Misah and Misah bidei shamayim

There is a fascinating machlokes on the last pasuk of parshas bamidbar - The Ramban and the Behag use the pasuk in the minyan hamitzvos as a lav for stealing from the klei shares.  The Rambam, however, thinks the pasuk is only a "remez" to stealing klei shares, but in the minyan hamitzvos, there is no such lav:

ואף על פי שאמרו (סנה' פא ב) רמז לגונב את הקסוה לא יבואו לראות, ויש די ספוק באמרם רמז ושפשטיה דקרא אינו כן. ואינו גם כן מכלל מחוייבי מיתה בידי שמים כמו שהתבאר בתוספתא (זבחים ספי"ב וכריתות פ"א ה"ב) ובסנהדרין (פג א

The Rambam defends his claim that there is no full-fledged lav for stealing klei shares by noting that there is no official punishment / misah bidei shamayim for this action.  Were one to be chayav misah bidei shamayim, then for sure it would be a full fledged lav - with no such chiyuv, its entirely possible / very plausible that while of course it is prohibited to steal klei shares, it is not a lav in its own right.

The Ramban jumps on this Rambam:  what do you mean that theres no chiyuv misah bidei shamayim?  The mishnah in sanhedrin lists 3 cases that kanain pogin bo - and stealing klei shares is one of them!  The mishnayos which list those issurim which have a chiyuv misah bidei shamayim leave out stealing klei shares not because it is less chammur - but rather because it is more chammur:  the list only includes those prohibitions whose sole punishment is misah bidei shamayim, not those, like stealing klei shares, which have an additional punishment of kanain pogin bo.

In the above formulation, the Ramban (based on gemara sanhedrin 82b) makes a global claim:  Chiyuv misah bidei adam, in all its forms (beis din, kanain pogin bo, kipah, etc.) includes within itself chiyuv misah bidei shamayim.  More strongly formulated: chiyuv misah bidei adam is predicated on and justified solely by the fact that this person is chayav misah bidei shamayim.  Otherwise, what right would we have to kill him?

The Megillas Esther points out that the rambam, based on another opinion in the gemara, seems to hold almost the entirely opposite position:  To the contrary, if one is chayav misah bidei shamayim, then it would be redundant to also have them be chayav bidei adam - let Hashem take care of giving his promised misah bidei shamayim.  The only role of misah bidei adam is in a case where a person is NOT chayav misah bidei shamayim - that is where it is sometimes constructive to have misah bidei adam.

This might just be a cute cheshbon, but this could explain an interesting lashon of the rambam in the peirush hamishnayos.  Another of the three cases of kanain pogin bo is a boel aramis - in that case, the gemara limits the right of the kanain to kill the boel aramis to the shaas maaseh aveirah - once the aveirah is over, the kanain cannot kill him anymore.  Some acharonim believe that this limitation only applies to boel aramis -- but by stealing klei shares, one can kill the ganav even after he has finished the maaseh gneivah.  Why the difference?

The Rambam says in peirush hamishnayos:
ו] קסוה, כלי שרת נגזר מן קשות הנסך. ומקלל בקוסם, הוא שיברך השם בשם עבודה זרה. ובועל ארמית, הוא שיבעול בת עובדי עבודה זרה בפרהסיא בעשרה ישראל או יותר, ובשעת מעשה דוקא כמעשה פינחס, אבל אחר שפירש, או שלא היה בקהל מישראל, או שלא היתה עובדת עבודה זרה, אסור להרגו. אבל הוא מחוייב כרת על בת עובד עבודה זרה ואף על פי שלא נזכר בתורה ולא נמנה מכלל הכרתות, אלא שהוא קבלה. ונתפרש במקרא במה שנאמר ובעל בת אל נכר יכרת ה' לאיש אשר יעשנה וכו'.

If I am correct, the rambam is saying the following:  By boel aramis, you cant kill him once the maaseh aveirah is finished because now he is chayav kares / misah bidei shamayim - and that we leave to Hashem to fulfill.  In the other cases, however, even after the maaseh aveirah, the person is not chayav misah bidei shamayim - therefore the kanain can still kill the avaryan. (the diyuk is better in the translations in the back of the gemara)

I think this machlokes Rambam / Ramban plays out lishitasam in a few other places:

In parshas lech lecha, the Ramban famously disagrees with the Rambam and says that if a navi prophesies that someone deserves to die, it is a mitzvah to kill them.  The Rambam, on the other hand, thinks that you're chayav misah if you kill someone due to such a nevuah.  The Ramban, lishitaso, thinks misah bidei adam is a function of misah bidei shamayim - if Hashem wants a person dead, as evidenced by nevuah, then that "chiyuv misah bidei shamayim" translates into a hetter of misah bidei adam.  But the Rambam thinks that misah bidei shamayim and misah bidei adam are two disjoint concepts - one does not lead to the other - so why should this prophecy translate into a misah bidei adam - if hashem wants to kill this guy, let Hashem kill him.

There is a famous din by eidim zomimin of kaasher zamam vilo kaasher asah.  That is, if witnesses perjure in an attempt to have someone executed by the courts and get found out before the guy is executed, then they themselves are killed.  After the fact, however, they're let off the hook.  The Ramban has a very fascinating explanation for why this should be:  Bikerev elokim yishpot - Hashem steers the hands of the sanhedrin - if the witnesses were found false before the execution of their victim, thats because Hashem is trying to save the innocent victim - therefore the 2 witnesses are guilty and liable to the death penalty.  If however, Hashem allowed the execution of the 'victim' to go through, it must be because the 'victim' wasn't really so innocent after all, and therefore the eidim did not kill an innocent man and are let off the hook.  This assumes the Ramban's shittah about the nature of chiyuv misah bidei adam- namely, that it is predicated on and built off misah bidei shamayim.  This does not even get off the ground, however, in the Rambam's opinion (and indeed, if I recall correctly, when the kesef mishnah tries to explain the rationale of kaasher zamam in the Rambam, he does not even mention shittas haramban.)

I don't know where exactly to go with this machlokes, but at least I'll end with the following observation. How does the Rambam answer the strong kashya of the Ramban: what could be the mechayev / justification to give misah bidei adam if not misah bidei shamayim?  I think the point is that when we seek justice here in this world, we don't attempt to play G-d - we can't know what G-d knows or take his global perspective in our justice system.  Misah bidei shamayim, we leave to shamayim.  What we can do is din bidei adam - and as long as we use the dinei hatorah to implement our dinei adam, then our din will also ultimately reach the level of being a true din tzedek.

behar -- liolam bahem taavodu

I've been a little stressed recently, so no write.  This also isn't really anything special - but maybe food for thought.

There is a mitzvah in this weeks parsha,  liolam bahem taavodu:

והמצוה הרל"ה היא שצונו בדין עבד כנעני. והוא שנעבוד בו לעולם ושאין לו חירות אלא בשן ועין. והוא הדין לשאר ראשי אברים שאינם חוזרים כמו שבא בו (שם כד ב מכיל') הפירוש המקובל. והוא אמרו יתעלה (ס"פ בהר) לעולם בהם תעבודו ואמר (משפטי' כא) וכי יכה איש וכו'. ולשון גמר גיטין (לח א) כל המשחרר עבדו עובר בעשה דכתיב לעולם בהם תעבודו.
(Rambam, mitzvah 235)

There is a machlokes in the rishonim with regards to the taam hamitzvah.  The Ramban in gittin (38b) writes that it really is just an extension of li sichanem.  Were you to be meshachrer the eved, however, for the purpose of making a minyan, thats not a matnas chinam and hence is completely muttar.  (See the rashba there, however, for the difficulties in this approach, and the maggid mishnah avadim 9:6)

 the sefer hachinuch has quite a different way of understanding it:

משרשי המצוה, לפי שעם ישראל הם מבחר המין האנושי ונבראו להכיר בוראם ולעבוד לפניו, וראויים להיות להם עבדים לשמש אותם, ואם אין להם עבדים מן האומות, עכ"פ יצטרכו להשתעבד באחיהם ולא יוכלו להשתדל בעבודתו ברוך הוא, על כן נצטוינו להחזיק באלו לתשמישנו אחר שהוכשרו ונעקרה עבודה זרה מפיהם ולא יהיו למוקש בבתינו.
...
  ומהיות יסוד המצוה כדי שירבו בני אדם בעבודת בוראם ברוך הוא, התירו חכמים זכרונם לברכה לעבור על מצוה זו בכל עת שביטול מצוה זו יהיה גורם למצוה אחרת, ואפילו בשביל מצוה דרבנן אם היא מצוה דרבים, כגון שלא היו עשרה בבית הכנסת וצריכין לשחרר העבד ולהשלים המנין. ואל יקשה עליך, ואיך נדחה מצות עשה זו דאורייתא בשביל מצוה דרבנן, כי מפני שיסוד המצוה אינו אלא כדי להרבות עבודתו ברוך הוא, אחר שבשחרורו עכשיו נעשית מצוה, ועוד שגם הוא מתרבה בגופו במצוות שלא היה חייב קודם השחרור, בין זה וזה אמרו זכרונם לברכה שמותר לשחררו, שכן קיבלו הענין.

For the sefer hachinuch, the mitzvah stems not out of a prohibition of giving a matnas chinam, but rather, out of the broader perspective of G-d's greater plan.  (This approach neatly avoids the questions of the rashba and maggid mishnah on the Ramban, ayen sham).

Please forgive my modern sentiments, but what type of rationale is that for keeping people forever enslaved?

To strengthen the question, the Rambam emphasizes in various places how the torah is very makpid that we should have rachmanus on our avadim.  Particularly in the moreh this clash becomes very ironic:

וכן כל המצות אשר ספרנום בהלכות עבדים כולם חמלה רחמנות וחנינה לאביונים, ומרוב הרחמנות יציאת עבד כנעני חפשי בחסרון אחד מאבריו, שלא יתחברו בו העבדות והבטול ואפילו בהפלת שן כ"ש על זולת מהאברים,

So if the torah has such a rachmanus on the avadim that they immediately go free upon hakaas shein vi-ayen, then why did the torah insist that they cannot go free otherwise?  Shouldn't this rachamanus carry over to at least allow a master to free his avadim if he so chooses?

Whether or not I have a good answer to this, kabalah hi u-nikabel.  But I thought maybe this twist might help explain it.

The torah emphasizes one theme again and again, throughout parshas behar:  ki avadai heim - avdus isnt tofes on bnei yisrael because we already are avadim - shtari kodem, Hashem's claim on us is first.  You have to free an eved ivri by yovel - ki avadai hem.  You can't work him with avodas perech - ki avadai hem.  There is no reference to a right to be free or anything of the sort.  Who made up such a thing?  The reason why we cannot enslave bnei yisrael is solely because bnei yisrael already belong to another master.

Its nothing against the eved that we can't free him.  But unlike by bnei yisrael, this eved has no shtar kodem - mimeila, his avdus is liolam.

The take-away message, then, is that if we neglect to fulfill our obligations in our shtar to Hashem, we c''v open the door for a new shtar which we don't like.  On the positive side, if we fulfill our obligations to G-d, then no new claims can take effect against us.

Shavua tov!