chanukah and aharon hakohen

This is partially built off of last year's Chanukah dvar torah.

Rashi at the beginning of parshas behaaloshcha quotes a famous medrash:

בהעלתך - למה נסמכה פרשת המנורה לפרשת הנשיאים, לפי שכשראה אהרן חנוכת הנשיאים חלשה דעתו, שלא היה עמהם בחנוכה, לא הוא ולא שבטו, אמר לו הקב"ה חייך, שלך גדולה משלהם, שאתה מדליק ומטיב את הנרות

Aharon saw the chanukas ha-nesiim, and he had a chalishus hadaas. Hashem tells him to not worry because his portion is greater than theirs: he has the menorah.  The Ramban famously explains that this refers not to the menorah in the beis hamikdash, but to the menorah of chanukah.

I thought it was interesting to contrast Aharon's reaction here to his reaction when he meets Moshe Rabbeinu returning to Midyan.  There the torah says: גַם הִנֵּה־הוּא יֹצֵא לִקְרָאתֶךָ וְרָאֲךָ וְשָׂמַח בְּלִבּוֹ - Aharon will see Moshe's greatness, but there won't be any chalishus daas or jealousy!  To the contrary, וְשָׂמַח בְּלִבּוֹ, Aharon will share in Moshe's happiness, not thinking of or caring if he personally has any role to play in this story.  As far as Aharon knew, he could come out of this story with nothing: not even as a kohen. In fact, only because of this total lack of jealousy was Aharon zocheh to the choshen: ומשם זכה אהרן לעדי החשן הנתון על הלב.

Why in the one story does Aharon not get jealous at all (and therefore is zocheh to the choshen), and in the other story Aharon experiences chalishus hadaas (and because of that is zocheh to the menorah)?

Last year we discussed a deeper understanding of the Bach's distinction between chanukah and purim.  To review, from a slightly different angle:

On Purim, the primary danger facing the Jews was a physical danger: Haman wanted to wipe the Jewish people off the face of the earth.  The danger of Chanukah, however, was a spiritual battle: While there were many tzaros caused by the Greeks, the primary battle was against the Greek  desire to convert us and erase G-d's name from his people.

On Purim, the decision to fight was obvious and inevitable.  If you don't fight, you definitely die, if you fight, maybe you'll live - its a very simple cost benefit analysis.  But on Chanukah, the Chasmonaim had to be מקנא לה to fight against the Greeks and the Misyavnim.  And in being מקנא לה, there lies a great danger:  How does a person know that their קנאה לה is genuine and stems from an authentic passion to be mikayem dvar hashem?  Kinah is a dangerous middah - it is מוציא את האדם מן העולם - and 99% of the time, is a middah raah.  מי יעלה בהר ה  - who can say that their kinah for Hashem is authentic and justified?

What we celebrate on Chanukah then, is not just that the Chashmonaim fought this spiritual war, but that they fought a genuine spiritual war - their kinah for hashem was authentic.  How did they reach this madregah?

There may not be a complete answer to this question, but we can say this:  A person who has even an ounce of kinah in his bones that is shelo lishma, a kinah bein adam lachaveiro that is not pure, such a person CANNOT be mikaneh for Hashem.  If a person has not been completely misgaber over the yetzer hara of kinah, then his kinah for Hashem will be tainted with the impure kinah that spills over from his middos raos. Only a person who has risen above impure kinah can even think of being mikaneh lashem.

Thus, there is no contradiction between the two stories regarding Aharon hakohen: To the contrary, Aharon only had a hetter to have a  chalishus daas over his not being part of the chanukas hamizbeach in the mishkan because he didn't have even an ounce of kinah within him: proof positive, how he was able to be happy with Moshe Rabbeinu when his younger brother stole the show and left him to be a translator.  Through this chalishus hadaas, Aharon was zocheh that his descendants, the chashmonaim, would continue his legacy with an authentic קנאה for Hashem.

This tension lies at the heart of קנאות: kinah for Hashem can only be genuine if a person ultimately wants not קנאות, but shalom.  Thus, it makes perfect sense that the Kohanim are on the one hand described as the ultimate lovers of shalom (בשלום ובמישור הלך אתי), and yet are also involved so many times in kinah for Hashem (Pinchas, the Chashmonaim).  Only the people who are ohev shalom virodef shalom have the right to be mikaneh for Hashem.

The Rambam ends hilchos chanukah with this idea:

היה לפניו נר ביתו ונר חנוכה או נר ביתו וקדוש היום נר ביתו קודם משום שלום ביתו שהרי השם נמחק לעשות שלום בין איש לאשתו. גדול השלום שכל התורה ניתנה לעשות שלום בעולם שנאמר דרכיה דרכי נעם וכל נתיבותיה שלום

Ner Chanukah represents our kinah for Hashem -- our zealotry and passion to be mikayem dvar Hashem.  That passion and zealotry is a critical part of what we are as Jews, and Chanukah is the time to be mischazek, to keep the flame of passion for dvar Hashem burning brightly and constantly (ner tamid).  But, says the Rambam, that passion and zealotry is only meaningful in the context of דרכיה דרכי נעם וכל נתיבותיה שלום - it has to be with an ultimate desire for shalom.  We should all be zocheh to internalize both of these middos!

A freilichen Chanukah.

Kevuras Sarah

(see last year's piece for a different angle).

The rabbeinu yonah writes that Kevuras Sarah was Avraham's tenth nisayon:

העשירי קבורת שרה. שנאמר לו קום התהלך בארץ לארכה ולרחבה כי לך אתננה. וכשמתה אשתו לא מצא מקום לקברה עד שקנאו ולא הרהר


Ironically, the Ibn Ezra seems to view the story of kevuras sarah in almost the exact opposite light:

ונזכרה זאת הפרשה להודיע מעלת ארץ ישראל על כל הארצות לחיים ולמתים. ועוד לקיים דבר ד' לאברהם להיות לו נחלה

Rabbeinu Yonah thinks that making Avraham pay for the land, after he was already promised it, is in some sense a violation of that havtacha.  The Ibn Ezra, on the other hand, thinks that hi gufa - this was the fulfillment of Hashem's promise to Avraham.

Parenthetically, the Ramban argues on both Rabbeinu Yonah and the Ibn Ezra:

ולא ידעתי טעם לדברי רבי אברהם שאומר להודיע מעלת ארץ ישראל לחיים ולמתים, ועוד לקיים לו דבר השם להיות לו נחלה, כי מה מעלה לארץ בזה כי לא יוליכנה אל ארץ אחרת לקברה, ודבר השם לאברהם על כל הארץ היה ונתקיים רק בזרעו

For the Ramban, Avraham's purchase of machpela was neither an abnegation nor a fulfillment of Hashem's havtacha, because that havtacha was only meant to be fulfilled generations later through zera Avraham.  This machlokes rishonim seems to parallel the machlokes between the respective shepherds of Lot and Avraham, which does seem a little strange.

Getting back to the Ibn Ezra and his dispute with R Yonah, I suggest that the Ibn Ezra's approach has historically been an important part of Zionist history.  When we began to return to EY in the 19th and 20th centuries, we had to buy the land back from its inhabitants.  We've had to fight for it, and it has come (and continues to come) at a heavy price.  All this shouldn't be seen as a violation of Hashem's havtacha -- to the contrary, it is a fulfillment thereof.  Hashem promised us the land, but he didn't promise that it would come free.

Nonetheless, the words of the Rabbeinu Yonah echo - if Hashem promised us the land, why is there so much suffering for our brothers and sisters who live there?  Let us pray for the security and safety of our brethren in Israel, and all around the world.

mitzvas milah and its origins

last year i raised the question concerning the origins of mitzvas milah.  i stumbled across a teshuva of the rambam that directly addresses this topic (start at top right column):

 

mabul - will hashem really never bring another one

We are familiar with the story of the mabul.  This question sometimes gets a bad rap, but it must be asked.  Everything in the Torah teaches us some halacha, hashkafa, or mussar. What does the mabul  teach us?

The Rambam explains that the mabul is fundamental to Judaism - in fact - it is the basis for one of the thirteen cardinal principles of faith:

והיסוד העשירי שהוא יתעלה יודע מעשה בני אדם ולא הזניחם, ולא כדעת האומר עזב ה' את הארץ, אלא כמו שאמר גדול העצה ורב העליליה אשר עיניך פקוחות על כל דרכי בני האדם, ואמר וירא ה' כי רבה רעת האדם בארץ, ואמר זעקת סדום ועמורה כי רבה, הרי אלו מורים על היסוד העשירי הזה.

The tenth principle of faith, commonly misunderstood to be that Hashem knows what goes on in this world, is actually much more than that.  (Hashem's knowledge of what goes on is really assumed by the first few ikkarim of G-d's existence and ultimate perfection.)  The tenth ikkar is that Hashem cares about, and therefore reacts to what we do.  Hashem is not, as per the deistic conception, a watchmaker who leaves his creations to do as they please - rather, he cares that we behave in certain ways, and will react to encourage obedience and discourage rebellion.

The proof is the mabul - Hashem saw the evil of man in the time preceding the mabul - and he didn't just shrug it off.  To the contrary, Hashem destroyed the entire world because of it.

How ironic, then, that the force of this ikkar seems to be blunted by Hashem's subsequent promise to never destroy the world, (seemingly) even if we were to deserve it.  Are we then back to the watchmaker model, where Hashem is no longer mashgiach in the happenings of the world, or at least, only to a much lesser extent?

The question is really stronger than that, though, because the rambam takes the lesson of the mabul further in his yad hachazaka (teshuva 3:1):

אדם שעונותיו מרובין על זכיותיו מיד הוא מת ברשעו שנאמר על רוב עונך. וכן מדינה שעונותיה מרובין מיד היא אובדת שנאמר זעקת סדום ועמורה כי רבה וגו'. וכן כל העולם כולו אם היו עונותיהם מרובין מזכיותיהן מיד הן נשחתין שנאמר וירא ה' כי רבה רעת האדם. ושקול זה אינו לפי מנין הזכיות והעונות אלא לפי גודלם. יש זכות שהיא כנגד כמה עונות שנאמר יען נמצא בו דבר טוב. ויש עון שהוא כנגד כמה זכיות שנאמר וחוטא אחד יאבד טובה הרבה. ואין שוקלין אלא בדעתו של אל דעות והוא היודע היאך עורכין הזכיות כנגד העונות:

The Rambam writes that an individual who sins will inevitably die from his sins.  (The hebrew is miyad -- see here where they explain that as inevitably.  Its the best explanation I've seen so far, though I'm certainly open to other possibilities.)  Similarly, a wicked province will inevitably be destroyed, and if the world were to become more bad than good, the world would inevitably be destroyed.  Proof: the mabul - but Hashem promised to never destroy the world again?

Its important to understand where the Rambam is coming from, and why the question is more on the havtacha of the keshes than on the rambam himself.  Sevara is squarely with the rambam:  If we believe in hashgacha, and we believe in din, how can Hashem promise to not destroy the world even if it deserves it?  That violates the Rambam's ikkarim of hashgacha and tzedek!

In the back of the frankel rambam they ask this question, and suggest that perhaps Hashem's havtacha was only to not destroy the world through water - but he could still destroy it through other means.  This is certainly a possible answer, but it makes G-d's havatcha and seeming consolation to Noach a farce -- who cares that Hashem won't bring a mabul if he will instead just bring a giant volcano?

I'm still looking for answers, and I'm open to suggestions.  But I think the following might be the answer.

The Chayei Adam brings that because the keshes is a siman that Hashem really wants to destroy the world, it is a siman ra and one who sees it shouldn't point it out to his friend.  Its not obvious that the keshes is a siman ra; even if it is, I still believe the chayei adam is incorrect.

The Seforno writes:  והיתה לאות ברית. בהיות הקשת כפולה כי אמנם נלאו חכמי המחקר לתת טעם לסדר צבעי הקשת השנית, אשר הוא על הפך סדר צבעי הקשת הראשונה המורגלת, והיא תהיה אות לצדיקי הדור שדורם חייב, כאמרם "כלום נראתה הקשת בימיך" (כתובות עז ב), ויתפללו ויוכיחו וילמדו דעת את העם:

The whole point of the keshes is to inspire teshuva - because of that, it davka is important to spread the news of a rainbow so that people know that Hashem is angry and we need to do teshuva.

The seforno goes a step further in his understanding of the keshes, and this I think will answer for the rambam:   וראיתיה לזכור ברית עולם. אשגיח במסובב ממנה, והוא תפלת הצדיקים ועמדם בפרץ למען אשיב חימה מהשחית, כמו זוכר "ברית עולם":

Hashem didn't make any blanket promise to not destroy the world.  The keshes inspires teshuva - Hashem will see that teshuva, and because of that teshuva, he won't destroy the world.  If c''v that teshuva would not materialize, then it is scary to think about what could happen.  Because as the Rambam told us: וכן כל העולם כולו אם היו עונותיהם מרובין מזכיותיהן מיד הן נשחתין שנאמר וירא ה' כי רבה רעת האדם.

Whats the moral of the story?  The next halacha in rambam:

לפיכך צריך כל אדם שיראה עצמו כל השנה כולה כאילו חציו זכאי וחציו חייב. וכן כל העולם חציו זכאי וחציו חייב. חטא חטא אחד הרי הכריע את עצמו ואת כל העולם כולו לכף חובה וגרם לו השחתה. עשה מצוה אחת הרי הכריע את עצמו ואת כל העולם כולו לכף זכות וגרם לו ולהם תשועה והצלה שנאמר וצדיק יסוד עולם זה שצדק הכריע את כל העולם לזכות והצילו. ומפני ענין זה נהגו כל בית ישראל להרבות בצדקה ובמעשים טובים ולעסוק במצות מראש השנה ועד יום הכפורים יתר מכל השנה. ונהגו כולם לקום בלילה בעשרה ימים אלו ולהתפלל בבתי כנסיות בדברי תחנונים ובכיבושין עד שיאור היום

(parenthetically, this rambam answers a question people always ask:  why do we act differently during aseres yemei hateshuva - isn't it just a game?  The answer is that we're trying to chap one more mitzvah, one more zechus, to save the world.  Do we appreciate that?  We should --  its not a joke).

This is hard to internalize - its quite harsh.  But with G-d's help, we should all merit to be a tzaddik yesod olam.

end of yom tov season

its always sad - though I dont know whether that stems from a reluctance to again face reality (bad) or something more genuine.

Over this sukkos, I theorized that the minhag to dance before the torah on simchas torah and the hakafos of simchas torah are in reality two separate minhagim - i believe this is meduyak in shulchan aruch and in the darchei moshe, and if you think about, theres one point which clinches this argument:  since when do you 'dance' with the torah by walking it around the bimah in a circle -- thats not dancing!

Hakafos, it is clear, stem from hoshanos - as we say in hakafos, ana hashem hoshia na...  We do hoshanos with lulav and esrog, and simcha is an inherent part of the daled minim (as per the pasuk usmachtem lifnei hashem shivas yomim).  While on rosh hashana and yom kippur, we cry out to g-d to save us out of yirah, in the hoshanos of sukkos, which culminate in the hoshanos / hakafos of simchas torah, we daven for hashem to save us with simcha. (I think the excessive emphasis on 'dancing' really takes away from this powerful point.)

G-d should grant us all meaningful and successful months ahead, and a speedy rebuilding of the beis hamkidash in our days.

Back to Mishkan, relationship to sukkos

Some while ago I wrote this piece about mishkan and the real machlokes between rashi an the ramban.  This is a short addendum to that connecting it to sukkos.

This also relates to my speech last year sukkos (here) about why sukkos is in tishrei and not in nissan.

I have a simple question:  we just had yom kippur 3 days ago. What do you think - did Hashem forgive us, or not forgive us?

People sometimes get so caught up in their personal sins / forgiveness, that they forget that yom kippur is equally (if not more) important as a day of atonement for klal yisrael as a whole.  So did Hashem forgive us, klal yisrael?  Did he, or did he not, say salachti kidvarecha as we prayed that he would at the very onset of yom kippur?

Well, on the one hand, there are so many midrashim about the confidence klal yisrael has going into din.  Lech echol bisimcha lachmecha - rejoice, for surely kvar ratza ha-elokim es maasecha.  But lets look again at the ramban from the mishkan piece above:

ואמר לכולם ענין המשכן אשר נצטוה בו מתחלה קודם שבור הלוחות, כי כיון שנתרצה להם הקב"ה ונתן לו הלוחות שניות וכרת עמו ברית חדשה שילך השם בקרבם, הנה חזרו לקדמותם ולאהבת כלולותם, ובידוע שתהיה שכינתו בתוכם כענין שצוהו תחלה, כמו שאמר (לעיל כה ח) ועשו לי מקדש ושכנתי בתוכם, ולכן צוה אותם משה עתה בכל מה שנצטוה מתחלה:

'Once Hashem forgave them, it is clear and obvious that his shechinah will again rest among them as originally intended, and thus Moshe immediately preceded to begin mileches hamishkan.'

If Hashem forgave us, then wouldn't we have a beis hamikdash?  After all, we believe that the reason we don't have a beis hamikdash is due to our sins - so if we have no sins, then where is our beis hamikdash?!

I believe this is a tremendous raayah to shittas rashi (again from the mishkan piece).  Yes, Hashem forgave us, and wasn't meifer his bris with us.  But that doesn't mean we're back to where we were before, with Hashem coming to be mashreh his shechinah amongst us with a beis hamikdash.  The fact that bnei yisrael were able to recover from cheit ha-egel to the extent that they were able to build the mishkan was special above and beyond ordinary teshuvah -- as rashi said, it was a special eidus that hashem truly forgave the cheit ha-egel.  We, li-daavoneinu, don't seem to be zocheh to this special kapparah.

Thinking in this way really transforms the way I view a large segment of the Jewish calendar.   (Just as a hakdamah, there is a machlokes in chazal how many times moshe went up to har sinai.  rashi says 3, but the ramban quotes a deah in chazal which the gra accepts as correct that moshe went up two times.  it doesn't fundamentally change what I'm about to say, but its definitely easier to assume like the gra.  So we will).

On the 17th of tammuz, bnei yisrael do the unthinkable and break the bris they made just a few weeks earlier at har sinai, and worship a golden calf.  Every year, shiva assar bitammuz heralds in a bad time for the Jewish people.  We go through a three weeks, culminating in tisha b'av, when bnei yisrael did cheit hameraglim (not the same year -but not important for now).  This three week period doesn't exist in isolation - it really is (unfortunately) the culmination of a year of sin, a year in which the beis hamikdash has not been rebuilt because of our aveiros.  And after such a year of sin, like klal yisrael in the midbar, we may very well (chas vishalom) deserve death.

Rosh Chodesh Elul: Moshe Rabbeinu goes up to har sinai to plead with Hashem for 40 days to spare the Jewish people.  And every year, on rosh chodesh elul, we begin with extra davening (and selichos for some) to also plead for our lives.  When Moshe goes up to har sinai, the kol shofar is heard: as the rambam writes: עורו ישינים משנתכם ונרדמים הקיצו מתרדמתכם וחפשו במעשיכם וחזרו בתשובה וזכרו בוראכם -the shofar was a wake up call:  Moshe is going to daven, but if the people don't do teshuvah, it will all be in vain.  We begin blowing the shofar on rosh chodesh elul, culminating in our tekios on rosh hashanah, for the same reason: we need to do teshuvah so that hashem wont destroy us after the year of sin and its culmination in the three weeks.

Yom Kippur: Hashem teaches Moshe the yud gimmel middos harachamim and grants atonement: salachti kidvarecha.  Every year, our selichos culminate in the selichos of neilah - kimo shehodata le-anav mikedem... We beg Hashem to remember the yud gimmel middos he taught Moshe Rabbeinu and to forgive us with them.

And here, as we mentioned, the parallel breaks.  If we had truly succeeded on yom kippur, we should have been zocheh to a beis hamikdash.  But we didn't  truly succeed - and that should leave us broken.  Is there any consolation, a small ray of light that we can cling to?

Thats where sukkos comes in.  The Gra explains that sukkos is in tishrei and not in nissan because it is a zecher to the return of the ananei hakavod after Hashem forgave us on yom kippur.   We don't have a mishkan / beis hamikdash.  But we do have the ananei hakavod - the sukkah in your backyard.

כֹּה אָמַר יְקֹוָק זָכַרְתִּי לָךְ חֶסֶד נְעוּרַיִךְ אַהֲבַת כְּלוּלֹתָיִךְ לֶכְתֵּךְ אַחֲרַי בַּמִּדְבָּר בְּאֶרֶץ לֹא זְרוּעָה - the mishkan is hashem's way of coming to live with the Jewish people - that we don't have.  So instead we say, "fine.  If Hashem won't come to live with us, we'll have to follow after him"  לֶכְתֵּךְ אַחֲרַי בַּמִּדְבָּר - we build a sukkah to go out and follow Hashem in the desert.  The return of the ananei hakavod after the cheit ha-egel is our ray of hope thats left with no beis hamikdash - it's Hashem's hand, beckoning us to follow after him.  He's not yet willing to come live with us, but he's not leaving us behind - he gives us the ananei hakavod so that we will follow after him, and one day,  catch up with him.   That day should come very soon.

Chag kasher visameach!

 

Misah and Misah bidei shamayim

There is a fascinating machlokes on the last pasuk of parshas bamidbar - The Ramban and the Behag use the pasuk in the minyan hamitzvos as a lav for stealing from the klei shares.  The Rambam, however, thinks the pasuk is only a "remez" to stealing klei shares, but in the minyan hamitzvos, there is no such lav:

ואף על פי שאמרו (סנה' פא ב) רמז לגונב את הקסוה לא יבואו לראות, ויש די ספוק באמרם רמז ושפשטיה דקרא אינו כן. ואינו גם כן מכלל מחוייבי מיתה בידי שמים כמו שהתבאר בתוספתא (זבחים ספי"ב וכריתות פ"א ה"ב) ובסנהדרין (פג א

The Rambam defends his claim that there is no full-fledged lav for stealing klei shares by noting that there is no official punishment / misah bidei shamayim for this action.  Were one to be chayav misah bidei shamayim, then for sure it would be a full fledged lav - with no such chiyuv, its entirely possible / very plausible that while of course it is prohibited to steal klei shares, it is not a lav in its own right.

The Ramban jumps on this Rambam:  what do you mean that theres no chiyuv misah bidei shamayim?  The mishnah in sanhedrin lists 3 cases that kanain pogin bo - and stealing klei shares is one of them!  The mishnayos which list those issurim which have a chiyuv misah bidei shamayim leave out stealing klei shares not because it is less chammur - but rather because it is more chammur:  the list only includes those prohibitions whose sole punishment is misah bidei shamayim, not those, like stealing klei shares, which have an additional punishment of kanain pogin bo.

In the above formulation, the Ramban (based on gemara sanhedrin 82b) makes a global claim:  Chiyuv misah bidei adam, in all its forms (beis din, kanain pogin bo, kipah, etc.) includes within itself chiyuv misah bidei shamayim.  More strongly formulated: chiyuv misah bidei adam is predicated on and justified solely by the fact that this person is chayav misah bidei shamayim.  Otherwise, what right would we have to kill him?

The Megillas Esther points out that the rambam, based on another opinion in the gemara, seems to hold almost the entirely opposite position:  To the contrary, if one is chayav misah bidei shamayim, then it would be redundant to also have them be chayav bidei adam - let Hashem take care of giving his promised misah bidei shamayim.  The only role of misah bidei adam is in a case where a person is NOT chayav misah bidei shamayim - that is where it is sometimes constructive to have misah bidei adam.

This might just be a cute cheshbon, but this could explain an interesting lashon of the rambam in the peirush hamishnayos.  Another of the three cases of kanain pogin bo is a boel aramis - in that case, the gemara limits the right of the kanain to kill the boel aramis to the shaas maaseh aveirah - once the aveirah is over, the kanain cannot kill him anymore.  Some acharonim believe that this limitation only applies to boel aramis -- but by stealing klei shares, one can kill the ganav even after he has finished the maaseh gneivah.  Why the difference?

The Rambam says in peirush hamishnayos:
ו] קסוה, כלי שרת נגזר מן קשות הנסך. ומקלל בקוסם, הוא שיברך השם בשם עבודה זרה. ובועל ארמית, הוא שיבעול בת עובדי עבודה זרה בפרהסיא בעשרה ישראל או יותר, ובשעת מעשה דוקא כמעשה פינחס, אבל אחר שפירש, או שלא היה בקהל מישראל, או שלא היתה עובדת עבודה זרה, אסור להרגו. אבל הוא מחוייב כרת על בת עובד עבודה זרה ואף על פי שלא נזכר בתורה ולא נמנה מכלל הכרתות, אלא שהוא קבלה. ונתפרש במקרא במה שנאמר ובעל בת אל נכר יכרת ה' לאיש אשר יעשנה וכו'.

If I am correct, the rambam is saying the following:  By boel aramis, you cant kill him once the maaseh aveirah is finished because now he is chayav kares / misah bidei shamayim - and that we leave to Hashem to fulfill.  In the other cases, however, even after the maaseh aveirah, the person is not chayav misah bidei shamayim - therefore the kanain can still kill the avaryan. (the diyuk is better in the translations in the back of the gemara)

I think this machlokes Rambam / Ramban plays out lishitasam in a few other places:

In parshas lech lecha, the Ramban famously disagrees with the Rambam and says that if a navi prophesies that someone deserves to die, it is a mitzvah to kill them.  The Rambam, on the other hand, thinks that you're chayav misah if you kill someone due to such a nevuah.  The Ramban, lishitaso, thinks misah bidei adam is a function of misah bidei shamayim - if Hashem wants a person dead, as evidenced by nevuah, then that "chiyuv misah bidei shamayim" translates into a hetter of misah bidei adam.  But the Rambam thinks that misah bidei shamayim and misah bidei adam are two disjoint concepts - one does not lead to the other - so why should this prophecy translate into a misah bidei adam - if hashem wants to kill this guy, let Hashem kill him.

There is a famous din by eidim zomimin of kaasher zamam vilo kaasher asah.  That is, if witnesses perjure in an attempt to have someone executed by the courts and get found out before the guy is executed, then they themselves are killed.  After the fact, however, they're let off the hook.  The Ramban has a very fascinating explanation for why this should be:  Bikerev elokim yishpot - Hashem steers the hands of the sanhedrin - if the witnesses were found false before the execution of their victim, thats because Hashem is trying to save the innocent victim - therefore the 2 witnesses are guilty and liable to the death penalty.  If however, Hashem allowed the execution of the 'victim' to go through, it must be because the 'victim' wasn't really so innocent after all, and therefore the eidim did not kill an innocent man and are let off the hook.  This assumes the Ramban's shittah about the nature of chiyuv misah bidei adam- namely, that it is predicated on and built off misah bidei shamayim.  This does not even get off the ground, however, in the Rambam's opinion (and indeed, if I recall correctly, when the kesef mishnah tries to explain the rationale of kaasher zamam in the Rambam, he does not even mention shittas haramban.)

I don't know where exactly to go with this machlokes, but at least I'll end with the following observation. How does the Rambam answer the strong kashya of the Ramban: what could be the mechayev / justification to give misah bidei adam if not misah bidei shamayim?  I think the point is that when we seek justice here in this world, we don't attempt to play G-d - we can't know what G-d knows or take his global perspective in our justice system.  Misah bidei shamayim, we leave to shamayim.  What we can do is din bidei adam - and as long as we use the dinei hatorah to implement our dinei adam, then our din will also ultimately reach the level of being a true din tzedek.