cheit hameraglim and the limits of teshuva

first, mazel tov to anyone graduating!  we should all continue to be successful in all our endeavors.

i also want to wish myself a refuah sheleimah in advance as im getting my wisdom teeth pulled tomorrow morning.  (i was wondering for a while if its muttar to go for an elective procedure that will cause you pain on shabbos on erev shabbos, but i think it is.  presumably its at least as much of a dvar mitzvah as parnassa.)

we've mentioned before the idea that there must be some limit to teshuva. this is a little depressing but i want to talk about this.

we know that bnei yisrael sinned pretty badly by the cheit hameraglim. this sin lead hashem to punish bnei yisrael to die in the midbar.  bnei yisrael, hearing hashem's wrath, realized that they sinned, and do teshuva.  they admit to their sin, and want to rectify it by going to eretz yisrael right away.  but its too late. "al taalu", moshe tells the people from G-d, "ki ein hashem bikirbechem" - G-d is no longer with you.

it is true that by cheit ha-egel we also see signs of teshuva not being completely effective.  but it is not nearly to the same extent.  if teshuvah really works, why couldnt hashem "find it in his heart" to forgive and allow bnei yisrael to enter eretz yisrael?

this question is already hinted at in the parshios following the sippur hameraglim.  the torah immediately follows up with the the halachos of nesachim for karbanos, writing, דַּבֵּר אֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם כִּי תָבֹאוּ אֶל־אֶרֶץ מוֹשְׁבֹתֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי נֹתֵן לָכֶם:.  the ramban explains that hashem is promising bnei yisrael that they will eventually get to eretz yisrael.  bnei yisrael needed this promise because they almost lost faith - who's to say we'll go in after forty years - have we really been forgiven?

similarly, shortly thereafter we are given the halachos of the special karbanos for an individual or community who sin in avodah zarah.  the ramban explains: ונכנסה כאן בעבור שהם מרו דבר השם ואמרו נתנה ראש ונשובה מצרימה (לעיל יד ד), להיות שם במצרים כאשר היו בראשונה בלא תורה ובלא מצות. והנה באה הפרשה, להודיעם כי אפילו בע"ז יכפר על השוגגים  - this parsha is here to teach bnei yisrael that teshuva works - hashem forgives even avodah zarah.  (the ramban here focuses on shogeg, but later quotes rashi who writes explicitly that even bimeizid, teshuvah is mechaper.)  this begs the question.  hashem follows up the story of cheit hameraglim teaching bnei yisrael the koach of teshuva - so put your money where your mouth is - forgive bnei yisrael and erase the 40 year decree!

the meshech chochma addresses this question.  he explains that since bnei yisrael only did teshuva after hashem's wrath was revealed and the meraglim were killed, it was not a complete teshuva.  chazal discuss a similar idea - a person who does teshuva when he's old and frail, half-dead and now has no taavos isnt a complete baal teshuvah.  its not so hard to have charata when the taavah to sin is no longer bothering you.  similarly, after an open display of yad hashem, teshuva/charata was cheap - it wasnt 100% real.

i dont have any disproofs of this meshech chochma (and i have nothing but respect for r meir simcha).  but as a limmud zchus for klal yisrael, lets assume bnei yisrael's teshuva was real.  then why were they still punished?

this comes down to a question i heard r twersky address in the rambam.  in the seventh perek of hilchos teshuva, the rambam writes:  ואל ידמה אדם בעל תשובה שהוא מרוחק ממעלת הצדיקים מפני העונות והחטאות שעשה. אין הדבר כן אלא אהוב ונחמד הוא לפני הבורא כאילו לא חטא מעולם.  - ki-ilu lo chata me-olam = doing teshuva "undoes" your aveirah - its as if it were never done.

similarly the rambam writes: אמש היה זה שנאוי לפני המקום משוקץ ומרוחק ותועבה. והיום הוא אהוב ונחמד קרוב וידיד - yesterday the guy was a rasha, and today he's a tzaddik gammur.

but can you really do teshuva for anything in an instant / between yesterday and today, and make it as if you never sinned? earlier in hilchos teshuva (end of perek 1), the rambam brings down the famous daled chilukei kapparah:  אף על פי שהתשובה מכפרת על הכל ועצמו של יום הכפורים מכפר. יש עבירות שהן מתכפרים לשעתן ויש עבירות שאין מתכפרים אלא לאחר זמן. כיצד...  המחלל את השם אע"פ שעשה תשובה והגיע יום הכפורים והוא עומד בתשובתו ובאו עליו יסורין אינו מתכפר לו כפרה גמורה עד שימות. אלא תשובה יום הכפורים ויסורין שלשתן תולין ומיתה מכפרת שנאמר ונגלה באזני ה' צבאות וגו' אם יכופר העון הזה לכם עד תמותון:

r twersky explained that the rambam in perek aleph was referring to a lower level of teshuvah, a teshuvah miyirah, while in the seventh perek the rambam is discussing someone who does teshuvah me-ahavah.  i do not believe that this is correct.  the chiluk has no basis in the rambam - the rambam does not limit the daled chilukei kaaparah to lower levels of teshuvah, and the pesukim make no distinctions: אם יכופר העון הזה לכם עד תמותון - no ifs, ands, or buts.

but if we read the rambam again, the answer is clear.  אהוב ונחמד הוא לפני הבורא כאילו לא חטא מעולם - its not as if he never sinned - rather, g-d loves him as much as he loves somebody who never sinned.  the koach of teshuva isnt to undo your sins - your sins are done, and whats done may sometimes have consequences that last throughout the entire rest of one's life until the moment of death.  the chiddush of teshuvah is that yesterday, g-d hated you for your evil actions.  through teshuva, g-d loves us again, and if he still punishes us for our sins, it is out of love. (this is against everything we've discussed comparing teshuvah to hataras nedarim- umitzvah liyashev.)

there is an idea that is not exactly the same, but perhaps even stronger. (thinking about it, this might help us better understand the meshech chochma.)  there is another stirah in the rambam that bothered many acharonim.  in perek 3 of hilchos teshuva, the rambam writes that a person can do teshuva for any aveirah, no matter how severe. this includes avodah zarah, and fits with the rashi/ramban we saw earlier that one can do teshuvah for avodah zarah even bimeizid.  and yet, in hilchos avodah zarah perek 2, the rambam, disucssing ovdei avodah zarah and apikorsim, writes: אין מקבלים אותם בתשובה לעולם שנאמר כל באיה לא ישובון ולא ישיגו ארחות חיים - so can they or cant they do teshuva?

the answer can be found in the gemara avodah zara 17a.  the gemara tells a sequence of stories of people attempting to do teshuvah for aveiros chamuros such as avodah zarah and giluy arayos.  a woman came to r chisda, asking how to do teshuvah.  r chisda responded, "bring shrouds" - his point was that to properly do teshuvah for some very serious sins, a person has to die from the pain/ remorse they feel because they committed this sin.  so you can do teshuva for anything.  but sometimes teshuvah involves dying.

getting back to the meraglim, perhaps these ideas help us understand why the gezeirah of death in the midbar remained in place even after teshuvah.  focusing in on the first suggestion, if we assume for a second that the ikkar cheit of the meraglim was "vayimasu bi-eretz chemdah",  we readily understand how the punishment could remain in place even after hashem forgave us.  we kicked and rejected hashem's gift to us - we needed  to spend 40 yrs in the desert to learn to appreciate eretz yisrael.  g-d should grant, hashiveinu hashem eilecha vinashuva, to see the fully rebuilt eretz yisrael and yerushalayim speedily in our days.

good shabbos.

kalev's tefillah

the gemara in sotah 34b notices that when discussing the trip of the meraglim, the torah begins in the plural, "vayaalu banegev", but ends in the singular - "vayavo ad chevron".  the gemara famously explains: kalev by himself went to chevron to daven by the graves of his forefathers. he said: avosai - please ask g-d for mercy to prevent me from slipping into the sin of the meraglim.

is this allowed?  isnt kalev using the dead as an intermediary between himself and hashem, which is a violation of the fifth ikkar of the rambam: היסוד החמישי שהוא יתעלה הוא אשר ראוי לעבדו ולרוממו ולפרסם גדולתו ומשמעתו. ואין עושין כן למה שלמטה ממנו במציאות מן המלאכים והכוכבים והגלגלים והיסודות וכל מה שהורכב מהן, לפי שכולם מוטבעים בפעולותיהם אין להם שלטון ולא בחירה אלא רצונו יתעלה, ואין עושין אותם אמצעים להגיע בהם אליו, אלא כלפיו יתעלה יכוונו המחשבות ויניחו כל מה שזולתו. וזה היסוד החמישי הוא האזהרה על עבודה זרה, ורוב התורה באה להזהיר על זה.

so people pointed out to me the obvious distinction: maybe praying to malachim is a violation of this ikkar emunah, but praying to dead people is really just asking them to pray for you.  the same way you can ask someone who is alive, you can ask someone who is dead.

but i was a little skeptical.  so i asked rabbi google, and found http://www.globalyeshiva.com/profiles/blogs/graves-and-cemeteries-1.  the bach (YD 217) writes that it is forbidden to pray to the dead because of the issur of "doresh el hameisim."  he asks from the gemara about kalev, and says that kalev didnt daven to the dead.  rather, kalev went to kivrei avos because it was a makom of kedusah but there davened only to hashem (see the drashos haran drush 8 for a fascinating elaboration on the nature of the kedusha of kivrei tzaddikim).  but i cant understand this bach for the life of me - did he read the next line in the gemara!! (at least edit out the controversial line in his hagahos)

i just point out that this ikkar of the rambam is really a major machlokes rishonim.  this is evidenced by the practice still followed in many shuls of reciting certain selichos which ask malachim to intercede on our behalf to hashem.  for example "malachei rachamim, misharsei elyon, chalu na pinei kel bimeitav higayon..." or even more famously, machnisei rachamim hachnisu rachamaeinu lifnei baal harachamim. according to the rambam, it is a violation of no less an issur than avodah zarah to say these tefillos. other rishonim felt, however, that it is entirely appropriate to ask malachim to intercede on our behalf.  i consider this gemara about kalev a raayah to the anti-rambam camp.

 should one say these tefillos?  i dont know, and i really should ask a sheila.  my eitzah for machnisei rachamim these past few years has been to daven slowly so that i dont have time to say it - making it a non-issue (unfortunately, that usually doesnt work for malachei rachamim, which is recited responsively.)

im looking for mekoros on this issue- if anyone has, i'd love to hear them.

וְהָיִיתָ לָּנוּ לְעֵינָיִם

i have to begin by discussing capital letters.  i have recieved numerous complaints about the fact that i write without them, particularly in light of the fact that it would be so easy to write in microsoft word where they auto-correct capitals for you (as my chavrusa astutely pointed out, since i only type with two fingers, using one of the 2 for the shift key is a major expense.)  one person asked me if i thought capitals were chukas akum.  i responded that if that were so, any non-jewish alphabet would be chukas akum.  but now i think he might have been on to something: why do i dislike capital letters - because they're pointless - we get by just fine without them in hebrew.  a practice of the goyim that is pointless is forbidden because of chukas akum because any practice of unknown origins must be suspected to have roots in idolatry.  so to write in a non-jewish alphabet is fine, because it makes sense to develop an alphabet.  but capitals, which are pointless, fall under chukas akum. (this is partially a joke).

moshe tells yisro not to leave bnei yisrael because וְהָיִיתָ לָּנוּ לְעֵינָיִם.  what does this mean?  rashi, in one pshat, says שתהא חביב עלינו כגלגל עינינו, שנאמר (דברים י, יט) ואהבתם את הגר.  (parenthetically, i wonder if this pshat is taluy in the machlokes whether yisro came to join bnei yisrael before or after mattan torah.  if he came before, then he wasnt really any more of a ger than the rest of bnei yisrael, was he?  unless all of klal yisrael had the din of a ger back then, such that bnei yisrael were all chayav in ahavas hager to each other.  but that seems strange.)

 this goes against my strongly held pedagogical beliefs (I may write something about that some other time), but I don't have a good question to ask here.  but it seems that rashi thinks that regular ahavas yisrael wouldnt have been enough to persuade yisro to stay.  what is stronger about the mitzvah of ahavas hager than standard ahavas yisrael?

we've discussed before the ramban's shittah in viahavta lireacha kamocha.  the ramban explains: the torah doesnt say viahavta oso.  rather it says viahavta LI-reacha.  hence, the torah doesnt mean you have to love him as much as you love yourself, but rather, show love TO him the same way you show love to yourself (but not to the same degree).  the ramban's proof for this is the halacha that chayecha kodmin - you are allowed to care about yourself more than others.

the aruch hashulchan (and i think r shimon in shaarei yosher as well) explains that the ramban is essentially limiting viahavta lireacha to a "dont do him bad" instead of a "do him good".  you arent obligated to give someone all your money if they ask for it, because you dont have to really love them as much as you love yourself.  rather, chazal phrase the obligations that stem from ahavas yisrael as "what you dont like to be done to yourself, dont do to others."

does this apply to ahavas ha-ger?  the rambam writes in hilchos deos, and in sefer hamitzvos that there is a difference between ahavas hager and regular ahavas yisrael.  וברוב המדרשות בארו שהאל יתעלה צונו על הגר כמו שצונו על עצמו יתעלה אמר (פ' שמע) ואהבת את י"י אלדיך ואמר ואהבתם את הגר - the midrashim compare ahavas hager to ahavas hashechina.  in what way is ahavas hager more similar to ahavas hashechinah than regular ahavas yisrael?

i believe (but i dont have it in front of me) that r yaakov kaminetsky in emes liyaakov explains based on the ramban (for those who read my article on kedoshim, this might be slightly problematic.  but lets ignore that for now.)  by ahavas yisrael, the torah says LI-reacha, which we explained means a limited love.  but by both ahavas hager and ahavas hashem, the torah doesnt say show love to the other, but rather to love.  this means that the mitzvos of ahavas hager and ahavas hashem mandate loving hashem/geirim as much as we love ourselves, even if regular ahavas yisrael is not mechayev love of that degree. (hence by ahavas hashem, the pasuk goes on: bichol livavcha uvchol nafshecha uvchol meodecha)

(this also explains why the rambam uses the pasuk va'ahavtaem es hager - from sefer devarim, as the basis for the mitzvah of ahavas hager, and not the earlier pasuk in parshas kedoshim, viahvata LO kamocha (referring to ahavas hager.)  the pasuk in devarim reflects the fuller nature of the mitzvah.)

as such, we understand why moshe needed to specifically reference ahavas hager.  rashi implies, and the ramban says it straight out, that the reason yisro didnt want to come with bnei yisrael to eretz yisrael was that he, as a ger, would not be entitled to a nachala.  moshe responds, the good which G-d gives us we will pass on to you, which rashi interprets to mean that moshe promised him a nachala, even though he wasnt entitled. why would moshe do this? how was he allowed to do this - what he's giving to yisro is coming out of the chelek that the rest of bnei yisrael were entitled to, and ahavas yisrael isnt mechayev that when someone asks for your money, that you just give it to him!  but the answer is, maybe ahavas hager is mechayev that level of ahavah.

we need to understand though, why ahavas hager should be raised above standard ahavas yisrael - and for this we need a framework for the mitzvah of ahavas yisrael in general.

the context that the rambam gives before presenting the mitzvos of ahavas yisrael and ahavas hager in hilchos deos is quite fascinating.  the rambam begins the perek (6): דרך ברייתו של אדם להיות נמשך בדעותיו ובמעשיו אחר ריעיו וחביריו ונוהג כמנהג אנשי מדינתו, לפיכך צריך אדם להתחבר לצדיקים ולישב אצל החכמים תמיד כדי שילמוד ממעשיהם, ויתרחק מן הרשעים ההולכים בחשך כדי שלא ילמוד ממעשיהם, הוא ששלמה אומר הולך את חכמים יחכם ורועה כסילים ירוע.  this halacha is presumably motivated by concerns of bein adam lamakom- you have to surround yourself with tzaddikim so that you will be a tzaddik.

the next halacha emphasizes this point: מצות עשה להדבק בחכמים ותלמידיהם כדי ללמוד ממעשיהם כענין שנאמר ובו תדבק - there is a mitzvah to "cleave" to talmidei chachamim.  as the rambam there explains, this mitvzah is learned from the words in the pasuk "to cleave to hashem - how can you cleave to hashem, who is compared to fire - rather, the pasuk means to attach oneself to talmidei chachamim".   so again, the focus of the perek is how to connect to the shechina.

so is the follow up halacha a shift in focus?  מצוה על כל אדם לאהוב את כל אחד ואחד מישראל כגופו שנאמר ואהבת לרעך כמוך.

i wonder if the rambam thinks that we should view ahavas yisrael almost as an extension of/ broadening out  the mitzvah of cleaving to talmidei chachamim.  we have to love jews because if we love people who are tzaddikim (vi-amech kulam tzaddikim), we ourselves will become bigger tzaddikim.  thus, the mitzvah of ahavas yisrael falls into the framework set up by the beginning of the perek, הולך את חכמים יחכם ורועה כסילים ירוע.

it is with this context that we understand why ahavas hager is taken to a higher level than regular ahavas yisrael.  as gilad barach has already discussed (highly recommended reading), the rambam, as opposed to the sefer hachinuch, does not see the ger's being a stranger and alone (and hence needing extra compassion) as the rationale behind the mitzvah of ahavas hager.  rather, it is the fact that the ger threw off the sheker he was raised with and came to cling to the shechina that merits him this extra love.  why?  i suggest that just like we have a mitzvah to cling to talmidei chachamim, we have an extra mitzvah to love and cling to geirim, people who of themselves recognized the emes of yahadus and torah. again, this mitzvah is part of the broader context of the entire perek.

i was (and still am) a little bothered by the suggestion that  we "use" ahavas yisrael "selifshly", to further our own spiritual growth - this doesnt seem to be the classical understanding of mitzvos bein adam lchaveiro.  but the rambam in pirkei avos talks about the different types of friendships that can exist between people.  the truest friendship, the rambam writes, is one where friends are bound together because of the G-dly ideals and commitments they share.  a friendship that isnt founded on ideals of furthering avodas hashem wont last- whatever you share with the friend isnt eternal, and when what you share fades away, so will the friendship.  thus, ahavas yisrael has to be based in furthering avodas hashem in order for us to be able to truly love all of klal yisrael.

(i think that this is also how i understand why we have no mitzvah to love people who dont keep the mitzvos (bimeizid only, not tinok shenishbas).  its not a punishment against them, its just that the whole platform for  friendship has been undermined. this needs further thought.)

have a great shabbos!

R Elchanan somehow thinks Miriam (sister of Moshe Rabbeinu) was an apikores

The rambam writes at the end of hilchos tumas tzaraas that miriam's mistake that caused her to say lashon hara about moshe was that she "equated him with other neviim".  in truth, the rambam isnt saying a chiddush - this is the clear implication of miriam's statement "harak ach bimoshe diber hashem halo gam banu diber" - we are all neviim just like him.

r elchanan (cited by the sefer hamafteach, kovetz hearos biurei ha-agados siman 7 or so), asks, isnt it one of the 13 ikkarim that moshe rabbeinu was on a fundamentally higher plane than all the other neviim?  was miriam an apikores by denying this?

r elchanan answers that unil this ikkar was revealed through hashem's subsequent response to miriam (lo ken avdi moshe, bichol beisi neeman hu, etc.)  miriam wasnt responsible for not knowing it.

with all due respect, this is preposterous.  consider the implications:  the rambam writes that the source for the ikkar of schar vi-onesh is the dialogue between moshe and hashem right after cheit ha-egel.  moshe tells hashem, "dont punish bnei yisrael, or else you have to kill me".  g-d responds, "thats not the way my ikkar of schar vi-onesh works.  i punish those who sin, and dont punish those who dont."  was moshe unaware of this ikkar until g-d informed him of it right now.  moshe rabbeinu was an apikores bishogeg until now??  hard to swallow, seeing as he got the entirety of the torah (which presumably includes the 13 ikkarim) at har sinai.

furthermore, the ikkar of the superiority of nevuas moshe is divided into four parts (see the rambam seventh ikkar or so) and two of them are proved with pesukim from well before miriam's incident!  so anyways, r elchanan fails to explain how miriam was unaware of the superiority of moshe rabbeinu.

rather, the answer is (for both the dialogue between moshe and hashem and miriam's lashon hara) that everyone knew the ikkarim all along.  moshe / miriam just didnt see the implications to their particular cases of the ikkar.  this seems to be pashut pshat - not a big chiddush.

the rambam quotes these stories as proof for his ikkarim because when hashem explains moshe and miriam's mistakes, he "chazzers" the ikkar for them in its entirety so that we will have it written in the torah.

anyone care to defend r elchanan?

nazir

i meant to write this up before shabbos but i didnt get a chance.  hopefully this isnt like avar yomo batel karbano. (anyone reading this?)

The ramban writes, why does a nazir bring a chatas at the end of his nezirus - ועל דרך הפשט כי האיש הזה חוטא נפשו במלאת הנזירות, כי הוא עתה נזור מקדושתו ועבודת השם, וראוי היה לו שיזיר לעולם ויעמוד כל ימיו נזיר וקדוש לאלהיו, כענין שאמר (עמוס ב יא) ואקים מבניכם לנביאים ומבחוריכם לנזירים, השוה אותו הכתוב לנביא, וכדכתיב (לעיל פסוק ח) כל ימי נזרו קדוש הוא לה' והנה הוא צריך כפרה בשובו להטמא בתאוות העולם:

the reason is, says the ramban, that the nazir is sinning by leaving the spiritual heights of nezirus and coming back to regular every day life.

according to the ramban, a nazir is not a sinner, despite some statements of chazal to that effect.  a nazir, the ramban points out, is compared to a navi.

the ramban's shittah is in contrast to that of rashi, who accepts chazal's statement that a nazir is a sinner as normative.  thus, rashi in parshas naso quotes the chazal that the sin of the nazir that mandates his bringing a karbon is  שציער עצמו מן היין.  how does rashi explain the pesukim in amos which compare a nazir to a navi? rashi in amos explains:  לנזרים - תרגם יונתן למלפין שהיו פרושין מדרכי עם הארץ ועוסקים בתורה - the nazir is amos is not referring to the halachic concept of nezirus found in naso - rather, it means the gedolei torah vihoraah who separate themselves from the ways of normal people to learn and teach torah.  when the pesukim in amos go on to describe the sin of the nazir drinking wine (which would seem to support the ramban's position that the nazir referred to here is the classical nazir), rashi explains: ותשקו את הנזירים יין - שלא יורו אתכם שהשיכור אסור להורות, ותשקו את הנזירים יין, תרגם יונתן ואטעיתון ית מלפיכון בחמר - the sin the navi is referring to is teaching torah while drunk, but it is not connected whatsoever to the prohibition of a classical nazir to drink wine, because the pesukim here arent talking about a classical nazir.  we couldnt compare a classical nazir to a navi - a nazir is a sinner!

whats interesting is the rambam's take on this issue.  on the one hand, the rambam (deos 3) also accepts as normative chazal's statement that a nazir is a sinner: שמא יאמר אדם הואיל והקנאה והתאוה והכבוד וכיוצא בהם דרך רעה הן ומוציאין את האדם מן העולם. אפרוש מהן ביותר ואתרחק לצד האחרון. עד שלא יאכל בשר ולא ישתה יין ולא ישא אשה ולא ישב בדירה נאה ולא ילבש מלבוש נאה אלא השק והצמר הקשה וכיוצא בהן כגון כהני העובדי כוכבים. גם זה דרך רעה היא ואסור לילך בה. המהלך בדרך זו נקרא חוטא. שהרי הוא אומר בנזיר וכפר עליו מאשר חטא על הנפש. אמרו חכמים ומה אם נזיר שלא פירש אלא מן היין צריך כפרה המונע עצמו מכל דבר ודבר על אחת כמה וכמה.

and yet, at the end of hilchos nezirus, the rambam writes like the ramban that a nazir is compared to a navi - הנודר לה' דרך קדושה הרי זה נאה ומשובח ועל זה נאמר נזר אלהיו על ראשו קדש הוא לה'. ושקלו הכתוב כנביא (שנאמר) ואקים מבניכם לנביאים ומבחוריכם לנזירים:   how can the rambam take both sides at once?

this is similar to an issue i struggled with in a different context.  chazal say in brachos that the place where baalei teshuva stand is greater than that of regular tzaddikim.  rabbeinu yonah (somewhere in pirkei avos, i believe perek 3) asks, how could it be that baalei teshuvah are greater than tzaddikim who never sinned?  how could you be better off sinning - how could you lose out by totally following ratzon hashem?  because of this question, he drastically re-interprets the gemara.  but the rambam takes the gemara literally: אמרו חכמים מקום שבעלי תשובה עומדין אין צדיקים גמורין יכולין לעמוד בו. כלומר מעלתן גדולה ממעלת אלו שלא חטאו מעולם מפני שהן כובשים יצרם יותר מהם.

so was your sin a mitzvah - after all, it allowed you to come closer to hashem.  surely the answer is no.  and yet, there were definitely positive benefits achieved through that sin.

nazir is the flip case of the baal teshuvah.  really, a nazir is like a navi, as the rambam said in hilchos nezirus.  but that doesnt mean that there isnt also an element of sin in becoming a nazir.   some aveiros have an aspect of mitzvah within them, and some mitzvos have an aspect of aveirah within them.

how do we understand this?  either an action is ratzon hashem, in which case its entirely a mitzvah, or its not ratzon hashem, in which case its entirely aveirah.

ratzon hashem is multifaceted.  hashem wants many different things on many different levels, and sometimes, the multiplicity of values that hashem is after conflict.  we have to choose one action or another - one value has to override the other.  but that doesnt mean the negated value is gone. while doing a mitzvah, there can still be a tzad aveirah shebo or vica versa.

my mashal to understand this is as follows: compare two people, one a yaakov ish tam his entire life and one, who while now he looks just like the first guy, used to party/get drunk/do drugs / that type of stuff.   whose a better candidate to do kiruv by hanging out with non-religious people in bars and drinking with them?  obviously the second guy.  so is he better off because of his sins?  in some sense, yes.  he has a chance to do a tremendous mitzvah the first guy doesn't have because of his sins.  but in another sense, obviously not.  the purity of the first guy is clearly unmatched by that of the second.

about this it is said, hanistaros lashem elokeinu - we cant know how everything we do may ultimately be for good.  vihaniglos lanu ulvaneinu ad olam, laasos es kol divrei hatorah hazos - our job is to keep the torah to the best of our abilities, and through that, everything will work out.

shavuos - shittas harambam ligabai zechiras maamad har sinai

what im about to say now is not my chiddush- its stuff i've heard/read.  still, i thought it was worthwhile  to write it out.

the ramban, in his hasagos on the sefer hamitzvos of the rambam, says the rambam forgot a pretty important mitzvas lo taaseh - namely, to not forget maamad har sinai. this prohibition is based on the pasuk in parshas vaeschanan: השמר לך ושמור נפשך מאד פן תשכח את הדברים אשר ראו עיניך ופן יסורו מלבבך כל ימי חייך והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך יום אשר עמדת לפני י"י אלהיך בחורב. - as chazal say, hishamer in the torah always means a lav - hence this is a prohibition against forgetting the day we stood at har sinai.  whats pshat in the rambam?

the megillas esther suggests that the rambam holds like rashi's pshat in the pasuk.  rashi there writes, אז כשלא תשכחו אותם ותעשום על אמתתם תחשבו חכמים ונבונים ואם תעוותו אותם מתוך שכחה תחשבו שוטים - the prohibition isnt to forget the specific maamad har sinai, but rather, to forget and fail to practice the torah given over at har sinai.  as such, this commandment is not counted as per shoresh daled of the rambam.  (a mitzvah which doesnt command a new action, but rather, commands us to keep that which we already were commanded, is called a mitzvah klalis.  thus, the mitzvah to not forget the torah and to keep the torah is a mitzvah klalis and not counted.)

the problem is, the rambam does seem to think that the pasuk specifically exhorts us to remember har sinai.  the rambam writes in iggeres teiman:מעמד הר סיני שצונו הקדוש ברוך הוא לזכרו תמיד, וגם הזהירנו מלשכחו אותו, וצונו ללמד אותו לבנינו כדי שיגדלו על תלמודו, הוא מה שנאמר (דברים ד' ט' - י'): "רק השמר לך ושמר נפשך מאד פן תשכח את הדברים אשר ראו עיניך ופן יסורו מלבבך כל ימי חייך והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך יום אשר עמדת לפני ה' אלהיך בחרב" 

the real answer, i think, lies in the mishna in avos.  the mishna says: רבי דוסתאי ברבי ינאי משום רבי מאיר אומר כל השוכח דבר אחד ממשנתו מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו מתחייב בנפשו שנאמר (דברים ד') רק השמר לך ושמור נפשך מאד פן תשכח את הדברים אשר ראו עיניך

how did chazal extend the pasuk, which we saw is talking about maamad har sinai, and make it into an issur to forget any part of torah?

this goes back to the piece i wrote about the rambam's shittah in talmud torah. when we learn torah, we have to learn the same way it was given over at har sinai.  but even more - we have to learn as if we right now are at har sinai.

if someone learns and really feels that he is right now at har sinai, and hashem himself is giving him the torah, he wont forget.  the mitzvah to remember har sinai is not counted as its own mitzvah because really, it is part of and defines the mitzvah of talmud torah.  we have to learn torah not just for the content, but for the experience of connecting to har sinai.  a person who learns haphazardly and forgets demonstrates his lack of connection to har sinai, and is thus in violation of the pasuk of hishamer.

the more i think about it, the more this directly connects to my previous piece.  i asked, according to the rambam, there doesnt seem to be an issur to teach torah for schar.  the drasha of mah ani bichinam af atah doesnt connote an issur, all it tells us is that klal yisrael learned for free at har sinai.  but the answer is, the torah commands us in our pasuk to learn as if we were at har sinai - we are the bnei yisrael standing underneath the mountain.  if you take money for teaching, that is a violation of remembering maamad har sinai - you are learning in a way that is incompatible with that of har sinai.  (i need to update that article)

emor - kiddush hashem

first of all, ive been told that i was "misleading" in last week's dvar torah - pretending i answered for the ramban when i really didnt.  i think i put 2 disclaimers in there to the effect that i do not have any clear resolution to all the issues i brought up.  but let this be a third.

second, further support for the notion that the rambam paskins like ben petura can be found in the omission of the rambam of the entire sugya in nedarim (80b) based off r akiva's shita of chayecha kodmin.  the gemara there debates when a community with water has to give of its water to the other community - the entire premise of the sugya, as the ran points out, is that if giving water endangers the first community, then they should not give, as per chayecha kodmin.  the rambam's ommission of this sugya points again to his rejection of r akiva.

on to this week's parsha.  parshas emor has lots of stuff about the moadim, but i dont want to talk about that now.  lets look at the mitzvah of kiddush hashem (and the prohibition of chilul hashem), learned from the pasuk "vilo sichalelu es sheim kadshi vinikdashti bitoch bnei yisrael..." - do not profane the name of g-d, and I (g-d) will become sanctified in the midst of bnei yisrael" - what exactly does this mitzvah entail.

explains the ramban: על דעת רבותינו (תו"כ פרק ט ד) מצות עשה, שנקדש את שמו במצות ליהרג עליהן ולא נעבור

the mitzvah of kiddush hashem is to die al kiddush hashem.  the beis yosef on the tur in yoreh deah siman 157 asks a question: והא דבשאר עבירות מפלגינן בין בשעת השמד לשלא בשעת השמד ובין בצינעא לבפרהסיא ובין להנאת עצמן לשלא להנאת עצמן ובג' עבירות לא מפלגינן בינייהו כתוב בנמוקי יוסף (סנהדרין יז סוע"ב) דטעמא משום דהני לאו משום חילול השם הוא דאסירי אלא מפני חומר עצמן הילכך בכל ענין אסירי. 

we know that there are various halachos about when we say yehareg vial yaavor.  the big three (avodah zara, shfichus damim, giluy arayos), are yehareg vial yaavor even bi-tzinah (not in front of ten jews).  other aveiros are only yehareg vial yaavor if they're (a) front of ten jews and the goy forcing one to do them is miskavein not lihanaas atzmo but rather, solely lihaaviro al hamitzvos (b) bishaas hashmad, in a time of general religious persecution   says the beis yosef, this distinction reflects the fact that there are different reasons why these different categories are yehareg vial yaavor.  the big 3 are yehareg vial yaavor not because of kiddush hashem, but rather, because of "chumras atzman" - the severity of the issurim themselves. kiddush hashem, however, is the reason that other mitzvos are yehareg vial yaavor bifarhesya or bishaas hashmad.

this would seem to make sense.  as the lechem mishna (yesodei hatorah 5:4) points out, the simple understanding would be that there is only a kiyum of kiddush hashem bifarhesya - hence it is impossible that kiddush hashem would be michayev one to die bi-tzinah for the big three.

the rambam, however, disagrees.  says the rambam:  וכל מי שנאמר בו יהרג ואל יעבור ונהרג ולא עבר הרי זה קידש את השם - ALL the yehareg vial yaavors are a kiyum of kiddush hashem.  that presumably includes those that are not bifarhesya, i.e. the big three.  (i note for the sake of honesty that the lechem mishna does not understand this way.  however, his understanding seems impossible in the rambam here, and even more so in iggeres hashmad.)  so we have to understand how the rambam understands kiddush hashem to be broader than the conventional definition.

there is a fascinating machlokes between the rambam and the ramban concerning why avraham avinu gets the special title אַבְרָהָם אֹהֲבִי (yeshayahu 41:8).  the ramban writes in parshas yisro that it is because avraham was willing to die al kiddush hashem when he threw himself into the fire at ur kasdim.  but the ramban says, there is another explanation some chachamim hold of.  while he doesnt mention the rambam by name, he is clearly referring to the rambam at the end of the tenth perek of hilchos teshuva, where the rambam writes: העובד מאהבה עוסק בתורה ובמצות והולך בנתיבות החכמה לא מפני דבר בעולם ולא מפני יראת הרעה ולא כדי לירש הטובה אלא עושה האמת מפני שהוא אמת וסוף הטובה לבא בגללה. ומעלה זו היא מעלה גדולה מאד ואין כל חכם זוכה לה. והיא מעלת אברהם אבינו שקראו הקב"ה אוהבו לפי שלא עבד אלא מאהבה והיא המעלה שצונו בה הקב"ה על ידי משה שנאמר ואהבת את ה' אלהיך, ובזמן שיאהוב אדם את ה' אהבה הראויה מיד יעשה כל המצות מאהבה: 

whats so amazing about this rambam is the fact that he could have said like the ramban, but chose not to.  in other words, the maalah of throwing himself into the kivshan ha-eish wasnt enough to merit avraham with his special status.  what was enough?  the fact that avraham loved g-d in his general mitzvah performance and day to day life.

the ramban suggests that this machlokes between himself and the rambam is actually a machlokes in the mechilta.  the first opinion in the mechilta seems to  attribute avraham's status as an ohev shel hashem to his special avodah me-ahava, while the second opinion in the mechilta connects between avraham and all the others who throughout the generations have had to die al kiddush hashem. מה לך יוצא ליהרג, על שמלתי את בני. מה לך יוצא לישרף, על שקראתי בתורה. מה לך יוצא ליצלב, על שאכלתי את המצה. מה לך לוקה מאפרגל, על שנטלתי את הלולב. (the ramban writes that this was during a shaas hashmad when even regular mitzvos  are yehareg vial yaavor - see beis yosef who cites this same medrash from vayikra rabba and disagrees).

i wonder if according to the rambam, we can suggest there is no machlokes in the mechilta. kiddush hashem includes within it that some of the mitzvos are yehareg vial yaavor.  but what that reflects is that we have to dedicate ourselves in our entirety to ahavas hashem - the real mitzvah of kiddush hashem is to live our lives in accordance with ahavas hashem.  hence, it was this that merited avraham his special status.

the rambam basically says this explicitly.  in sefer hamitzvos, the rambam writes that kiddush hashem is מסירת נפשנו למות ביד האונס על אהבתו ית' - (notice the mention of ahavas hashem.) but in iggeres hashmad, the rambam writes that kiddush hashem also includes much more:   וקדושת השם היא הפך חלול השם, וזה שהאדם כשיעשה מצוה מן המצוות ולא יערב עמהן כונה מן הכונות אלא אהבת ה' יתעלה ועבודתו לבד, הנה הוא קדש את השם 

the rambam also agrees that there is a concept of kiddush hashem birabbim.  but as much as thats important, equally important is the kiddush hashem just between us and hashem.  what really is kiddush hashem?  its when we act in a way that hashem can look at us, ויאמר לי עבדי אתה ישראל אשר בך אתפאר.  may we all be zocheh!

viahavta lireacha kamocha - kedoshim

vi-ahavta lireacha kamocha - the ramban makes the following fascinating comment:וטעם ואהבת לרעך כמוך - הפלגה, כי לא יקבל לב האדם שיאהוב את חבירו כאהבתו את נפשו, ועוד שכבר בא רבי עקיבא ולמד חייך קודמין לחיי חבירך (ב"מ סב א:   in english, the torah is "exaggerating" when it says love your friend like yourself.  you cant love someone else as much as you love yourself.  furthermore, dont we hold "chayecha kodmin" - you are supposed to care about your own life more than that of others.

so what does it mean, if it cannot be taken literally?  the ramban explains that we are commanded to care about other people's welfare not to the same extent as we do ours, but rather in the same way that we care about ourselves.  just like we are happy for ourselves when we do well and succeed, we should want others to do well and be happy at their successes - we shouldn't want that others dont succeed, or even that they should succeed but just less than we do.

this ramban is a big chiddush.  if we compare this to the rambam, it does not seem that the rambam accepts this position of the ramban. in sefer hamitzvos, the rambam writes:  והמצוה הר"ו היא שצונו לאהוב קצתנו את קצתנו כמו שנאהב עצמנו ושתהיה חמלתי ואהבתי לאחי כחמלתי ואהבתי לעצמי בממונו ובגופו וכל מה שיהיה ברשותו או ירצה אותו וכל מה שארצה לעצמי ארצה לו כמוהו וכל מה שאשנא לעצמי או למי שידבק בי אשנא לו כמוהו. והוא אמרו יתעלה (שם) ואהבת לרעך כמוך:

the rambam takes the mitzvah literally.  and what bothers me is the following: how do we make sense of this machlokes - what are the rambam and the ramban disagreeing about exactly? one thinks it is possible to love others like oneself, and one thinks it impossible, and thats it?  if the rambam and ramban were to find themselves in the same room, discussing this mitzvah, would they be able to have an intelligent conversation about this machlokes, or is there nothing to talk about - they would just talk past each other.  i think this is a very difficult question.

so to begin, which shitah do we understand at first?  you might think the ramban. after all, he is the one coming from what seems to be personal experience - lo yikabel lev ha-adam to love others like himself.  but i think the opposite is true.  consider (this example was pointed out to me by my chavrusa) a mother's love for her children.  does she not love them even more than she loves herself?  in many family relationships, i think we can say that there are people who love others as much as themselves.  so the rambam would tell us that klal yisrael is family as much as your brother or sister is.  no one said that thats an easy thing to accomplish, but then again, there are lots of difficult mitzvos.  for the ramban to reinterpret this mitzvah, we need a higher bar than difficulty - we need impossibility, or at least incompatibility with other parts of hashkafas hatorah.

what about the ramban's second proof, chayecha kodmin?  i looked up the gemara, which is the famous machlokes between ben petura and r akiva about the following scenario: if a person is travelling with his friend, and he has enough water for only one person to live, ben petura says he should share even though both people will / may (big machlokes about pshat in gemara) die, while r akiva says chayecha kodmin - one's own life takes precedence.  i looked to see where the rambam paskins this gemara. and shockingly, he doesnt seem to mention it.  i looked around, and while this is definitely not simple at all, at least some acharonim believe that the rambam paskens like ben petura - in other words, we may not paskin that chayecha kodmin!  i didnt see anyone say this, but i would suggest that this is lishitaso by viahavta lireacha kamocha, that it is a literal obligation.  (see rambam yesodei hatorah 5:5 for support for the assertion that he paskins like ben peturah - there is possible room to distinguish between the cases however - im not really holding at all in the sugya of pikuach nefesh and yehareg vial yaavor so i hope im not messing up big time here.)

so so far, the ramban seems to be in trouble.  but then i realized something interesting - the same r akiva that the ramban quoted who said chayecha kodmin also said the words to a famous uncle moishy/ yeshiva boys choir song / medrash.  viahavta lireacha kamocha - amar r akiva - zeh klal gadol batorah.  but didnt r akiva undermine the centrality of viahavta lireacha with his chayecha kodmin?

r shimon shkop talks about this tension between love of oneself / love of others in his hakdamah to his sefer, shaarei yosher.  interestingly, his discussion is primarily in the  context of kedoshim tihyu, not viahavta lireacha.  i summarize (with a few points thrown in) below - i think this helps us understand the tension the ramban is dealing with, even if we are left at the end not fully understanding the ramban.

  there are three classical explanations (that i know of) to the words kedoshim tihyu . 1. rashi - to separate oneself from arayos.  2. ramban - to not be a naval birshus hatorah.  3. rambam (sefer hamitzvos, shoresh 4) - be kadosh by keeping the entire torah (lichora this is the simplest pshat in the pasuk). 

but says, r shimon, none of these explanations would account for the following medrash:  קדושים תהיו: יכול כמוני ת"ל כי קדוש אני קדושתי למעלה מקדושתכם - you might think that you should be kadosh just like hashem is kadosh (= on the same level as hashem), talmud lomar, ki kadosh ani hashem - my (hashem's) kedusha is far above your kedusha.  according to all the above explanations, what was the hava amina that our kedusha could be on the same level as hashem's - none of the above explanation of kedusha is really applicable to hakadosh baruch hu (although maybe keeping the torah is applicable to hashem based on previous discussions-- hmm)

rather, says r shimon, kedusha is really about selflessness.  we are kadosh in that we emulate hashem, the ultimate meitiv la-achaerim, by doing good to others and devoting everything we do to the good of others.  thats the hava amina of the medrash - you would think that you should be totally selfless (= take viahavta lireacha literally and love your friend as much as yourself), like hashem.  talmud lomar ki kadosh ani - man shouldn't be totally selfless - there is a place for man to love/ care about himself.

in fact, says r shimon, when we look at human nature, we realize that man's self love is so strong it cannot be negated.  rather, what a person can do is change how he identifies his "self".  a small person thinks his self is just him.  but if you think a little bigger, you realize that yourself includes your family as well.  as we progress, it might even include classmates, neighbors, friends, acquaintances, until if we truly succeed, we identify with klal yisrael such that we are part of one big "self".  thus, when we care for others we arent negating our self love - we are applying it by including others within our definition of "self".

it wasnt a stirah for r akiva to say both viahavta and chayecha kodmin - the way we reach a strong love for our fellow jew is by applying the naturally, g-d given strong love we have for ourselves and using it to help others.

behar bechukosai - shavuos

i think we've discussed before the following question: how was moshe rabbeinu allowed to break the luchos when bnei yisrael sinned.  wasnt he violating the issur of lo taasun kein lashem elokeichem (and this was after mattan torah, so its a real question.)  i think there are a few answers that one could say, but i think the one i'm about to say is the simplest and most direct explanation.

parshas behar begins by telling us vayidaber hashem el moshe bihar sinai - these parshios were said at har sinai.  coming off of the whole sefer vayikra until now, which seems to have been said from the ohel moed (vayikra el moshe vayidaber hashem eilav me-ohel moed lemor), this is a little strange.  (we know that rashi quotes chazal, mah inyan shemittah eitzel har sinai- to teach that all the mitzvos were said at sinai.  i was thinking of writing up my chaburah from this summer about this topic - maybe ill still do that.)

the ibn ezra explains that really behar - bechukosai belongs back in the area around parshas mishpatim.  behar bechukosai contains the bris (blessings and curses) that hashem established with us at har sinai when we said naaseh vinishma.  the torah delayed recording this bris until now because since a large part of the bris is about keeping shemittah and yovel, the torah wanted to specify the halachos of shemittah before recording the bris. (why these mitzvos are so much more important than everything else is a good question.  but its pretty clear that they play an especially significant role.  the pasuk emphasizes that when bnei yisrael are exiled, the land will rest all the shmittos it was supposed to, and chazal say the length of galus bavel was exactly in accordance with the number of shmittos and yovlos bnei yisrael didnt keep.)

the ramban, lishitaso, explains how the torah is really kiseder.  in parshas mishpatim, the torah records the bris bnei yisrael entered into with hashem before cheit ha-egel.  but when bnei yisrael sinned, it was כאילו נתבטלה הברית ההיא אצל הקב"ה - as if the first bris with hashem was nullified.  as such, they needed a new bris.  hashem wanted the second bris to be stronger than the first, and as such, put the brachos and the tochacha into this second bris.

this bris is first mentioned now because when moshe came down from har sinai on yom kippur, he immediately commanded  bnei yisrael in mileches hamishkan. when the mishkan was finished, he had to teach all the halachos of karbanos and the like.  once the rest of sefer vayikra was finished, moshe rabbeinu called klal yisrael together and had them enter into this second bris that hashem had commanded him about bihar sinai.

the rosh quotes this ramban, but with a sharper formulation: וכיון שחטאו חשב משה שכל הציוויין נתבטלו ושבר הלוחות .  moshe's breaking of the luchos was a reflection of the fact that he thought that the bris klal yisrael had with hashem was over. why was it muttar?  because  moshe rabbeinu thought there was no more torah anymore- this is quite a scary thought.

tosfos in kesubos 72a has an interesting question about sefiras haomer.  the torah says u-sifartim lachem - hence theres a mitzvah to count sefiras haomer.  by a zav / zavah, the torah says visafrah lah shivas yamim - they should count shivah nekiim.  if this is a mitzvah just like sefiras haomer is a mitzvah, why doesnt a zavah make a bracha when she counts each day of the shivah nekiim?  answers tosfos - if the zavah sees dam on any subsequent day, then retroactively we know that the days we thought were part of the shivah nekiim actually were not part of it - hence retroactively there was no mitzvah to count those days, and any bracha made would turn out retroactively to be a bracha libattalah.  but sefiras haomer - nothing can happen in the future that will make these days retroactively not yemei ha-omer.  hence, we count with a bracha.

(agav- tosfos is a huge chiddush that there is a mitzvah for a zavah to count the shivah nekiim out loud.  the ramban, sefer hachinuch, and the rambam give a a different answer to this question (the sefer hachinuch explicitly in this weeks parsha, the ramban implicitly in parshas emor, and the rambam in sefer hamitzvos even less explicitly) - without a mesorah that visafarta means a mitzvah to count out loud, pashut pshat is that it means to just keep track of the time, but its not a mitzvah in and of itself.)

biderech drush - tosfos is an amazing havtacha.  the ohr hachaim draws the parallel that just like a niddah counts 7 days until tahara, we count 7 weeks until our tahara and our kabbalas hatorah.  but tosfos highlights the difference: a zavah has no guarantees - at any time, she can see dam and her count goes out the window.  we are guaranteed our tahara.

when you think about it, who said we can assume that shavuos, what we are counting towards, will come?  moshe rabbeinu thought that because of our sins, the bris would be battel.  are we really deserving of this bris with hashem that we will enter into this shavuos?  the chiddush of tosfos, and really, the new bris that hashem gave us in this week's parsha, is that no matter what, the bris stands. וַאֲנִי זֹאת בְּרִיתִי אוֹתָם אָמַר יְקֹוָק רוּחִי אֲשֶׁר עָלֶיךָ וּדְבָרַי אֲשֶׁר־שַׂמְתִּי בְּפִיךָ לֹא־יָמוּשׁוּ מִפִּיךָ וּמִפִּי זַרְעֲךָ וּמִפִּי זֶרַע זַרְעֲךָ אָמַר יְקֹוָק מֵעַתָּה וְעַד־עוֹלָם: 

eretz yisrael - shittas harambam ligabai mitzvas yishuv eretz yisrael

why is it important (is it important) to live in eretz yisrael? 

we know that the ramban thinks that there is a mitzvas aseh to live in israel.  however, the rambam famously leaves this mitzvah out of his minyan hamitzvos.  there have been lots of totally incorrect ideas people have decided on in the rambam.  (one particular one that never ceases to amaze me is this idea that the rambam holds that the mitzvah to live in israel is a mitvah that is kollel kol hatorah kulah, and therfore isnt counted as per the shoroshim of the rambam.  if anyone ever tells you this, you know they've never opened a rambam in their lives.)

the clearest proof that the rambam disagrees with the ramban is the rambam's statement in hilchos melachim - ומותר לשכון בכל העולם חוץ מארץ מצרים - it is permitted to live anywhere in the world.  according to the ramban, that is not true! (people like to talk about the ramban without somehow realizing what obviously follows) - it is a bittul mitzvas aseh to live in chutz laaretz, according to the ramban.  this is scary.

but the rambam doesnt think living in eretz yisrael is obligatory.  except, we come to the following difficulty. two halachos later, the rambam writes:  אסור לצאת מארץ ישראל לחוצה לארץ לעולם, אלא ללמוד תורה או לישא אשה או להציל מן העכו"ם ויחזור לארץ - from where do we derive the issur to leave eretz yisrael if there is no mitzvah to live in eretz yisrael?

the meiri, following in the rambam's footsteps of leaving out the mitzvah to live in eretz yisrael,writes some things that are (to my mind) quite troubling.  chazal say "a person should always live in eretz yisrael - even in a city that is majority non-jewish - instead of living in chutz laaretz in a city that is majority jewish."  on the surface, this chazal attests to something special about eretz yisrael beyond the fact that it is a good religious environment because of all the tzaddikim who live there.  the meiri undermines this: לעולם ידור אדם בארץ ישראל אפילו בעיר שרובה גוים ולא ידור בחוצה לארץ אף בעיר שרבה ישראל שחוצה לארץ דירת קבע לגוים ולעובדי האלילים ואי איפשר שלא ללמוד מדרכיהם - even if the city  in chutz laaretz has majority jews, the culture will still be that of the non-jewish world around.

but if you could find a place in chutz laaretz which wont be influenced by the surrounding culture, then, says the meiri, it is (and it should be painful to write this) just as good as eretz yisrael.  and i quote:וכשם שאסור לצאת מארץ ישראל לחוצה לארץ כך אסור לצאת מבבל לשאר ארצות שכל מקום שחכמה ויראת חטא מצויין שם דינו כארץ ישראל וכמו שאמרו כל הדר בבבל כאלו דר בארץ ישראל שכל מה שאמרו לא אמרו אלא מפני שסתם חוצה לארץ אין חכמה ויראת חטא מצויין בה לישראל לרוב הצרות ועול הגליות שסובלים שם - the gemara says that just like it is prohibited to leave eretz yisrael, it is also prohibited to leave bavel.  why? the meiri explains:  because any place where wisdom and fear of g-d is found is "ki-eretz yisrael".

as i hope to show in a second, thank g-d, the rambam argues entirely on this meiri.  and i am sure you have heard of the phrase  "berlin is our jerusalem."  it was not only the reform who made this claim; unfortunately, many of the religious felt this way too - and we know all too well what happened to the jews who did not flee germany. (i do not pass judgement - all i say is that it is a historical truth that those who left europe to go to eretz yisrael were saved.)  check out the meshech chochma in parshas bechukosai where he speaks very sharply about this point.

the rambam (all based on gemaras) clearly does not accept the equation between bavel and eretz yisrael.  and i quote: גדולי החכמים היו מנשקין על תחומי ארץ ישראל ומנשקין אבניה ומתגלגלין על עפרה, וכן הוא אומר כי רצו עבדיך את אבניה ואת עפרה יחוננו. - gedolei hachachamim loved the very land of israel, kissing it's stones and rolling in it's dirt.  why in the world would they feel that way according to the meiri?

אמרו חכמים כל השוכן בארץ ישראל עונותיו מחולין... גדולי החכמים היו מוליכים מתיהם לשם. צא ולמד מיעקב אבינו ויוסף הצדיק - again, being buried in eretz yisrael should be meaningless if its only about the religious atmosphere.

the rambam, when he quotes the prohibition to leave bavel, gives a very different reason (based on his read of the gemara kesubos): כשם שאסור לצאת מהארץ לחוצה לארץ כך אסור לצאת מבבל לשאר הארצות, שנאמר בבלה יובאו ושמה יהיו. - that pasuk is hashem telling klal yisrael that they will be exiled to bavel and will remain there until hashem brings them out. how did chazal learn out from a prophecy that we will be in bavel that it is forbidden to leave bavel?

i think we are lead to the following conclusion:  it may be that there is no command to stay in bavel, but rather there is only a prophecy that hashem will keep us in bavel.  but a prohecy reflects ratzon hashem - even if its not a command, ratzon hashem is also mechayev.   hence, it was forbidden to leave bavel.

the ramban, when attacking the rambam for leaving out the mitzvah of yishuv eretz yisrael, explains that this mitzvah is based off an explicit pasuk: "vihorashtem es haaretz viyshavtem bah" - you shall conquer the land and dwell within it".  how does the rambam deal with the pasuk?  the simple explanation is that the the rambam believes that the phrase viyshavtem bah is not a command; rather it is a havtacha- hashem is promising us that we will be able to live peacefully on our land.  and yet, as we just saw, it does not follow from the fact that a pasuk is a havtacha/nevua and not a mitzvah that there are no obligations that stem from the pasuk.  ratzon hashem is also mechayev - hence it is forbidden to leave eretz yisrael.

 another way of formulating this idea is as follows: belief in nevuah naturally obligates one to act in accordance to that belief.  and that leads me to a very powerful story recorded by r aharon soloveitchik in a circa 1970 tradition article later republished in his book, logic of the heart logic of the mind.  a group of people came to ask r yosef chaim sonnenfeld if they could lie about their country of origin (switching from something like romania to hungary, dont remember exactly) to obtain a visa from the british to enter palestine.  he paskined that it was assur.  they subsequently asked him if they could lie and claim that their country of origin was palestine.  to this r yosef paskined muttar.  why is this different.  he explained:  the gemara in kesubos darshens the pasuk ולציון יאמר איש ואיש יולד בה והוא יכוננה עליון א"ר מיישא בר בריה דר' יהושע בן לוי אחד הנולד בה ואחד המצפה לראותה - the navi writes that both those who were born in eretz yisrael, and those that long to be there are considered to be bnei eretz yisrael.  to r yosef, this was so real that he didnt consider it a lie for a jew to claim palestine as his country of origin.

the avodah of yom yerushalayim is to try to feel that way.  its not my place to be preaching -  yafeh naeh doresh vinaeh mikayem.  but i just wanted to write these ideas down.  please god, we should all merit to see the complete re-establishment of yerushalayim bimheirah biyameinu!

hashem keeps the torah?

i've been thinking a lot about this whole "hashem keeps the torah" idea recently, particularly because mekoros to that effect just keep popping up.  a few weeks ago, i was reading emes liyaakov (r yaakov kaminetsky's hearos on chumash), and it lead me to another medrash about hashem keeping thetorah.  that medrash reminded me of a dvar torah i wrote when my family was celebrating my grandparents 50th anniversary (we all had to write something and i had no idea what i was supposed to say). so here goes nothing.

forgive me if i repeat ideas or quote sources already mentioned.  i just want to lay everything out clearly.

the daas zekeinim asks a strange question in the beginning of parshas beshalach.  right before krias yam suf, hashem instructs moshe to have beni yisrael camp next to "baal tzfon", a mitzri avodah zarah.  asks the daas zekeinim, thats assur!  in parshas mishpatim, the torah says, visheim elohim acherim lo tazkiru - the gemara explains that one is not allowed to reference a location by an avodah zara.

the daas zekeinim suggests 2 possible answers: 1. hashem doesnt have to keep the torah.  2. hashem doesnt have to keep the torah before mattantorah.

what is going on?  even according to the first teretz, what was the hava amina that hashem keeps the torah - this hava amaina surely had to come from somewhere?  and the second teretz holds that hashem actually keeps the torah - again, where does this come from?

lets jump for a second to the first mishna in the fifth perek of pirkei avos.  says the mishna: בעשרה מאמרות נברא העולם - the world was created with ten maamaros. nine vayomers, and the gemara says breshis was a maamar. 9 + 1 = 10 (im not a math major for nothing).

 ומה תלמוד לומר והלא במאמר אחד יכול להבראות - notice the mishna doesnt ask why god created the world with ten maamaros as opposed to one. rather, we ask mah talmud lomar - what can we learn from god's acting in this way.  we can never fully or satisfactorily answer the why god does x question, but we can understand and learn important truths about how we should perceive the world.  i think this is an important point for the rest of what im going to say to make sense, and in hashkafa in general.

answers the mishna, אלא להפרע מן הרשעים שמאבדין את העולם שנברא בעשרה מאמרות וליתן שכר טוב לצדיקים שמקיימין את העולם שנברא בעשרה מאמרות.  how inthe world does this answer the question?  what is the connection between the world being created with 10 maamaros and schar vi-onesh?  hashemcouldnt punish reshaim and reward tzaddikim if the world had been created bimaamar echad?

i dont think what im about to say is a chiddush.  its really straight out of the rambam's explanation of this mishna.  says the rambam:

והיה יכול לבטא הבריאה כולה במאמר אחד, ולומר: ויאמר אלהים יהיו שמים וארץ ויקוו המים ותוצא הארץ וכו', ואמנם ייחד מאמר לכל סיפור, להודיעך גדולת זאת המציאות ושכלולה, ושמפסידה מפסיד דבר גדול, ומתקנה מתקן דבר גדול

if hashem had created the world with one maamar, the rasha would have a taana against hakadosh baruch hu's punishment.  who the heck cares that i sinned and acted like a jerk my entire life?  so i messed up your (god's) creation plans -- so what- whats this world worth to you  anyways?!  you created it with a snap of your (metaphorical) fingers, not even thinking about it, you could destroy it with a snap of your fingers, absent-mindedly, and you could create 50 worlds just like this one or better with no effort whatsoever.  i didnt mess up anything meaningful.

the tzaddik faces the same taana from the other side.  what reward do you (the tzaddik) deserve - do you think you accomplished anything meaningful?

answers hashem:  you think i dont care about this world - you think i didnt invest effort in its creation?  i didnt just snap and create the world instantaneously - biasarah maamaros nivra haolam.

we can understand hashem keeping the torah in a similar vein.  says the medrash in parshas mishpatim:

ד"א ואלה המשפטים, הה"ד (שם /תהלים/ קמז) מגיד דבריו ליעקב אלו הדברות, חוקיו ומשפטיו לישראל אלו המשפטים לפי שאין מדותיו של הקב"ה כמדת ב"ו =בשר ודם=, מדם /מדת/ ב"ו מורה לאחרים לעשו' והוא אינו עושה כלום והקב"ה אינו כן אלא מה שהוא עושה הוא אומר לישראל לעשות ולשמור, מעשה ברבן גמליאל ור' יהושע ור"א בן עזריה ור' עקיבא שהלכו לרומי ודרשו שם אין דרכיו של הקב"ה כבשר ודם שהוא גוזר גזירה והוא אומר לאחרים לעשות והוא אינו עושה כלום והקב"ה אינו כן

i think its the same idea - you think hashem doesnt take the torah seriously?  you think it doesnt matter?  hakadosh baruch hu does take it seriously - he even keeps the torah.

we can go a step further.  i saw a great vort that i think connects to this idea.  the medrash says that when yosef wanted to sell binyamin into slavery, yehuda (not knowing that yosef was yosef) told yosef that he couldnt do that because the halacha is (based on a pasuk in parshas mishpatim) that only one who cannot afford to pay for their theft is sold into slavery.  if the thief has the means to pay (as binyamin did), however, it is forbidden to sell him into slavery.  what type of claim is that?  what does the viceroy in egypt care about what the torah (which wasnt even given yet) says?

whats the pshat? its true that to the viceroy this was a bad taana.  but yehuda didnt think of it that way - he couldnt fathom a law or psak shelo kahalacha.  the best way i have to express this is that yehuda had no tfisa of metzius outside of torah - he couldnt grasp a reality other than that of thetorah.

why not?  because hashem didnt just command us to keep the torah and then go home and chill out.  hashem keeps the torah - the whole world is an expression of torah.

my rebbe once pointed out:  in birchos krias shema of maariv, we say (referring to torah and mitzvos) ki heim chayeinu vi-orech yameinu - we dont saytorah umitzvos is what we do with our lives, something to the effect of ki heim mah she-osim bichayeinu - torah umitzvos is our lives - theres no tfisah of metzius outside of it.  i think thats a reflection of the same idea of hashem keeping the torah.

my take-away from this however many years ago it was is the same then as it is now. just like it is a mechayev to us that hashem "put effort" into this world and "takes it seriously",  on a more human level, the same holds true for how we relate to the mesorah and previous generations.  by sacrificing so much to remain religious and to pass on the mesorah to the next generation, our parents/grandparents etc. have been mechayev us.  if we dont live up to their standards, we havent just messed ourselves up - we've wrecked everything they sought to accomplish. even more scarily, we are to the future generations what our parents are to us.  if we dont take it seriously, then ki-ilu theres nothing there for our children that is worth keeping - what gives the mesorah meaning is the effort and sacrifice invested by those before.