So lets actually focus on the question I threw out parenthetically in the previous post (copied here): When we ask about pharaoh's loss of bechira, are we bothered with the punishment brought afterwards for something which the person did not do, or are we bothered with the very fact that G-d takes someone's bechira / makes them do an aveirah?
We saw Rashi take the first side. The Ramban seems to do so as well: והנה פירשו בשאלה אשר ישאלו הכל, אם השם הקשה את לבו מה פשעו - lit. translation, if pharaoh was forced, what was his sin? we aren't bothered with how hashem could have forced him, we're just bothered with how hashem considered his refusal a sin and punished him for it, given that he was forced. Thus the Ramban answers: כי פרעה ברשעו אשר עשה לישראל רעות גדולות חנם, נתחייב למנוע ממנו דרכי תשובה, כאשר באו בזה פסוקים רבים בתורה ובכתובים, ולפי מעשיו הראשונים נדון. - Pharaoh wasn't punished for anything he did after his bechira was taken. But Hashem needed time to finish the punishment for all the evil he did beforehand with full free will. So Hashem had to "hold him down" and prevent him from doing teshuva so that he could be meted out the full punishment.
A mashal for understanding the ramban: when a kid is bad, he needs to be spanked. So you take your kid and lie him down, and begin spanking him - obviously after the first smack he's going to start crying out that he's sorry. But you need to finish the punishment = finish spanking him. So you ignore his "teshuva". Similarly, Hashem didn't let pharaoh say he's sorry and get out of the rest of the punishment the second the spanking got too tough - once you sin, you have to tough out the rest of your punishment even if you're now sorry.
The Rambam, while commonly interpreted in line with this ramban, disagrees (I think). Take a look:
ואפשר שיחטא אדם חטא גדול או חטאים רבים עד שיתן הדין לפני דיין האמת שיהא הפרעון מזה החוטא על חטאים אלו שעשה ברצונו ומדעתו שמונעין ממנו התשובה ואין מניחין לו רשות לשוב מרשעו כדי שימות ויאבד בחטאו שיעשה, הוא שהקב"ה אמר על ידי ישעיהו השמן לב העם הזה וגו', וכן הוא אומר ויהיו מלעיבים במלאכי האלהים ובוזים דבריו ומתעתעים בנביאיו עד עלות חמת ה' בעמו עד לאין מרפא, כלומר חטאו ברצונם והרבו לפשוע עד שנתחייבו למנוע מהן התשובה שהיא המרפא, לפיכך כתוב בתורה ואני אחזק את לב פרעה, לפי שחטא מעצמו תחלה והרע לישראל הגרים בארצו שנאמר הבה נתחכמה לו, נתן הדין למנוע התשובה ממנו עד שנפרע ממנו, לפיכך חזק הקב"ה את לבו, ולמה היה שולח לו ביד משה ואומר שלח ועשה תשובה וכבר אמר לו הקב"ה אין אתה משלח שנאמר ואתה ועבדיך ידעתי וגו' ואולם בעבור זאת העמדתיך, כדי להודיע לבאי העולם שבזמן שמונע הקב"ה התשובה לחוטא אינו יכול לשוב אלא ימות ברשעו שעשה בתחילה ברצונו,
וכענין זה שואלין הצדיקים והנביאים בתפלתם מאת ה' לעזרם על האמת, כמו שאמר דוד הורני ה' דרכך, כלומר אל ימנעוני חטאי דרך האמת שממנה אדע דרכך ויחוד שמך, וכן זה שאמר ורוח נדיבה תסמכני כלומר תניח רוחי לעשות חפצך ואל יגרמו לי חטאי למונעני מתשובה אלא תהיה הרשות בידי עד שאחזור ואבין ואדע דרך האמת, ועל דרך זו כל הדומה לפסוקים אלו.
The Rambam tells us that when a person loses their bechira, its only because they ultimately face death and kares - their soul dies forever. Notice that the ramban made no mention of that. I believe that that is an important machlokes.
Already the Rambam does not fit with our spanking the child mashal. You don't spank your child to kill him! You just need to finish the punishment. Thats obviously not the idea that the rambam is referring to.
Within this Rambam there is another hidden machlokes between him and the ramban, this time concerning the purpose of the makkos. The Ramban in parshas bo famously tells us what he believes to be the purpose of yetzias mitzraim and the makkos / nissim/ niflaos performed in egypt:
ועתה אומר לך כלל בטעם מצות רבות. הנה מעת היות ע"ג בעולם מימי אנוש החלו הדעות להשתבש באמונה, מהם כופרים בעיקר ואומרים כי העולם קדמון, כחשו בה' ויאמרו לא הוא, ומהם מכחישים בידיעתו הפרטית ואמרו איכה ידע אל ויש דעה בעליון (תהלים עג יא), ומהם שיודו בידיעה ומכחישים בהשגחה ויעשו אדם כדגי הים שלא ישגיח האל בהם ואין עמהם עונש או שכר, יאמרו עזב ה' את הארץ. וכאשר ירצה האלהים בעדה או ביחיד ויעשה עמהם מופת בשנוי מנהגו של עולם וטבעו, יתברר לכל בטול הדעות האלה כלם, כי המופת הנפלא מורה שיש לעולם אלוה מחדשו, ויודע ומשגיח ויכול. וכאשר יהיה המופת ההוא נגזר תחלה מפי נביא יתברר ממנו עוד אמתת הנבואה, כי ידבר האלהים את האדם ויגלה סודו אל עבדיו הנביאים, ותתקיים עם זה התורה כלה:
ולכן יאמר הכתוב במופתים למען תדע כי אני ה' בקרב הארץ (לעיל ח יח), להורות על ההשגחה, כי לא עזב אותה למקרים כדעתם. ואמר (שם ט כט) למען תדע כי לה' הארץ, להורות על החידוש, כי הם שלו שבראם מאין ואמר (שם ט יד) בעבור תדע כי אין כמוני בכל הארץ. להורות על היכולת, שהוא שליט בכל, אין מעכב בידו, כי בכל זה היו המצריים מכחישים או מסתפקים. אם כן האותות והמופתים הגדולים עדים נאמנים באמונת הבורא ובתורה כלה:
The Rambam cannot agree to this. The Rambam writes in hilchos yesodei hatorah that osos and mofsim were never performed to prove the existence or capabilites of Hashem. What we need to know in emunah, we know from har sinai:
משה רבינו לא האמינו בו ישראל מפני האותות שעשה. שהמאמין על פי האותות יש בלבו דופי שאפשר שיעשה האות בלט וכשוף. אלא כל האותות שעשה משה במדבר לפי הצורך עשאם. לא להביא ראיה על הנבואה. היה צריך להשקיע את המצריים קרע את הים והצלילן בתוכו. צרכנו למזון הוריד לנו את המן. צמאו בקע להן את האבן. כפרו בו עדת קרח בלעה אותן הארץ. וכן שאר כל האותות. ובמה האמינו בו במעמד הר סיני שעינינו ראו ולא זר ואזנינו שמעו ולא אחר האש והקולות והלפידים והוא נגש אל הערפל והקול מדבר אליו ואנו שומעים משה משה לך אמור להן כך וכך.
Thus, it is no surprise that the rambam here in hilchos teshuvah offers an entirely different understanding of the nature / purpose of the makkos. I re-copy from above the relevant segment:
ולמה היה שולח לו ביד משה ואומר שלח ועשה תשובה וכבר אמר לו הקב"ה אין אתה משלח שנאמר ואתה ועבדיך ידעתי וגו' ואולם בעבור זאת העמדתיך, כדי להודיע לבאי העולם שבזמן שמונע הקב"ה התשובה לחוטא אינו יכול לשוב אלא ימות ברשעו שעשה בתחילה ברצונו
The same pasuk that the ramban interprets as demonstrating G-d's capabilities / yecholes, the Rambam understands to be demonstrating G-d's hanhaga - not to prove what He can do, but to show what He does do. The purpose of the makkos was to teach the hanhaga that Hashem can take away someone's ability to do teshuva and leave them to die like that - in this world and the next.
The Ramban agrees that we need pesukim to teach us the hanhaga of taking away someone's bechira chofshis, but he would never entertain the notion that that is the purpose of the makkos! Thats because the way the Ramban understands the concept, its not nearly so radical - its not a qualitatively new type of punishment, just a chiddush in the way G-d applies the same old punishments from before. For the Rambam, something much deeper is going on.
The Rambam says that it is because of this lesson from Pharaoh that tzaddikim plead with G-d to prevent their sins from blocking between themselves and Hashem. This is the strongest proof that the rambam is entirely different from the ramban - for the ramban, there is no connection between menias habechira to finish a punishment and a tzaddik's fear of a disconnect between him and hashem. From where did the rambam draw this connection?
The pshat in the rambam is given away by the question we started with. The ramban was only worried about how hashem could punish pharaoh with the makkos after hardening his heart. The rambam wasn't primarily worried about the physical punishments like makkos, although that certainly is a difficulty as well. The heart of the question, however, is much more profound - how could Hashem take away a person's bechira and make them do aveiros?
Answers the Rambam, hashem can only do this if the person no longer deserves to be a human being / a baal bechirah. If someone abuses free will past a certain point, they no longer deserve it, and hence it is taken away and the person is nichras. Menias Habechira must be followed by kares because they together form the ultimate punishment for a person who has no connection to anything good - we strip him of his status as a human being and he is forever cut off and severed from G-d. (The kashya from the makkos is now answered mimeila - if we're giving this guy kares anyways, extra makkos don't really matter anymore.)
The Rambam is saying something frightening - bechira chofshis, to be a human being, is not a "right" - it is a privilege. Someone who abuses it forfeits their status as human - without bechira, there is no difference between them and a behema.
Thus, even if we don't sin quite like pharaoh, the lesson of pharoah applies on our level as well. We daven that our sins should not block between us and Hashem because every aveirah we do makes us unworthy of the bechira we were given with which we performed an aveirah. Every aveirah is pogem in our nature as tzelem elokim - and it is only through the great mercy of G-d that he gives us a chance to do teshuvah and begin again to exercise our bechirah in the way it was meant to be used.
One might wonder why the whole point and lesson of the makkos is to teach us this one random hanhaga of hashem - that he sometimes takes away bechira. But with this background, we understand completely.
The whole point of yetzias mitzraim is freedom - Hashem frees the Jews from their egyptian oppressors. But within that, G-d needs to tell us what freedom is and what it is not. Do we have freedom to go become atheists, or deviants and miscreants?
No! Freedom, says G-d, is not a right. Its a privilege. and when you abuse it, you lose your freedom / bechira, and with it your status as a human being, and you are nichras.
Freedom is the freedom to live with dignity, and to live with dignity is to live with purpose. Thats the freedom of yetzias mitzraim, and that is meaningful.
We should all be zocheh!
Sunday, December 29, 2013
Saturday, December 28, 2013
bechira chofshis 1
Bechira chofshis comes up big time in this week's parsha with the hardening of pharoah's heart - so commonly discussed that it is difficult to imagine having anything interesting to say. Nonetheless, two points:
1. rashi (often overlooked): ג) ואני אקשה - מאחר שהרשיע והתריס כנגדי, וגלוי לפני שאין נחת רוח באומות עובדי עבודה זרה לתת לב שלם לשוב, טוב לי שיתקשה לבו למען הרבות בו אותותי ותכירו אתם את גבורותי. וכן מדתו של הקב"ה מביא פורענות על האומות עובדי עבודה זרה כדי שישמעו ישראל וייראו, שנאמר (צפניה ג ו) הכרתי גוים נשמו פנותם וגו', (שם ז) אמרתי אך תיראי אותי תקחי מוסר, ואף על פי כן בחמש מכות הראשונות לא נאמר ויחזק ה' את לב פרעה, אלא ויחזק לב פרעה:
This Rashi seems to be like the ibn ezra / rambam we quoted last week - how is it just that hashem stole the bechira chofshis of the goyim and then punished them, or brings tzaros upon them with apparently no justification (it is fascinating to note the two possible ways to formulate the question about bechira - are we bothered with the punishment brought afterwards for something which the person did not do, or are we bothered with the very fact that G-d takes someone's bechira / makes them do an aveirah. it seems that rashi is only bothered with the former, but I'm not yet convinced that the other rishonim all agree with rashi's formulation of the question.) Answers Rashi, G-d doesn't care - he does it for klal yisrael. This sounds exactly like the rambam about shechitas behemos.
2. The famous teretz of the ramban / rambam (whom most people put them together) is that pharoah lost his bechira chofshis due to his prior sins. Hashem has the right to take away someone's bechira and keep punishing them as part of what they deserve for their first sins that were done with full free will. Whats fascinating about this answer is its implications for the distinction between persuasion / coercion.
That is, isn't there a much easier way out of this dilemma - just because hashem manipulates a person towards one direction, is that automatically coercion to the point where this person has lost his free will?
The gemara in brachos (10a) has a story where r meir wanted to daven that some people who were really bothering him should die, and his wife told him to daven instead that these people do teshuvah. The maharsha asks, how can you daven for someone to do teshuva - doesn't that impinge upon their bechira? The answer commonly given is that Hashem can manipulate/ persuade people in a way that somehow still leaves them with bechira chofshis - so how do we know that that isn't what hashem did to pharoah?
A similar question comes up in halacha (this is nogea to the news that ba-avonoseinu harabbim keeps coming up) with regards to get meuseh. A get that is forced is invalid. Obviously, however, one is allowed to persuade someone to give their wife a get, as long as the persuasion does not cross the line and become coercion. The question is, where is that line? (If hashem had made pharoah give a get, would it have been kosher?)
1. rashi (often overlooked): ג) ואני אקשה - מאחר שהרשיע והתריס כנגדי, וגלוי לפני שאין נחת רוח באומות עובדי עבודה זרה לתת לב שלם לשוב, טוב לי שיתקשה לבו למען הרבות בו אותותי ותכירו אתם את גבורותי. וכן מדתו של הקב"ה מביא פורענות על האומות עובדי עבודה זרה כדי שישמעו ישראל וייראו, שנאמר (צפניה ג ו) הכרתי גוים נשמו פנותם וגו', (שם ז) אמרתי אך תיראי אותי תקחי מוסר, ואף על פי כן בחמש מכות הראשונות לא נאמר ויחזק ה' את לב פרעה, אלא ויחזק לב פרעה:
This Rashi seems to be like the ibn ezra / rambam we quoted last week - how is it just that hashem stole the bechira chofshis of the goyim and then punished them, or brings tzaros upon them with apparently no justification (it is fascinating to note the two possible ways to formulate the question about bechira - are we bothered with the punishment brought afterwards for something which the person did not do, or are we bothered with the very fact that G-d takes someone's bechira / makes them do an aveirah. it seems that rashi is only bothered with the former, but I'm not yet convinced that the other rishonim all agree with rashi's formulation of the question.) Answers Rashi, G-d doesn't care - he does it for klal yisrael. This sounds exactly like the rambam about shechitas behemos.
2. The famous teretz of the ramban / rambam (whom most people put them together) is that pharoah lost his bechira chofshis due to his prior sins. Hashem has the right to take away someone's bechira and keep punishing them as part of what they deserve for their first sins that were done with full free will. Whats fascinating about this answer is its implications for the distinction between persuasion / coercion.
That is, isn't there a much easier way out of this dilemma - just because hashem manipulates a person towards one direction, is that automatically coercion to the point where this person has lost his free will?
The gemara in brachos (10a) has a story where r meir wanted to daven that some people who were really bothering him should die, and his wife told him to daven instead that these people do teshuvah. The maharsha asks, how can you daven for someone to do teshuva - doesn't that impinge upon their bechira? The answer commonly given is that Hashem can manipulate/ persuade people in a way that somehow still leaves them with bechira chofshis - so how do we know that that isn't what hashem did to pharoah?
A similar question comes up in halacha (this is nogea to the news that ba-avonoseinu harabbim keeps coming up) with regards to get meuseh. A get that is forced is invalid. Obviously, however, one is allowed to persuade someone to give their wife a get, as long as the persuasion does not cross the line and become coercion. The question is, where is that line? (If hashem had made pharoah give a get, would it have been kosher?)
Saturday, December 21, 2013
Does G-d have to play by the rules?
I did not get a chance to research this as much as I would want, but off the cuff, there is a fascinating machlokes in this week's parsha that seems to relate to this question.
וְשָׁאֲלָה אִשָּׁה מִשְּׁכֶנְתָּהּ וּמִגָּרַת בֵּיתָהּ כְּלֵי־כֶסֶף וּכְלֵי זָהָב וּשְׂמָלֹת וְשַׂמְתֶּם עַל־בְּנֵיכֶם וְעַל־בְּנֹתֵיכֶם וְנִצַּלְתֶּם אֶת־מִצְרָיִם: - G-d seems to be promising Moshe that bnei yisrael will ask to "borrow" all the Egyptians stuff, and then never pay it back -- in English, stealing! How is that ok?
Take a look at these two diametrically opposed answers:
Ibn Ezra:
ויש מתאוננים ואומרים כי אבותינו גנבים היו. ואלה הלא יראו, כי מצוה עליונה היתה. ואין טעם לשאול למה, כי השם ברא הכל, והוא נתן עושר למי שירצה ויקחנו מידו ויתננו לאחר. ואין זה רע, כי הכל שלו הוא.
Rashbam:
ושאלה אשה משכנתה - במתנה גמורה וחלוטה, שהרי [כתוב] ונתתי את חן העם. כמו שאל ממני ואתנה גוים נחלתך. זהו עיקר פשוטו ותשובה למינים: - I don't need to tell you that the "minim" he is referring to learn the pasuk like the Ibn Ezra and therefore claimed that G-d is a thief.
Take a look at this peirush hamishnayos of the rambam (bava kamma 4: 3) which I cannot translate here. All I'll say is that the last time I looked at it 3 years ago (a friend of mine showed it to me when we were learning BK), I thought that it put the Rambam on the Ibn Ezra's side in the above debate. Now I'm not so sure (though I recall that there might have been different girsaos that affected the interpretation):
ג] אם אירע דין לישראל עם גוי הרי אופן המשפט ביניהם כמו שאבאר לך, אם היה לנו בדיניהם זכות דננו להם בדיניהם ואמרנו להם כך דיניכם, ואם היה יותר טוב לנו שנדון בדינינו דננו להם לפי דינינו ונאמר להם כך דינינו. ואל יקשה בעיניך דבר זה ואל תתמה עליו כמו שלא תתמה על שחיטת בעלי החיים אף על פי שלא עשו שום רע, לפי שמי שלא נשלמו בו התכונות האנושיות אינו אדם באמת ואין תכליתו אלא לאדם, והדבור על ענין זה צריך ספר מיוחד.
I'm curious as to which side of this machlokes people relate to more, and why. My initial (rational) reaction was to favor the Ibn Ezra - isn't his logic compelling - if G-d created the world, then he owns it and he's allowed to do whatever he wants with it -- including stealing from the mitzrim, killing amalekim, etc. etc. How does the rashbam respond to that?
וְשָׁאֲלָה אִשָּׁה מִשְּׁכֶנְתָּהּ וּמִגָּרַת בֵּיתָהּ כְּלֵי־כֶסֶף וּכְלֵי זָהָב וּשְׂמָלֹת וְשַׂמְתֶּם עַל־בְּנֵיכֶם וְעַל־בְּנֹתֵיכֶם וְנִצַּלְתֶּם אֶת־מִצְרָיִם: - G-d seems to be promising Moshe that bnei yisrael will ask to "borrow" all the Egyptians stuff, and then never pay it back -- in English, stealing! How is that ok?
Take a look at these two diametrically opposed answers:
Ibn Ezra:
ויש מתאוננים ואומרים כי אבותינו גנבים היו. ואלה הלא יראו, כי מצוה עליונה היתה. ואין טעם לשאול למה, כי השם ברא הכל, והוא נתן עושר למי שירצה ויקחנו מידו ויתננו לאחר. ואין זה רע, כי הכל שלו הוא.
Rashbam:
ושאלה אשה משכנתה - במתנה גמורה וחלוטה, שהרי [כתוב] ונתתי את חן העם. כמו שאל ממני ואתנה גוים נחלתך. זהו עיקר פשוטו ותשובה למינים: - I don't need to tell you that the "minim" he is referring to learn the pasuk like the Ibn Ezra and therefore claimed that G-d is a thief.
Take a look at this peirush hamishnayos of the rambam (bava kamma 4: 3) which I cannot translate here. All I'll say is that the last time I looked at it 3 years ago (a friend of mine showed it to me when we were learning BK), I thought that it put the Rambam on the Ibn Ezra's side in the above debate. Now I'm not so sure (though I recall that there might have been different girsaos that affected the interpretation):
ג] אם אירע דין לישראל עם גוי הרי אופן המשפט ביניהם כמו שאבאר לך, אם היה לנו בדיניהם זכות דננו להם בדיניהם ואמרנו להם כך דיניכם, ואם היה יותר טוב לנו שנדון בדינינו דננו להם לפי דינינו ונאמר להם כך דינינו. ואל יקשה בעיניך דבר זה ואל תתמה עליו כמו שלא תתמה על שחיטת בעלי החיים אף על פי שלא עשו שום רע, לפי שמי שלא נשלמו בו התכונות האנושיות אינו אדם באמת ואין תכליתו אלא לאדם, והדבור על ענין זה צריך ספר מיוחד.
I'm curious as to which side of this machlokes people relate to more, and why. My initial (rational) reaction was to favor the Ibn Ezra - isn't his logic compelling - if G-d created the world, then he owns it and he's allowed to do whatever he wants with it -- including stealing from the mitzrim, killing amalekim, etc. etc. How does the rashbam respond to that?
Wednesday, December 18, 2013
chizuk huddle - shema yisrael
Last year, R Twersky's shiur initiated a "chizuk huddle" once a week where we "huddle" in a corner of the bies medrash after seder one day and someone gives chizuk/mussar/divrei hashkafah for five minutes. Today one of the most chashuv of the chavrei hakollel was the "rosh huddle" and he said a mehalech I would like to share.
We know that rashi tells us that when yaakov came down to mitzraim to meet yosef for the first time in 22 years, yosef cried on yaakov's shoulders - but yaakov didn't cry: אבל יעקב לא נפל על צוארי יוסף ולא נשקו, ואמרו רבותינו שהיה קורא את שמע
Obviously Yaakov isn't callous about the tremendous emotional significance of this reunion. But rather, rashi is telling us that Yaakov somehow felt that the most appropriate reaction to this momentous occasion was not to cry, as yosef did, but rather to recite krias shema. why?
Chazal identify krias shema with yaakov avinu in another famous gemara cited by the rambam in hilchos kerias shema 1: 4 (There are some changes from the way the story is presented in the gemara, but not for now): הקורא קריאת שמע כשהוא גומר פסוק ראשון אומר בלחש ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד וחוזר וקורא כדרכו ואהבת את יי' אלהיך עד סופה. ולמה קורין כן מסורת היא בידינו שבשעה שקבץ יעקב אבינו את בניו במצרים בשעת מיתתו ציום וזרזם על יחוד השם ועל דרך ה' שהלך בה אברהם ויצחק אביו ושאל אותם ואמר להם בני שמא יש בכם פסלות מי שאינו עומד עמי ביחוד השם כענין שאמר לנו משה רבינו פן יש בכם איש או אשה וגו' ענו כולם ואמרו שמע ישראל יי' אלהינו יי' אחד, כלומר שמע ממנו אבינו ישראל יי' אלהינו יי' אחד, פתח הזקן ואמר ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד. לפיכך נהגו כל ישראל לומר שבח ששבח בו ישראל הזקן אחר פסוק זה:
So yaakov has this unique association with krias shema because on one level, the yisrael referred to in the pasuk is yaakov avinu. but this story also reveals a deeper level of association. Yaakov, on his deathbead was trying to one last time be mizarez his children in yichud hashem - but he can't do that if one of them isn't in it - there has to be achdus, a unity of purpose amongst the brothers, for them to be able to properly accept ol malchus shamayim / the unity of G-d. Thats why yaakov asked, שמא יש בכם פסלות. and the brothers responded, shema yisrael - we as one accept yichud hashem. This was what caused yaakov avinu to praise hashem with the shevach of baruch shem.
So we see that the statement shema yisrael signifies more than a personal acceptance of kabbalas ol malchus shamayim - it is about klal yisrael unifying, coming together in achdus, to as one be mekabel hashem as one. When yosef wasn't there, yaakov couldn't recite kerias shema - there was no achdus. The reunion with yosef is the ultimate restoration of achdus and hence there is no more appropriate time to recite kerias shema. It is no coincidence that the rashi right before this one emphasizes the connection between the achdus of klal yisrael and yichud hashem: כל הנפש הבאה ליעקב - מצאתי בויקרא רבה (ד ו) עשו שש נפשות היו לו והכתוב קורא אותן (לעיל לו ו) נפשות ביתו, לשון רבים, לפי שהיו עובדין לאלהות הרבה, יעקב שבעים היו לו והכתוב קורא אותן נפש, לפי שהיו עובדים לאל אחד:
The unity of klal yisrael and the unity of g-d are inextricably linked - both in the sense that achdus is meaningful in that it leads to and reflects yichud hashem and in the sense that kabbalas ol malchus shamayim is meaningless if there is strife and discord. I think this idea connects back to our discussion of yaakov avinu lo mes - specifically yaakov didn't die because only in yaakov is there a potential for all his desendants to come together as one to declare yichud hashem - mah zaro bichaim, af hu bichaim. if thats true, then even today, when we say shema yisrael, we can refer not only to klal yisrael, but also to yisrael sabba, yaakov avinu who is still alive with us today by virtue of our recitation of the shema. We should be zocheh to merit ziruz both in yichud /achdus within klal yisrael and yichud hashem.
We know that rashi tells us that when yaakov came down to mitzraim to meet yosef for the first time in 22 years, yosef cried on yaakov's shoulders - but yaakov didn't cry: אבל יעקב לא נפל על צוארי יוסף ולא נשקו, ואמרו רבותינו שהיה קורא את שמע
Obviously Yaakov isn't callous about the tremendous emotional significance of this reunion. But rather, rashi is telling us that Yaakov somehow felt that the most appropriate reaction to this momentous occasion was not to cry, as yosef did, but rather to recite krias shema. why?
Chazal identify krias shema with yaakov avinu in another famous gemara cited by the rambam in hilchos kerias shema 1: 4 (There are some changes from the way the story is presented in the gemara, but not for now): הקורא קריאת שמע כשהוא גומר פסוק ראשון אומר בלחש ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד וחוזר וקורא כדרכו ואהבת את יי' אלהיך עד סופה. ולמה קורין כן מסורת היא בידינו שבשעה שקבץ יעקב אבינו את בניו במצרים בשעת מיתתו ציום וזרזם על יחוד השם ועל דרך ה' שהלך בה אברהם ויצחק אביו ושאל אותם ואמר להם בני שמא יש בכם פסלות מי שאינו עומד עמי ביחוד השם כענין שאמר לנו משה רבינו פן יש בכם איש או אשה וגו' ענו כולם ואמרו שמע ישראל יי' אלהינו יי' אחד, כלומר שמע ממנו אבינו ישראל יי' אלהינו יי' אחד, פתח הזקן ואמר ברוך שם כבוד מלכותו לעולם ועד. לפיכך נהגו כל ישראל לומר שבח ששבח בו ישראל הזקן אחר פסוק זה:
So yaakov has this unique association with krias shema because on one level, the yisrael referred to in the pasuk is yaakov avinu. but this story also reveals a deeper level of association. Yaakov, on his deathbead was trying to one last time be mizarez his children in yichud hashem - but he can't do that if one of them isn't in it - there has to be achdus, a unity of purpose amongst the brothers, for them to be able to properly accept ol malchus shamayim / the unity of G-d. Thats why yaakov asked, שמא יש בכם פסלות. and the brothers responded, shema yisrael - we as one accept yichud hashem. This was what caused yaakov avinu to praise hashem with the shevach of baruch shem.
So we see that the statement shema yisrael signifies more than a personal acceptance of kabbalas ol malchus shamayim - it is about klal yisrael unifying, coming together in achdus, to as one be mekabel hashem as one. When yosef wasn't there, yaakov couldn't recite kerias shema - there was no achdus. The reunion with yosef is the ultimate restoration of achdus and hence there is no more appropriate time to recite kerias shema. It is no coincidence that the rashi right before this one emphasizes the connection between the achdus of klal yisrael and yichud hashem: כל הנפש הבאה ליעקב - מצאתי בויקרא רבה (ד ו) עשו שש נפשות היו לו והכתוב קורא אותן (לעיל לו ו) נפשות ביתו, לשון רבים, לפי שהיו עובדין לאלהות הרבה, יעקב שבעים היו לו והכתוב קורא אותן נפש, לפי שהיו עובדים לאל אחד:
The unity of klal yisrael and the unity of g-d are inextricably linked - both in the sense that achdus is meaningful in that it leads to and reflects yichud hashem and in the sense that kabbalas ol malchus shamayim is meaningless if there is strife and discord. I think this idea connects back to our discussion of yaakov avinu lo mes - specifically yaakov didn't die because only in yaakov is there a potential for all his desendants to come together as one to declare yichud hashem - mah zaro bichaim, af hu bichaim. if thats true, then even today, when we say shema yisrael, we can refer not only to klal yisrael, but also to yisrael sabba, yaakov avinu who is still alive with us today by virtue of our recitation of the shema. We should be zocheh to merit ziruz both in yichud /achdus within klal yisrael and yichud hashem.
Sunday, December 15, 2013
pikuach nefesh on shabbos - value education
This is a semi -halachic analysis. As with all halacha I ever write, I put forth the standard disclaimer regarding my lack of halachic authority.
The halacha is that pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos - If there is danger to life, then it is not only permissable, but it is obligatory to violate the shabbos
Not only vadai pikuach nefesh, but even safek pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos. Thus, if you see a person drop suddenly on shabbos and you're not sure if they face a life threatening issue, you should still violate the shabbos to ensure their safety (eg. taking them to a hospital, etc.)
The question becomes, how far does it go - is anything and everything a safek pikuach nefesh? I don't know if people have thought about this much, but from the (thankfully) few situations I've been in it always makes me nervous that I don't really know how to tell if something is pikuach nefesh or not such that we should be mechalel shabbos.
What if someone experiences symptoms that seem most likely to not be anything dangerous, but there is a definite possibility that there is a real sakanah here - (I'm no doctor, so my examples are probably bad, but lets say one has a persistent pain in the stomach that could just be nothing or perhaps it is appendicitis. The point is that the safek is not a safek hashakul - its not 50-50 that this is life threatening, but rather, the odds seem to point to it not being life threatening, despite the possibility that it is indeed dangerous.) If we say that it doesn't have to be 50-50 to save, then how far do we go: 90-10, 99-1, 99.999-0.001?
If there is a community in which there is an epidemic disease spreading, can they eat on yom kippur to protect themselves against the possible life threatening danger of falling ill?
If one hasn't yet received a standard vaccination (no epidemics, just normal circumstances) can one take it on shabbos or should they wait till after shabbos?
If someone does research in medical techniques to treat cancer, can they work on shabbos since their research may ultimately save lives - and the quicker its done, the sooner lives can be saved?
I don't think the halacha is the same in each of those cases - all I'm trying to show is how amorphous the concept of safek pikuach nefesh is.
One approach that I recall R Twersky quoting once to limit the principle of pikuach nefesh being docheh shabbos is that we only apply said principle when there is a "choleh lifanecha" - an actual person we can identify whose life we are trying to save. By the medical research question, there is no choleh lifanecha - these techniques are being developed to treat unknown people at some unknown time in the future. I don't remember if R Twersky also used this principle in the second example concerning eating on yom kippur, possibly arguing that since you aren't ill yet, there is no choleh lifanecha to be mattir achilah on yom kippur.
The problem with this approach is that it doesn't seem to have any source- and it would seem to limit the principle of pikuach nefesh docheh shabbos in cases where common sense says it shouldn't be limited, eg. case 2.
R Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, quoted in a footnote at the beginning of the 32nd perek of shemiras shabbos kehilchasah and originally in a teshuvah (chelek 2:37) I saw today in minchas shlomo, seems to have a different approach:
ולענין עיקר הדבר מה נקרא ספק פקו"נ ומה לא, ועד איפה הוא הגבול, גם אנכי בעניי הסתפקתי טובא בזה, אלא שמצד הסברא נלענ"ד דכל שדרך רוב בני אדם לברוח מזה כבורח מפני הסכנה ה"ז חשיב כספק פקוח נפש וקרינן ביה בכה"ג וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם, אבל אם אין רוב בני אדם נבהלים ומפחדים מזה אין זה חשיב סכנה, קצת דוגמא לכך הרכבת [זריקת] אבעבועות לילדים, אע"ג דמצד הדין אפשר שצריכים באמת להזדרז ולעשותו בהקדם האפשרי אם הרופא אומר שכבר הגיע הזמן לעשותו, אך אעפ"כ אין רגילין כלל לעשותן בבהילות ובזריזות, ולפיכך אף אם באמת יש בזה קצת סכנה הו"ל כמ"ש חז"ל והאידנא שומר פתאים ד' וחלילה לחלל שבת עבור כך, משא"כ אם אחד נמצא במקום כזה שיודע ברור שאם לא ירכיב עכשיו את האבעבועות בשבת יצטרך לחכות ד' או ה' שנים, כיון דבזמן מרובה כזה ודאי נבהלים ומפחדים לשהות, אפשר דשפיר חשיב כפקוח נפש ודוחה שבת. +עי' שש"כ פל"ב הערה ב'.+
loose translation / summary: a safek pikuach nefesh is defined by whatever people perceive as dangerous. thus, since people don't perceive it as a sakanah to delay a vaccination, it is prohibited -- chalilal la-kel that we should be mattir -- recieving a vaccination on shabbos, even though there is a certain element of danger in every day that you delay getting vaccinated. In any case that people perceive as dangerous, however, even if the danger is very remote and there is no "choleh lifanecha", we still are michalel shabbos because we view it as a safek sakanas nefashos.
Thus, the litmus test that a person has to use to determine whether something falls into the category of pikuach nefesh is to ask themselves how they would react during the week. If during the week, they would react as if this were sakanas nefashos, then they have license to do so on shabbos as well, (almost) irregardless of any objective determination of safek sakanas nefashos. The purpose of this test is almost an honesty check - are you being mechalel shabbos right now because you just don't care about kedushas shabbos, or because you really perceive this situation as one of safek sakanas nefashos? To answer this question, you think about how you would perceive this situation without shabbos as a factor - if even then, you would react as if it were a case of pikuach nefesh, then you have license to do so on shabbos as well.
So to answer our original q: how is one supposed to know when they should be michalel shabbos for pikuach nefesh. One answer is that we should take the time to learn some basic medical knowledge so that we can be more confident in ourselves if any situation comes up. But according to r shlomo zalman, there's something else that needs to be done thats critical in hashkafah as well.
The chiddush of r shlomo zalman is that halacha isn't interested as much in the "what" of what you're doing but more in the "why". We don't ask - is there an objective safek pikuach nefesh. Rather, we ask, why is this person being mechalel shabbos - is this situation really perceived as a sakanah, or is it that this person just doesn't care enough about kedushas shabbos. If a person cares enough, he can't be wrong - even if objectively this situation isn't a safek sakanas nefashos, this person cares so much about shabbos that if he was mechalel shabbos, it must be that he really perceived this situation as one of sakanas nefashos - and therefore it was muttar to be mechalel shabbos.
(This ties to what I believe is a general yesod in kol hatorah kulah that the tzurah of an action one does is often more important than the action itself - the way you do something defines an action even more than what you are actually doing.)
So according to r shlomo zalman, the education we need to be more confident in knowing when we should be mechalel shabbos for pikuach nefesh isn't primarily an intellectual one; rather it is to instill within ourselves an appreciation for and a deep caring for kedushas shabbos - only then can we have any confidence that when we feel the need to be mechalel shabbos for pikuach nefesh, its because we actually perceive this case as one of pikuach nefesh and not just because we aren't makpid chas vishalom on kedushas shabbos.
Truth be told, this argument works the other way as well. While I personally feel that for me, the idea of the sanctity of human life is much more obvious than that of shabbos, we do hear of cases where people rachmana litzlan are not mechalel shabbos even to save lives - and people die because of it. For them, the problem is the opposite- they know intellectually that pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos, but they have not properly instilled within themselves how great the value of the sanctity of human life is, and thats what they need to work on to make the right choices.
There is no better way to conclude this idea than with the words of the rambam concerning pikuach nefesh on shabbos, and the values the torah represents in general:
כשעושים דברים האלו אין עושין אותן לא ע"י נכרים ולא ע"י קטנים ולא ע"י עבדים ולא ע"י נשים כדי שלא תהא שבת קלה בעיניהם. אלא על ידי גדולי ישראל וחכמיהם. ואסור להתמהמה בחילול שבת לחולה שיש בו סכנה שנאמר אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם. הא למדת שאין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם אלא רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם.
The halacha that pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos is not only a din in pikuach nefesh, but also in shabbos, and also in kol hatorah kulah: אין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם - rather, רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם.
The halacha is that pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos - If there is danger to life, then it is not only permissable, but it is obligatory to violate the shabbos
Not only vadai pikuach nefesh, but even safek pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos. Thus, if you see a person drop suddenly on shabbos and you're not sure if they face a life threatening issue, you should still violate the shabbos to ensure their safety (eg. taking them to a hospital, etc.)
The question becomes, how far does it go - is anything and everything a safek pikuach nefesh? I don't know if people have thought about this much, but from the (thankfully) few situations I've been in it always makes me nervous that I don't really know how to tell if something is pikuach nefesh or not such that we should be mechalel shabbos.
What if someone experiences symptoms that seem most likely to not be anything dangerous, but there is a definite possibility that there is a real sakanah here - (I'm no doctor, so my examples are probably bad, but lets say one has a persistent pain in the stomach that could just be nothing or perhaps it is appendicitis. The point is that the safek is not a safek hashakul - its not 50-50 that this is life threatening, but rather, the odds seem to point to it not being life threatening, despite the possibility that it is indeed dangerous.) If we say that it doesn't have to be 50-50 to save, then how far do we go: 90-10, 99-1, 99.999-0.001?
If there is a community in which there is an epidemic disease spreading, can they eat on yom kippur to protect themselves against the possible life threatening danger of falling ill?
If one hasn't yet received a standard vaccination (no epidemics, just normal circumstances) can one take it on shabbos or should they wait till after shabbos?
If someone does research in medical techniques to treat cancer, can they work on shabbos since their research may ultimately save lives - and the quicker its done, the sooner lives can be saved?
I don't think the halacha is the same in each of those cases - all I'm trying to show is how amorphous the concept of safek pikuach nefesh is.
One approach that I recall R Twersky quoting once to limit the principle of pikuach nefesh being docheh shabbos is that we only apply said principle when there is a "choleh lifanecha" - an actual person we can identify whose life we are trying to save. By the medical research question, there is no choleh lifanecha - these techniques are being developed to treat unknown people at some unknown time in the future. I don't remember if R Twersky also used this principle in the second example concerning eating on yom kippur, possibly arguing that since you aren't ill yet, there is no choleh lifanecha to be mattir achilah on yom kippur.
The problem with this approach is that it doesn't seem to have any source- and it would seem to limit the principle of pikuach nefesh docheh shabbos in cases where common sense says it shouldn't be limited, eg. case 2.
R Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, quoted in a footnote at the beginning of the 32nd perek of shemiras shabbos kehilchasah and originally in a teshuvah (chelek 2:37) I saw today in minchas shlomo, seems to have a different approach:
ולענין עיקר הדבר מה נקרא ספק פקו"נ ומה לא, ועד איפה הוא הגבול, גם אנכי בעניי הסתפקתי טובא בזה, אלא שמצד הסברא נלענ"ד דכל שדרך רוב בני אדם לברוח מזה כבורח מפני הסכנה ה"ז חשיב כספק פקוח נפש וקרינן ביה בכה"ג וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם, אבל אם אין רוב בני אדם נבהלים ומפחדים מזה אין זה חשיב סכנה, קצת דוגמא לכך הרכבת [זריקת] אבעבועות לילדים, אע"ג דמצד הדין אפשר שצריכים באמת להזדרז ולעשותו בהקדם האפשרי אם הרופא אומר שכבר הגיע הזמן לעשותו, אך אעפ"כ אין רגילין כלל לעשותן בבהילות ובזריזות, ולפיכך אף אם באמת יש בזה קצת סכנה הו"ל כמ"ש חז"ל והאידנא שומר פתאים ד' וחלילה לחלל שבת עבור כך, משא"כ אם אחד נמצא במקום כזה שיודע ברור שאם לא ירכיב עכשיו את האבעבועות בשבת יצטרך לחכות ד' או ה' שנים, כיון דבזמן מרובה כזה ודאי נבהלים ומפחדים לשהות, אפשר דשפיר חשיב כפקוח נפש ודוחה שבת. +עי' שש"כ פל"ב הערה ב'.+
loose translation / summary: a safek pikuach nefesh is defined by whatever people perceive as dangerous. thus, since people don't perceive it as a sakanah to delay a vaccination, it is prohibited -- chalilal la-kel that we should be mattir -- recieving a vaccination on shabbos, even though there is a certain element of danger in every day that you delay getting vaccinated. In any case that people perceive as dangerous, however, even if the danger is very remote and there is no "choleh lifanecha", we still are michalel shabbos because we view it as a safek sakanas nefashos.
Thus, the litmus test that a person has to use to determine whether something falls into the category of pikuach nefesh is to ask themselves how they would react during the week. If during the week, they would react as if this were sakanas nefashos, then they have license to do so on shabbos as well, (almost) irregardless of any objective determination of safek sakanas nefashos. The purpose of this test is almost an honesty check - are you being mechalel shabbos right now because you just don't care about kedushas shabbos, or because you really perceive this situation as one of safek sakanas nefashos? To answer this question, you think about how you would perceive this situation without shabbos as a factor - if even then, you would react as if it were a case of pikuach nefesh, then you have license to do so on shabbos as well.
So to answer our original q: how is one supposed to know when they should be michalel shabbos for pikuach nefesh. One answer is that we should take the time to learn some basic medical knowledge so that we can be more confident in ourselves if any situation comes up. But according to r shlomo zalman, there's something else that needs to be done thats critical in hashkafah as well.
The chiddush of r shlomo zalman is that halacha isn't interested as much in the "what" of what you're doing but more in the "why". We don't ask - is there an objective safek pikuach nefesh. Rather, we ask, why is this person being mechalel shabbos - is this situation really perceived as a sakanah, or is it that this person just doesn't care enough about kedushas shabbos. If a person cares enough, he can't be wrong - even if objectively this situation isn't a safek sakanas nefashos, this person cares so much about shabbos that if he was mechalel shabbos, it must be that he really perceived this situation as one of sakanas nefashos - and therefore it was muttar to be mechalel shabbos.
(This ties to what I believe is a general yesod in kol hatorah kulah that the tzurah of an action one does is often more important than the action itself - the way you do something defines an action even more than what you are actually doing.)
So according to r shlomo zalman, the education we need to be more confident in knowing when we should be mechalel shabbos for pikuach nefesh isn't primarily an intellectual one; rather it is to instill within ourselves an appreciation for and a deep caring for kedushas shabbos - only then can we have any confidence that when we feel the need to be mechalel shabbos for pikuach nefesh, its because we actually perceive this case as one of pikuach nefesh and not just because we aren't makpid chas vishalom on kedushas shabbos.
Truth be told, this argument works the other way as well. While I personally feel that for me, the idea of the sanctity of human life is much more obvious than that of shabbos, we do hear of cases where people rachmana litzlan are not mechalel shabbos even to save lives - and people die because of it. For them, the problem is the opposite- they know intellectually that pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos, but they have not properly instilled within themselves how great the value of the sanctity of human life is, and thats what they need to work on to make the right choices.
There is no better way to conclude this idea than with the words of the rambam concerning pikuach nefesh on shabbos, and the values the torah represents in general:
כשעושים דברים האלו אין עושין אותן לא ע"י נכרים ולא ע"י קטנים ולא ע"י עבדים ולא ע"י נשים כדי שלא תהא שבת קלה בעיניהם. אלא על ידי גדולי ישראל וחכמיהם. ואסור להתמהמה בחילול שבת לחולה שיש בו סכנה שנאמר אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם ולא שימות בהם. הא למדת שאין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם אלא רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם.
The halacha that pikuach nefesh is docheh shabbos is not only a din in pikuach nefesh, but also in shabbos, and also in kol hatorah kulah: אין משפטי התורה נקמה בעולם - rather, רחמים וחסד ושלום בעולם.
Saturday, December 14, 2013
Vayechi - yaakov avinu lo mes
Chazal write in maseches taanis (5b) that yaakov avinu lo mes - he never died:
א"ר יוחנן יעקב אבינו לא מת א"ל וכי בכדי ספדו ספדנייא וחנטו חנטייא וקברו קברייא א"ל מקרא אני דורש שנאמר ואתה אל תירא עבדי יעקב נאם ה' ואל תחת ישראל כי הנני מושיעך מרחוק ואת זרעך מארץ שבים מקיש הוא לזרעו מה זרעו בחיים אף הוא בחיים
Chazal tell us in brachos 18a that, really, all tzaddikim never die: אלו צדיקים שבמיתתן נקראו חיים שנאמר ובניהו בן יהוידע בן איש חי - was yaakov avinu any different than all of the tzaddikim who don't die?
First, what does it mean that tzaddikim are called "alive" even after they're dead? The rambam, quoting a well known yerushalmi, writes: ומציינין את כל בית הקברות ובונין נפש על הקבר. והצדיקים אין בונים להם נפש על קברותיהם שדבריהם הם זכרונם. ולא יפנה אדם לבקר הקברות:
The simple read of the rambam (see radbaz who is meyashev our minhag; the pashtus is that our minhag is just against the rambam) is that we dont build a matzevah for tzaddikim - because they need no matzevah to be memorialized - their good deeds live on as their memorial. The natural follow up is to not visit kevarim - thats not the way to remember the dead. If the person is worthy of being remembered, then there is no need to take away from the meaningful remembrance of their actions by going to the cemetery to remember the 'meaningless' dead body.
If this connects to the previous maamar chazal (which I believe it does), it means that tzaddikim are called living even when they have died because of the legacy of their words of torah and the mitzvos they performed.
One way to explain that yaakov's "lo meis" is different than that applied by chazal to other tzaddikim is literally: Other tzaddikim experienced physical death, even if their legacy lives on - not so with yaakov avinu.
Despite the immense difficulty with interpreting the pesukim this way, this seems to be the approach of rashi in taanis and the last ramban in parshas vayechi.
Based on the maharsha, I think one can suggest another approach. Note that there is another figure whom chazal seem to claim never died, despite the fact that he most definitely seems to die in tanach: dovid hamelech. as the song goes, dovid melech yisrael chai vikayam (the phrase is used in rosh hashanah 25a, credit to wikipedia).
So what is different about yaaov and dovid as opposed to all the other tzaddikim?
The gemara's source that yaakov avinu lo meis was a hekesh between yaakov and his descendants. Unlike avraham and yitzchak, yaakov's descendants all remained within the fold -mitaso sheleimah.
Zaro shel dovid also has a unique significance to it - that line will never be broken, and the melech hamashioch will one day come out of it.
Thus, Yaakov and Dovid live on through their children in a way that in a sense is perhaps more real than the way most tzaddikim live on through their actions. Bra kara di-avuha - If one's children truly fulfill one's destiny and purpose than we don't just say that that person is called alive when he is dead - such a person is truly alive.
In Hamalach hagoel, yaakov blesses ehpraim and menashe by saying "viyikarei bahem shemi" - my name should be called upon them - Yaakov is alive because of this brachah - his children, that is, us, are called by his name because we fulfill the mission and purpose that he began.
This is important on two levels: First, the yartzheits of my mother's parents both fall out right around now, and to know that they live on because I live on is to carry a burden - it obligates one to live with purpose, lest one throw not only one's own life, but theirs too by the wayside.
Second, we all want to be able to (one day) give our descendants the bracha given to them by yaakov avinu - viyikarei bahem shemi. But thats only a bracha if shemi - our names - are something worthy to be carried on by future generations.
Shavua tov!
א"ר יוחנן יעקב אבינו לא מת א"ל וכי בכדי ספדו ספדנייא וחנטו חנטייא וקברו קברייא א"ל מקרא אני דורש שנאמר ואתה אל תירא עבדי יעקב נאם ה' ואל תחת ישראל כי הנני מושיעך מרחוק ואת זרעך מארץ שבים מקיש הוא לזרעו מה זרעו בחיים אף הוא בחיים
Chazal tell us in brachos 18a that, really, all tzaddikim never die: אלו צדיקים שבמיתתן נקראו חיים שנאמר ובניהו בן יהוידע בן איש חי - was yaakov avinu any different than all of the tzaddikim who don't die?
First, what does it mean that tzaddikim are called "alive" even after they're dead? The rambam, quoting a well known yerushalmi, writes: ומציינין את כל בית הקברות ובונין נפש על הקבר. והצדיקים אין בונים להם נפש על קברותיהם שדבריהם הם זכרונם. ולא יפנה אדם לבקר הקברות:
The simple read of the rambam (see radbaz who is meyashev our minhag; the pashtus is that our minhag is just against the rambam) is that we dont build a matzevah for tzaddikim - because they need no matzevah to be memorialized - their good deeds live on as their memorial. The natural follow up is to not visit kevarim - thats not the way to remember the dead. If the person is worthy of being remembered, then there is no need to take away from the meaningful remembrance of their actions by going to the cemetery to remember the 'meaningless' dead body.
If this connects to the previous maamar chazal (which I believe it does), it means that tzaddikim are called living even when they have died because of the legacy of their words of torah and the mitzvos they performed.
One way to explain that yaakov's "lo meis" is different than that applied by chazal to other tzaddikim is literally: Other tzaddikim experienced physical death, even if their legacy lives on - not so with yaakov avinu.
Despite the immense difficulty with interpreting the pesukim this way, this seems to be the approach of rashi in taanis and the last ramban in parshas vayechi.
Based on the maharsha, I think one can suggest another approach. Note that there is another figure whom chazal seem to claim never died, despite the fact that he most definitely seems to die in tanach: dovid hamelech. as the song goes, dovid melech yisrael chai vikayam (the phrase is used in rosh hashanah 25a, credit to wikipedia).
So what is different about yaaov and dovid as opposed to all the other tzaddikim?
The gemara's source that yaakov avinu lo meis was a hekesh between yaakov and his descendants. Unlike avraham and yitzchak, yaakov's descendants all remained within the fold -mitaso sheleimah.
Zaro shel dovid also has a unique significance to it - that line will never be broken, and the melech hamashioch will one day come out of it.
Thus, Yaakov and Dovid live on through their children in a way that in a sense is perhaps more real than the way most tzaddikim live on through their actions. Bra kara di-avuha - If one's children truly fulfill one's destiny and purpose than we don't just say that that person is called alive when he is dead - such a person is truly alive.
In Hamalach hagoel, yaakov blesses ehpraim and menashe by saying "viyikarei bahem shemi" - my name should be called upon them - Yaakov is alive because of this brachah - his children, that is, us, are called by his name because we fulfill the mission and purpose that he began.
This is important on two levels: First, the yartzheits of my mother's parents both fall out right around now, and to know that they live on because I live on is to carry a burden - it obligates one to live with purpose, lest one throw not only one's own life, but theirs too by the wayside.
Second, we all want to be able to (one day) give our descendants the bracha given to them by yaakov avinu - viyikarei bahem shemi. But thats only a bracha if shemi - our names - are something worthy to be carried on by future generations.
Shavua tov!
Wednesday, December 4, 2013
chanukah dvar torah from last yr
I said this at my sister's shabbos sheva brachos, with a few additions and changes.
so i was learning the halachos of chanuka, and i had a few questions.
1. i saw brought down that rav soloveitchik had a diyuk in rashi that the persumei nisa we do on chanuka by lighting the menora is not only for jews, but for non-jews as well. based on that, he asked, why specifically by chanuka do we do persumei nisa to non-jews, when by purim (krias hamegilah) and pesach (arba kosos), the pirsumei nisa is only for jews. i would add to the question one point- do we really think we will accomplish anything productive in our pirsumei nisa to the goyim. as the rambam emphasizes in several places, the point of persumei nisa is not just to remember a historical event - it is to recognize yad hashem in our lives and give thanks for his saving us bayamim haheim bazman hazeh - do we really succeed at all in accomplishing that.
2. the gemara writes as follows: the mitzvah of ner chanuka is to light it outside next to one's door. if one lives on a higher floor of a building, one may light in the window and be mikayem persumei nisa that way. bishaas hasakanh, one may light on their table and that suffices. ignoring why we dont light outside nowadays, this gemara is very difficult. most rishonim understand that shelo bishaas hasakanah, one is not yotzeh at all by lighting on their table, because there is no persumei nisa there. (tosfos is michadeish that even on the table, there is persumei nisa for bnei beiso, but thats a big chiddush -- unclear if most rishonim agree). if so, then why bishaas hasakanah do we light on the table - we just shouldnt light at all. if we cant be mikayem the mitzvah, so its very sad, but why "pretend" that were doing it when in reality, theres no persumeinisa being accomplished and in normal circumstances, one wouldnt even be yotzeh bdieved with what one is doing now?
it is noted quite often that a distinction between the nisim of purim and chanuka is that on purim, we faced a physical tragedy - death. on chanuka, we faced a spiritual enemy - the greeks didnt want to kill us, they wanted to convert us. i think that there is something very important hidden in that distinction:
when facing death, there is no choice but to fight. if you dont fight, you definitely die, if you fight, maybe you'll live - its a very simple cost benefit analysis. however, in a state of spiritual danger, the decision to fight or not is not always so clear cut. sometimes, you'll lose more by fighting than not, and it would be better to just accept the bad circumstances you're in and make the best of them. as chazal say, tafasta merubah lo tafasta, tafasta muat tafasta. (as a mashal, a person who isnt cut out for learning shouldnt try to force himself to learn 16 hrs in the beis medrash every day, because he'll end up making things worse by driving himself insane and killing himself. he should accept the circumstances he is in, and make the best of them).
a half- truth is always the strongest lie. when the yetzer hara persuades us to not fight a spiritual battle, but to accept things as they stand, he uses this argument and makes a compelling case because there are many times when this argument is actually correct. but, too often, we may accept this argument in cases where it should not be applied -- where we should fight -- out of a sense of spiritual complacency - we feel comfortable where we are spiritually, and dont feel the burning desire to push forward and grow. hence, it becomes easy to justify our inaction by saying, well, if we fight the greeks, we'll just make it worse.
the miracle of chanuka is not only that we won, but that we chose to fight. we were able to throw off this sense of complacency and say that we will not accept the spiritual state of affairs as it stands. because we kept our ideals, and our constant desire to grow in spirituality, we were able to recognize that chanuka was a time when we did need to fight for our beliefs, and not say that we should do the mitzvos as best as we can given the circumstances.
going back to question 2, i had an interesting inference in the rambam. there is a halacha that one needs to put another light next to the menorah to use, so that one will not use the ner chanuka which, as we say in haneros halalu is kodesh and hence forbidden to derive benefit from (this is the source of the minhag of the shamash). the rambam only mentions this halacha in the context of lighting al shulchano, but not in the context of lighting outside or by the window. it is easy to understand why one would not need a shamash when lighting outside - after all, one will not use the light of the menorah there since people generally dont hang out outside. but why when lighting by the window do we not need a shamash - isnt there a chashash there too that one will use the ner chanuka?
rashi writes that the purpose of a shamash is not just to avoid accidentally using ner chanuka, but as a heker - to make it obviously recognizable that the ner chanuka is not there for lighting purposes, but rather, for leshem mitzvas ner chanuka.
we asked - why bother lighting at all al shulchano bishaas hasakanah - after all, you're not accomplishing pirsumei nisa. but the whole point of chanuka is to recognize that we cant be complacent about the negatives in the current spirtual state of affairs. we have to try to push to accomplish our goals and objectives, even if we will not succeed at doing so much. davka when one lights on the table, and they think theyre not really being mekayem mitzvas ner chanuka, thats when chazal said make a heker to recognize that this is ner chanuka. ner chanuka is about not giving up and doing whatever one can to not be complacent in their spiritual state.
going back to our first question, the answer is very similar. davka on chanuka is the time to focus on our ultimate spiritual goals - vihayah hashem limelech al kol haaretz, bayom hahu yihyeh hashem echad ushmo echad. normally, we dont focus on that so much, because we cant win that battle now - halvai that we make hashem a melech over us personally. but chanuka is the time to remember what we truly want, and to not accept the lowly spiritual state we are in now. even though it may have little effect now, we ultimately have faith that one day, hashem will be the melech al kol haaretz, and all the nations will appreciate the persumei nisa of chanuka, lichsheyibaneh beis hamkidsah bimheirah biyameinu.
after thinking this through, i think it answers some other questions as well: theres a famous kashya of the pnei yeshoshua i believe, why couldnt they light shemen tamei - dont we have a principle that tumah is hutrah bitzibbur? lidvareinu, it doesnt matter if technically you're allowed to light with shemen tamei in certain circumstances. the whole point of chanuka is to rise above the "circumstance excuse", and to live in the ideal world.
Saturday, November 23, 2013
yehuda's znus
The maharal and the mizrachi ask the question that must be one everyone's minds: how was yehuda allowed/ ok with having relations with a woman he presumed to be a harlot?
(The Maharal really formulates it only as a technical question, given the issur of lo tihyeh kidesha - for that, yesh ladun if thats so obviously assur according to all the rishonim (in particular see the ramban in kedoshim 19:29 and in ki teitzei on the pasuk of lo tihyeh kidesha).)
Regardless, you almost hear the rambam directly addressing this question at the very beginning of hilchos ishus. The rambam writes:
קודם מתן תורה היה אדם פוגע אשה בשוק אם רצה הוא והיא נותן לה שכרה ובועל אותה על אם הדרך והולך. וזו היא הנקראת קדשה. משנתנה התורה נאסרה הקדשה שנאמר לא תהיה קדשה מבנות ישראל. לפיכך כל הבועל אשה לשם זנות בלא קידושין לוקה מן התורה לפי שבעל קדשה: --thats exactly what yehuda did, and what the rambam says was standard, before mattan torah.
Many have pointed out that the rambam doesn't give a similar introduction to any other mitzvah - for example, "before mattan torah no one shook lulav, after mattan torah people started to shake lulav on sukkos."
The rambam is emphasizing a unique paradigm shift regarding kiddushin - before mattan torah these things (=harlots) were accepted as normal - despite the fact that we look upon them so differently nowadays (as we well should).
I sort of hate to give this mashal, but from a certain (somewhat twisted) perspective there is really no difference between buying food (lets say for pleasure and not for basic subsistence) and buying what yehuda bought.
What's the difference? Its that at mattan torah we were given a new perspective - a perspective that that type of relationship cannot be just casual, but requires commitment. The rambam is telling us precisely that - the chiddush of kiddushin at mattan torah is that one cannot separate a sexual relationship from commitment.
What changed at mattan torah? (that is, why does kiddushin undergo a paradigm shift at mattan torah more than any other mitzvah)? This is a little bit towards the drush side, but I think its 100% emes. Mattan torah is where we entered into a bris with hakadosh baruch hu - or in other words, a committed relationship. We cannot worship G-d today, and baal tomorrow - we (and G-d) remain committed to each other. The relationship between a man and a woman is sacred - it mirrors the bris between us and G-d - it cannot be a casual relationship thats here today and gone tomorrow. For marriage to be a meaningful mashal to the newly created bris of har sinai, there must be a paradigm shift - while before, one could compare a sexual relationship to any other pleasure that can be had casually, now that is no more. Now there must be marriage, with a real and lasting commitment.
I think this adds a new dimension to the machlokes rambam/ raavad whether any casual sexual relationship is prohibited after mattan torah, or only one with a harlot. The rambam, lishitaso, says thats its any woman - if theres no commitment, its prohibited.
Lishitaso, the rambam we quoted yesterday says its not really permitted to give a get. If the whole chiddush of kiddushin is that sexual relationships require commitment, then why should you be allowed to break off that commitment whenever you want with a get? The whole point of a commitment is that you commit - no backsies allowed.
The maggid mishnah points out something very strange according to the rambam: a casual relationship with a jewess is prohibited min hatorah because of lo tihyeh kedesha - but the rambam writes explicitly that a casual relationship with a non-jew is only assur midrabanan! how can that be less chammur than with another jew?
Lidvareinu, it makes sense. the issur by a jew is to take a person who deserves a committed relationship and "use" them for only a casual one. By a non-jew, even a committed relationship is prohibited - so its not shayach to have an issur of taking a relationship thats supposed to be committed and making it casual. Hence biah with a goy is only assur midrabanan.
Taking the connection between marriage and har sinai one step further, the same way that it is assur (according to the rambam) for a man to give his wife a get, so too it is "prohibited" for Hashem to ever divorce us - as yeshayah says - where is the get that I (hashem) wrote for you (klal yisrael)?
With my sister getting married this week (super exciting!) this would make great sheva brachos torah if it weren't so awkward. But I think its very powerful, both on the level of marriage and on the level of our connection with hakadosh baruch hu. We should be zocheh to build a meaningful connection with hashem, and, each of us in the proper time, with our spouses.
Shavua tov!
(The Maharal really formulates it only as a technical question, given the issur of lo tihyeh kidesha - for that, yesh ladun if thats so obviously assur according to all the rishonim (in particular see the ramban in kedoshim 19:29 and in ki teitzei on the pasuk of lo tihyeh kidesha).)
Regardless, you almost hear the rambam directly addressing this question at the very beginning of hilchos ishus. The rambam writes:
קודם מתן תורה היה אדם פוגע אשה בשוק אם רצה הוא והיא נותן לה שכרה ובועל אותה על אם הדרך והולך. וזו היא הנקראת קדשה. משנתנה התורה נאסרה הקדשה שנאמר לא תהיה קדשה מבנות ישראל. לפיכך כל הבועל אשה לשם זנות בלא קידושין לוקה מן התורה לפי שבעל קדשה: --thats exactly what yehuda did, and what the rambam says was standard, before mattan torah.
Many have pointed out that the rambam doesn't give a similar introduction to any other mitzvah - for example, "before mattan torah no one shook lulav, after mattan torah people started to shake lulav on sukkos."
The rambam is emphasizing a unique paradigm shift regarding kiddushin - before mattan torah these things (=harlots) were accepted as normal - despite the fact that we look upon them so differently nowadays (as we well should).
I sort of hate to give this mashal, but from a certain (somewhat twisted) perspective there is really no difference between buying food (lets say for pleasure and not for basic subsistence) and buying what yehuda bought.
What's the difference? Its that at mattan torah we were given a new perspective - a perspective that that type of relationship cannot be just casual, but requires commitment. The rambam is telling us precisely that - the chiddush of kiddushin at mattan torah is that one cannot separate a sexual relationship from commitment.
What changed at mattan torah? (that is, why does kiddushin undergo a paradigm shift at mattan torah more than any other mitzvah)? This is a little bit towards the drush side, but I think its 100% emes. Mattan torah is where we entered into a bris with hakadosh baruch hu - or in other words, a committed relationship. We cannot worship G-d today, and baal tomorrow - we (and G-d) remain committed to each other. The relationship between a man and a woman is sacred - it mirrors the bris between us and G-d - it cannot be a casual relationship thats here today and gone tomorrow. For marriage to be a meaningful mashal to the newly created bris of har sinai, there must be a paradigm shift - while before, one could compare a sexual relationship to any other pleasure that can be had casually, now that is no more. Now there must be marriage, with a real and lasting commitment.
I think this adds a new dimension to the machlokes rambam/ raavad whether any casual sexual relationship is prohibited after mattan torah, or only one with a harlot. The rambam, lishitaso, says thats its any woman - if theres no commitment, its prohibited.
Lishitaso, the rambam we quoted yesterday says its not really permitted to give a get. If the whole chiddush of kiddushin is that sexual relationships require commitment, then why should you be allowed to break off that commitment whenever you want with a get? The whole point of a commitment is that you commit - no backsies allowed.
The maggid mishnah points out something very strange according to the rambam: a casual relationship with a jewess is prohibited min hatorah because of lo tihyeh kedesha - but the rambam writes explicitly that a casual relationship with a non-jew is only assur midrabanan! how can that be less chammur than with another jew?
Lidvareinu, it makes sense. the issur by a jew is to take a person who deserves a committed relationship and "use" them for only a casual one. By a non-jew, even a committed relationship is prohibited - so its not shayach to have an issur of taking a relationship thats supposed to be committed and making it casual. Hence biah with a goy is only assur midrabanan.
Taking the connection between marriage and har sinai one step further, the same way that it is assur (according to the rambam) for a man to give his wife a get, so too it is "prohibited" for Hashem to ever divorce us - as yeshayah says - where is the get that I (hashem) wrote for you (klal yisrael)?
With my sister getting married this week (super exciting!) this would make great sheva brachos torah if it weren't so awkward. But I think its very powerful, both on the level of marriage and on the level of our connection with hakadosh baruch hu. We should be zocheh to build a meaningful connection with hashem, and, each of us in the proper time, with our spouses.
Shavua tov!
Friday, November 22, 2013
Yosef's dreams
I just want to do a short post on the parsha, even though I havent had so much time unfortunately to do a better post with more research.
The daas zekeinim asks the question: why did yosef tell his dreams to his brothers - didn't he realize that it would just increase the enmity and resentment towards him?
Rashi writes that when yosef met the malach gavriel while searching for his brothers, the malach warned him that the shevatim had left behind all feelings of brotherhood towards yosef - so why did yosef almost knowingly go meet them to face his demise?
The daas zekeinim answers that yosef felt that he was bound to tell over his dreams midin "navi shekovesh nevuaso chayav misah" - a prophet is not allowed to conceal his prophecy.
Similarly, we can say that yosef went to his brothers knowing that the outcome would not necessarily be pretty, because he was bound by kibud av to fulfill the command of his father.
I think thats a powerful lesson about the binding nature of truth despite any possible negative consequences.
I saw another answer to the daas zekeinim's question in the maharal. The maharal writes that since kol hachalomos holchin achar hapeh, (dreams are subject to interpetations), yosef told his dreams to his brothers so that they should interpret them as false dreams and hence they would not come true.
If thats true, then the irony of the story is astounding. If the brothers had been dan yosef likaf zechus and understood his intentions, they could have interpreted the dream as false and it never would have happened. Instead, they just got mad at yosef and hated him, sold him down to mitzraim, and ended up being responsible for the dreams coming true.
A few lessons: We get a new perspective on yosef that he davka wanted his dreams to not come true because they would hurt his brothers, even if they would benefit himself. We always have to think about personal gain vs communal benefit. Perhaps even more interestingly, Yosef gets criticized a lot for not being dan his brothers likaf zechus, but we see here that the problem went both ways - it takes 2 to fight (and that gets us back to the previous post).
Good shabbos!
The daas zekeinim asks the question: why did yosef tell his dreams to his brothers - didn't he realize that it would just increase the enmity and resentment towards him?
Rashi writes that when yosef met the malach gavriel while searching for his brothers, the malach warned him that the shevatim had left behind all feelings of brotherhood towards yosef - so why did yosef almost knowingly go meet them to face his demise?
The daas zekeinim answers that yosef felt that he was bound to tell over his dreams midin "navi shekovesh nevuaso chayav misah" - a prophet is not allowed to conceal his prophecy.
Similarly, we can say that yosef went to his brothers knowing that the outcome would not necessarily be pretty, because he was bound by kibud av to fulfill the command of his father.
I think thats a powerful lesson about the binding nature of truth despite any possible negative consequences.
I saw another answer to the daas zekeinim's question in the maharal. The maharal writes that since kol hachalomos holchin achar hapeh, (dreams are subject to interpetations), yosef told his dreams to his brothers so that they should interpret them as false dreams and hence they would not come true.
If thats true, then the irony of the story is astounding. If the brothers had been dan yosef likaf zechus and understood his intentions, they could have interpreted the dream as false and it never would have happened. Instead, they just got mad at yosef and hated him, sold him down to mitzraim, and ended up being responsible for the dreams coming true.
A few lessons: We get a new perspective on yosef that he davka wanted his dreams to not come true because they would hurt his brothers, even if they would benefit himself. We always have to think about personal gain vs communal benefit. Perhaps even more interestingly, Yosef gets criticized a lot for not being dan his brothers likaf zechus, but we see here that the problem went both ways - it takes 2 to fight (and that gets us back to the previous post).
Good shabbos!
Gittin
Gittin have been coming up in the news a lot recently, and this issue bothers me a lot, so I wanted to say something. First, specifically about these agunah cases. They're terrible, and we cannot be aloof to such suffering. But on the other hand, I don't know how people pick sides and decide who is right and who is wrong. It seems to me that in fights, and I'm sure particularly in divorces (Please G-d no one should ever know) things get nasty - and both sides do nasty things. Is one side obviously wrong, no matter what other nasty things the other party has done? I don't think its that simple. I've long been torn whether to go to these rallies held by ORA to pressure the giving of a get. If ORA is correct, then this is something that is critically important. But how do they know who's right and whose wrong in these nasty divorces? I cannot help but to conclude that shev vi-al taaseh adif - better to not get involved and risk actively wronging an "innocent" party (I've asked several rabbonim about this and they seemed to express similar sentiments that it is dangerous to just assume that one of the parties is automatically wrong)
Second, I read an article by a certain Rabbi Dr. Eliyahu Safran that really disturbed me. Rabbi Safran notes that when he divorced, he gave the get within the week - that is certainly the right thing to do when compared with the (evil) option of get refusal.
But Rabbi Safran attempts to develop an entire philosophical framework for divorce, claiming that divorce should not be stigmatized, and instead, should just be accepted as a fact of life within the Jewish community. And I quote:
I understand that this man may feel very bad about his divorce. But thats no excuse for the gross distortion of Jewish ideals.
I shouldn't need to quote any sources, but here are 2:
1. the gemara in gittin famously ends off, "אמר ר' אלעזר: כל המגרש אשתו ראשונה - אפילו מזבח מוריד עליו דמעות, שנאמר: וזאת שנית תעשו כסות דמעה את מזבח ה' בכי ואנקה מאין [עוד] פנות אל המנחה ולקחת רצון מידכם, ואמרתם על מה על כי ה' העיד בינך ובין אשת נעוריך אשר אתה בגדתה בה והיא חברתך ואשת בריתך.
I don't know how anyone could claim that an event which causes the mizbeach to cry and is referred to as begidah should not be stigmatized and strongly discouraged.
Moreover, it is well known that the rambam seems to paskin like beis shammai that it is forbidden for one to divorce one's wife unless she committed adultery:
ולא יגרש אדם אשתו ראשונה אלא אם כן מצא בה ערות דבר שנאמר כי מצא בה ערות דבר וגו'. (rambam gerushin 10:21)
Obviously we don't paskin like this. But there is a critical hashkafic lesson here: Marriage has to be a commitment - you have to go in with the attitude that there is no way out. period. If divorce were to be not stigmatized, marriage would become like having a girlfriend - no big deal, because if anything ever goes wrong, you can always back out 1 2 3. Divorce feeds on itself - the more we allow divorce to become prevalent in our communities, the more marriage loses the perception of commitment and the more divorce we will have.
To safeguard the institution of marriage, it is worth the suffering that we inflict on divorcees by stigmatizing them the same way we stigmatize alcoholics and drug addicts. and truth be told, the religious failure reflected by divorce is just as great, if not greater, than that of alcoholism and drug addiction. That isn't to say that such a person has no hope - a drug addict / alcoholic / divorcee can all do teshuvah and move on - that is the amazing gift of teshuvah that hashem gave us. but that doesn't take away one iota from the absolute religious failure reflected by these 3 vices.
Destroying R Safran's ridiculous philosophical framework does not justify get refusal whatsover - being a religious failure does not justify hurting or inflicting damage on another human being. And if R Safran didnt believe what he wrote and was just lying to save the victims of get refusers by trying to falsely salvage the ego of divorcees, then that is totally acceptable. But the truth must be told.
I don't mean to judge other people - especially given that I've never been in their shoes (= never been married). but R Safran should not claim that excuses for failure are its underlying cause - alcoholism and drug and gambling addictions can also all be explained by a variety of excuses. But thats not the lesson we go out and teach.
Please G-d we should not hear of or know of divorce, not us nor anyone in klal yisrael. Please G-d, we should see only simcha, bracha, and shalom.
Second, I read an article by a certain Rabbi Dr. Eliyahu Safran that really disturbed me. Rabbi Safran notes that when he divorced, he gave the get within the week - that is certainly the right thing to do when compared with the (evil) option of get refusal.
But Rabbi Safran attempts to develop an entire philosophical framework for divorce, claiming that divorce should not be stigmatized, and instead, should just be accepted as a fact of life within the Jewish community. And I quote:
Let us, as Chazal, our Talmudic sages, did, acknowledge that our belief in marriages as bashert is more ideal than truth. In candor, let us confront the truth that many, many marriages are entered into with little preparation or understanding about even the most basic truths about living in intimacy with another person.It is a rare young scholar who is schooled – in even the most cursory manner – in his bride’s emotional, spiritual, psychological and physical needs and priorities. And it is only a rare young woman who is taught to look beyond her groom’s learning or his ability to make a good living. It is a wonder that any marriage survives and succeeds!Yet, most do.Some do not.There needn’t be any shame in that. (emphasis added)
I understand that this man may feel very bad about his divorce. But thats no excuse for the gross distortion of Jewish ideals.
I shouldn't need to quote any sources, but here are 2:
1. the gemara in gittin famously ends off, "אמר ר' אלעזר: כל המגרש אשתו ראשונה - אפילו מזבח מוריד עליו דמעות, שנאמר: וזאת שנית תעשו כסות דמעה את מזבח ה' בכי ואנקה מאין [עוד] פנות אל המנחה ולקחת רצון מידכם, ואמרתם על מה על כי ה' העיד בינך ובין אשת נעוריך אשר אתה בגדתה בה והיא חברתך ואשת בריתך.
I don't know how anyone could claim that an event which causes the mizbeach to cry and is referred to as begidah should not be stigmatized and strongly discouraged.
Moreover, it is well known that the rambam seems to paskin like beis shammai that it is forbidden for one to divorce one's wife unless she committed adultery:
ולא יגרש אדם אשתו ראשונה אלא אם כן מצא בה ערות דבר שנאמר כי מצא בה ערות דבר וגו'. (rambam gerushin 10:21)
Obviously we don't paskin like this. But there is a critical hashkafic lesson here: Marriage has to be a commitment - you have to go in with the attitude that there is no way out. period. If divorce were to be not stigmatized, marriage would become like having a girlfriend - no big deal, because if anything ever goes wrong, you can always back out 1 2 3. Divorce feeds on itself - the more we allow divorce to become prevalent in our communities, the more marriage loses the perception of commitment and the more divorce we will have.
To safeguard the institution of marriage, it is worth the suffering that we inflict on divorcees by stigmatizing them the same way we stigmatize alcoholics and drug addicts. and truth be told, the religious failure reflected by divorce is just as great, if not greater, than that of alcoholism and drug addiction. That isn't to say that such a person has no hope - a drug addict / alcoholic / divorcee can all do teshuvah and move on - that is the amazing gift of teshuvah that hashem gave us. but that doesn't take away one iota from the absolute religious failure reflected by these 3 vices.
Destroying R Safran's ridiculous philosophical framework does not justify get refusal whatsover - being a religious failure does not justify hurting or inflicting damage on another human being. And if R Safran didnt believe what he wrote and was just lying to save the victims of get refusers by trying to falsely salvage the ego of divorcees, then that is totally acceptable. But the truth must be told.
many marriages are entered into with little preparation or understanding about even the most basic truths about living in intimacy with another person...I've been blessed to see many good marriages, and I've been cursed to be witness to some failing marriages, and it has nothing to do with education/a specific lack of knowledge that could be corrected through schooling. Frankly, to claim that marriages fail because the two genders are not taught the knowledge to understand each other is laughable. Marriages fail because of lack of maturity - thats the long and short of it. People who are mature deal with the curve balls life throws - people who are not do not.
I don't mean to judge other people - especially given that I've never been in their shoes (= never been married). but R Safran should not claim that excuses for failure are its underlying cause - alcoholism and drug and gambling addictions can also all be explained by a variety of excuses. But thats not the lesson we go out and teach.
Please G-d we should not hear of or know of divorce, not us nor anyone in klal yisrael. Please G-d, we should see only simcha, bracha, and shalom.
Friday, November 15, 2013
America and the holocaust - and us
A lot of what I wanted to say about this topic has been said better than I could have done it in the past few weeks. So I just want to connect some dots.
The staff at the YU commentator put out an editorial about the american response, or more accurately, the lack thereof, to the holocaust as it was occurring. The first comment there is from some Adam Zimilover, who wrote a more detailed paper documenting the reaction to the holocaust. I think it is appropriate to take the time to read these articles.
The bottom line is that the american response to the holocaust was abysmal. Our people went through the greatest catastrophe ever, one that perhaps makes even the near-tragedy of purim seem like nothing. And yet, by purim klal yisrael managed to gather together and make fast days and cry out and daven to hashem. By the holocaust - kimat nothing.
My great grandfather was one of the 400 rabbonim who marched upon washington, and he also helped raise money for the vaad hatzalah. He was not the only one. But even that level of response was nothing in the face of the overwhelming terror facing the Jewish people, and by and large, most Jews in america didn't even do that.
The commentator article I posted a while back was dated January 1945. Can you imagine debating whether or not its proper for YU to have a drama society while as you are speaking, Jews are being murdered every second by Hitler yemach shemo? I don't know if I can conceive of such a thing, and thank G-d, we live in a safer world where such things should remain inconceivable.
(Some guy commented on the commentator article that this is a complex issue that is being unduly simplified. I totally disagree. I also don't buy for 1 second these garbage excuses that they didn't know what was happening. Jabotinsky knew BEFORE the holocaust that it would happen, and the fact that people chose to be in denial does not mean they didn't know.)
When you realize this, you make a heavy accusation against our ancestors alive at the time, and its a little scary to make such accusations. How do we understand this?
Before we make such accusations, we need to look in a mirror. and I'm afraid that what we will find there is not much better.
Divrei chaim posted here about how while it was easy to organize tehillim rallies for various issues on the yeshivishe agenda, no one - in either the yeshivish or modern orthodox worlds - saw fit to organize any such event concerning the very real dangers klal yisrael faces from Iran and other enemies yimach shemam.
Last year there was a war going on Israel. People maybe had the time to grudgingly say a few perakim of tehillim. But overall, nothing changed - life went on as normal.
People who had midterms were too busy studying for them to have time to care about what was going on in Israel. Our busy schedules didn't let up - life went on as normal.
Its true that the war in Israel was not anywhere on the scale of past tragedies that have afflicted the jewish people. But is that really good excuse? Moreover,we should sit down and take the time to do some self-reflection - would we really have reacted differently if G-d forbid there ever were a tragedy to befall the jewish people rachmana litzlan?
Its not at all surprising that people were able to sit here and debate drama clubs while the holocaust was going on - we do almost the exact same thing when we study for a chemistry midterm while a war is going on Israel - we let the distance of the tragedy, as opposed to the immediate needs of our daily lives, lull us into ignoring the tragedy and focusing on the stupidity of the here and now.
One could counter this criticism by saying that life does need to go on in places where the tragedy isn't hitting. To a certain extent, I agree. But to a certain extent, I bidavka disagree - life needs to somewhat NOT go on in recognition of a tzarah facing klal yisrael.
We know from rashi in several places in bereshis that tashmish is assur in a time of tragedy - thats a real disruption to family life, but so be it.
Further, life needing to go on is not a stirah to taking a tzarah seriously (more so than saying 4 perakim of tehillim or something like that.)
Please G-d, we should never see another tragedy or tzarah befall klal yisrael ever again. But if rachmana litzlan such a thing should ever come to be, then I want to throw out 2 ideas:
1. For every day that the tragedy persists, give x dollars (some significant amount) towards alleviating that tzarah. you can't just give one sum and be done - every day the tzarah goes on you have to be part of it and contribute to the cause.
2. I dont understand why the institution of taanis tzibbur as per the shulchan aruch 576 (and look there - the fasts are much more intense than the way we typically do a fast day.) has been abolished. the mishna berura mentions maybe ein taanis tzibbur bibavel and i am not at all holding in these halachos. but again, the idea that motivates and permeates all these halachos is that klal yisrael cannot remain apathetic in the face of a tazarah - we must care, and it must affect us.
we should be zocheh to never know any tzaros again and see the geulah sheleimah speedily in our days
The staff at the YU commentator put out an editorial about the american response, or more accurately, the lack thereof, to the holocaust as it was occurring. The first comment there is from some Adam Zimilover, who wrote a more detailed paper documenting the reaction to the holocaust. I think it is appropriate to take the time to read these articles.
The bottom line is that the american response to the holocaust was abysmal. Our people went through the greatest catastrophe ever, one that perhaps makes even the near-tragedy of purim seem like nothing. And yet, by purim klal yisrael managed to gather together and make fast days and cry out and daven to hashem. By the holocaust - kimat nothing.
My great grandfather was one of the 400 rabbonim who marched upon washington, and he also helped raise money for the vaad hatzalah. He was not the only one. But even that level of response was nothing in the face of the overwhelming terror facing the Jewish people, and by and large, most Jews in america didn't even do that.
The commentator article I posted a while back was dated January 1945. Can you imagine debating whether or not its proper for YU to have a drama society while as you are speaking, Jews are being murdered every second by Hitler yemach shemo? I don't know if I can conceive of such a thing, and thank G-d, we live in a safer world where such things should remain inconceivable.
(Some guy commented on the commentator article that this is a complex issue that is being unduly simplified. I totally disagree. I also don't buy for 1 second these garbage excuses that they didn't know what was happening. Jabotinsky knew BEFORE the holocaust that it would happen, and the fact that people chose to be in denial does not mean they didn't know.)
When you realize this, you make a heavy accusation against our ancestors alive at the time, and its a little scary to make such accusations. How do we understand this?
Before we make such accusations, we need to look in a mirror. and I'm afraid that what we will find there is not much better.
Divrei chaim posted here about how while it was easy to organize tehillim rallies for various issues on the yeshivishe agenda, no one - in either the yeshivish or modern orthodox worlds - saw fit to organize any such event concerning the very real dangers klal yisrael faces from Iran and other enemies yimach shemam.
Last year there was a war going on Israel. People maybe had the time to grudgingly say a few perakim of tehillim. But overall, nothing changed - life went on as normal.
People who had midterms were too busy studying for them to have time to care about what was going on in Israel. Our busy schedules didn't let up - life went on as normal.
Its true that the war in Israel was not anywhere on the scale of past tragedies that have afflicted the jewish people. But is that really good excuse? Moreover,we should sit down and take the time to do some self-reflection - would we really have reacted differently if G-d forbid there ever were a tragedy to befall the jewish people rachmana litzlan?
Its not at all surprising that people were able to sit here and debate drama clubs while the holocaust was going on - we do almost the exact same thing when we study for a chemistry midterm while a war is going on Israel - we let the distance of the tragedy, as opposed to the immediate needs of our daily lives, lull us into ignoring the tragedy and focusing on the stupidity of the here and now.
One could counter this criticism by saying that life does need to go on in places where the tragedy isn't hitting. To a certain extent, I agree. But to a certain extent, I bidavka disagree - life needs to somewhat NOT go on in recognition of a tzarah facing klal yisrael.
We know from rashi in several places in bereshis that tashmish is assur in a time of tragedy - thats a real disruption to family life, but so be it.
Further, life needing to go on is not a stirah to taking a tzarah seriously (more so than saying 4 perakim of tehillim or something like that.)
Please G-d, we should never see another tragedy or tzarah befall klal yisrael ever again. But if rachmana litzlan such a thing should ever come to be, then I want to throw out 2 ideas:
1. For every day that the tragedy persists, give x dollars (some significant amount) towards alleviating that tzarah. you can't just give one sum and be done - every day the tzarah goes on you have to be part of it and contribute to the cause.
2. I dont understand why the institution of taanis tzibbur as per the shulchan aruch 576 (and look there - the fasts are much more intense than the way we typically do a fast day.) has been abolished. the mishna berura mentions maybe ein taanis tzibbur bibavel and i am not at all holding in these halachos. but again, the idea that motivates and permeates all these halachos is that klal yisrael cannot remain apathetic in the face of a tazarah - we must care, and it must affect us.
we should be zocheh to never know any tzaros again and see the geulah sheleimah speedily in our days
Wednesday, November 6, 2013
vayeitzei - yaakov's tochacha
I've been very excited for this week's parsha because R Yaakov has my favorite vort in the whole emes liyaakov (or at least, what I've read of it) on this week's parsha.
Yaakov flees from eisav to charan and bumps into a bunch of shepherds lazing by the well. Yaakov, a foreigner from a different country, having never met these people ever before in his life, immediately proceeds to "but in" to their business asking them why they are lazing around and not working. That's a little bit awkward - what prompted Yaakov to do this?
The seforno asks this question, and he writes:
הצדיק ימאס את העול ג"כ אל האחרים כאמרו תועבת צדיקים איש עול
Yaakov protested the laziness of the shephers because a tzaddik cannot stand evil - in himself, or in others.
R Yaakov, I believe, argues on this seforno. He begins by making a diyuk in Yaakov's language when he starts talking to the shepherds (Having been attacked over this diyuk, I think we can concede under pressure that it is not muchrach - but R yaakov's point exists without it so it is not crucial.)
וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם יַעֲקֹב אַחַי מֵאַיִן אַתֶּם וַיֹּאמְרוּ מֵחָרָן אֲנָחְנוּ:
Since when are these total strangers his "brothers"?
To buttress this diyuk, r yaakov directs our attention to a rashi in parshas chukas. When moshe rabbeinu sends to edom asking to be allowed to pass through his land, he begins by saying, "ko amar achicha yisrael". rashi comments:
...אחיך ישראל - מה ראה להזכיר כאן אחוה
So you see that it is fair to wonder why someone should start talking about being brother to someone who isn't really his brother.
Shifting focus for a moment, we know there is a machlokes in the gemara in erchin concerning how far one must go to rebuke others in fulfillment of the mitzvah of tochachah. One opinion says give up when the guy you're trying to rebuke gets really mad at you, another opinion is when he starts cursing you, we paskin that you shouldn't give up until he starts hitting you. Regardless of which opinion you take, how does this make sense? Since when do you not fulfill a mitzvah deoraysa because someone will curse you out over it, and even if they'll start hitting you (obviously as long as there is no danger to life), why should that stop fulfillment of a mitzvah deoraysa?
Says R yaakov, if the mitzvah of tochacha were to act as G-d's police officers (as the seforno might very well claim), then the above question would indeed hold. But look at the way the rambam formulates mitzvas tochacha:
הרואה חבירו שחטא או שהלך בדרך לא טובה מצוה להחזירו למוטב ולהודיעו שהוא חוטא על עצמו במעשיו הרעים שנאמר הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך. המוכיח את חבירו בין בדברים שבינו לבינו. בין בדברים שבינו לבין המקום. צריך להוכיחו בינו לבין עצמו. וידבר לו בנחת ובלשון רכה ויודיעו שאינו אומר לו אלא לטובתו להביאו לחיי העולם הבא. אם קיבל ממנו מוטב ואם לאו יוכיחנו פעם שניה ושלישית. וכן תמיד חייב אדם להוכיחו עד שיכהו החוטא ויאמר לו איני שומע. וכל שאפשר בידו למחות ואינו מוחה הוא נתפש בעון אלו כיון שאפשר לו למחות בהם:
We might have thought, before seeing this rambam, that the mitzvah of tochacha is a mitzvah bein adam lamakom - a religious obligation to dispel evil from our midst. But the rambam is clear that that is NOT the case - mitzvas tochacha is a mitzvah bein adam lachaveiro - we have an obligation to look out for our friend's ultimate best interests - if we really care about our friends, then we will help them stay on the right path. (lichora a big nafka minah of this that you have to ask mechila from your friend for NOT rebuking him enough - pretty wild if that is true)
It now immediately follows that we should ony be mochiach as long as we are acting in the rebukee's best interests - that is, our goal is not to eliminate evil at all costs, in which case we would be mochiach even after the guy started cursing/hitting. Rather, our goal is to help bring this guy back to what's best for him. When he starts cursing/hitting, we say that tochacha, even if it will stop evil right now, will not be productive in our real goal of helping this person.
It wouldn't have necessarily been appropriate for any random person to just start giving tochacha to total strangers. But yaakov avinu cared so much about people that he was even able to refer to total strangers as his brothers. It was in this spirit that yaakov offered his rebuke, and only because of this that his rebuke was acceptable.
As the gemara goes on to say in erchin, nowadays we don't know how to be mochiach. It's a high enough darga to care about and be a kannai for Hashem. It is perhaps an even higher darga for a person to care about other people. Tochacha requires that the two merge: on the one hand, one has to take very seriously the mitzvos bein adam lamakom to be able to rebuke others in their performance. On the other hand, the rebuke has to come not from kannaus, but rather, from deeply caring about the individual whom you are rebuking. this is no small feat.
I think this is a very important context to mitzvas tochacha that has important practical applications. From least to greatest:
1. I once had a halachic debate with someone about the following scenario: if you see someone eating a pig sandwich, can you steal the sandwich from them to prevent them from doing an issur. (Funny that this also sort of comes up in the parsha by rachel stealing lavan's avodah zarah - obviously that story isn't a raayah to this shailah whatsoever.) Without going into the details, I think that any attempt to answer this question must be misyaches to the above understanding that mitzvas tochacha isn't about being g-d's police officer - its about caring about other jews.
2. People who know me know that I've ranted since tenth grade about the weak excuse of the chazon ish to explain why we are so meikel in how we treat apikorsim nowadays. This approach really provides a much firmer basis to his mehalech - nowadays we don't know how to be mochiach - the only way we can act to help our fellow Jews who have unfortunately turned off the path is to treat them with love. I still don't know if I agree to this because it seems so black and white against the rambam - but I don't think this is an appropriate forum to discuss this issue.
3. A few weeks ago I wrote about Rabbi Yosef Mendelevich's ahavas yisrael and how he allowed no distinction between his love of G-d and love of man. (http://doleh-u-mashkeh.blogspot.com/2013/10/rabbi-yosef-mendelevich.html). I was thinking of this R Yaakov when I wrote that. I've always thought that it is very wrong when you see some people who go into chinuch / rabbanus not because they have such a burning passion to teach young children torah, but rather, because they want to stay in learning (for themselves). Like R yaakov's pshat in tochacha, a person can't go into chinuch as part of his avodas hashem bein adam lamakom - it has to be a mitzvah bein adam lachaveiro. A mechanech needs to be someone like R yosef Mendelevich, like Yaakov avinu, who teaches others torah not as a mitzvah bein adam lamakom but rather because of his burning ahavas yisrael and desire to teach bnei yisrael torah and bring them closer to hakadosh baruch hu.
Even if we don't go into chinuch, that's a lesson for us as friends, siblings, parents, and everything else we'll do in life.
Its a little early, but I will still take this chance to wish everyone a good shabbos!
Yaakov flees from eisav to charan and bumps into a bunch of shepherds lazing by the well. Yaakov, a foreigner from a different country, having never met these people ever before in his life, immediately proceeds to "but in" to their business asking them why they are lazing around and not working. That's a little bit awkward - what prompted Yaakov to do this?
The seforno asks this question, and he writes:
הצדיק ימאס את העול ג"כ אל האחרים כאמרו תועבת צדיקים איש עול
Yaakov protested the laziness of the shephers because a tzaddik cannot stand evil - in himself, or in others.
R Yaakov, I believe, argues on this seforno. He begins by making a diyuk in Yaakov's language when he starts talking to the shepherds (Having been attacked over this diyuk, I think we can concede under pressure that it is not muchrach - but R yaakov's point exists without it so it is not crucial.)
וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם יַעֲקֹב אַחַי מֵאַיִן אַתֶּם וַיֹּאמְרוּ מֵחָרָן אֲנָחְנוּ:
Since when are these total strangers his "brothers"?
To buttress this diyuk, r yaakov directs our attention to a rashi in parshas chukas. When moshe rabbeinu sends to edom asking to be allowed to pass through his land, he begins by saying, "ko amar achicha yisrael". rashi comments:
...אחיך ישראל - מה ראה להזכיר כאן אחוה
So you see that it is fair to wonder why someone should start talking about being brother to someone who isn't really his brother.
Shifting focus for a moment, we know there is a machlokes in the gemara in erchin concerning how far one must go to rebuke others in fulfillment of the mitzvah of tochachah. One opinion says give up when the guy you're trying to rebuke gets really mad at you, another opinion is when he starts cursing you, we paskin that you shouldn't give up until he starts hitting you. Regardless of which opinion you take, how does this make sense? Since when do you not fulfill a mitzvah deoraysa because someone will curse you out over it, and even if they'll start hitting you (obviously as long as there is no danger to life), why should that stop fulfillment of a mitzvah deoraysa?
Says R yaakov, if the mitzvah of tochacha were to act as G-d's police officers (as the seforno might very well claim), then the above question would indeed hold. But look at the way the rambam formulates mitzvas tochacha:
הרואה חבירו שחטא או שהלך בדרך לא טובה מצוה להחזירו למוטב ולהודיעו שהוא חוטא על עצמו במעשיו הרעים שנאמר הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך. המוכיח את חבירו בין בדברים שבינו לבינו. בין בדברים שבינו לבין המקום. צריך להוכיחו בינו לבין עצמו. וידבר לו בנחת ובלשון רכה ויודיעו שאינו אומר לו אלא לטובתו להביאו לחיי העולם הבא. אם קיבל ממנו מוטב ואם לאו יוכיחנו פעם שניה ושלישית. וכן תמיד חייב אדם להוכיחו עד שיכהו החוטא ויאמר לו איני שומע. וכל שאפשר בידו למחות ואינו מוחה הוא נתפש בעון אלו כיון שאפשר לו למחות בהם:
We might have thought, before seeing this rambam, that the mitzvah of tochacha is a mitzvah bein adam lamakom - a religious obligation to dispel evil from our midst. But the rambam is clear that that is NOT the case - mitzvas tochacha is a mitzvah bein adam lachaveiro - we have an obligation to look out for our friend's ultimate best interests - if we really care about our friends, then we will help them stay on the right path. (lichora a big nafka minah of this that you have to ask mechila from your friend for NOT rebuking him enough - pretty wild if that is true)
It now immediately follows that we should ony be mochiach as long as we are acting in the rebukee's best interests - that is, our goal is not to eliminate evil at all costs, in which case we would be mochiach even after the guy started cursing/hitting. Rather, our goal is to help bring this guy back to what's best for him. When he starts cursing/hitting, we say that tochacha, even if it will stop evil right now, will not be productive in our real goal of helping this person.
It wouldn't have necessarily been appropriate for any random person to just start giving tochacha to total strangers. But yaakov avinu cared so much about people that he was even able to refer to total strangers as his brothers. It was in this spirit that yaakov offered his rebuke, and only because of this that his rebuke was acceptable.
As the gemara goes on to say in erchin, nowadays we don't know how to be mochiach. It's a high enough darga to care about and be a kannai for Hashem. It is perhaps an even higher darga for a person to care about other people. Tochacha requires that the two merge: on the one hand, one has to take very seriously the mitzvos bein adam lamakom to be able to rebuke others in their performance. On the other hand, the rebuke has to come not from kannaus, but rather, from deeply caring about the individual whom you are rebuking. this is no small feat.
I think this is a very important context to mitzvas tochacha that has important practical applications. From least to greatest:
1. I once had a halachic debate with someone about the following scenario: if you see someone eating a pig sandwich, can you steal the sandwich from them to prevent them from doing an issur. (Funny that this also sort of comes up in the parsha by rachel stealing lavan's avodah zarah - obviously that story isn't a raayah to this shailah whatsoever.) Without going into the details, I think that any attempt to answer this question must be misyaches to the above understanding that mitzvas tochacha isn't about being g-d's police officer - its about caring about other jews.
2. People who know me know that I've ranted since tenth grade about the weak excuse of the chazon ish to explain why we are so meikel in how we treat apikorsim nowadays. This approach really provides a much firmer basis to his mehalech - nowadays we don't know how to be mochiach - the only way we can act to help our fellow Jews who have unfortunately turned off the path is to treat them with love. I still don't know if I agree to this because it seems so black and white against the rambam - but I don't think this is an appropriate forum to discuss this issue.
3. A few weeks ago I wrote about Rabbi Yosef Mendelevich's ahavas yisrael and how he allowed no distinction between his love of G-d and love of man. (http://doleh-u-mashkeh.blogspot.com/2013/10/rabbi-yosef-mendelevich.html). I was thinking of this R Yaakov when I wrote that. I've always thought that it is very wrong when you see some people who go into chinuch / rabbanus not because they have such a burning passion to teach young children torah, but rather, because they want to stay in learning (for themselves). Like R yaakov's pshat in tochacha, a person can't go into chinuch as part of his avodas hashem bein adam lamakom - it has to be a mitzvah bein adam lachaveiro. A mechanech needs to be someone like R yosef Mendelevich, like Yaakov avinu, who teaches others torah not as a mitzvah bein adam lamakom but rather because of his burning ahavas yisrael and desire to teach bnei yisrael torah and bring them closer to hakadosh baruch hu.
Even if we don't go into chinuch, that's a lesson for us as friends, siblings, parents, and everything else we'll do in life.
Its a little early, but I will still take this chance to wish everyone a good shabbos!
Friday, November 1, 2013
Guest Post: Tefilah
In a very exciting new step for doleh-u-mashkeh, we have our first guest post. (If anyone else ever wants to write, please feel free!) Its attacking something I wrote, so I will respond at the end (note that in deference to the author, I have not changed anything even if I don't like being called "baal hamshkeh"):
Tzarich iyun on our guest poster.
In a recent post http://doleh-u-mashkeh.
In last week’s parsha, Rashi (Bereishis 25:30) writes that Hashem kindly took Avraham five years before his time to ensure that Avraham would not see his grandson Esav develop into a Rasha. Initially the plan was for Avraham to live until 180, but as Yaakov and Esav approached their bar mitzvas, Hashem decided to cut Avraham short at 175.
The problem with this Rashi is that the initial plan doesn't seem to make much sense. Did Hashem not realize that Esav was going to turn to the dark side? Why wouldn’t Hashem account for this when He initially planned the length of Avraham’s life?
Rav Chaim Yosef Sonnenfeld answers this question by pointing out a misunderstanding of when the plan was changed: the plan wasn’t changed when Avraham was 175 to account for Evil Esav, but was changed years earlier. He explains that in the original plan, Yaakov and Esav were supposed to be born when Avraham was 167 in order that Avraham would finish his 180 years before Esav turned evil. However, in the beginning of this week’s parsha, Yitzchak’s fervent teffilos for children stirred Hashem to the point that He changed His plan and allowed Yaakov and Esav to enter the world five years earlier, when Avraham was 162. The new reality became such that Esav would become evil when Avraham was 175, as opposed to 180, so Hashem changed the plan and out of kindness took Avraham five years early. [For the gematria inclined: "Vayeiaser lo Hashem"- same gematria as chamesh shanim.]
Sounds like a nice pshat, but what emerges from this idea is that Yitzchak’s teffilos for a son indirectly killed Avraham. Perhaps if Yitzchak would have followed the mehalech of the baalei mussar he would have gotten what he wanted while avoiding this collateral damage on his father…
Nevertheless, I don’t think you’ll find a mekor in chazal reprimanding Yitzchak for his fervent tefillos.
Perhaps the takeaway is that Yitzchak davened for what from his perspective seemed positive, and he need not consider the possibility that Hashem would pull a fast one and grant the request only to negatively affect the greater scheme.
In fact, this episode demonstrates that Hashem will account for the ramifications of our requests and ensure that all factors are taken into consideration, even those that we cannot realize.
קרוב ה' לכל קוראיו לכל אשר יקראהו באמת. רצון יראיו יעשה ואת שועתם ישמע ויושיעם
Good shabbos
My comments: 1) dont chazal say that hashem purposely made the imahos barren because hashem desires the tefillah of tzaddikim - if so it was part of the plan that yitzchak shouldnt have kids until he davened for them which undermines this whole vort.
2) indeed, r tzaddok which we quoted in the last post was coming off that very idea - sometimes tefillah's purpose isn't to change the master plan, but rather, to allow the master plan to come to fruition.
3) looking at it again, it really makes no sense. the whole question was that hashem should realize that eisav was going to "turn to the dark side" - by that logic, hashem should also realize that yitzchak was going to daven! ela mai, Hashem didnt incorporate yitzchak's tefillah into the "master plan" because that was a function of yitzchak's bechira chofshis - then he also shouldn't factor eisav's going off (also a function of free will) into the plan!
Tzarich iyun on our guest poster.
Wednesday, October 30, 2013
commentator archives - dr belkin on drama
I always love looking through old newspapers - i think its fascinating to see old perspectives and what exactly people were thinking about back then.
A friend of mine decided to look through the archives of the commentator and found a fascinating article by Dr. Belkin. I found this article to be a little harsh, but maybe that just reflects a lack of sensitivity on my part - you'll see what I mean when you read it. Overall, I think we all wish the university today was guided a little more by the perspective of Dr. Belkin.
Just a word/story about Dr. Belkin: One shabbos an alumnus of YU was here who was a talmid of R Gorelick (one of the roshei yeshiva at YU then from pre-war europe). R Gorelick told his talmidim: 'you all think that I am kodesh, while Dr. Belkin, who is just the president of the university, isn't anything special. But really its exactly the opposite - in Radin, Dr. Belkin was the big iluy/masmid while I used to hide in the bathroom and read Voltaire. ' At which point one student interjected - c'mon rebbe, you don't really know voltaire - so R gorelick showed him that he knew voltaire a lot better than this student. the point being that despite not being famous, dr belkin was obviously very chashuv, so we should take seriously what he says.
anyways, heres the link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2M_eyjK9lJLS2c3dW14cjN2ZXc/edit?usp=sharing
(theres one more very important thing I want to say about this article but that will be for later)
A friend of mine decided to look through the archives of the commentator and found a fascinating article by Dr. Belkin. I found this article to be a little harsh, but maybe that just reflects a lack of sensitivity on my part - you'll see what I mean when you read it. Overall, I think we all wish the university today was guided a little more by the perspective of Dr. Belkin.
Just a word/story about Dr. Belkin: One shabbos an alumnus of YU was here who was a talmid of R Gorelick (one of the roshei yeshiva at YU then from pre-war europe). R Gorelick told his talmidim: 'you all think that I am kodesh, while Dr. Belkin, who is just the president of the university, isn't anything special. But really its exactly the opposite - in Radin, Dr. Belkin was the big iluy/masmid while I used to hide in the bathroom and read Voltaire. ' At which point one student interjected - c'mon rebbe, you don't really know voltaire - so R gorelick showed him that he knew voltaire a lot better than this student. the point being that despite not being famous, dr belkin was obviously very chashuv, so we should take seriously what he says.
anyways, heres the link: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2M_eyjK9lJLS2c3dW14cjN2ZXc/edit?usp=sharing
(theres one more very important thing I want to say about this article but that will be for later)
Friday, October 25, 2013
chayei sarah - the last nisayon
Kayadua, there is a machlokes about what exactly the ten nisyonos of avraham were. The Rambam ends the list in parshas vayera with the climactic akeidas yitzchak.
But the rabbeinu yonah ends the list with the beginning of this week's parsha - he thinks the tenth nisayon was avraham's burial of sarah: העשירי קבורת שרה. שנאמר לו קום התהלך בארץ לארכה ולרחבה כי לך אתננה. וכשמתה אשתו לא מצא מקום לקברה עד שקנאו ולא הרהר.
At first glance, this seems ridiculous - avraham was willing to sacrifice his son - what does the sacrifice of 400 coins mean in relation to that - its nothing?
(What we say below isnt meant to explain how the tenth nisayon was greater than that of the akeidah - that I do not say. but it will explain how the 2 nisyonos were different - how the nisayon of kevuras sarah is not automatically subsumed under that of the akeidah)
By akeidas yitzchak, hashem commanded avraham to slaughter his son. obviously thats an incredible nisayon - but at the end of the day, if hashem commands you to do something, you do it.
By kevuras sarah we have exactly the opposite - hashem told avraham that the land is his. Efron is even (seemingly) offering the land for free - its so tempting - just take efron up on his bluff and take the land for free - after all - it really belongs to avraham anyways as per hashem's havtacha.
The nisayon wasn't to obey hashem, no matter how hard that might be. hashem didn't say anything here. the nisayon wasn't even to do what's right in the absence of a command- mitzad hadin, its entirely possible that avraham had every right to take the land without paying (leaving the discussion by the shepherds aside for now). the nisayon was that even if hashem didn't say anything, and even if you're totally justified/in the right, and even if the guy you're dealing with is a dishonest jerk (as efron was), still you should give in to him and pay for the field - even though he offered it for free!
The gemara somewhere in Bava metzia recounts how when one amora hired workers who instead of doing the job for him, accidentally broke his stuff, he wanted to take payment from them. This amora's rebbe stepped in, however, and forced him to not only not take payment for the damage the workers did, but to pay them for their time as if they had done their job - obviously this is far above and beyond what the letter, and perhaps even the spirit of the law requires - but thats the lesson of the tenh nisayon. we have to go so far to be nice to others, and put aside our pain / frustration at the lack of justice that doing so entails - that is non-trivial.
Good shabbos!
But the rabbeinu yonah ends the list with the beginning of this week's parsha - he thinks the tenth nisayon was avraham's burial of sarah: העשירי קבורת שרה. שנאמר לו קום התהלך בארץ לארכה ולרחבה כי לך אתננה. וכשמתה אשתו לא מצא מקום לקברה עד שקנאו ולא הרהר.
At first glance, this seems ridiculous - avraham was willing to sacrifice his son - what does the sacrifice of 400 coins mean in relation to that - its nothing?
(What we say below isnt meant to explain how the tenth nisayon was greater than that of the akeidah - that I do not say. but it will explain how the 2 nisyonos were different - how the nisayon of kevuras sarah is not automatically subsumed under that of the akeidah)
By akeidas yitzchak, hashem commanded avraham to slaughter his son. obviously thats an incredible nisayon - but at the end of the day, if hashem commands you to do something, you do it.
By kevuras sarah we have exactly the opposite - hashem told avraham that the land is his. Efron is even (seemingly) offering the land for free - its so tempting - just take efron up on his bluff and take the land for free - after all - it really belongs to avraham anyways as per hashem's havtacha.
The nisayon wasn't to obey hashem, no matter how hard that might be. hashem didn't say anything here. the nisayon wasn't even to do what's right in the absence of a command- mitzad hadin, its entirely possible that avraham had every right to take the land without paying (leaving the discussion by the shepherds aside for now). the nisayon was that even if hashem didn't say anything, and even if you're totally justified/in the right, and even if the guy you're dealing with is a dishonest jerk (as efron was), still you should give in to him and pay for the field - even though he offered it for free!
The gemara somewhere in Bava metzia recounts how when one amora hired workers who instead of doing the job for him, accidentally broke his stuff, he wanted to take payment from them. This amora's rebbe stepped in, however, and forced him to not only not take payment for the damage the workers did, but to pay them for their time as if they had done their job - obviously this is far above and beyond what the letter, and perhaps even the spirit of the law requires - but thats the lesson of the tenh nisayon. we have to go so far to be nice to others, and put aside our pain / frustration at the lack of justice that doing so entails - that is non-trivial.
Good shabbos!
Thursday, October 17, 2013
Tefillah - Against the baalei mussar
I'm trying to find someone to whom I can attribute the idea which I'm about to disagree with (if you know please let me know).
I've heard people attribute to the baalei mussar that the highest level of tefillah is to not daven for anything specific; rather you should daven that hashem should do whatever is best - after all, you don't really know what is best - so maybe you / the world would really be better off if you didn't get what you're davening for. Therefore, leave the decision about what's best to Hashem and let your role be to daven that whatever Hashem knows is best should happen.
I think this is ridiculous. First of all, chazal were mitaken all our tefillos, and they never do this. Much more powerfully - how different and lacking our torah would be were the characters in tanach to follow this terrible advice. The emotional power of sefer tehillim would vanish.
We would never learn the depths of Moshe's desire to enter Eretz Yisrael.
In connection to this week's parsha, we would lose Avraham's powerful tefillah to save sdom. Instead of "hashofet kol haaretz lo yaaseh mishpat", we would have avraham say, ok G-d, whatever you think is right.
We wouldn't even be here to discuss this question, because the exact same thing would happen when Hashem told moshe he was going to wipe us out after the cheit ha-egel.
I think this mistake is connected to another flaw in people's understanding of tefillah. Many are troubled, how does it make sense that Hashem listens to our tefilos - mimah nafshach - if we deserve it, Hashem should give it to us without us asking, and if we don't deserve it, then asking makes it better? How can Hashem "change his mind" (lo ish kel viychazev) simply because we lay it on very thick to him?
So theres the famous shtickel torah - tefillah doesn't change G-d, it changes you. by davening you are transformed into a person worthy of what you're asking for.
Its cute. And of course it is true that tefillah, by virtue of its being a mitzvah, makes one a better person. But thats not the real answer to this question.
Let me ask you another question: I need a house to live in. Now, Why should I invest effort into building this house. Mimah nafshach - If I deserve the house, G-d must give it to me. If I dont deserve it, then why would G-d let me keep it simply because I exerted some stupid physical effort to build the house. Can G-d change his mind about whether or not I deserve this house simply because I build it?
Ela mai, for whatever reason (and we can get at an approximate intuitive understanding of why this is so), G-d created the world in a way that having a house to live in doesn't correspond to the simple metric of do you deserve it / do you not. Theres another factor thrown in - did you build the house.
So Hashem also wanted another metric to be thrown in (and again, we can attain an approximate understanding of why G-d wanted this) which is that independent of deserving it, did you daven for it? Hashem wanted to create a world where he could say Ki mi goy gadol asher lo elokim kerovim eilav - to do that he had to introduce a separate metric. But its no different, no more unfair, no more G-d changing his mind, than the fact that you need to build a house to live in it.
(I hate to quote chasidim, but I realized that this idea is mefurash in R Tzadok. In KBY, R Kalman Ber had us memorize this line from R tzaddok - I dont know where its from and I didnt understand its significance until I understood the above mashal. but here it is:
"Tefillah tzarich likol davar, af al pi shekivar nigzar min hashamayim")
So if you think tefillah is really just a way to change oneself, then it doesn't really matter what you ask for. But if we correctly understand that tefillah is part of the way Hashem created the world, and it is just like hishtadlus in that regard, then we see immediately why its important to daven for specific things.
Theres a fascinating gemara in bava metzia (I think 106a). The gemara says something along the lines of the following: if I asked my worker to plant wheat and he planted barley, and there was a makkas medinah that destroyed all the wheat and barley around the area, the worker is still chayav. why? because I, thinking the worker had planted wheat, davened for hashem to protect the wheat; if there had really been wheat there, maybe my tefilla would have been answered. since there was only barley, my tefilla had no effect.
So I was very troubled: Does G-d run a bureaucracy up there in shamayim: Sorry sir, your tefilla form says wheat, not barley - this seems ridiculous.
But in hishtadlus, effort alone doesn't count. If you try to build a house with rotten wood, all the good will in the world gets you no where. Tefilla is another form of hishtadlus and hence follows the same rules.
This is all very non -rambam - esque. But it has an application which I find inspiring, and that is again, avraham's tefilla to save sdom. Whats pshat that avraham can argue with Hashem about whether it is just to destroy sdom or not - the chutzpah!
But as we've said, in tefilla, it does matter that you are specific. you shouldn't leave it to g-d to decide whats best; rather, as part of your hishtadlus of tefilla, you have to evaluate what you think is best / right to ask for (the same way that in regular hishtadlus you have to decide what to be mishtadel for). Avraham thought it was right to save sdom - if he had any other way to do so, he would have tried it. but he didn't. so his last line of hishtadlus was tefillah. Even if G-d himself wants to destroy sdom, that doesn't change avraham's moral compass of right and wrong - he is still obligated to be mishtadel to do good - and part of that chiyuv includes davening. (This is al derech the machlokes rambam and ramban about ratzon hashem and right and wrong (ramban somewhere in bris bein habesarim) but thats for another discussion). This is a very powerful idea.
Good shabbos!
I've heard people attribute to the baalei mussar that the highest level of tefillah is to not daven for anything specific; rather you should daven that hashem should do whatever is best - after all, you don't really know what is best - so maybe you / the world would really be better off if you didn't get what you're davening for. Therefore, leave the decision about what's best to Hashem and let your role be to daven that whatever Hashem knows is best should happen.
I think this is ridiculous. First of all, chazal were mitaken all our tefillos, and they never do this. Much more powerfully - how different and lacking our torah would be were the characters in tanach to follow this terrible advice. The emotional power of sefer tehillim would vanish.
We would never learn the depths of Moshe's desire to enter Eretz Yisrael.
In connection to this week's parsha, we would lose Avraham's powerful tefillah to save sdom. Instead of "hashofet kol haaretz lo yaaseh mishpat", we would have avraham say, ok G-d, whatever you think is right.
We wouldn't even be here to discuss this question, because the exact same thing would happen when Hashem told moshe he was going to wipe us out after the cheit ha-egel.
I think this mistake is connected to another flaw in people's understanding of tefillah. Many are troubled, how does it make sense that Hashem listens to our tefilos - mimah nafshach - if we deserve it, Hashem should give it to us without us asking, and if we don't deserve it, then asking makes it better? How can Hashem "change his mind" (lo ish kel viychazev) simply because we lay it on very thick to him?
So theres the famous shtickel torah - tefillah doesn't change G-d, it changes you. by davening you are transformed into a person worthy of what you're asking for.
Its cute. And of course it is true that tefillah, by virtue of its being a mitzvah, makes one a better person. But thats not the real answer to this question.
Let me ask you another question: I need a house to live in. Now, Why should I invest effort into building this house. Mimah nafshach - If I deserve the house, G-d must give it to me. If I dont deserve it, then why would G-d let me keep it simply because I exerted some stupid physical effort to build the house. Can G-d change his mind about whether or not I deserve this house simply because I build it?
Ela mai, for whatever reason (and we can get at an approximate intuitive understanding of why this is so), G-d created the world in a way that having a house to live in doesn't correspond to the simple metric of do you deserve it / do you not. Theres another factor thrown in - did you build the house.
So Hashem also wanted another metric to be thrown in (and again, we can attain an approximate understanding of why G-d wanted this) which is that independent of deserving it, did you daven for it? Hashem wanted to create a world where he could say Ki mi goy gadol asher lo elokim kerovim eilav - to do that he had to introduce a separate metric. But its no different, no more unfair, no more G-d changing his mind, than the fact that you need to build a house to live in it.
(I hate to quote chasidim, but I realized that this idea is mefurash in R Tzadok. In KBY, R Kalman Ber had us memorize this line from R tzaddok - I dont know where its from and I didnt understand its significance until I understood the above mashal. but here it is:
"Tefillah tzarich likol davar, af al pi shekivar nigzar min hashamayim")
So if you think tefillah is really just a way to change oneself, then it doesn't really matter what you ask for. But if we correctly understand that tefillah is part of the way Hashem created the world, and it is just like hishtadlus in that regard, then we see immediately why its important to daven for specific things.
Theres a fascinating gemara in bava metzia (I think 106a). The gemara says something along the lines of the following: if I asked my worker to plant wheat and he planted barley, and there was a makkas medinah that destroyed all the wheat and barley around the area, the worker is still chayav. why? because I, thinking the worker had planted wheat, davened for hashem to protect the wheat; if there had really been wheat there, maybe my tefilla would have been answered. since there was only barley, my tefilla had no effect.
So I was very troubled: Does G-d run a bureaucracy up there in shamayim: Sorry sir, your tefilla form says wheat, not barley - this seems ridiculous.
But in hishtadlus, effort alone doesn't count. If you try to build a house with rotten wood, all the good will in the world gets you no where. Tefilla is another form of hishtadlus and hence follows the same rules.
This is all very non -rambam - esque. But it has an application which I find inspiring, and that is again, avraham's tefilla to save sdom. Whats pshat that avraham can argue with Hashem about whether it is just to destroy sdom or not - the chutzpah!
But as we've said, in tefilla, it does matter that you are specific. you shouldn't leave it to g-d to decide whats best; rather, as part of your hishtadlus of tefilla, you have to evaluate what you think is best / right to ask for (the same way that in regular hishtadlus you have to decide what to be mishtadel for). Avraham thought it was right to save sdom - if he had any other way to do so, he would have tried it. but he didn't. so his last line of hishtadlus was tefillah. Even if G-d himself wants to destroy sdom, that doesn't change avraham's moral compass of right and wrong - he is still obligated to be mishtadel to do good - and part of that chiyuv includes davening. (This is al derech the machlokes rambam and ramban about ratzon hashem and right and wrong (ramban somewhere in bris bein habesarim) but thats for another discussion). This is a very powerful idea.
Good shabbos!
Monday, October 14, 2013
Rabbi Yosef Mendelevich
I know Im supposed to answer the question I asked about milah. But the formulation is still fuzzy in my mind.
Tonight Rabbi Yosef Mendelevich came to speak at YU, where I had the zechus to hear him. If you never heard of him (like I hadnt till last week), he was born an irreligious Jew in Soviet Russia, became interested in Jewish history and started an underground Jewish education movement in Russia, was arrested trying to escape to Israel and spent eleven years in the gulag in communist russia. Despite all that, he remained (and if anything grew more) committed to Judaism and when he was freed, moved immediately to Israel where he became fully Orthodox.
What stood out to me was Mendelevich's tremendous ahavas yisrael. He said that the publicity of his trial and attempted escape forced the Soviet Union to begin to allow Jews out of Russia, such that while almost no Jews had left Russia once communism took over there, by the time he was freed 300,000 Jews had emigrated from Russia to Israel. He said that he felt it was a worthwhile trade - he would stay longer in prison to free more Jews from the communists. and this prison wasn't exactly a pleasant place - he was beaten, put to forced labor, never allowed visitations from family or friends. If he had given in to Russian demands to confess, to not act religious, things would have gone much easier for him. He brought the hard conditions upon himself, and still felt it was worth it to help other Jews escape. That is pure ahavas yisrael in every sense of the phrase.
Too often we separate our private religious lives / relationship with Hashem from our interpersonal relationships - this man allowed no such distinctions - when he spoke about his life, you saw that to him, being true to G-d was the same as being true to His people, and vica versa. He almost died on several occasions because of his refusal to take off his yarmulke - you could just look at that narrowly as dedication to mitzvos bein adam lamakom (and it is certainly incredible even in that light alone). But Mendelevich described that to him it wasn't just that - it was about him representing the spirit of the Jewish people to the Russians - we cannot be broken. Should Mendelevich give in, he realized it reflects badly not on him alone, but on our entire people. Through that, his action of (literal) mesiras nefesh became one that is limaan kol klal yisrael.
Please G-d, we should all never know any of the suffering Mendelevich knew, but we should all strive to reach his level of ahavas hashem and ahavas yisrael.
Tonight Rabbi Yosef Mendelevich came to speak at YU, where I had the zechus to hear him. If you never heard of him (like I hadnt till last week), he was born an irreligious Jew in Soviet Russia, became interested in Jewish history and started an underground Jewish education movement in Russia, was arrested trying to escape to Israel and spent eleven years in the gulag in communist russia. Despite all that, he remained (and if anything grew more) committed to Judaism and when he was freed, moved immediately to Israel where he became fully Orthodox.
What stood out to me was Mendelevich's tremendous ahavas yisrael. He said that the publicity of his trial and attempted escape forced the Soviet Union to begin to allow Jews out of Russia, such that while almost no Jews had left Russia once communism took over there, by the time he was freed 300,000 Jews had emigrated from Russia to Israel. He said that he felt it was a worthwhile trade - he would stay longer in prison to free more Jews from the communists. and this prison wasn't exactly a pleasant place - he was beaten, put to forced labor, never allowed visitations from family or friends. If he had given in to Russian demands to confess, to not act religious, things would have gone much easier for him. He brought the hard conditions upon himself, and still felt it was worth it to help other Jews escape. That is pure ahavas yisrael in every sense of the phrase.
Too often we separate our private religious lives / relationship with Hashem from our interpersonal relationships - this man allowed no such distinctions - when he spoke about his life, you saw that to him, being true to G-d was the same as being true to His people, and vica versa. He almost died on several occasions because of his refusal to take off his yarmulke - you could just look at that narrowly as dedication to mitzvos bein adam lamakom (and it is certainly incredible even in that light alone). But Mendelevich described that to him it wasn't just that - it was about him representing the spirit of the Jewish people to the Russians - we cannot be broken. Should Mendelevich give in, he realized it reflects badly not on him alone, but on our entire people. Through that, his action of (literal) mesiras nefesh became one that is limaan kol klal yisrael.
Please G-d, we should all never know any of the suffering Mendelevich knew, but we should all strive to reach his level of ahavas hashem and ahavas yisrael.
Tuesday, October 8, 2013
Theological crisis
Thats a slight exaggeration. But here's the question, and it has critical theological ramifications.
The Rambam (peirush hamishnayos end of seventh perek of chullin) is adamant that all the mitzvos we do, we do because we were commanded at sinai - even if some mitzvos were given before sinai, the tzviuy from before sinai isnt what is mechayev - only the tzivuy from sinai counts:
ושים לבך לכלל הגדול הזה המובא במשנה זו והוא אמרם מסיני נאסר, והוא, שאתה צריך לדעת שכל מה שאנו נזהרים ממנו או עושים אותו היום אין אנו עושים זאת אלא מפני צווי ה' על ידי משה, לא מפני שה' צוה בכך לנביאים שקדמוהו, דוגמא לכך, אין אנו אוכלים אבר מן החי לא מפני שה' אסר על בני נח אבר מן החי, אלא מפני שמשה אסר עלינו אבר מן החי במה שנצטווה בסיני שישאר אבר מן החי אסור. וכן אין אנו מלים בגלל שאברהם מל את עצמו ואנשי ביתו, אלא מפני שה' צונו על ידי משה להמול כמו שמל אברהם עליו השלום, וכן גיד הנשה אין אנו נמשכים בו אחרי אסור יעקב אבינו אלא צווי משה רבינו, הלא תראה אמרם שש מאות ושלש עשרה מצות נאמרו לו למשה בסיני, וכל אלה מכלל המצות.
A question that we will need to get back to to answer my primary question: why is the rambam so adamant about this, and why is this such an important "klal gadol".
But before we discuss that, the primary question: As you can see in the second bolding, one of the rambam's examples of a mitvzah given before sinai is the mitzvah of milah in this week's parsha, and the rambam explicitly writes that the tzivuy to avraham is not what binds us - rather it is the tzivuy from moshe that we care about.
How do you square that with the pashut pshat in the psukim:
(ט) וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים אֶל־אַבְרָהָם וְאַתָּה אֶת־בְּרִיתִי תִשְׁמֹר אַתָּה וְזַרְעֲךָ אַחֲרֶיךָ לְדֹרֹתָם:
(י) זֹאת בְּרִיתִי אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׁמְרוּ בֵּינִי וּבֵינֵיכֶם וּבֵין זַרְעֲךָ אַחֲרֶיךָ הִמּוֹל לָכֶם כָּל־זָכָר:
(יא) וּנְמַלְתֶּם אֵת בְּשַׂר עָרְלַתְכֶם וְהָיָה לְאוֹת בְּרִית בֵּינִי וּבֵינֵיכֶם:
(יב) וּבֶן־שְׁמֹנַת יָמִים יִמּוֹל לָכֶם כָּל־זָכָר לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם יְלִיד בָּיִת וּמִקְנַת־כֶּסֶף מִכֹּל בֶּן־נֵכָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא מִזַּרְעֲךָ הוּא:
(יג) הִמּוֹל יִמּוֹל יְלִיד בֵּיתְךָ וּמִקְנַת כַּסְפֶּךָ וְהָיְתָה בְרִיתִי בִּבְשַׂרְכֶם לִבְרִית עוֹלָם:
(יד) וְעָרֵל זָכָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יִמּוֹל אֶת־בְּשַׂר עָרְלָתוֹ וְנִכְרְתָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא מֵעַמֶּיהָ אֶת־בְּרִיתִי הֵפַר: ס
Hashem specifically commands Avraham in a tzivuy lidoros (notice the boldings) - how can that tzivuy be batel? How could it be that we are not obligated to do milah because hashem commanded avraham in a tzivuy lidoros? Do we not fulfill that tzivuy when we do milah?
Check out the rambam's language by mitzvas milah in sefer hamitzvos:
והמצוה הרט"ו היא שצונו למול את הבן והוא אמרו יתעלה לאברהם (ס"פ לך) המול לכם כל זכר
(notice the bolded, underlined, and italicized word for emphasis)
The tzivuy of milah is the one that was given to avraham - how do we make sense of that?
(Lest you think this is a kashya by all mitzvos that were given pre-mattan torah, its not true. Look at the leshonos in sefer hamitzvos and the pesukim vitimtzah nachas.)
I asked R Twersky about this issue, and while he didn't have answer, suggested a direction to think in. I still need to think about it more before I can think about attempting to formulate an answer. But this is a major theological crisis. Ideas, anybody?
The Rambam (peirush hamishnayos end of seventh perek of chullin) is adamant that all the mitzvos we do, we do because we were commanded at sinai - even if some mitzvos were given before sinai, the tzviuy from before sinai isnt what is mechayev - only the tzivuy from sinai counts:
ושים לבך לכלל הגדול הזה המובא במשנה זו והוא אמרם מסיני נאסר, והוא, שאתה צריך לדעת שכל מה שאנו נזהרים ממנו או עושים אותו היום אין אנו עושים זאת אלא מפני צווי ה' על ידי משה, לא מפני שה' צוה בכך לנביאים שקדמוהו, דוגמא לכך, אין אנו אוכלים אבר מן החי לא מפני שה' אסר על בני נח אבר מן החי, אלא מפני שמשה אסר עלינו אבר מן החי במה שנצטווה בסיני שישאר אבר מן החי אסור. וכן אין אנו מלים בגלל שאברהם מל את עצמו ואנשי ביתו, אלא מפני שה' צונו על ידי משה להמול כמו שמל אברהם עליו השלום, וכן גיד הנשה אין אנו נמשכים בו אחרי אסור יעקב אבינו אלא צווי משה רבינו, הלא תראה אמרם שש מאות ושלש עשרה מצות נאמרו לו למשה בסיני, וכל אלה מכלל המצות.
A question that we will need to get back to to answer my primary question: why is the rambam so adamant about this, and why is this such an important "klal gadol".
But before we discuss that, the primary question: As you can see in the second bolding, one of the rambam's examples of a mitvzah given before sinai is the mitzvah of milah in this week's parsha, and the rambam explicitly writes that the tzivuy to avraham is not what binds us - rather it is the tzivuy from moshe that we care about.
How do you square that with the pashut pshat in the psukim:
(ט) וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים אֶל־אַבְרָהָם וְאַתָּה אֶת־בְּרִיתִי תִשְׁמֹר אַתָּה וְזַרְעֲךָ אַחֲרֶיךָ לְדֹרֹתָם:
(י) זֹאת בְּרִיתִי אֲשֶׁר תִּשְׁמְרוּ בֵּינִי וּבֵינֵיכֶם וּבֵין זַרְעֲךָ אַחֲרֶיךָ הִמּוֹל לָכֶם כָּל־זָכָר:
(יא) וּנְמַלְתֶּם אֵת בְּשַׂר עָרְלַתְכֶם וְהָיָה לְאוֹת בְּרִית בֵּינִי וּבֵינֵיכֶם:
(יב) וּבֶן־שְׁמֹנַת יָמִים יִמּוֹל לָכֶם כָּל־זָכָר לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם יְלִיד בָּיִת וּמִקְנַת־כֶּסֶף מִכֹּל בֶּן־נֵכָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא מִזַּרְעֲךָ הוּא:
(יג) הִמּוֹל יִמּוֹל יְלִיד בֵּיתְךָ וּמִקְנַת כַּסְפֶּךָ וְהָיְתָה בְרִיתִי בִּבְשַׂרְכֶם לִבְרִית עוֹלָם:
(יד) וְעָרֵל זָכָר אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יִמּוֹל אֶת־בְּשַׂר עָרְלָתוֹ וְנִכְרְתָה הַנֶּפֶשׁ הַהִוא מֵעַמֶּיהָ אֶת־בְּרִיתִי הֵפַר: ס
Hashem specifically commands Avraham in a tzivuy lidoros (notice the boldings) - how can that tzivuy be batel? How could it be that we are not obligated to do milah because hashem commanded avraham in a tzivuy lidoros? Do we not fulfill that tzivuy when we do milah?
Check out the rambam's language by mitzvas milah in sefer hamitzvos:
והמצוה הרט"ו היא שצונו למול את הבן והוא אמרו יתעלה לאברהם (ס"פ לך) המול לכם כל זכר
(notice the bolded, underlined, and italicized word for emphasis)
The tzivuy of milah is the one that was given to avraham - how do we make sense of that?
(Lest you think this is a kashya by all mitzvos that were given pre-mattan torah, its not true. Look at the leshonos in sefer hamitzvos and the pesukim vitimtzah nachas.)
I asked R Twersky about this issue, and while he didn't have answer, suggested a direction to think in. I still need to think about it more before I can think about attempting to formulate an answer. But this is a major theological crisis. Ideas, anybody?
Saturday, October 5, 2013
mezuzah
I know this has nothing to do with the parsha, but I was thinking about this and I have something I hope is interesting.
The Rambam has harsh words for those who use mezuzah as a mystical protection from danger:
אבל אלו שכותבין מבפנים שמות המלאכים או שמות קדושים או פסוק או חותמות הרי הן בכלל מי שאין להם חלק לעולם הבא, שאלו הטפשים לא די להם שבטלו המצוה אלא שעשו מצוה גדולה שהיא יחוד השם של הקב”ה ואהבתו ועבודתו כאילו הוא קמיע של הניית עצמן כמו שעלה על לבם הסכל שזהו דבר המהנה בהבלי העולם.
those who put "shemos hamalachim" in a mezuzah to be some sort of supernatural protection have taken a tremendous mitzvah that centers around yichud hashem, around loving and fearing g-d, and made it self-serving - to act as mystical protection. there is no greater perversion of torah (according to the rambam) than this.
(Rashi and Tosfos seem to argue on this rambam, and indeed, on this very halacha, the ramach is masig (quoted in the kesef mishna): כתב הרמ"ך דבמסכת ע"ז משמע מהא דאמר אונקלוס לגונדא דרומאי כי הקדוש ברוך הוא עושה המזוזה לשמור ישראל מבחוץ.)
(This is reflective of the rambam's general take on amulet users (peirush hamishnayos sotah 7:4): אל תטריד את מחשבתך במה שהוזים כותבי הקמיעות וטפשי בני אדם)
Based on this approach, the rambam writes something fascinating in the last halacha of hilchos mezuzah:
חייב אדם להזהר במזוזה מפני שהיא חובת הכל תמיד. וכל זמן שיכנס ויצא יפגע ביחוד השם שמו של הקדוש ב"ה ויזכור אהבתו ויעור משנתו ושגיותיו בהבלי הזמן. וידע שאין דבר העומד לעולם ולעולמי עולמים אלא ידיעת צור העולם ומיד הוא חוזר לדעתו והולך בדרכי מישרים. אמרו חכמים הראשונים כל מי שיש לו תפילין בראשו ובזרועו וציצית בבגדו ומזוזה בפתחו מוחזק הוא שלא יחטא שהרי יש לו מזכירין רבים והן הם המלאכים שמצילין אותו מלחטוא שנאמר חונה מלאך יי' סביב ליראיו ויחלצם.
Chazal mention malachim in the context of mezuzah - how does the rambam square this with the disdain he showed for shemos malachim earlier? Answers the rambam, the malachim aren't fiery beings with wings that protect man from physical danger - the malachim are mitzvos that remind us of hashem and protect us from sin.
I thought that with this we can understand a difficulty in the rambam elsewhere. The rambam, based on a gemara brachos, writes:
וכל זמן שיכנס לבית הכסא אומר קודם שיכנס התכבדו מכובדים קדושים משרתי עליון עזרוני עזרוני שמרוני שמרוני המתינו לי עד שאכנס ואצא שזה דרכן של בני אדם. (hilchos tefila 7:4)
A person is supposed to ask the malachim to wait for him when he enters the bathroom - since they cant go in. How does the rambam understand this - we have fiery beings with wings who escort us but they cant go into the bathroom? We're allowed to daven to them - isnt that avodah zarah?
But juxtaposed to the rambam in hilchos mezuzah, this makes perfect sense. We are familiar with the famous gemara that tells how dovid hamelech, when he entered the bathroom, was disturbed by the lack of mitzvos - no tefillin, no mezuzah, an issur talmud torah. This tefillah reflects that sensitivity - we are scared to enter a place where there are no mitzvos, and we pray that our mitzvos should still be there - we should still be shayach to mitzvos - when we come out.
I find this whole approach very inspirational. First of all, there are those who think this "modern" shittah of the rambam is less "frum" than the shitah that mezuzah literally protects from physical harm. I think its exactly the opposite - the rambam's position is much more frum. We don't do mitzvos to gain physical protection - to the contrary, we do mitzvos even if that means suffering in this world. Hence mezuzah is not about physical protection - its about a meaningful protection, a protection from sin.
Second, I think this connection to the tefilla before entering a beis hakiseh reveals a profound sensitivity to mitzvos - its only five minutes without mitzvos, but that should bother us. We should all be zocheh to attain such a madrega.
Shavua tov!
The Rambam has harsh words for those who use mezuzah as a mystical protection from danger:
אבל אלו שכותבין מבפנים שמות המלאכים או שמות קדושים או פסוק או חותמות הרי הן בכלל מי שאין להם חלק לעולם הבא, שאלו הטפשים לא די להם שבטלו המצוה אלא שעשו מצוה גדולה שהיא יחוד השם של הקב”ה ואהבתו ועבודתו כאילו הוא קמיע של הניית עצמן כמו שעלה על לבם הסכל שזהו דבר המהנה בהבלי העולם.
those who put "shemos hamalachim" in a mezuzah to be some sort of supernatural protection have taken a tremendous mitzvah that centers around yichud hashem, around loving and fearing g-d, and made it self-serving - to act as mystical protection. there is no greater perversion of torah (according to the rambam) than this.
(Rashi and Tosfos seem to argue on this rambam, and indeed, on this very halacha, the ramach is masig (quoted in the kesef mishna): כתב הרמ"ך דבמסכת ע"ז משמע מהא דאמר אונקלוס לגונדא דרומאי כי הקדוש ברוך הוא עושה המזוזה לשמור ישראל מבחוץ.)
(This is reflective of the rambam's general take on amulet users (peirush hamishnayos sotah 7:4): אל תטריד את מחשבתך במה שהוזים כותבי הקמיעות וטפשי בני אדם)
Based on this approach, the rambam writes something fascinating in the last halacha of hilchos mezuzah:
חייב אדם להזהר במזוזה מפני שהיא חובת הכל תמיד. וכל זמן שיכנס ויצא יפגע ביחוד השם שמו של הקדוש ב"ה ויזכור אהבתו ויעור משנתו ושגיותיו בהבלי הזמן. וידע שאין דבר העומד לעולם ולעולמי עולמים אלא ידיעת צור העולם ומיד הוא חוזר לדעתו והולך בדרכי מישרים. אמרו חכמים הראשונים כל מי שיש לו תפילין בראשו ובזרועו וציצית בבגדו ומזוזה בפתחו מוחזק הוא שלא יחטא שהרי יש לו מזכירין רבים והן הם המלאכים שמצילין אותו מלחטוא שנאמר חונה מלאך יי' סביב ליראיו ויחלצם.
Chazal mention malachim in the context of mezuzah - how does the rambam square this with the disdain he showed for shemos malachim earlier? Answers the rambam, the malachim aren't fiery beings with wings that protect man from physical danger - the malachim are mitzvos that remind us of hashem and protect us from sin.
I thought that with this we can understand a difficulty in the rambam elsewhere. The rambam, based on a gemara brachos, writes:
וכל זמן שיכנס לבית הכסא אומר קודם שיכנס התכבדו מכובדים קדושים משרתי עליון עזרוני עזרוני שמרוני שמרוני המתינו לי עד שאכנס ואצא שזה דרכן של בני אדם. (hilchos tefila 7:4)
A person is supposed to ask the malachim to wait for him when he enters the bathroom - since they cant go in. How does the rambam understand this - we have fiery beings with wings who escort us but they cant go into the bathroom? We're allowed to daven to them - isnt that avodah zarah?
But juxtaposed to the rambam in hilchos mezuzah, this makes perfect sense. We are familiar with the famous gemara that tells how dovid hamelech, when he entered the bathroom, was disturbed by the lack of mitzvos - no tefillin, no mezuzah, an issur talmud torah. This tefillah reflects that sensitivity - we are scared to enter a place where there are no mitzvos, and we pray that our mitzvos should still be there - we should still be shayach to mitzvos - when we come out.
I find this whole approach very inspirational. First of all, there are those who think this "modern" shittah of the rambam is less "frum" than the shitah that mezuzah literally protects from physical harm. I think its exactly the opposite - the rambam's position is much more frum. We don't do mitzvos to gain physical protection - to the contrary, we do mitzvos even if that means suffering in this world. Hence mezuzah is not about physical protection - its about a meaningful protection, a protection from sin.
Second, I think this connection to the tefilla before entering a beis hakiseh reveals a profound sensitivity to mitzvos - its only five minutes without mitzvos, but that should bother us. We should all be zocheh to attain such a madrega.
Shavua tov!
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