once we're on the topic of ribbis

Another small question:  The gemara records a machlokes between r yochanan and r elazar as to whether ribbis, once given, is forcibly taken by beis din to be returned to the borrower.  Why does R Yochanan think that once the malveh takes the ribbis, we let him keep it?  The gemara explains:  מות יומת דמיו בו יהיה - הוקשו מלוי רבית לשופכי דמים, מה שופכי דמים לא ניתנו להשבון - אף מלוי רבית לא נתנו להשבון - the torah compares malvei ribbis to murderers - just like a murderer cannot atone by undoing his actions (because his actions cannot be undone), so too malvei ribbis cannot atone by giving back the ribbis.

The problem is, gazlanim are also compared to shofchei damim - and there we clearly allow for (and mandate) the returning of stolen goods.  כל הגוזל את חבירו שוה פרוטה כאילו נוטל נשמתו ממנו שנ'  כן ארחות כל בוצע בצע את נפש בעליו יקח (rambam, gezeilah 1:13 based on BK somewhere) - doesnt this prove that the fact that the pasuk compares an issur to murder doesnt mean that the issur cannot be undone?

ribbis question

I know I'm falling a little behind on divrei torah here, and I will try to catch up.  in the meantime, I'm learning eizehu neshech with another guy here at weizmann, and there is something that bothers me significantly.

In general, the rule is that masneh adam al mah shekasuv batorah bidavar shebimamon- a person has the right to waive issurei torah that involve one's own money.  for example, although the torah assurs collecting a loan after the shemittah year has passed, if both the borrower and lender agreed at the time of the loan that this loan would extend even past shemittah, their condition works - the lender has the right to collect the loan even after shemittah.

a notable exception to this principle is ribbis - even if both parties are willing to initiate a loan with interest, it is prohibited to do so.  why?

I always thought the reason was (and I would swear that I have seen this brought down as the reason) that unlike other monetary issurim, which only address one party, by ribbis, the torah gives a prohibition to both the malveh and loveh.  In other words, by shemittah, the torah doesnt put a blanket assur on collecting a loan after shemittah - by addressing the issur only to the lender, the torah is essentially granting a zechus to the borrower.  Since it is his zechus, he has the right to waive it; if both parties agree, a loan may be initiated that extends past shemittah.  Ribbis, in contrast, has an issur directed specifically to the loveh - this teaches us that even if he would be willing to forgo the zechus to a loan without ribbis, he is not entitled to do so.

But the guy I was learning with argued out that you dont need to come on to the above to see why ribbis is different.  Even if the torah only assured ribbis to the malveh, we would still know that the issur is different from other monetary issurim and cannot be waived.  Why?  Because if ribbis could be waived, then you would never have a case where ribbis is assur.  If the loveh agreed, the issur would be waived, and if he didnt agree originally, then it wouldnt be ribbis dioraysa (ribbis deoraysa must be agreed to at the time of the original loan).  By shemittah, even though the issur can be waived we have a case where it applies - where money was lent without any special preconditions.  For ribbis, we have no such case.

So my question is, whose right?  I am convinced that I have seen sources that explain the rationale for ribbis being different the way I explained it, but if so, how do you deal with explanation #2 (we have to find some case where ribbis deoraysa would exist even if the issur could be waived).  Any mareh mekomos/ hearos much much appreciated.  Thanks!

tiny heara on balak

Hi from Israel!!!  Its very exciting to be here.

This is a very short heara on parshas balak.  its very mussar - ish (my father would be probably be furious at me for saying it), but so be it.

The mishna in pirkei avos draws a contrast between avraham and bilaam, in three character traits, one being nefesh rechavah / nefesh shefalah.  This is understood to refer to the character traits of haughtiness / humility.

Where do we see Bilaam's haughtiness?  Rashi on chumash writes that we learn it from Bilaam's refusal to go with the first group of nobles that balak sent for him.  Chazal interpret that Bilaam told the nobles that he couldn't go with them because it was beneath his dignity to go with low ranking officers.  This, says Rashi, reflects Bilaam's gaavah.

In his peirush hamishnyos, the rambam offers a different pshat.  According to the Rambam, Bilaam's gaavah was expressed when he called himself "yodea daas elyon"  - one who knows G-d.

Gaavah in material things or earthly kavod isnt gaavah - its just plain retarded.  To think that the rank of an officer appointed by balak has any meaning isn't arrogance - its sheer stupidity. Thus, Bilaam's gaavah had to be in ruchnius - to think that he could understand G-d.

In contrast to Bilaam's gaavah, the rambam explains that avraham's humility was expressed in his telling G-d, "anochi afar v'efer" - Avraham said to G-d, "G-d, I am nothing before you.  I have no real knowledge, understanding, or closeness to you."

Man is very frail - but what we sometimes forget is that the primary emphasis of that statement is in ruchnius itself, not just in physicality.  Its not just that we are physically weak, we get sick, we grow old, we die.  But much more - we are affected spiritually so much by our surroundings - that means that we have to ask, is our spirituality real?  We think we are frum and G-d fearing, but how much of that is just cultural norms and would fall away given the right set of circumstances?

I am depressing myself.  But I'll end with the poem Ozymandias:

I met a traveller from an antique land
Who said: Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desart. Near them, on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown,
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them and the heart that fed:
And on the pedestal these words appear:
"My name is Ozymandias, king of kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!"
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and level sands stretch far away.

parshas chukas and the rambam's shemoneh perakim

I'm sorry that I didn't write a dvar torah for last week.  I have something written down that I was going to put up after shabbos, but I don't like it as is.  Maybe with some revision I can fix it, but I'm not sure.

Next week I'm going to Israel (yay!!!) and I don't know if I'm going to have internet access to put up a dvar torah.  After that, I'm going to be doing research at the Weizmann Institute, so assuming (with the help of G-d) that I stay religious there, I'll try to keep posting.

I'm not sure if this is entirely correct / clear. I would love feedback, as always.

Parshas chukas comes up a lot in the rambam’s shemoneh perakim.  In the fourth perek, the rambam discusses the sin of moshe rabbeinu at mei merivah.  In the sixth perek, the rambam contrasts chukim and mishpatim and explains the practical relevance of the distinction.  This leads me to wonder if there is a connection between these 2 parshios.  Let’s explore this.

What was the sin of moshe rabbeinu – the rambam is a little confusing.  Perek daled of shemonh perakim is all about the “golden middle path” – we should strive to have balance in our middos, not leaning too much to one side or another (too generous or too stingy, etc.).  The rambam finishes off by warning us how dangerous/ prevalent the problem of bad middos is: ואתה יודע, כי אדון הראשונים והאחרונים, משה רבנו, כבר אמר לו יתעלה: "יען לא האמנתם בי", "על אשר מריתם", "על אשר לא קדשתם" - כל זה. וחטאו, עליו השלום, היה, שנטה אל אחד משני הקצוות במעלה ממעלות המידות, והיא הסבלנות, כאשר נטה אל הכעס – moshe rabbeinu’s sin was that he got angry at klal yisrael when he called them rebels.  This reflected an imbalance in middos.

The problem is that in perek 7, the rambam discusses whether a person with imperfect middos can be a navi.  He writes that while any imperfection in middos will translate into a lower level of nevuah, there is room for a small amount of imperfection in middos in a navi.  The rambam proves this by giving a list of neviim and their respective character flaws (shlomo – baal taavah.  Dovid- cruelty, etc.  the rambam is quite harsh with our neviim.)  While he lists eliyahu as an example of a navi with a temper, moshe rabbeinu is not on the list.  In fact, the rambam goes on to say about moshe rabbeinu: שלא נשארה לו מחיצה שלא קרעה, ושכבר נשלמו בו מעלות המידות כולן והמעלות השכליות כולן – moshe rabbeinu had no character flaws – but didn’t we see that he had an anger management problem just like eliyahu?

The answer is that somehow, the character flaw of moshe rabbeinu was different.  Hence, the rambam doesn’t think that this character flaw was enough, in and of itself, to be a sin that prevented moshe rabbeinu from entering eretz yisrael.  The rambam goes on in perek daled: שהוא לא היה מדבר עם אנשים המוניים, ולא עם מי שאין להם מעלה, אלא עם אנשים שהקטנה שבנשיהם היתה כמו יחזקאל בן בוזי, כמו שזכרו החכמים, וכל מה שיעשה או יאמר - יבחנוהו. וכאשר ראוהו שכעס, אמרו שהוא עליו השלום אינו מי שיש לו פחיתות מידה, ואלמלא ידע שה' קצף עלינו בבקשת המים, ושאנו הכעסנוהו יתעלה - לא היה כועס. ולא מצאנו בדברי ה' יתעלה אליו בזה הענין לא כעס ולא קצף, אלא אמר: "קח את המטה וכו' והשקית את העדה ואת בעירם". – Moshe’s sin was that by getting angry, bnei yisrael assumed that hashem was angry at them, which was false.  Moshe was punished for creating this false impression by not being allowed to enter eretz yisrael.  (I’m trying to answer a question here, namely, why didn’t the rambam stop with the first part of his explanation of moshe’s sin, that moshe got angry.  The answer is that somehow, moshe’s character flaw was different than a standard character flaw and hence didn’t merit punishment by itself.  Thus the rambam needed to add the second part of his explanation.  Obviously, however, we are still bound to explain Moshe's sin in a way that it fits in the context of perek daled and the golden mean.)

We need to understand what was so bad about this misimpression that moshe rabbeinu gave.  In particular, as the ramban points out, the torah describes what bnei yisrael did at mei merivah as “fighting with G-d.”  Surely then, Moshe was justified in getting angry.

Lets jump to chukim vs mishpatim.  In perek vav, the rambam raises the following philosophical inquiry:  There are two types of people – a person who does mitzvos even though its hard, and is kovesh es yitzro, or a person for whom doing the right thing is the easy and natural thing to do.  Which person is greater?

On the one hand, the pasuk says נפש רשע איוותה רע – even to desire bad is bad.  Similarly, the pasuk says, שמחה לצדיק עשות משפט – tzaddikim love doing mitzvos.  This would indicate that the second type of person is greater.  On the other hand, chazal say, כל הגדול מחברו יצרו גדול ממנו.  And of course, the famous mishnah, לפום צערא אגרא.  Finally, chazal say (rashi quotes at the end of parshas kedoshim), בן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר, לא יאמר אדם אי אפשי לאכול בשר בחלב, אי אפשי ללבוש שעטנז, אי אפשי לבוא על הערוה, אלא אפשי, ומה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי". – a person should want to do aveiros, and refrain only by being kovesh es yitzro.  How do we resolve this contradiction?

This is where the rambam introduces the distinction between chukim and mishpatim.  By chukim, there is nothing inherently wrong in their violation.  So its ok (and in fact, proper) to want to do them; the only thing that should stop you from eating treif is love of G-d.  To want to kill, on the other hand, reflects a bad middah – bad middos need to be eradicated.  (Before learning this rambam, I was very disturbed by the statement above from R shimon ben gamliel that one should want to do aveiros.  I asked a rabbi in camp once in a Q and A if I should want to kill him.  I think he misunderstood my question and thought I actually wanted to kill him, because he got really nervous.  But this rambam addresses the exact tension I felt then.)

Our problem lies back in perek daled.  Is there really nothing inherently wrong with the violation of chukim? 

The rambam explains that the purpose of the vast majority of the mitzvos hatorah is to keep a person’s middos balanced.  וזה, שהתורה אמנם אסרה מה שאסרה וציוותה מה שציוותה - מזאת הסיבה, רצוני לומר: כדי שנתרחק מן הקצה האחד יותר על צד ההרגל. שאיסור המאכלות האסורות כולם, ואיסור הביאות האסורות… the rambam lists what he later (perek vav) describes as chukim, and here provides a rationale – hashem assured certain foods to keep us from being baalei taavah – so if we start drooling over cheeseburgers, and refrain from eating them only because hashem commanded, aren’t we failing to eradicate the bad middah of taavah?  What is the difference now between chukim and mishpatim?

The answer I believe is that the rambam understood the nature of chok fundamentally differently than other rishonim.  חוקים שחקקתי לך ואין לך רשות להרהר בהם – the sefer hachinuch and others would tell us that we have to be mishabed ourselves to chukim because of the chochmah hidden in them – we don’t know the deep and lofty reasons behind hashem’s mitzvos.  But you can take a different perspective – really, we do know the reasons behind chukim.  Therein lies the temptation – I don’t need to specifically avoid treif to not be a baal taavah.  I can work on taavah by sticking to a low calorie diet, albeit with treif as part of it.  We aren’t meshabed ourselves to chukim because we can’t know the reasons behind them – we are meshabed ourselves to chukim even though we know the reasons.

So should one desire treif?  Not really, because that would reflect the bad middah of taavah.  But there is nothing inherent in treif itself that it should epitomize taavah more than anything else.  Intellectually, one should not seek to provide fake justifications for not eating treif – rather accept the gezeirah of hashem.  Cant you fulfill the taam hagezeirah even with eating treif - מה אעשה ואבי שבשמים גזר עלי

This explanation makes a lot of sense in explaining כל הגדול מחברו יצרו גדול ממנו – why should that be?  If the struggle with chukim is to fulfill them even though you think you don’t need them, because you can fulfill the taam even without the actual gezeirah, then its obvious that this struggle is more difficult the greater you are.

The lesson of chok according to the rambam is not about the loftiness of the hidden and secret wisdom of G-d, but rather, is a lesson in human frailty. Despite our knowledge, we can’t trust ourselves to choose the correct course of action and not be swayed by our human frailties.  We still need G-d to tell us what to do.

This is really a major theme motivating perek daled and the discussion of the golden mean.  The rambam sharply criticizes those who think that fasting,  inuyim, and suffering are methods to achieve purity.  As we quoted above, the mitzvos hatorah provide the balance for a person to have good middos.  Adding more restrictions, says the rambam, is only harmful - לא דייך מה שאסרה לך התורה, אלא שאתה אוסר עליך דברים אחרים?  Human frailty cuts both ways – we cant subtract from the chukim, but we also cant add.

The ramban already said it- Moshe rabbeinu had every right to assume that he should get mad at bnei yisrael.  But the lesson of chok is that even if you think you know that you have the right to be angry, you cant act without G-d's direction.  Maybe your anger stems from a character flaw, and isn’t lishmah – if you act independently of G-d, because of your knowledge, you fail. 

This to me is a very powerful lesson.  Moshe Rabbeinu, wiser than even Shlomo hamelech, more closely connected to G-d than anyone before or after - if anyone would have the right to get mad for Hashem, it would be Moshe Rabbeinu.  But even Moshe is bound by חוקים שחקקתי לך ואין לך רשות להרהר בהם - if Hashem didn't show anger, Moshe cant play G-d and decide how to react.  That he did so anyways reflects a character flaw (but not at all similar to the character flaws of other neviim, because here Moshe thought his anger was justified.)  It is then a kol shekain for us, if we try to be kannaim for hashem (against chassidus, for example) that we have to wonder if we are justified in getting angry for Hashem, or maybe our kannaus also stems from impure motives.

So should we become mindless robots who do nothing unless its written explicitly to be permitted?  No.  The gemara tells us that moshe rabbeinu did 3 things midaato, and Hashem was maskim afterwards.   There is room for human innovation and trying to figure things out, as opposed to just blindly following orders.  But the lesson is in the extreme care we must take to make sure what we're doing is right, and doesn't stem from our own personal desires.  If even Moshe could be fooled into thinking an action was right because of a vice in his character, kol shekain for us.  G-d should grant us all deah binah vihaskel to understand truth and act accordingly.

Good shabbos!

pachim ketanim

Today I "killed" an hour of my time going back to get a spring jacket I had forgotten at someone's house. I was tempted to just abandon it (hope that they'd find a way to get it back to me later), but I was inspired by yaakov's going back for the pachim ketanim to be makpid on my possessions even at a considerable expense of time.  I realized something interesting from the experience, though.  A few months ago, a former KBY guy in kollel elyon was giving mussar, and he said that he doesnt understand why anyone would take a train for 2$ that takes an hr and a half instead of just taking a taxi for 25 (even 50) $ that will take 1/3 of the time (obviously assuming one can afford it.)  His argument was, isn't your time a lot more valuable than money?

This hit a nerve, because it wasn't the way I was brought up.  And thinking about it, doesn't the story with yaakov going back to get the small jars -- at a considerable expense of time, I add-- disprove him?    Rashi (chullin 91a) emphasizes that the jars werent really worth anything significant (especially with yaakov being so wealthy, so clearly he could afford the loss).  and yet yaakov chose to go back. the gemara explains that because he was so makpid on gezel, he therefore felt it important to treat seriously even the pachim ketanim. Whats pshat- yaakov was so wealthy that he wouldnt have been tempted to steal just because of the loss of pachim ketanim?

I think the pshat is that once you have a lackadaisical  attitude towards money that it isnt serious/ it doesnt matter, you automatically won't be makpid in the right way concerning other people's money, because you dont perceive it as a serious issue. You have to take money seriously - even at considerable expense of time - in order to be able to have the proper attitude towards other people's money.

I need to figure out how to contact this guy (he's now in florida) to express my disagreement.  And as always, I'd love to hear other peoples opinions.

Delay in dvar torah this week

I don't think I am going to get a chance to finish writing a dvar torah before shabbos this week.  but I'll just put up a follow-up to what I wrote last week about kalev's tefilah and praying to the dead.  The gemara in taanis brings down the practice to go to a beis hakevaros on a fast day.  Tosfos seems to assume that the purpose of this visit is to ask the dead to intercede on our behalf with Hashem.  In a similar vein, the ran in his eighth derasha  explains that kivrei tzaddikim have a "shefa of kedusha" about them that we try to tap into when we pray there.  The Rambam, in hilchos taanis clearly disagrees: אחר שמתפללין יוצאין כל העם לבית הקברות ובוכין ומתחננים שם. כלומר הרי אתם מתים כאלו אם לא תשובו מדרכיכם  - we dont go to the cemetery to daven to dead, nor to tap into their kedusha.  Rather, it is to remind ourselves of our mortality to motivate teshuva, al derech the gemara in the beginning of brachos, yachshov liyom hamisah.  While this is not an absolute proof, this is further evidence that the rambam would assur davenin to the dead.  This point is strengthened by the fact that the rambam in hilchos aveilus writes, ולא יפנה אדם לבקר הקברות - in general a person shouldnt go to a cemetery.  while the nosei keilim debate as to what exactly the rambam means (since we do have the minhag to go at various times to the cemetery), one explanation would be that the rambam discourages cemetery visiting because he was afraid of people davening to the dead.  This still requires further research.