The maharal and the mizrachi ask the question that must be one everyone's minds: how was yehuda allowed/ ok with having relations with a woman he presumed to be a harlot?
(The Maharal really formulates it only as a technical question, given the issur of lo tihyeh kidesha - for that, yesh ladun if thats so obviously assur according to all the rishonim (in particular see the ramban in kedoshim 19:29 and in ki teitzei on the pasuk of lo tihyeh kidesha).)
Regardless, you almost hear the rambam directly addressing this question at the very beginning of hilchos ishus. The rambam writes:
קודם מתן תורה היה אדם פוגע אשה בשוק אם רצה הוא והיא נותן לה שכרה ובועל אותה על אם הדרך והולך. וזו היא הנקראת קדשה. משנתנה התורה נאסרה הקדשה שנאמר לא תהיה קדשה מבנות ישראל. לפיכך כל הבועל אשה לשם זנות בלא קידושין לוקה מן התורה לפי שבעל קדשה: --thats exactly what yehuda did, and what the rambam says was standard, before mattan torah.
Many have pointed out that the rambam doesn't give a similar introduction to any other mitzvah - for example, "before mattan torah no one shook lulav, after mattan torah people started to shake lulav on sukkos."
The rambam is emphasizing a unique paradigm shift regarding kiddushin - before mattan torah these things (=harlots) were accepted as normal - despite the fact that we look upon them so differently nowadays (as we well should).
I sort of hate to give this mashal, but from a certain (somewhat twisted) perspective there is really no difference between buying food (lets say for pleasure and not for basic subsistence) and buying what yehuda bought.
What's the difference? Its that at mattan torah we were given a new perspective - a perspective that that type of relationship cannot be just casual, but requires commitment. The rambam is telling us precisely that - the chiddush of kiddushin at mattan torah is that one cannot separate a sexual relationship from commitment.
What changed at mattan torah? (that is, why does kiddushin undergo a paradigm shift at mattan torah more than any other mitzvah)? This is a little bit towards the drush side, but I think its 100% emes. Mattan torah is where we entered into a bris with hakadosh baruch hu - or in other words, a committed relationship. We cannot worship G-d today, and baal tomorrow - we (and G-d) remain committed to each other. The relationship between a man and a woman is sacred - it mirrors the bris between us and G-d - it cannot be a casual relationship thats here today and gone tomorrow. For marriage to be a meaningful mashal to the newly created bris of har sinai, there must be a paradigm shift - while before, one could compare a sexual relationship to any other pleasure that can be had casually, now that is no more. Now there must be marriage, with a real and lasting commitment.
I think this adds a new dimension to the machlokes rambam/ raavad whether any casual sexual relationship is prohibited after mattan torah, or only one with a harlot. The rambam, lishitaso, says thats its any woman - if theres no commitment, its prohibited.
Lishitaso, the rambam we quoted yesterday says its not really permitted to give a get. If the whole chiddush of kiddushin is that sexual relationships require commitment, then why should you be allowed to break off that commitment whenever you want with a get? The whole point of a commitment is that you commit - no backsies allowed.
The maggid mishnah points out something very strange according to the rambam: a casual relationship with a jewess is prohibited min hatorah because of lo tihyeh kedesha - but the rambam writes explicitly that a casual relationship with a non-jew is only assur midrabanan! how can that be less chammur than with another jew?
Lidvareinu, it makes sense. the issur by a jew is to take a person who deserves a committed relationship and "use" them for only a casual one. By a non-jew, even a committed relationship is prohibited - so its not shayach to have an issur of taking a relationship thats supposed to be committed and making it casual. Hence biah with a goy is only assur midrabanan.
Taking the connection between marriage and har sinai one step further, the same way that it is assur (according to the rambam) for a man to give his wife a get, so too it is "prohibited" for Hashem to ever divorce us - as yeshayah says - where is the get that I (hashem) wrote for you (klal yisrael)?
With my sister getting married this week (super exciting!) this would make great sheva brachos torah if it weren't so awkward. But I think its very powerful, both on the level of marriage and on the level of our connection with hakadosh baruch hu. We should be zocheh to build a meaningful connection with hashem, and, each of us in the proper time, with our spouses.
Shavua tov!
Saturday, November 23, 2013
Friday, November 22, 2013
Yosef's dreams
I just want to do a short post on the parsha, even though I havent had so much time unfortunately to do a better post with more research.
The daas zekeinim asks the question: why did yosef tell his dreams to his brothers - didn't he realize that it would just increase the enmity and resentment towards him?
Rashi writes that when yosef met the malach gavriel while searching for his brothers, the malach warned him that the shevatim had left behind all feelings of brotherhood towards yosef - so why did yosef almost knowingly go meet them to face his demise?
The daas zekeinim answers that yosef felt that he was bound to tell over his dreams midin "navi shekovesh nevuaso chayav misah" - a prophet is not allowed to conceal his prophecy.
Similarly, we can say that yosef went to his brothers knowing that the outcome would not necessarily be pretty, because he was bound by kibud av to fulfill the command of his father.
I think thats a powerful lesson about the binding nature of truth despite any possible negative consequences.
I saw another answer to the daas zekeinim's question in the maharal. The maharal writes that since kol hachalomos holchin achar hapeh, (dreams are subject to interpetations), yosef told his dreams to his brothers so that they should interpret them as false dreams and hence they would not come true.
If thats true, then the irony of the story is astounding. If the brothers had been dan yosef likaf zechus and understood his intentions, they could have interpreted the dream as false and it never would have happened. Instead, they just got mad at yosef and hated him, sold him down to mitzraim, and ended up being responsible for the dreams coming true.
A few lessons: We get a new perspective on yosef that he davka wanted his dreams to not come true because they would hurt his brothers, even if they would benefit himself. We always have to think about personal gain vs communal benefit. Perhaps even more interestingly, Yosef gets criticized a lot for not being dan his brothers likaf zechus, but we see here that the problem went both ways - it takes 2 to fight (and that gets us back to the previous post).
Good shabbos!
The daas zekeinim asks the question: why did yosef tell his dreams to his brothers - didn't he realize that it would just increase the enmity and resentment towards him?
Rashi writes that when yosef met the malach gavriel while searching for his brothers, the malach warned him that the shevatim had left behind all feelings of brotherhood towards yosef - so why did yosef almost knowingly go meet them to face his demise?
The daas zekeinim answers that yosef felt that he was bound to tell over his dreams midin "navi shekovesh nevuaso chayav misah" - a prophet is not allowed to conceal his prophecy.
Similarly, we can say that yosef went to his brothers knowing that the outcome would not necessarily be pretty, because he was bound by kibud av to fulfill the command of his father.
I think thats a powerful lesson about the binding nature of truth despite any possible negative consequences.
I saw another answer to the daas zekeinim's question in the maharal. The maharal writes that since kol hachalomos holchin achar hapeh, (dreams are subject to interpetations), yosef told his dreams to his brothers so that they should interpret them as false dreams and hence they would not come true.
If thats true, then the irony of the story is astounding. If the brothers had been dan yosef likaf zechus and understood his intentions, they could have interpreted the dream as false and it never would have happened. Instead, they just got mad at yosef and hated him, sold him down to mitzraim, and ended up being responsible for the dreams coming true.
A few lessons: We get a new perspective on yosef that he davka wanted his dreams to not come true because they would hurt his brothers, even if they would benefit himself. We always have to think about personal gain vs communal benefit. Perhaps even more interestingly, Yosef gets criticized a lot for not being dan his brothers likaf zechus, but we see here that the problem went both ways - it takes 2 to fight (and that gets us back to the previous post).
Good shabbos!
Gittin
Gittin have been coming up in the news a lot recently, and this issue bothers me a lot, so I wanted to say something. First, specifically about these agunah cases. They're terrible, and we cannot be aloof to such suffering. But on the other hand, I don't know how people pick sides and decide who is right and who is wrong. It seems to me that in fights, and I'm sure particularly in divorces (Please G-d no one should ever know) things get nasty - and both sides do nasty things. Is one side obviously wrong, no matter what other nasty things the other party has done? I don't think its that simple. I've long been torn whether to go to these rallies held by ORA to pressure the giving of a get. If ORA is correct, then this is something that is critically important. But how do they know who's right and whose wrong in these nasty divorces? I cannot help but to conclude that shev vi-al taaseh adif - better to not get involved and risk actively wronging an "innocent" party (I've asked several rabbonim about this and they seemed to express similar sentiments that it is dangerous to just assume that one of the parties is automatically wrong)
Second, I read an article by a certain Rabbi Dr. Eliyahu Safran that really disturbed me. Rabbi Safran notes that when he divorced, he gave the get within the week - that is certainly the right thing to do when compared with the (evil) option of get refusal.
But Rabbi Safran attempts to develop an entire philosophical framework for divorce, claiming that divorce should not be stigmatized, and instead, should just be accepted as a fact of life within the Jewish community. And I quote:
I understand that this man may feel very bad about his divorce. But thats no excuse for the gross distortion of Jewish ideals.
I shouldn't need to quote any sources, but here are 2:
1. the gemara in gittin famously ends off, "אמר ר' אלעזר: כל המגרש אשתו ראשונה - אפילו מזבח מוריד עליו דמעות, שנאמר: וזאת שנית תעשו כסות דמעה את מזבח ה' בכי ואנקה מאין [עוד] פנות אל המנחה ולקחת רצון מידכם, ואמרתם על מה על כי ה' העיד בינך ובין אשת נעוריך אשר אתה בגדתה בה והיא חברתך ואשת בריתך.
I don't know how anyone could claim that an event which causes the mizbeach to cry and is referred to as begidah should not be stigmatized and strongly discouraged.
Moreover, it is well known that the rambam seems to paskin like beis shammai that it is forbidden for one to divorce one's wife unless she committed adultery:
ולא יגרש אדם אשתו ראשונה אלא אם כן מצא בה ערות דבר שנאמר כי מצא בה ערות דבר וגו'. (rambam gerushin 10:21)
Obviously we don't paskin like this. But there is a critical hashkafic lesson here: Marriage has to be a commitment - you have to go in with the attitude that there is no way out. period. If divorce were to be not stigmatized, marriage would become like having a girlfriend - no big deal, because if anything ever goes wrong, you can always back out 1 2 3. Divorce feeds on itself - the more we allow divorce to become prevalent in our communities, the more marriage loses the perception of commitment and the more divorce we will have.
To safeguard the institution of marriage, it is worth the suffering that we inflict on divorcees by stigmatizing them the same way we stigmatize alcoholics and drug addicts. and truth be told, the religious failure reflected by divorce is just as great, if not greater, than that of alcoholism and drug addiction. That isn't to say that such a person has no hope - a drug addict / alcoholic / divorcee can all do teshuvah and move on - that is the amazing gift of teshuvah that hashem gave us. but that doesn't take away one iota from the absolute religious failure reflected by these 3 vices.
Destroying R Safran's ridiculous philosophical framework does not justify get refusal whatsover - being a religious failure does not justify hurting or inflicting damage on another human being. And if R Safran didnt believe what he wrote and was just lying to save the victims of get refusers by trying to falsely salvage the ego of divorcees, then that is totally acceptable. But the truth must be told.
I don't mean to judge other people - especially given that I've never been in their shoes (= never been married). but R Safran should not claim that excuses for failure are its underlying cause - alcoholism and drug and gambling addictions can also all be explained by a variety of excuses. But thats not the lesson we go out and teach.
Please G-d we should not hear of or know of divorce, not us nor anyone in klal yisrael. Please G-d, we should see only simcha, bracha, and shalom.
Second, I read an article by a certain Rabbi Dr. Eliyahu Safran that really disturbed me. Rabbi Safran notes that when he divorced, he gave the get within the week - that is certainly the right thing to do when compared with the (evil) option of get refusal.
But Rabbi Safran attempts to develop an entire philosophical framework for divorce, claiming that divorce should not be stigmatized, and instead, should just be accepted as a fact of life within the Jewish community. And I quote:
Let us, as Chazal, our Talmudic sages, did, acknowledge that our belief in marriages as bashert is more ideal than truth. In candor, let us confront the truth that many, many marriages are entered into with little preparation or understanding about even the most basic truths about living in intimacy with another person.It is a rare young scholar who is schooled – in even the most cursory manner – in his bride’s emotional, spiritual, psychological and physical needs and priorities. And it is only a rare young woman who is taught to look beyond her groom’s learning or his ability to make a good living. It is a wonder that any marriage survives and succeeds!Yet, most do.Some do not.There needn’t be any shame in that. (emphasis added)
I understand that this man may feel very bad about his divorce. But thats no excuse for the gross distortion of Jewish ideals.
I shouldn't need to quote any sources, but here are 2:
1. the gemara in gittin famously ends off, "אמר ר' אלעזר: כל המגרש אשתו ראשונה - אפילו מזבח מוריד עליו דמעות, שנאמר: וזאת שנית תעשו כסות דמעה את מזבח ה' בכי ואנקה מאין [עוד] פנות אל המנחה ולקחת רצון מידכם, ואמרתם על מה על כי ה' העיד בינך ובין אשת נעוריך אשר אתה בגדתה בה והיא חברתך ואשת בריתך.
I don't know how anyone could claim that an event which causes the mizbeach to cry and is referred to as begidah should not be stigmatized and strongly discouraged.
Moreover, it is well known that the rambam seems to paskin like beis shammai that it is forbidden for one to divorce one's wife unless she committed adultery:
ולא יגרש אדם אשתו ראשונה אלא אם כן מצא בה ערות דבר שנאמר כי מצא בה ערות דבר וגו'. (rambam gerushin 10:21)
Obviously we don't paskin like this. But there is a critical hashkafic lesson here: Marriage has to be a commitment - you have to go in with the attitude that there is no way out. period. If divorce were to be not stigmatized, marriage would become like having a girlfriend - no big deal, because if anything ever goes wrong, you can always back out 1 2 3. Divorce feeds on itself - the more we allow divorce to become prevalent in our communities, the more marriage loses the perception of commitment and the more divorce we will have.
To safeguard the institution of marriage, it is worth the suffering that we inflict on divorcees by stigmatizing them the same way we stigmatize alcoholics and drug addicts. and truth be told, the religious failure reflected by divorce is just as great, if not greater, than that of alcoholism and drug addiction. That isn't to say that such a person has no hope - a drug addict / alcoholic / divorcee can all do teshuvah and move on - that is the amazing gift of teshuvah that hashem gave us. but that doesn't take away one iota from the absolute religious failure reflected by these 3 vices.
Destroying R Safran's ridiculous philosophical framework does not justify get refusal whatsover - being a religious failure does not justify hurting or inflicting damage on another human being. And if R Safran didnt believe what he wrote and was just lying to save the victims of get refusers by trying to falsely salvage the ego of divorcees, then that is totally acceptable. But the truth must be told.
many marriages are entered into with little preparation or understanding about even the most basic truths about living in intimacy with another person...I've been blessed to see many good marriages, and I've been cursed to be witness to some failing marriages, and it has nothing to do with education/a specific lack of knowledge that could be corrected through schooling. Frankly, to claim that marriages fail because the two genders are not taught the knowledge to understand each other is laughable. Marriages fail because of lack of maturity - thats the long and short of it. People who are mature deal with the curve balls life throws - people who are not do not.
I don't mean to judge other people - especially given that I've never been in their shoes (= never been married). but R Safran should not claim that excuses for failure are its underlying cause - alcoholism and drug and gambling addictions can also all be explained by a variety of excuses. But thats not the lesson we go out and teach.
Please G-d we should not hear of or know of divorce, not us nor anyone in klal yisrael. Please G-d, we should see only simcha, bracha, and shalom.
Friday, November 15, 2013
America and the holocaust - and us
A lot of what I wanted to say about this topic has been said better than I could have done it in the past few weeks. So I just want to connect some dots.
The staff at the YU commentator put out an editorial about the american response, or more accurately, the lack thereof, to the holocaust as it was occurring. The first comment there is from some Adam Zimilover, who wrote a more detailed paper documenting the reaction to the holocaust. I think it is appropriate to take the time to read these articles.
The bottom line is that the american response to the holocaust was abysmal. Our people went through the greatest catastrophe ever, one that perhaps makes even the near-tragedy of purim seem like nothing. And yet, by purim klal yisrael managed to gather together and make fast days and cry out and daven to hashem. By the holocaust - kimat nothing.
My great grandfather was one of the 400 rabbonim who marched upon washington, and he also helped raise money for the vaad hatzalah. He was not the only one. But even that level of response was nothing in the face of the overwhelming terror facing the Jewish people, and by and large, most Jews in america didn't even do that.
The commentator article I posted a while back was dated January 1945. Can you imagine debating whether or not its proper for YU to have a drama society while as you are speaking, Jews are being murdered every second by Hitler yemach shemo? I don't know if I can conceive of such a thing, and thank G-d, we live in a safer world where such things should remain inconceivable.
(Some guy commented on the commentator article that this is a complex issue that is being unduly simplified. I totally disagree. I also don't buy for 1 second these garbage excuses that they didn't know what was happening. Jabotinsky knew BEFORE the holocaust that it would happen, and the fact that people chose to be in denial does not mean they didn't know.)
When you realize this, you make a heavy accusation against our ancestors alive at the time, and its a little scary to make such accusations. How do we understand this?
Before we make such accusations, we need to look in a mirror. and I'm afraid that what we will find there is not much better.
Divrei chaim posted here about how while it was easy to organize tehillim rallies for various issues on the yeshivishe agenda, no one - in either the yeshivish or modern orthodox worlds - saw fit to organize any such event concerning the very real dangers klal yisrael faces from Iran and other enemies yimach shemam.
Last year there was a war going on Israel. People maybe had the time to grudgingly say a few perakim of tehillim. But overall, nothing changed - life went on as normal.
People who had midterms were too busy studying for them to have time to care about what was going on in Israel. Our busy schedules didn't let up - life went on as normal.
Its true that the war in Israel was not anywhere on the scale of past tragedies that have afflicted the jewish people. But is that really good excuse? Moreover,we should sit down and take the time to do some self-reflection - would we really have reacted differently if G-d forbid there ever were a tragedy to befall the jewish people rachmana litzlan?
Its not at all surprising that people were able to sit here and debate drama clubs while the holocaust was going on - we do almost the exact same thing when we study for a chemistry midterm while a war is going on Israel - we let the distance of the tragedy, as opposed to the immediate needs of our daily lives, lull us into ignoring the tragedy and focusing on the stupidity of the here and now.
One could counter this criticism by saying that life does need to go on in places where the tragedy isn't hitting. To a certain extent, I agree. But to a certain extent, I bidavka disagree - life needs to somewhat NOT go on in recognition of a tzarah facing klal yisrael.
We know from rashi in several places in bereshis that tashmish is assur in a time of tragedy - thats a real disruption to family life, but so be it.
Further, life needing to go on is not a stirah to taking a tzarah seriously (more so than saying 4 perakim of tehillim or something like that.)
Please G-d, we should never see another tragedy or tzarah befall klal yisrael ever again. But if rachmana litzlan such a thing should ever come to be, then I want to throw out 2 ideas:
1. For every day that the tragedy persists, give x dollars (some significant amount) towards alleviating that tzarah. you can't just give one sum and be done - every day the tzarah goes on you have to be part of it and contribute to the cause.
2. I dont understand why the institution of taanis tzibbur as per the shulchan aruch 576 (and look there - the fasts are much more intense than the way we typically do a fast day.) has been abolished. the mishna berura mentions maybe ein taanis tzibbur bibavel and i am not at all holding in these halachos. but again, the idea that motivates and permeates all these halachos is that klal yisrael cannot remain apathetic in the face of a tazarah - we must care, and it must affect us.
we should be zocheh to never know any tzaros again and see the geulah sheleimah speedily in our days
The staff at the YU commentator put out an editorial about the american response, or more accurately, the lack thereof, to the holocaust as it was occurring. The first comment there is from some Adam Zimilover, who wrote a more detailed paper documenting the reaction to the holocaust. I think it is appropriate to take the time to read these articles.
The bottom line is that the american response to the holocaust was abysmal. Our people went through the greatest catastrophe ever, one that perhaps makes even the near-tragedy of purim seem like nothing. And yet, by purim klal yisrael managed to gather together and make fast days and cry out and daven to hashem. By the holocaust - kimat nothing.
My great grandfather was one of the 400 rabbonim who marched upon washington, and he also helped raise money for the vaad hatzalah. He was not the only one. But even that level of response was nothing in the face of the overwhelming terror facing the Jewish people, and by and large, most Jews in america didn't even do that.
The commentator article I posted a while back was dated January 1945. Can you imagine debating whether or not its proper for YU to have a drama society while as you are speaking, Jews are being murdered every second by Hitler yemach shemo? I don't know if I can conceive of such a thing, and thank G-d, we live in a safer world where such things should remain inconceivable.
(Some guy commented on the commentator article that this is a complex issue that is being unduly simplified. I totally disagree. I also don't buy for 1 second these garbage excuses that they didn't know what was happening. Jabotinsky knew BEFORE the holocaust that it would happen, and the fact that people chose to be in denial does not mean they didn't know.)
When you realize this, you make a heavy accusation against our ancestors alive at the time, and its a little scary to make such accusations. How do we understand this?
Before we make such accusations, we need to look in a mirror. and I'm afraid that what we will find there is not much better.
Divrei chaim posted here about how while it was easy to organize tehillim rallies for various issues on the yeshivishe agenda, no one - in either the yeshivish or modern orthodox worlds - saw fit to organize any such event concerning the very real dangers klal yisrael faces from Iran and other enemies yimach shemam.
Last year there was a war going on Israel. People maybe had the time to grudgingly say a few perakim of tehillim. But overall, nothing changed - life went on as normal.
People who had midterms were too busy studying for them to have time to care about what was going on in Israel. Our busy schedules didn't let up - life went on as normal.
Its true that the war in Israel was not anywhere on the scale of past tragedies that have afflicted the jewish people. But is that really good excuse? Moreover,we should sit down and take the time to do some self-reflection - would we really have reacted differently if G-d forbid there ever were a tragedy to befall the jewish people rachmana litzlan?
Its not at all surprising that people were able to sit here and debate drama clubs while the holocaust was going on - we do almost the exact same thing when we study for a chemistry midterm while a war is going on Israel - we let the distance of the tragedy, as opposed to the immediate needs of our daily lives, lull us into ignoring the tragedy and focusing on the stupidity of the here and now.
One could counter this criticism by saying that life does need to go on in places where the tragedy isn't hitting. To a certain extent, I agree. But to a certain extent, I bidavka disagree - life needs to somewhat NOT go on in recognition of a tzarah facing klal yisrael.
We know from rashi in several places in bereshis that tashmish is assur in a time of tragedy - thats a real disruption to family life, but so be it.
Further, life needing to go on is not a stirah to taking a tzarah seriously (more so than saying 4 perakim of tehillim or something like that.)
Please G-d, we should never see another tragedy or tzarah befall klal yisrael ever again. But if rachmana litzlan such a thing should ever come to be, then I want to throw out 2 ideas:
1. For every day that the tragedy persists, give x dollars (some significant amount) towards alleviating that tzarah. you can't just give one sum and be done - every day the tzarah goes on you have to be part of it and contribute to the cause.
2. I dont understand why the institution of taanis tzibbur as per the shulchan aruch 576 (and look there - the fasts are much more intense than the way we typically do a fast day.) has been abolished. the mishna berura mentions maybe ein taanis tzibbur bibavel and i am not at all holding in these halachos. but again, the idea that motivates and permeates all these halachos is that klal yisrael cannot remain apathetic in the face of a tazarah - we must care, and it must affect us.
we should be zocheh to never know any tzaros again and see the geulah sheleimah speedily in our days
Wednesday, November 6, 2013
vayeitzei - yaakov's tochacha
I've been very excited for this week's parsha because R Yaakov has my favorite vort in the whole emes liyaakov (or at least, what I've read of it) on this week's parsha.
Yaakov flees from eisav to charan and bumps into a bunch of shepherds lazing by the well. Yaakov, a foreigner from a different country, having never met these people ever before in his life, immediately proceeds to "but in" to their business asking them why they are lazing around and not working. That's a little bit awkward - what prompted Yaakov to do this?
The seforno asks this question, and he writes:
הצדיק ימאס את העול ג"כ אל האחרים כאמרו תועבת צדיקים איש עול
Yaakov protested the laziness of the shephers because a tzaddik cannot stand evil - in himself, or in others.
R Yaakov, I believe, argues on this seforno. He begins by making a diyuk in Yaakov's language when he starts talking to the shepherds (Having been attacked over this diyuk, I think we can concede under pressure that it is not muchrach - but R yaakov's point exists without it so it is not crucial.)
וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם יַעֲקֹב אַחַי מֵאַיִן אַתֶּם וַיֹּאמְרוּ מֵחָרָן אֲנָחְנוּ:
Since when are these total strangers his "brothers"?
To buttress this diyuk, r yaakov directs our attention to a rashi in parshas chukas. When moshe rabbeinu sends to edom asking to be allowed to pass through his land, he begins by saying, "ko amar achicha yisrael". rashi comments:
...אחיך ישראל - מה ראה להזכיר כאן אחוה
So you see that it is fair to wonder why someone should start talking about being brother to someone who isn't really his brother.
Shifting focus for a moment, we know there is a machlokes in the gemara in erchin concerning how far one must go to rebuke others in fulfillment of the mitzvah of tochachah. One opinion says give up when the guy you're trying to rebuke gets really mad at you, another opinion is when he starts cursing you, we paskin that you shouldn't give up until he starts hitting you. Regardless of which opinion you take, how does this make sense? Since when do you not fulfill a mitzvah deoraysa because someone will curse you out over it, and even if they'll start hitting you (obviously as long as there is no danger to life), why should that stop fulfillment of a mitzvah deoraysa?
Says R yaakov, if the mitzvah of tochacha were to act as G-d's police officers (as the seforno might very well claim), then the above question would indeed hold. But look at the way the rambam formulates mitzvas tochacha:
הרואה חבירו שחטא או שהלך בדרך לא טובה מצוה להחזירו למוטב ולהודיעו שהוא חוטא על עצמו במעשיו הרעים שנאמר הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך. המוכיח את חבירו בין בדברים שבינו לבינו. בין בדברים שבינו לבין המקום. צריך להוכיחו בינו לבין עצמו. וידבר לו בנחת ובלשון רכה ויודיעו שאינו אומר לו אלא לטובתו להביאו לחיי העולם הבא. אם קיבל ממנו מוטב ואם לאו יוכיחנו פעם שניה ושלישית. וכן תמיד חייב אדם להוכיחו עד שיכהו החוטא ויאמר לו איני שומע. וכל שאפשר בידו למחות ואינו מוחה הוא נתפש בעון אלו כיון שאפשר לו למחות בהם:
We might have thought, before seeing this rambam, that the mitzvah of tochacha is a mitzvah bein adam lamakom - a religious obligation to dispel evil from our midst. But the rambam is clear that that is NOT the case - mitzvas tochacha is a mitzvah bein adam lachaveiro - we have an obligation to look out for our friend's ultimate best interests - if we really care about our friends, then we will help them stay on the right path. (lichora a big nafka minah of this that you have to ask mechila from your friend for NOT rebuking him enough - pretty wild if that is true)
It now immediately follows that we should ony be mochiach as long as we are acting in the rebukee's best interests - that is, our goal is not to eliminate evil at all costs, in which case we would be mochiach even after the guy started cursing/hitting. Rather, our goal is to help bring this guy back to what's best for him. When he starts cursing/hitting, we say that tochacha, even if it will stop evil right now, will not be productive in our real goal of helping this person.
It wouldn't have necessarily been appropriate for any random person to just start giving tochacha to total strangers. But yaakov avinu cared so much about people that he was even able to refer to total strangers as his brothers. It was in this spirit that yaakov offered his rebuke, and only because of this that his rebuke was acceptable.
As the gemara goes on to say in erchin, nowadays we don't know how to be mochiach. It's a high enough darga to care about and be a kannai for Hashem. It is perhaps an even higher darga for a person to care about other people. Tochacha requires that the two merge: on the one hand, one has to take very seriously the mitzvos bein adam lamakom to be able to rebuke others in their performance. On the other hand, the rebuke has to come not from kannaus, but rather, from deeply caring about the individual whom you are rebuking. this is no small feat.
I think this is a very important context to mitzvas tochacha that has important practical applications. From least to greatest:
1. I once had a halachic debate with someone about the following scenario: if you see someone eating a pig sandwich, can you steal the sandwich from them to prevent them from doing an issur. (Funny that this also sort of comes up in the parsha by rachel stealing lavan's avodah zarah - obviously that story isn't a raayah to this shailah whatsoever.) Without going into the details, I think that any attempt to answer this question must be misyaches to the above understanding that mitzvas tochacha isn't about being g-d's police officer - its about caring about other jews.
2. People who know me know that I've ranted since tenth grade about the weak excuse of the chazon ish to explain why we are so meikel in how we treat apikorsim nowadays. This approach really provides a much firmer basis to his mehalech - nowadays we don't know how to be mochiach - the only way we can act to help our fellow Jews who have unfortunately turned off the path is to treat them with love. I still don't know if I agree to this because it seems so black and white against the rambam - but I don't think this is an appropriate forum to discuss this issue.
3. A few weeks ago I wrote about Rabbi Yosef Mendelevich's ahavas yisrael and how he allowed no distinction between his love of G-d and love of man. (http://doleh-u-mashkeh.blogspot.com/2013/10/rabbi-yosef-mendelevich.html). I was thinking of this R Yaakov when I wrote that. I've always thought that it is very wrong when you see some people who go into chinuch / rabbanus not because they have such a burning passion to teach young children torah, but rather, because they want to stay in learning (for themselves). Like R yaakov's pshat in tochacha, a person can't go into chinuch as part of his avodas hashem bein adam lamakom - it has to be a mitzvah bein adam lachaveiro. A mechanech needs to be someone like R yosef Mendelevich, like Yaakov avinu, who teaches others torah not as a mitzvah bein adam lamakom but rather because of his burning ahavas yisrael and desire to teach bnei yisrael torah and bring them closer to hakadosh baruch hu.
Even if we don't go into chinuch, that's a lesson for us as friends, siblings, parents, and everything else we'll do in life.
Its a little early, but I will still take this chance to wish everyone a good shabbos!
Yaakov flees from eisav to charan and bumps into a bunch of shepherds lazing by the well. Yaakov, a foreigner from a different country, having never met these people ever before in his life, immediately proceeds to "but in" to their business asking them why they are lazing around and not working. That's a little bit awkward - what prompted Yaakov to do this?
The seforno asks this question, and he writes:
הצדיק ימאס את העול ג"כ אל האחרים כאמרו תועבת צדיקים איש עול
Yaakov protested the laziness of the shephers because a tzaddik cannot stand evil - in himself, or in others.
R Yaakov, I believe, argues on this seforno. He begins by making a diyuk in Yaakov's language when he starts talking to the shepherds (Having been attacked over this diyuk, I think we can concede under pressure that it is not muchrach - but R yaakov's point exists without it so it is not crucial.)
וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם יַעֲקֹב אַחַי מֵאַיִן אַתֶּם וַיֹּאמְרוּ מֵחָרָן אֲנָחְנוּ:
Since when are these total strangers his "brothers"?
To buttress this diyuk, r yaakov directs our attention to a rashi in parshas chukas. When moshe rabbeinu sends to edom asking to be allowed to pass through his land, he begins by saying, "ko amar achicha yisrael". rashi comments:
...אחיך ישראל - מה ראה להזכיר כאן אחוה
So you see that it is fair to wonder why someone should start talking about being brother to someone who isn't really his brother.
Shifting focus for a moment, we know there is a machlokes in the gemara in erchin concerning how far one must go to rebuke others in fulfillment of the mitzvah of tochachah. One opinion says give up when the guy you're trying to rebuke gets really mad at you, another opinion is when he starts cursing you, we paskin that you shouldn't give up until he starts hitting you. Regardless of which opinion you take, how does this make sense? Since when do you not fulfill a mitzvah deoraysa because someone will curse you out over it, and even if they'll start hitting you (obviously as long as there is no danger to life), why should that stop fulfillment of a mitzvah deoraysa?
Says R yaakov, if the mitzvah of tochacha were to act as G-d's police officers (as the seforno might very well claim), then the above question would indeed hold. But look at the way the rambam formulates mitzvas tochacha:
הרואה חבירו שחטא או שהלך בדרך לא טובה מצוה להחזירו למוטב ולהודיעו שהוא חוטא על עצמו במעשיו הרעים שנאמר הוכח תוכיח את עמיתך. המוכיח את חבירו בין בדברים שבינו לבינו. בין בדברים שבינו לבין המקום. צריך להוכיחו בינו לבין עצמו. וידבר לו בנחת ובלשון רכה ויודיעו שאינו אומר לו אלא לטובתו להביאו לחיי העולם הבא. אם קיבל ממנו מוטב ואם לאו יוכיחנו פעם שניה ושלישית. וכן תמיד חייב אדם להוכיחו עד שיכהו החוטא ויאמר לו איני שומע. וכל שאפשר בידו למחות ואינו מוחה הוא נתפש בעון אלו כיון שאפשר לו למחות בהם:
We might have thought, before seeing this rambam, that the mitzvah of tochacha is a mitzvah bein adam lamakom - a religious obligation to dispel evil from our midst. But the rambam is clear that that is NOT the case - mitzvas tochacha is a mitzvah bein adam lachaveiro - we have an obligation to look out for our friend's ultimate best interests - if we really care about our friends, then we will help them stay on the right path. (lichora a big nafka minah of this that you have to ask mechila from your friend for NOT rebuking him enough - pretty wild if that is true)
It now immediately follows that we should ony be mochiach as long as we are acting in the rebukee's best interests - that is, our goal is not to eliminate evil at all costs, in which case we would be mochiach even after the guy started cursing/hitting. Rather, our goal is to help bring this guy back to what's best for him. When he starts cursing/hitting, we say that tochacha, even if it will stop evil right now, will not be productive in our real goal of helping this person.
It wouldn't have necessarily been appropriate for any random person to just start giving tochacha to total strangers. But yaakov avinu cared so much about people that he was even able to refer to total strangers as his brothers. It was in this spirit that yaakov offered his rebuke, and only because of this that his rebuke was acceptable.
As the gemara goes on to say in erchin, nowadays we don't know how to be mochiach. It's a high enough darga to care about and be a kannai for Hashem. It is perhaps an even higher darga for a person to care about other people. Tochacha requires that the two merge: on the one hand, one has to take very seriously the mitzvos bein adam lamakom to be able to rebuke others in their performance. On the other hand, the rebuke has to come not from kannaus, but rather, from deeply caring about the individual whom you are rebuking. this is no small feat.
I think this is a very important context to mitzvas tochacha that has important practical applications. From least to greatest:
1. I once had a halachic debate with someone about the following scenario: if you see someone eating a pig sandwich, can you steal the sandwich from them to prevent them from doing an issur. (Funny that this also sort of comes up in the parsha by rachel stealing lavan's avodah zarah - obviously that story isn't a raayah to this shailah whatsoever.) Without going into the details, I think that any attempt to answer this question must be misyaches to the above understanding that mitzvas tochacha isn't about being g-d's police officer - its about caring about other jews.
2. People who know me know that I've ranted since tenth grade about the weak excuse of the chazon ish to explain why we are so meikel in how we treat apikorsim nowadays. This approach really provides a much firmer basis to his mehalech - nowadays we don't know how to be mochiach - the only way we can act to help our fellow Jews who have unfortunately turned off the path is to treat them with love. I still don't know if I agree to this because it seems so black and white against the rambam - but I don't think this is an appropriate forum to discuss this issue.
3. A few weeks ago I wrote about Rabbi Yosef Mendelevich's ahavas yisrael and how he allowed no distinction between his love of G-d and love of man. (http://doleh-u-mashkeh.blogspot.com/2013/10/rabbi-yosef-mendelevich.html). I was thinking of this R Yaakov when I wrote that. I've always thought that it is very wrong when you see some people who go into chinuch / rabbanus not because they have such a burning passion to teach young children torah, but rather, because they want to stay in learning (for themselves). Like R yaakov's pshat in tochacha, a person can't go into chinuch as part of his avodas hashem bein adam lamakom - it has to be a mitzvah bein adam lachaveiro. A mechanech needs to be someone like R yosef Mendelevich, like Yaakov avinu, who teaches others torah not as a mitzvah bein adam lamakom but rather because of his burning ahavas yisrael and desire to teach bnei yisrael torah and bring them closer to hakadosh baruch hu.
Even if we don't go into chinuch, that's a lesson for us as friends, siblings, parents, and everything else we'll do in life.
Its a little early, but I will still take this chance to wish everyone a good shabbos!
Friday, November 1, 2013
Guest Post: Tefilah
In a very exciting new step for doleh-u-mashkeh, we have our first guest post. (If anyone else ever wants to write, please feel free!) Its attacking something I wrote, so I will respond at the end (note that in deference to the author, I have not changed anything even if I don't like being called "baal hamshkeh"):
Tzarich iyun on our guest poster.
In a recent post http://doleh-u-mashkeh.
In last week’s parsha, Rashi (Bereishis 25:30) writes that Hashem kindly took Avraham five years before his time to ensure that Avraham would not see his grandson Esav develop into a Rasha. Initially the plan was for Avraham to live until 180, but as Yaakov and Esav approached their bar mitzvas, Hashem decided to cut Avraham short at 175.
The problem with this Rashi is that the initial plan doesn't seem to make much sense. Did Hashem not realize that Esav was going to turn to the dark side? Why wouldn’t Hashem account for this when He initially planned the length of Avraham’s life?
Rav Chaim Yosef Sonnenfeld answers this question by pointing out a misunderstanding of when the plan was changed: the plan wasn’t changed when Avraham was 175 to account for Evil Esav, but was changed years earlier. He explains that in the original plan, Yaakov and Esav were supposed to be born when Avraham was 167 in order that Avraham would finish his 180 years before Esav turned evil. However, in the beginning of this week’s parsha, Yitzchak’s fervent teffilos for children stirred Hashem to the point that He changed His plan and allowed Yaakov and Esav to enter the world five years earlier, when Avraham was 162. The new reality became such that Esav would become evil when Avraham was 175, as opposed to 180, so Hashem changed the plan and out of kindness took Avraham five years early. [For the gematria inclined: "Vayeiaser lo Hashem"- same gematria as chamesh shanim.]
Sounds like a nice pshat, but what emerges from this idea is that Yitzchak’s teffilos for a son indirectly killed Avraham. Perhaps if Yitzchak would have followed the mehalech of the baalei mussar he would have gotten what he wanted while avoiding this collateral damage on his father…
Nevertheless, I don’t think you’ll find a mekor in chazal reprimanding Yitzchak for his fervent tefillos.
Perhaps the takeaway is that Yitzchak davened for what from his perspective seemed positive, and he need not consider the possibility that Hashem would pull a fast one and grant the request only to negatively affect the greater scheme.
In fact, this episode demonstrates that Hashem will account for the ramifications of our requests and ensure that all factors are taken into consideration, even those that we cannot realize.
קרוב ה' לכל קוראיו לכל אשר יקראהו באמת. רצון יראיו יעשה ואת שועתם ישמע ויושיעם
Good shabbos
My comments: 1) dont chazal say that hashem purposely made the imahos barren because hashem desires the tefillah of tzaddikim - if so it was part of the plan that yitzchak shouldnt have kids until he davened for them which undermines this whole vort.
2) indeed, r tzaddok which we quoted in the last post was coming off that very idea - sometimes tefillah's purpose isn't to change the master plan, but rather, to allow the master plan to come to fruition.
3) looking at it again, it really makes no sense. the whole question was that hashem should realize that eisav was going to "turn to the dark side" - by that logic, hashem should also realize that yitzchak was going to daven! ela mai, Hashem didnt incorporate yitzchak's tefillah into the "master plan" because that was a function of yitzchak's bechira chofshis - then he also shouldn't factor eisav's going off (also a function of free will) into the plan!
Tzarich iyun on our guest poster.
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