותו הזמן מצוה דרך תקנה או דרך הוראה או דרך גזרה אין זו תוספת שהרי לא אמרו שהקב"ה צוה לעשות ערוב או לקרות המגלה בעונתה, ואילו אמרו כן היו מוסיפין על התורה: אלא כך אנו אומרין, שהנביאים עם בית דין תקנו וצוו לקרות המגלה בעונתה כדי להזכיר שבחיו של הקב"ה ותשועות שעשה לנו והיה קרוב לשועינו, כדי לברכו ולהללו וכדי להודיע לדורות הבאים שאמת מה שהבטיחנו בתורה כי מי גוי גדול אשר לו אלהים קרובים אליו כי"י אלהינו בכל קראנו אליו. ועל דרך זו היא כל מצוה ומצוה שהיא מדברי סופרים בין עשה בין לא תעשה
Question 1: The Rambam makes out this great tension between the mitzvah to listen to chachamim and the mitzvah of bal tosif - the prohibition to add on to the torah. He asks, shouldn't all mitzvos midrabanan be a violation of bal tosif, of adding to the torah? So he answers that since chazal don't pass off their mitzvos as mitzvos mideorysa, but rather, admit that their mitzvos are rabbinic in origin, they haven't violated bal tosif. But why does the question even start? Since the same torah that said bal tosif is assur allowed (and mandated) chazal to make gezeiros / takanos, shouldnt those gezeiros by definition not be a violation of bal tosif?
An example to make this clearer: The torah prohibits shechita on shabbos. The same torah commands us to shecht karbanos in the beis hamikdash on shabbos. Is that a contradiction - a question that needs answering? No! By allowing karbanos, the torah is making an exception to the rule it itself made.
The same logic can be applied here - the torah assurs adding new mitzvos - but the same torah commands chazal to make new mitzvos. So when chazal make new mitzvos, it is by definition a kiyum of lo tassur and not a violation of bal tosif.
In fact, the Rashba actually says this exact sevara, and I quote: דלא אמרו דאיכא משום בל תוסיף אלא במה שהוא מוסיף מדעת עצמו כגון כהן שהוסיף ברכה משלו ואי נמי ישן בשמיני בסוכה במתכוין למצוה ואי נמי במה שאירע במקרה שנתערב מתן אחת במתן ארבע וכיוצא באלו, אבל במה שעמדו חכמים ותקנו לצורך אין כאן בל תוסיף דכבר אמרה תורה על פי התורה אשר יורוך. - anything chazal command is by definition not bal tosif since the torah commanded us to listen to chachamim.
Another point to observe in the rambam: The rambam seems to go off on a hashkafic tangent in the middle of a halachic discussion (by the second bolding). The rambam is in the middle of differentiating between what type of mitzvos midrabanan would or would not violate bal tosif. Paraphrasing: 'If chazal pass their mitzvah off as deoraysa, they violate bal tosif. But if they admit that their mitzvah is drabanan, eg. by mikra megillah, where chazal admit that the mitzvah is derabanan and chazal enacted it to show that G-d is close to us whenever we call, etc etc on the drush, there is no violation of bal tosif.' Why is it here? Its obviously very important, but what does it have to do with the rambam's distinction concerning which mitzvos derabanan violate bal tosif?
The answer lies in the rambam's formulation of the ninth ikkar emunah: ויסוד התשיעי הבטול. והוא שזו תורת משה לא תבטל, ולא תבוא תורה מאת ה' זולתה, ולא יתוסף בה ולא יגרע ממנה לא בכתוב ולא בפירוש, אמר לא תוסף עליו ולא תגרע ממנו.
The source of the ikkar emunah that the torah won't change is the mitvah of bal tosif and bal tigra. What this means is that bal tosif and bal tigra are much more than just technical mitzvos - but rather, they frame the Jewish worldview by being part of our ikkarei emunah - our principles of faith.
Its not just a plain old issur to add to the torah - to add to the torah reflects heresy. Part of our faith is that G-d gave us a perfect Torah. Perfect means that it doesn't need improvement, it doesn't need the Christians, or Muslims, or anyone else, to come along and make changes and "refine" it. To add to the torah is to deny its, and in a sense, G-d's perfection, by implying that the torah needs your human input to be better / complete.
If bal tosif were a regular issur, our comparison to shechita on shabbos would hold. Just like we said by shechita, we would say the torah can make exceptions to the rules it itself made. But bal tosif is an idea - the torah is perfect and cannot be added to. If thats true, what room is there for chazal to add to / improve upon the torah? Doesn't the torah itself imply that it is not perfect since it leaves room for chazal to add to the torah - but that can't be?
With this perspective, we look at the Rambam's answer in an entirely new light. The hashkafic drush now becomes an integral part of the point the rambam is driving out. Says the rambam, chazal's license to enact new legislation doesn't violate the perfection of the torah as long as chazal recognize their limits - if they try to pass off their new law as a deoraysa, that reflects that they think the torah is imperfect - it needs their addition to be complete, which would be heretical. What chazal can do, however, is enact a law to apply the eternal, non-changing values of the torah to the new situations and circumstances of today. Thus, an enactment of chazal is not a violation of bal tosif if 1) chazal don't pass it off as deoraysa and (perhaps even more importantly) 2) the legistlation is a 'kiyum deoraysa' - it is an application of Torah values to new circumstances / realities. Mikra megillah isnt bal tosif because it reflects a value in the torah itself - to recognize the truth of the pasuk כי מי גוי גדול אשר לו אלהים קרובים אליו כי"י אלהינו בכל קראנו אליו. Thus, all chazal did when they legislated mikra megillah was to apply the values of the torah to the new historical reality of purim. That is the role G-d gave chachamim, and that doesn't conflict with the Torah's perfection. ועל דרך זו היא כל מצוה ומצוה שהיא מדברי סופרים בין עשה בין לא תעשה
Going back to where we started, rashi explained that gezeirah ligzeirah is assur because the torah only allows mishmeres latorah, but not a mishmeres limishmeres. This isn't just some technical rule - this goes to the heart of what we just discussed. To make a gezeirah to protect the torah is within the limits of chazal's authority. But to treat the means to an end as an end in and of itself -- to take a drabanan and treat it as if it has inherent value such that we should make another gezeirah to protect this drabanan is to violate bal tosif - to add to the torah.
But if we make a gezeirah ligzeirah, and our intent is not to protect the first gezeirah, but rather to even further protect the original din dioraysa the first gezeirah was meant to protect, then there is no issur of gezeirah ligzeirah. We aren't making a mishmeres limishmeres - we are just continuing to make a mishmeres latorah.
Shavua tov!
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