I really have been very bad with posting divrei torah.
This shabbos, I had the merit to eat shabbos day by prof. aviezri frankael (see here also- if you scroll down there are torah articles which i highly recommend). (if you are too lazy to read all the stuff, lets just say this guy dropped out of school after 8th grade, fought in the 1948 war of independence, got a Phd. in math without any high school education, built the first computer in israel, started and developed the bar ilan responsa project, is a brilliant mathematician and talmid chacham. not a bad resume.)
I'll just say over what he said and connect it to a shiur I heard by R Aharon Soloveitchik (I recommend you listen to the shiur before you read this.)
We have quoted before the gemara in sotah 14a:
דרש רבי שמלאי מפני מה נתאוה משה רבינו ליכנס לא"י וכי לאכול מפריה הוא צריך או לשבוע מטובה הוא צריך אלא כך אמר משה הרבה מצות נצטוו ישראל ואין מתקיימין אלא בא"י אכנס אני לארץ כדי שיתקיימו כולן על ידי אמר לו הקב"ה כלום אתה מבקש אלא לקבל שכר מעלה אני עליך כאילו עשיתם (sotah 14a)
why did moshe want to go into eretz yisrael? Did he just want to eat the fruits? This gemara implies that there is something wrong with that - Moshe rabbeinu shouldn't want to go into eretz yisrael for the gashmius of it's good fruits - rather, he should want to go in to do mitzvos.
(Bihashgacha, I randomly opened a gemara pesachim (8b) and found a similar statement. א"ר אבין בר רב אדא אמר ר' יצחק מפני מה אין פירות גינוסר בירושלים כדי שלא יהו עולי רגלים אומרים אלמלא לא עלינו אלא לאכול פירות גינוסר בירושלים דיינו נמצאת עלייה שלא לשמה)
So then isn't it strange that we ask G-d in al hamichyah, vihaalenu litochah... vinochal mipiryah vinisbah mituvah - take us to Israel so that we may eat it's fruits and be satiated from the good of the land - the very phrase that the gemara uses disparagingly in moshe rabbeinu's context! Why, then, do we daven for this?
Truth be told, there is a deah in rishonim, brought down by the tur, to not say this line in al hamichyah because of the very question we just asked - but we do say it - so how do we explain that?
So I suggested to look at the whole phrase in al hamichyah - vinochal mipiryah, vinisbah mituvah, u-nivarech'cha aleha bekdusha u'vtahara - we want to eat the fruits to thank g-d for the land he gave us. this is the primary kiyum of the mitzvah of vi-achalta visavata u-verachta. The pesukim surrounding this mitzvah are clear that the mitzvah's focus is that G-d is bringing us to a beautiful and bountiful land (=eretz yisrael) so that we can eat, be satiated, and thank g-d for all the good he has given us. (I have pointed out to many ppl already that lifi peshuto shel mikra, the mitzvah of bentching should only apply in EY. see the ramban who is dochek because of this.) If thats your motivation, then its a positive thing to ask for vinochal mipiryah vinisbah mituvah.
There are 2 questions on this, one by me and one by prof. frankael.
me- if I am correct, then couldn't moshe rabbeinu have asked to eat the peiros for the same reason? (so why am I not correct - I still dont know. any suggestions are much appreciated)
frankael - in the beginning of al hamichyah, we also reference eretz chemda tova... leechol mipiryah vilisboa mituvah - and there we dont say anything about u-nivarech'cha aleha. I feel like you could get out of this question, but Prof. Frankael's answer is much better anyways.
So before presenting his answer, lets switch focus for a second to schar mitzvah. There are many different ways to formulate the question below, but I heard an excellent one thursday night from a friend of mine
Parshas Va'eschanan ends off, וְשָׁמַרְתָּ אֶת הַמִּצְוָה וְאֶת הַחֻקִּים וְאֶת הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי מְצַוְּךָ הַיּוֹם לַעֲשׂתָם - chazal famously darshen, hayom -- today -- to do the mitzvos, and tomorrow (= olam haba) to get reward. schar mitzvah bihai alma leika - there is no reward for mitzvos in this world.
parshas eikev begins, "and when you keep the mitzvos, g-d will give you all the good of this world" - וַאֲהֵבְךָ וּבֵרַכְךָ וְהִרְבֶּךָ וּבֵרַךְ פְּרִי בִטְנְךָ וּפְרִי אַדְמָתֶךָ דְּגָנְךָ וְתִירשְׁךָ וְיִצְהָרֶךָ שְׁגַר אֲלָפֶיךָ וְעַשְׁתְּרֹת צֹאנֶךָ עַל הָאֲדָמָה אֲשֶׁר נִשְׁבַּע לַאֲבֹתֶיךָ לָתֶת לָךְ: - so what in the world do chazal mean that there is no reward for mitzvos in this world - the torah clearly thinks there is?
(The rambam here addresses this question, and at greater length in his hakdama to perek chelek. but honestly, I like R Aharon Soloveitchik's answer (which is also based on rishonim) better.)
R Aharon quoted the rashba in his teshuvos (and its already discussed briefly in the ramban al hatorah) to differentiate between a yachid and a tzibbur. For a yachid, schar mitzvah bihai alma leika - an individual receives justice in the world to come, where he is rewarded for every mitzvah, and punished for every aveirah. As individuals, we do not merit (except in exceptional circumstances) to see G-d's hand revealed in this world to reward us (or punish us) for the deeds we do.
But that is not the case for a tzibbur. A tzibbur only exists in this world - as such, it must receive its reward / punishment in this world. If you look at the promises the torah makes, it is always to the tzibbur - to klal yisrael at large - if we as a nation do good, then we will merit good in this world - and conversely, if we as a nation sin, our beis hamikdash will be destroyed and we will be exiled to suffering.
(This is clearly seen by contrasting between the first 2 paragraphs of shema. The first, referring to a yachid, has no mention of schar. Only the second, which as rashi explains, is said to a tzibbur, mentions the rewards we will receive in this world for doing the mitzvos.)
This distinction answers a powerful question: How can the torah motivate us to do mitzvos by promises of earthly reward - isn't that so lowly, so shelo lishma, to be good just to live an easy life?
But with this distinction, the answer is clear: The torah makes no promises to individuals. Individuals are expected to live a good life even though they may suffer tremendously in this world. The motivation of earthly reward that the torah gives for mitzvos is actually selfless - because you don't do mitzvos to increase your own, personal, earthly well-being, but rather, to improve the lot of our people, bnei yisrael. That is a lofty motivation to do mitzvos - beyond the inherent good within a mitzvah, doing mitzvos is part of what we do as "national service" (and I am not getting into any political discussions right now whatsoever), because when we do mizvos, we help our entire nation, and really, the entire world.
Prof. Frankael used the same distinction to explain our quandary with moshe rabbeinu. Why was Moshe Rabbeinu not satisfied with the fact that bnei yisrael were going into Israel - why did he himself need to go? Was it to eat the fruits? If he cares about his personal gashmius, that would be selfishness.
But when we daven in al hamichya, we are davening for klal yisrael - as a tzibbur, we ask that G-d should bring us all back to the land he promised us, eretz zavas chalav u'dvash. That's not selfishness - if anything, it's selfless.
Please G-d, we should merit speedily in our days vihaalenu -- all of us -- litocha, vismchainu bibinyanah, vinochal mipiryah, vinisbah mituvah, u'nivarech'cha aleha bekdusha u'vtahara.
Sunday, July 28, 2013
Friday, July 19, 2013
hakkaras hatov to the atheist
I've told this atheist numerous times that I owe him a debt of gratitude for helping me clarify for myself many ideas through my discussions with him. I don't know if I will be able to express this idea clearly, but I will try, at least as a rough draft.
Before you read what I think, I'd like to ask you a question. After you have your own answer, you can read what I wrote and tell me if you disagree.
I assume that each and every one of us has a conception of what it means to live life as a good Jew. While we may not live up to our ideals, we each know (more or less) what we should be doing in order to live life as a good Jew. Where did we -- where did you -- get that knowledge from? How do you know what a Jew should do to live a good life?
Ok. Think about that, then back to my essay.
There is a person I know, who, whenever they hear of an evil / disgusting act committed by an orthodox jew, remarks, "its things like this which make me not want to be religious."
I always thought this was a highly irrational comment. Deciding whether or not to be religious should be a function of the objective truth of religion or lack thereof - who cares how other people act? If you accept as true the sinaitic revelation, then even if you have to be like avraham ha-ivri - who stood on one side of the river with the whole world against him, so be it.
To a certain extent, I was right. Objective truth does not change based on the actions of others.
But we know that chazal tell us that when religious jews act in an improper manner, this creates a chilul hashem. Why?
Obviously, its because of the reaction it induces as represented by our anonymous comment above. But as I said, I didn't think that chazal were giving legitimacy to such comments, which seem to be highly irrational. Rather, chazal were saying, since people think like that, even if there is no rational basis for such thinking, the chilul hashem is there.
But I've changed my mind. When discussing how I react to the sometimes terrible things fanatical "charedim" do in the name of judaism (I should just note that I am not, by any means, bashing charedim in general. I have many cousins in Israel who are all bona fide charedim, and they are some of the nicest people I know. I do disagree sharply with their hashkafah, but thats a different topic) I told the atheist that he shouldn't judge Judaism by how its "practitioners" act, but rather, by what it says. I proceeded to marshal sources to prove the fanatical extremists wrong, and we moved on.
But he wasn't satisfied with this response, and upon further reflection, I think he is partially right. Can you judge Judaism fairly based solely on the written word?
No. For every source that tells us to be kind, loving and generous, I'll find you a source that can be interpreted to preach hatred and cruelty. We may know how to interpret these sources in context, but for that you need more knowledge than just an objective analysis of the texts without any outside information. You need to come in, knowing, apriori what we stand for - asos mishpat, ahavas chesed, vihatznea leches (that doesn't mean that our interpretations are forced - they are natural, and make good sense. but you can never prove one specific interpretation, and you can always come out with a different outlook.) If you come in without the basis of middos, then you will end up with an interpretation of the talmud that preaches cruelty and hatred.
How is one supposed to know, apriori, that we preach kindness? Doesn't a purely objective read of the talmud demand that we don't assume anything about what it asks? Maybe the talmud really does preach a doctrine of hate?
No. Because we have a mesorah in how to interpret the talmud - we have a mesorah that teaches us these apriori facts. Its not an explicit, verbal mesorah - its a mesorah based on how klal yisrael lives and acts. Its true that the torah expects us to sometimes commit genocide, but if we look at the way bnei yisrael have lived, we see that the jews lived lives overwhelmingly of chesed, not of genocide. That is a mesorah, its part of torah shebaal peh back from Sinai- we know that we have to interpret the harsher laws of the torah in the context of that mesorah (no apologetics, but at the same time proper interpretation is required).
Another example where this mesorah comes into play: tznius. If you just read the talmud and some commentaries based off of it, you can very easily reach the conclusion that we should lock women up in their rooms, tear the clothing off women in the street if we deem it immodest, and all sorts of other harsh things. (see, for example http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/orthodox-judaism-treats-women-like-filthy-little-things-1.404505)
But I know that this is not the conclusion to be drawn from the talmud - how do I know? Because I have faith in our mesorah in how to live. And this mesorah tells me that that isnt what the talmud, or g-d, wants us to do. (Back to Sarid's Yemach Shemo article, like I said, if you come into the talmud with bad middos, the conclusion you draw will be one full of bad middos. That article represents not the Talmud's view of women, but is closer to Sarid's. see http://www.vosizneias.com/97948/2012/01/02/new-york-an-open-letter-to-yossi-sarid-by-rabbi-yair-hoffman/ for a more technical response, but ultimately, this response relies on my point.)
Anyone with half a brain knows that tznius, for both men and women, is so much more than just the strict halachos- its one of the three things g-d asks of us along with asos mishpat and ahavas chesed. what does it mean to follow hatznea leches im elokecha?
If you think that you can figure that out based on just reading the talmud and other sources, I think you're crazy. You need a mesorah - you need a living example of tznius to understand what tznius is. (Learning torah could deepen that understanding in profound ways - but it has to start with the living mesorah.)
When we say that we have faith in the mesorah all the way back to sinai - its on much more than just the strict technical laws. I believe that we know (not me, but someone living today) how to properly keep tznius because we have a mesorah going back to moshe rabbeinu what it means to live a life of hatznea leches. We have learned from the previous generations from their actions what the values are which Judaism is based on, and what should be interpreted and contextualized in light of those values. This mesorah affects how we understand the entirety of torah, and as a consequence of that fact obviously has tremendous nafka minahs lihalacha (like the cases I discussed above.)
I never realized this until now, but I believe the following is true: if you don't believe that there are people nowadays who both understand the torah (they're probably rabbis) and live their lives in accordance with its value system (tznius, chesed vs. cruelty) you are a heretic. Don't get me wrong - I rant against daas torah all the time. But this is about faith in our mesorah. If no one alive knows how to live their lives in accordance with the value system of the torah, then from where will the next generation learn? Is the mesorah broken?
If an orthodox jew is cruel, he corrupts our mesorah. The only way that I know that Judaism isnt a religion that preaches hate and cruelty is because of that mesorah (like I said, the interpretation of written sources will always follow the axiomatic values you bring in apriori). As such, for a Jew to be cruel undermines the entire mesorah upon which Judaism is based.
The halacha is that a rav she-eino hagun - a rebbe with bad middos, is prohibited to teach torah or to learn torah from him. We understand this very well - as important as learning the sugya of yiush shelo midaas is, it pales in comparison to the importance of the mesorah of our value system. To learn from a rebbe who is cruel (for example) will lead the talmid to a mesorah that Judaism is a cruel religion, and he will interpret halachic rulings accordingly (like Yossi Sarid yimach shemo).
We now understand - could there be a greater chillul hashem then a corruption of His religion? By acting in an improper way, we permanently corrupt and distort the mesorah = the torah, and make it into a teaching of falsehood. Torah is powerful - it connects to us- because it is a toras emes. It is totally understandable that when the torah is corrupted into a toras sheker, people dont want to stick with it. Acting against the value system of the torah isnt just a violation of the torah - but it corrupts the mesorah because we only know how to interpret the torah through the way klal yisrael lives and acts.
So my answer to the question I asked you above- while its obviously true that book learning is critically important - there is a mitzvah to learn torah, and only through study can one keep to the (important) technical laws of the halacha. But ultimately, torah shebaal peh, even nowadays, is still rubo al peh - we only know how to be good jews via the chain of mesorah and transmission from one generation to the next. Which means that it is totally fair to judge Judaism based on its practitioners. G-d should help us all take this knowledge to heart and act accordingly.
Before you read what I think, I'd like to ask you a question. After you have your own answer, you can read what I wrote and tell me if you disagree.
I assume that each and every one of us has a conception of what it means to live life as a good Jew. While we may not live up to our ideals, we each know (more or less) what we should be doing in order to live life as a good Jew. Where did we -- where did you -- get that knowledge from? How do you know what a Jew should do to live a good life?
Ok. Think about that, then back to my essay.
There is a person I know, who, whenever they hear of an evil / disgusting act committed by an orthodox jew, remarks, "its things like this which make me not want to be religious."
I always thought this was a highly irrational comment. Deciding whether or not to be religious should be a function of the objective truth of religion or lack thereof - who cares how other people act? If you accept as true the sinaitic revelation, then even if you have to be like avraham ha-ivri - who stood on one side of the river with the whole world against him, so be it.
To a certain extent, I was right. Objective truth does not change based on the actions of others.
But we know that chazal tell us that when religious jews act in an improper manner, this creates a chilul hashem. Why?
Obviously, its because of the reaction it induces as represented by our anonymous comment above. But as I said, I didn't think that chazal were giving legitimacy to such comments, which seem to be highly irrational. Rather, chazal were saying, since people think like that, even if there is no rational basis for such thinking, the chilul hashem is there.
But I've changed my mind. When discussing how I react to the sometimes terrible things fanatical "charedim" do in the name of judaism (I should just note that I am not, by any means, bashing charedim in general. I have many cousins in Israel who are all bona fide charedim, and they are some of the nicest people I know. I do disagree sharply with their hashkafah, but thats a different topic) I told the atheist that he shouldn't judge Judaism by how its "practitioners" act, but rather, by what it says. I proceeded to marshal sources to prove the fanatical extremists wrong, and we moved on.
But he wasn't satisfied with this response, and upon further reflection, I think he is partially right. Can you judge Judaism fairly based solely on the written word?
No. For every source that tells us to be kind, loving and generous, I'll find you a source that can be interpreted to preach hatred and cruelty. We may know how to interpret these sources in context, but for that you need more knowledge than just an objective analysis of the texts without any outside information. You need to come in, knowing, apriori what we stand for - asos mishpat, ahavas chesed, vihatznea leches (that doesn't mean that our interpretations are forced - they are natural, and make good sense. but you can never prove one specific interpretation, and you can always come out with a different outlook.) If you come in without the basis of middos, then you will end up with an interpretation of the talmud that preaches cruelty and hatred.
How is one supposed to know, apriori, that we preach kindness? Doesn't a purely objective read of the talmud demand that we don't assume anything about what it asks? Maybe the talmud really does preach a doctrine of hate?
No. Because we have a mesorah in how to interpret the talmud - we have a mesorah that teaches us these apriori facts. Its not an explicit, verbal mesorah - its a mesorah based on how klal yisrael lives and acts. Its true that the torah expects us to sometimes commit genocide, but if we look at the way bnei yisrael have lived, we see that the jews lived lives overwhelmingly of chesed, not of genocide. That is a mesorah, its part of torah shebaal peh back from Sinai- we know that we have to interpret the harsher laws of the torah in the context of that mesorah (no apologetics, but at the same time proper interpretation is required).
Another example where this mesorah comes into play: tznius. If you just read the talmud and some commentaries based off of it, you can very easily reach the conclusion that we should lock women up in their rooms, tear the clothing off women in the street if we deem it immodest, and all sorts of other harsh things. (see, for example http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/orthodox-judaism-treats-women-like-filthy-little-things-1.404505)
But I know that this is not the conclusion to be drawn from the talmud - how do I know? Because I have faith in our mesorah in how to live. And this mesorah tells me that that isnt what the talmud, or g-d, wants us to do. (Back to Sarid's Yemach Shemo article, like I said, if you come into the talmud with bad middos, the conclusion you draw will be one full of bad middos. That article represents not the Talmud's view of women, but is closer to Sarid's. see http://www.vosizneias.com/97948/2012/01/02/new-york-an-open-letter-to-yossi-sarid-by-rabbi-yair-hoffman/ for a more technical response, but ultimately, this response relies on my point.)
Anyone with half a brain knows that tznius, for both men and women, is so much more than just the strict halachos- its one of the three things g-d asks of us along with asos mishpat and ahavas chesed. what does it mean to follow hatznea leches im elokecha?
If you think that you can figure that out based on just reading the talmud and other sources, I think you're crazy. You need a mesorah - you need a living example of tznius to understand what tznius is. (Learning torah could deepen that understanding in profound ways - but it has to start with the living mesorah.)
When we say that we have faith in the mesorah all the way back to sinai - its on much more than just the strict technical laws. I believe that we know (not me, but someone living today) how to properly keep tznius because we have a mesorah going back to moshe rabbeinu what it means to live a life of hatznea leches. We have learned from the previous generations from their actions what the values are which Judaism is based on, and what should be interpreted and contextualized in light of those values. This mesorah affects how we understand the entirety of torah, and as a consequence of that fact obviously has tremendous nafka minahs lihalacha (like the cases I discussed above.)
I never realized this until now, but I believe the following is true: if you don't believe that there are people nowadays who both understand the torah (they're probably rabbis) and live their lives in accordance with its value system (tznius, chesed vs. cruelty) you are a heretic. Don't get me wrong - I rant against daas torah all the time. But this is about faith in our mesorah. If no one alive knows how to live their lives in accordance with the value system of the torah, then from where will the next generation learn? Is the mesorah broken?
If an orthodox jew is cruel, he corrupts our mesorah. The only way that I know that Judaism isnt a religion that preaches hate and cruelty is because of that mesorah (like I said, the interpretation of written sources will always follow the axiomatic values you bring in apriori). As such, for a Jew to be cruel undermines the entire mesorah upon which Judaism is based.
The halacha is that a rav she-eino hagun - a rebbe with bad middos, is prohibited to teach torah or to learn torah from him. We understand this very well - as important as learning the sugya of yiush shelo midaas is, it pales in comparison to the importance of the mesorah of our value system. To learn from a rebbe who is cruel (for example) will lead the talmid to a mesorah that Judaism is a cruel religion, and he will interpret halachic rulings accordingly (like Yossi Sarid yimach shemo).
We now understand - could there be a greater chillul hashem then a corruption of His religion? By acting in an improper way, we permanently corrupt and distort the mesorah = the torah, and make it into a teaching of falsehood. Torah is powerful - it connects to us- because it is a toras emes. It is totally understandable that when the torah is corrupted into a toras sheker, people dont want to stick with it. Acting against the value system of the torah isnt just a violation of the torah - but it corrupts the mesorah because we only know how to interpret the torah through the way klal yisrael lives and acts.
So my answer to the question I asked you above- while its obviously true that book learning is critically important - there is a mitzvah to learn torah, and only through study can one keep to the (important) technical laws of the halacha. But ultimately, torah shebaal peh, even nowadays, is still rubo al peh - we only know how to be good jews via the chain of mesorah and transmission from one generation to the next. Which means that it is totally fair to judge Judaism based on its practitioners. G-d should help us all take this knowledge to heart and act accordingly.
Wednesday, July 17, 2013
va-eschanan question
i've had a question since last year on a topic related to va-eschanan (I don't think I thought of it, I think a friend of mine brought it up). i still have no good answer, so I'll just put it out as food for thought, and I'd appreciate any suggestions.
דרש רבי שמלאי מפני מה נתאוה משה רבינו ליכנס לא"י וכי לאכול מפריה הוא צריך או לשבוע מטובה הוא צריך אלא כך אמר משה הרבה מצות נצטוו ישראל ואין מתקיימין אלא בא"י אכנס אני לארץ כדי שיתקיימו כולן על ידי אמר לו הקב"ה כלום אתה מבקש אלא לקבל שכר מעלה אני עליך כאילו עשיתם (sotah 14a)
Basically, the gemara asks, why did moshe want so badly to go into eretz yisrael - did he want the gashmius of tasting its good fruit? Rather, Moshe rabbeinu said to himself, "there are so many mitzvos that can only be fulfilled in eretz yisrael. If I go in, I can fulfill all these mitzvos." Hashem responded back to him, "Why do you want to do mitzvos? For the reward? I'll consider it as if you did the mitzvos.
There is a well known machlokes btwn the rambam and the ramban about whether there is a mitzvah of yishuv eretz yisrael - that is, is each and every individual in klal yisrael commanded to live in israel. (see here where I discuss this more fully). According to the ramban (who says there is a mitzvah), the whole question of the gemara doesnt get off the ground. Would we ask, why did moshe want to shake lulav and esrog. was it to smell the beautiful smell of the esrog? We would never ask such a stupid question, because we know exactly why moshe (or any jew) would want to shake lulav - because its a mitzvah. why, according to the ramban, is yishuv eretz yisrael different?
Even the answer of the gemara is difficult. We dont answer, because its a mitzvah to go to israel. instead, we talk about all the mitzvos that can be fulfilled and all the reward that can be gained from these mitzvos that can only be done in israel. Again, isnt there a much more fundamental answer - forgetting about what moshe will do after he gets to israel, there is a mitzvah to go to israel. period. not for any reason, not to do other mitzvos. independent of all that, there is a mitzvah to go to israel - why isnt that the answer of the gemara as to moshe's motivation to go into israel?
I might have just thought of an answer. to be continued...
דרש רבי שמלאי מפני מה נתאוה משה רבינו ליכנס לא"י וכי לאכול מפריה הוא צריך או לשבוע מטובה הוא צריך אלא כך אמר משה הרבה מצות נצטוו ישראל ואין מתקיימין אלא בא"י אכנס אני לארץ כדי שיתקיימו כולן על ידי אמר לו הקב"ה כלום אתה מבקש אלא לקבל שכר מעלה אני עליך כאילו עשיתם (sotah 14a)
Basically, the gemara asks, why did moshe want so badly to go into eretz yisrael - did he want the gashmius of tasting its good fruit? Rather, Moshe rabbeinu said to himself, "there are so many mitzvos that can only be fulfilled in eretz yisrael. If I go in, I can fulfill all these mitzvos." Hashem responded back to him, "Why do you want to do mitzvos? For the reward? I'll consider it as if you did the mitzvos.
There is a well known machlokes btwn the rambam and the ramban about whether there is a mitzvah of yishuv eretz yisrael - that is, is each and every individual in klal yisrael commanded to live in israel. (see here where I discuss this more fully). According to the ramban (who says there is a mitzvah), the whole question of the gemara doesnt get off the ground. Would we ask, why did moshe want to shake lulav and esrog. was it to smell the beautiful smell of the esrog? We would never ask such a stupid question, because we know exactly why moshe (or any jew) would want to shake lulav - because its a mitzvah. why, according to the ramban, is yishuv eretz yisrael different?
Even the answer of the gemara is difficult. We dont answer, because its a mitzvah to go to israel. instead, we talk about all the mitzvos that can be fulfilled and all the reward that can be gained from these mitzvos that can only be done in israel. Again, isnt there a much more fundamental answer - forgetting about what moshe will do after he gets to israel, there is a mitzvah to go to israel. period. not for any reason, not to do other mitzvos. independent of all that, there is a mitzvah to go to israel - why isnt that the answer of the gemara as to moshe's motivation to go into israel?
I might have just thought of an answer. to be continued...
Sunday, July 14, 2013
Tisha B'Av
What should I say? I wrote a whole rant in a fit of temper, but its not appropriate to rant like that, especially now. This past thursday night, I had the merit to learn at yeshivat merkaz harav, and I attended a shiur there about tisha b'av. I don't remember where all the mekoros were to look them up, but I will try to say over what I took away from the shiur (this isnt exactly what was said).
The medrash somewhere in medrash eichah writes, "eilu zechisem," if klal yisrael had merited, then the krias hatorah of tisha b'av would be that of yom kippur, ki bayom hazeh yechaper aleichem. now that lo zachinu, we read "tumasah bishuleha" a pasuk in eichah about out defilement.
What exactly is the contrast the midrash is making between what could be and what is - how could tisha b'av ever be like yom kippur?
The midrashim note the stark disparity in the lengths of the first and second exiles - one lasting 70 years, one which is almost 2000 yrs long and still ongoing. The medrash gives two parallels in halacha which reflect this disparity. Bnei Yisrael in galus bavel were like a niddah, as opposed to in the second exile, when they are like a zavah. a niddah, min hatorah, doesnt need shiva nekiim. at the end of 7 days, as long as now there is no more blood, she is tahor. A zavah, on the other hand, needs shivah nekiim - 7 days with no blood before she can immerse in the mikvah and become tahor.
The second mashal reflects the same idea, comparing a metzora musgar to a metzora muchlat. in galus bavel, we were like a metzora musgar, whose nega wasnt definitevly proved to be tzaraas yet. as such, if after 7 days of isolation, the nega doesnt get any worse - even if it doesnt get any better, the metzora is tahor. the second exile, on the other hand, is compared to a metzora muchlat - one who is definitely tamei. such a metzora cannot become tahor again until the nega is completely healed.
While one could take these distinctions between niddah / zavah and metzora musgar / muchlat as simple gezeiros hakasuv, there is a lomdus here. a metzora musgar / niddah doesnt have a chezkas tumah - in one case its normal to see blood, in the other the nega is not definitively tzaraas. since the person's original chezkas tahara remains, its easy to go back to being tahor. just stop seeing blood, and the niddah is tahor, or for the metzora, as long as the nega doesn get any worse, we dont assume its tzaraas.
but a zavah sees blood outside of a woman's normal cycle. this breaks all chazakos - the woman now has a chezkas tumaah. similarly, the metzora muchlat is definitely tamei with a nega tzaraas - he no longer has his chezkas tahara. in this case, we need more than before - its not enough for the blood to stop, but there must be 7 days of no blood to restore a chezkas tahara. its not enough for the nega to remain stable - it must heal completely to re-establish a chezkas tahara.
bnei yisrael were exiled the first time because of the gimmel chamuros. these sins are compared to niddah / metzora musgar. they dont break the chezkas tahara of bnei yisrael. when we stopped the sin, the galus ended, and our chezkas tahara was immediately back in place. this makes sense in the context of the famous rambam in hilchos gerushin - deep down, a jew never wants to sin. thus, the chezkas tahara of klal yisrael could not be removed because of our sins - at the core, the tahara remains.
but bayis sheni was destroyed because of sinas chinam. while technically less chammur then the big three, this sin is much more pernicious. it attacks to the very core of what it means to be the jewish nation - what type of nation hates itself? how can we claim to be one people, with one land, one culture, one beis hamikdash to worship g-d if we hate our neighbors and our friends? we cant.
its not enough to just fix the sin in this case. we need shivah nekiim. we need to restore our chezkas tahara - rebuild a nation. this is the tremendous difficulty of the exile of bayis sheni.
if we had merited, we wouldnt have sinned in a way that attacked to the core and destroyed our chazakah. in that case, teshuva alone would suffice to end our exile - and we would talk about kapparas avonos as a method to end the exile. but kapparas avonos isnt enough. we have a chezkas tumah -- tumasah bishuleha - that we need to remove and replace with a chezkas tahara.
please g-d, we should see the building of the beis hamikdash speedily in our days and not have to mourn once again tomorrow night. tzom harevii vitzom hachamishi vitzom hashevii vitzom ha-asiri- yihyu lisason ulisimcha ulimoadim tovim.
The medrash somewhere in medrash eichah writes, "eilu zechisem," if klal yisrael had merited, then the krias hatorah of tisha b'av would be that of yom kippur, ki bayom hazeh yechaper aleichem. now that lo zachinu, we read "tumasah bishuleha" a pasuk in eichah about out defilement.
What exactly is the contrast the midrash is making between what could be and what is - how could tisha b'av ever be like yom kippur?
The midrashim note the stark disparity in the lengths of the first and second exiles - one lasting 70 years, one which is almost 2000 yrs long and still ongoing. The medrash gives two parallels in halacha which reflect this disparity. Bnei Yisrael in galus bavel were like a niddah, as opposed to in the second exile, when they are like a zavah. a niddah, min hatorah, doesnt need shiva nekiim. at the end of 7 days, as long as now there is no more blood, she is tahor. A zavah, on the other hand, needs shivah nekiim - 7 days with no blood before she can immerse in the mikvah and become tahor.
The second mashal reflects the same idea, comparing a metzora musgar to a metzora muchlat. in galus bavel, we were like a metzora musgar, whose nega wasnt definitevly proved to be tzaraas yet. as such, if after 7 days of isolation, the nega doesnt get any worse - even if it doesnt get any better, the metzora is tahor. the second exile, on the other hand, is compared to a metzora muchlat - one who is definitely tamei. such a metzora cannot become tahor again until the nega is completely healed.
While one could take these distinctions between niddah / zavah and metzora musgar / muchlat as simple gezeiros hakasuv, there is a lomdus here. a metzora musgar / niddah doesnt have a chezkas tumah - in one case its normal to see blood, in the other the nega is not definitively tzaraas. since the person's original chezkas tahara remains, its easy to go back to being tahor. just stop seeing blood, and the niddah is tahor, or for the metzora, as long as the nega doesn get any worse, we dont assume its tzaraas.
but a zavah sees blood outside of a woman's normal cycle. this breaks all chazakos - the woman now has a chezkas tumaah. similarly, the metzora muchlat is definitely tamei with a nega tzaraas - he no longer has his chezkas tahara. in this case, we need more than before - its not enough for the blood to stop, but there must be 7 days of no blood to restore a chezkas tahara. its not enough for the nega to remain stable - it must heal completely to re-establish a chezkas tahara.
bnei yisrael were exiled the first time because of the gimmel chamuros. these sins are compared to niddah / metzora musgar. they dont break the chezkas tahara of bnei yisrael. when we stopped the sin, the galus ended, and our chezkas tahara was immediately back in place. this makes sense in the context of the famous rambam in hilchos gerushin - deep down, a jew never wants to sin. thus, the chezkas tahara of klal yisrael could not be removed because of our sins - at the core, the tahara remains.
but bayis sheni was destroyed because of sinas chinam. while technically less chammur then the big three, this sin is much more pernicious. it attacks to the very core of what it means to be the jewish nation - what type of nation hates itself? how can we claim to be one people, with one land, one culture, one beis hamikdash to worship g-d if we hate our neighbors and our friends? we cant.
its not enough to just fix the sin in this case. we need shivah nekiim. we need to restore our chezkas tahara - rebuild a nation. this is the tremendous difficulty of the exile of bayis sheni.
if we had merited, we wouldnt have sinned in a way that attacked to the core and destroyed our chazakah. in that case, teshuva alone would suffice to end our exile - and we would talk about kapparas avonos as a method to end the exile. but kapparas avonos isnt enough. we have a chezkas tumah -- tumasah bishuleha - that we need to remove and replace with a chezkas tahara.
please g-d, we should see the building of the beis hamikdash speedily in our days and not have to mourn once again tomorrow night. tzom harevii vitzom hachamishi vitzom hashevii vitzom ha-asiri- yihyu lisason ulisimcha ulimoadim tovim.
Saturday, July 13, 2013
extension of balak's dvar torah revised
So while debating with the atheist, I realized that there is a powerful extension to the vort I suggested for parshas balak. Forgive me for partially repeating myself in expressing the entirety of the idea I wish to say.
Our atheist attacked religion (and me) for its (and my) arrogance - "how do you claim to know so much of what G-d thinks", he asked me.
As a simple response, the fact that G-d told me what he thinks and commanded to me to act based on what he told me should be enough to remove any arrogance from the picture. but there is more to be said about this. I think the question is actually a profound one, with an important answer.
Because he's right - we cannot (and hence we don't) claim to understand G-d. How could a finite human being comprehend the infinite wisdom of G-d?
I told him, Our sages contrast between the personalities of Bilaam, the prophet who attempted to curse Israel, and Abraham, the forefather of the Jewish people. Both were people who independent of any outside help, managed to discover the one true G-d and connect with him. One, because of his righteous character, truly connected with G-d on a deep and meaningful level, to the point where G-d decided that he deserved for his descendants to forever after be G-d's chosen nation. The other, with his perverted character, so distorted his connection to G-d that he is judged in hell with the likes of jesus yimach shemo. What differentiates between these two personalities?
One of the three distinguishing traits chazal identify is nefesh rechavah vs nefesh shefala - Bilaam's arrogance as opposed to Abraham's humility. Where do we find these two traits expressed in the bible?
Maimonides addresses this question. He writes that Bilaam's arrogance comes through when he calls himself a yodea daas elyon - one who understands G-d. Abraham's humility, in contrast, comes through when Abraham tells G-d that he is no better than dust and ashes.
If we look at the context where these 2 statements are said, we are astounded. True, Abraham refers to himself as dust and ashes, but this is in the context of ARGUING WITH G-D! What greater display of arrogance could there be than to know better than G-d himself whether it is just to wipe out Sodom or not?
Conversely, Bilaam, when he calls himself a yodeo daas elyon, is in the middle of a complete submission to the will of G-d. Bilaam wants to curse the Jews, but as he says again and again, "whatever G-d tells me to say, that is what I will say." G-d tells him to bless the Jews, and bless them he does, despite the huge embarrassment of doing so in front of balak and all the sarei moav.
What I take away from this is that somehow, there is a way to even argue with G-d that isn't arrogant. If one is motivated by truth and justice, it is no contradiction to simultaneously recognize one's frailty and lowliness while at the same time fighting for what one knows to be right - because you have no choice. Truth is mechayev - you must do whats right - even if it involves putting yourself forward and taking on G-d himself. This isn't arrogant, as long as it is done out of a true care for justice, with recognition that "anochi afar va'efer" - I still am nothing but dust and ashes.
Conversely, it doesn't reflect humility to submit to G-d's will if you think that you truly understand and "know G-d". That's what Bilaam was saying when he said yodeo daas elyon - He submits to G-d out of knowledge and understanding of G-d. Religion is arrogant only if we think like Bilaam - that we can achieve some true understanding of G-d through the tiny minuscule amount that has been revealed.
There is a story that I like that encapsulates some (but not all) of this idea. I am not sure, but I think the story took place with R Yechezkel Abramsky.
For some reason or another, R Abramsky was required to testify in the secular court in London as an expert in religious law. So he goes, and as all witnesses do, he swears to tell the truth. Before they begin the specific inquiry, the judge asks him, is it true that you are a well respected rabbi?
He says, "yes".
Is it true that you are an expert in jewish law?
"Yes."
The greatest expert in Jewish law in all of England?
"Yes."
Arent you jews supposed to be humble?
"I'm under oath."
Emes sometimes obligates one to act in a way that seems contradictory to humility - but its no stirah.
Our atheist attacked religion (and me) for its (and my) arrogance - "how do you claim to know so much of what G-d thinks", he asked me.
As a simple response, the fact that G-d told me what he thinks and commanded to me to act based on what he told me should be enough to remove any arrogance from the picture. but there is more to be said about this. I think the question is actually a profound one, with an important answer.
Because he's right - we cannot (and hence we don't) claim to understand G-d. How could a finite human being comprehend the infinite wisdom of G-d?
I told him, Our sages contrast between the personalities of Bilaam, the prophet who attempted to curse Israel, and Abraham, the forefather of the Jewish people. Both were people who independent of any outside help, managed to discover the one true G-d and connect with him. One, because of his righteous character, truly connected with G-d on a deep and meaningful level, to the point where G-d decided that he deserved for his descendants to forever after be G-d's chosen nation. The other, with his perverted character, so distorted his connection to G-d that he is judged in hell with the likes of jesus yimach shemo. What differentiates between these two personalities?
One of the three distinguishing traits chazal identify is nefesh rechavah vs nefesh shefala - Bilaam's arrogance as opposed to Abraham's humility. Where do we find these two traits expressed in the bible?
Maimonides addresses this question. He writes that Bilaam's arrogance comes through when he calls himself a yodea daas elyon - one who understands G-d. Abraham's humility, in contrast, comes through when Abraham tells G-d that he is no better than dust and ashes.
If we look at the context where these 2 statements are said, we are astounded. True, Abraham refers to himself as dust and ashes, but this is in the context of ARGUING WITH G-D! What greater display of arrogance could there be than to know better than G-d himself whether it is just to wipe out Sodom or not?
Conversely, Bilaam, when he calls himself a yodeo daas elyon, is in the middle of a complete submission to the will of G-d. Bilaam wants to curse the Jews, but as he says again and again, "whatever G-d tells me to say, that is what I will say." G-d tells him to bless the Jews, and bless them he does, despite the huge embarrassment of doing so in front of balak and all the sarei moav.
What I take away from this is that somehow, there is a way to even argue with G-d that isn't arrogant. If one is motivated by truth and justice, it is no contradiction to simultaneously recognize one's frailty and lowliness while at the same time fighting for what one knows to be right - because you have no choice. Truth is mechayev - you must do whats right - even if it involves putting yourself forward and taking on G-d himself. This isn't arrogant, as long as it is done out of a true care for justice, with recognition that "anochi afar va'efer" - I still am nothing but dust and ashes.
Conversely, it doesn't reflect humility to submit to G-d's will if you think that you truly understand and "know G-d". That's what Bilaam was saying when he said yodeo daas elyon - He submits to G-d out of knowledge and understanding of G-d. Religion is arrogant only if we think like Bilaam - that we can achieve some true understanding of G-d through the tiny minuscule amount that has been revealed.
There is a story that I like that encapsulates some (but not all) of this idea. I am not sure, but I think the story took place with R Yechezkel Abramsky.
For some reason or another, R Abramsky was required to testify in the secular court in London as an expert in religious law. So he goes, and as all witnesses do, he swears to tell the truth. Before they begin the specific inquiry, the judge asks him, is it true that you are a well respected rabbi?
He says, "yes".
Is it true that you are an expert in jewish law?
"Yes."
The greatest expert in Jewish law in all of England?
"Yes."
Arent you jews supposed to be humble?
"I'm under oath."
Emes sometimes obligates one to act in a way that seems contradictory to humility - but its no stirah.
Wednesday, July 10, 2013
atheist debate 2
i am exhausted after my 2+ hr debate with the atheist and i have to wake up at the crack of dawn tomorrow because of our trip (our being me, irreligious jews, and some asians) to jerusalem tomorrow (should be interesting), but i just want to write a few things.
1. as a mashal to an idea i was discussing i told him about the machlokes in gemara bari vishema which is adif (if i claim definitively you owe me 100$ and you say you dont know who wins - the better claim or the person who has the money in his hand). i was shocked when he started arguing that the side bari adif is irrational and reflects an irrational religious outlook - i dont think that machlokes has anything to do with a religious outlook in the sense he meant - i think any rational thinking person can accept that there are two sides to this issue. i thought that was just sheer refusal to accept anything the torah says.
2. towards the conclusion of our discussion he remarked that he still doesn't believe in g-d, and if g-d exists he would like to ask him what Bertrand russel wanted to ask him, "If You exist, why do you conceal yourself so well." (he said russel said that, i have no idea if its true) How ironic, I said, that chazal preceded him by saying this was the most perplexing question about G-d and one that we have no good answer to. Tzaddik vira lo is this question, and moshe rabbeinu was denied the answer to this question.
3. we discussed if i believe he is going to hell. i said i dont judge - the rambam writes in hilchos teshuva that only g-d can truly judge people because he is yodeo machshavos libo shel adam. but i said, i believe anyone who is unfortunate enough to not believe in sinaitic revelation is a pale shadow of what they could be if they believed. he claimed that that is a condescending attitude. i said, irrelevant - it is a truthful attitude. if you accept sinaitic revelation, it follows that a person cannot achieve their potential without it. it is not condescending, its just the cold and harsh truth. im sorry that not everything i believe is cute and rosy. but we can still be friends.
4. i said that i dont know why g-d created the world. he said, to have people bow and worship him for all eternity. i said, saying that reflects how everything can be twisted to suit your perspective. if you want to make g-d sound nasty, its all too easy. but its just as easy to say things in a nice way and be pleasant. i dont know why g-d created the world (we can discuss the problems with mesillas yesharim's attempted answer some other time - see halachic man where he rejects ramchals approach in half a line. i dont really like ramchal anyway.) but i know that he created the world, and hence wants it to be beautiful and good - and the whole purpose of the torah was for that. as the rambam writes in hilchos zemanim, the torah was given to create shalom - to make the world a harmonious and peaceful place to live. halachic man expands very much in line with this theme.
thanks to everyone who responded. your comments were insightful and i hope i incorporated them into my thought process. i reiterate that i didnt initiate these debates - apparently this guy likes debating more than i do (albeit in a very different way. he has better decibel level control.)
1. as a mashal to an idea i was discussing i told him about the machlokes in gemara bari vishema which is adif (if i claim definitively you owe me 100$ and you say you dont know who wins - the better claim or the person who has the money in his hand). i was shocked when he started arguing that the side bari adif is irrational and reflects an irrational religious outlook - i dont think that machlokes has anything to do with a religious outlook in the sense he meant - i think any rational thinking person can accept that there are two sides to this issue. i thought that was just sheer refusal to accept anything the torah says.
2. towards the conclusion of our discussion he remarked that he still doesn't believe in g-d, and if g-d exists he would like to ask him what Bertrand russel wanted to ask him, "If You exist, why do you conceal yourself so well." (he said russel said that, i have no idea if its true) How ironic, I said, that chazal preceded him by saying this was the most perplexing question about G-d and one that we have no good answer to. Tzaddik vira lo is this question, and moshe rabbeinu was denied the answer to this question.
3. we discussed if i believe he is going to hell. i said i dont judge - the rambam writes in hilchos teshuva that only g-d can truly judge people because he is yodeo machshavos libo shel adam. but i said, i believe anyone who is unfortunate enough to not believe in sinaitic revelation is a pale shadow of what they could be if they believed. he claimed that that is a condescending attitude. i said, irrelevant - it is a truthful attitude. if you accept sinaitic revelation, it follows that a person cannot achieve their potential without it. it is not condescending, its just the cold and harsh truth. im sorry that not everything i believe is cute and rosy. but we can still be friends.
4. i said that i dont know why g-d created the world. he said, to have people bow and worship him for all eternity. i said, saying that reflects how everything can be twisted to suit your perspective. if you want to make g-d sound nasty, its all too easy. but its just as easy to say things in a nice way and be pleasant. i dont know why g-d created the world (we can discuss the problems with mesillas yesharim's attempted answer some other time - see halachic man where he rejects ramchals approach in half a line. i dont really like ramchal anyway.) but i know that he created the world, and hence wants it to be beautiful and good - and the whole purpose of the torah was for that. as the rambam writes in hilchos zemanim, the torah was given to create shalom - to make the world a harmonious and peaceful place to live. halachic man expands very much in line with this theme.
thanks to everyone who responded. your comments were insightful and i hope i incorporated them into my thought process. i reiterate that i didnt initiate these debates - apparently this guy likes debating more than i do (albeit in a very different way. he has better decibel level control.)
Thursday, July 4, 2013
correction concerning milchamah
I realized that I was very wrong about yesterday's post. I assumed that the war with midian had a din of milchemes mitzvah. After all, the war was commanded by Hashem. Apparently that assumption was totally incorrect.
The Ramban, in his hasagos to the sefer hamitzvos, says the rambam forgot to count a mitzvah in this weeks parshah - the mitzvah to besiege a city from only 3 sides (leaving the fourth side open for people to flee and avoid death) in a milchemes reshus. This mitzvah is learned from milchemes midian, where chazal darshen the pasuk, "bnei yisrael attacked midian in the way hashem commanded" to be referring to this halacha of leaving the fourth side open. The ramban clearly sees milchemes midian as a paradigm for milchemes reshus lidoros.
(The rambam doesnt disagree with the halacha - he quotes it in hilchos melachim. he just doesnt think it merits to be counted as its own mitzvah. As the megillas esther points out, the rambam probably felt it was just a detail in halacha subsumed under the broader mitzvah of milchemes reshus. Further, given that the din is learned out from a derasha, I think it would be a violation of the rambam's shoroshim to count it as its own mitzvah - yesh ladun more on this issue.)
Furthermore, it is prohibited to loot or leave the women and children alive in a milchemes mitzvah - that bnei yisrael did so here would prove that milchemes midian was a milchemes reshus.
So before I discuss this point more, getting back to the rambam yesterday, I dont know how he would deal with the sifri that says here that the leviim fought EVEN in a milchemes reshus - kol shekain they would fight in a milchemes mitzvah. I note that internally, the Rambam is unclear. While he does say in the last halacha in hilchos shemittah viyovel that leviim arent "orchin milchamah", it is very strange that this halacha is mentioned nowhere (as far as I know) in hilchos melachim, where the rambam discusses the laws of war in detail. It is very troubling that its not there - that is its primary place, and this requires explanation. vihadavar tzarich talmud.
(as an aside, see the last hasagas haraavad in hilchos shemittah - there is a machlokes between the rambam and the raavad whether leviim are allowed to partake in loot from a conquest outside of israel (it is definitely assur in EY bc. the pasuk says leviim dont take nachala or loot - hashem is their nachala). according to the raavad, the leviim who fought midian should be excluded from the count of looters - but they aren't!!)
So this is very strange - a milchemes reshus, one would think from the name, is a voluntary war. How can a war commanded by G-d be voluntary?
I'm too lazy / have not done enough research to justify writing what I think the answer to this question is. I'll leave it for now as food for thought (and I'm always open to suggestions), and I'll just say that I think there is (potentially) a lot of mussar in the answer.
The Ramban, in his hasagos to the sefer hamitzvos, says the rambam forgot to count a mitzvah in this weeks parshah - the mitzvah to besiege a city from only 3 sides (leaving the fourth side open for people to flee and avoid death) in a milchemes reshus. This mitzvah is learned from milchemes midian, where chazal darshen the pasuk, "bnei yisrael attacked midian in the way hashem commanded" to be referring to this halacha of leaving the fourth side open. The ramban clearly sees milchemes midian as a paradigm for milchemes reshus lidoros.
(The rambam doesnt disagree with the halacha - he quotes it in hilchos melachim. he just doesnt think it merits to be counted as its own mitzvah. As the megillas esther points out, the rambam probably felt it was just a detail in halacha subsumed under the broader mitzvah of milchemes reshus. Further, given that the din is learned out from a derasha, I think it would be a violation of the rambam's shoroshim to count it as its own mitzvah - yesh ladun more on this issue.)
Furthermore, it is prohibited to loot or leave the women and children alive in a milchemes mitzvah - that bnei yisrael did so here would prove that milchemes midian was a milchemes reshus.
So before I discuss this point more, getting back to the rambam yesterday, I dont know how he would deal with the sifri that says here that the leviim fought EVEN in a milchemes reshus - kol shekain they would fight in a milchemes mitzvah. I note that internally, the Rambam is unclear. While he does say in the last halacha in hilchos shemittah viyovel that leviim arent "orchin milchamah", it is very strange that this halacha is mentioned nowhere (as far as I know) in hilchos melachim, where the rambam discusses the laws of war in detail. It is very troubling that its not there - that is its primary place, and this requires explanation. vihadavar tzarich talmud.
(as an aside, see the last hasagas haraavad in hilchos shemittah - there is a machlokes between the rambam and the raavad whether leviim are allowed to partake in loot from a conquest outside of israel (it is definitely assur in EY bc. the pasuk says leviim dont take nachala or loot - hashem is their nachala). according to the raavad, the leviim who fought midian should be excluded from the count of looters - but they aren't!!)
So this is very strange - a milchemes reshus, one would think from the name, is a voluntary war. How can a war commanded by G-d be voluntary?
I'm too lazy / have not done enough research to justify writing what I think the answer to this question is. I'll leave it for now as food for thought (and I'm always open to suggestions), and I'll just say that I think there is (potentially) a lot of mussar in the answer.
Wednesday, July 3, 2013
shevet levi and milchamah.
bar ilan is down (or at least the yu link to access it isnt working for me), so i cant do any research about this or post any quotes. but i noticed something interesting in rashi in this weeks parsha - when hashem sends bnei yisrael to go attack midyan, bnei yisrael send 1000 people from each shevet. rashi comments - including shevet levi.
the rambam, at the end of hilchos shemittah viyovel writes that shevet levi doesnt go to milchamah, because their job is yoru mishpatecha liyaakov - to teach torah to bnei yisrael. people in r shachter's shiur have told me that r shachter understands this rambam to even be referring to a milchemes mitzvah. assuming that the rambam agrees with the sifri quoted by rashi, this would seemingly be a proof that the above rambam is limited to milchemes reshus. this (in my opinion) makes more sense; the rambam, when discussing milchemes mitzvah famously writes that everyone must go to fight: במלחמת מצוה הכל יוצאין ואפילו חתן מחדרו וכלה מחופתה - in my hebrew, hakol means everyone, including leviim.
(parenthetically, the sefer hachinuch writes that women are exempt from hearing the parsha of amalek since women do not go out to war. the minchas chinuch attacks with this rambam - in a milchemes mitzvah, women are part of the war effort as much as men are - kallah me-chupasah. we clearly reject the chinuch (women all come to hear parshas zachor), presumably because we accept the position of the minchas chinuch / rambam.)
whats really interesting (and politically controversial nowadays) is that it wasnt like we needed shevet levi to fight - we sent only 12000 soldiers from a nation with 600,000 males between 20-60. that last 1000 could easily have come from somewhere else. apparently, it was still important for every shevet to play a part in taking G-d's vengeance against the enemies of G-d. draw your own conclusions.
when bar ilan comes back up i have a few things i want to check up about this topic.
the rambam, at the end of hilchos shemittah viyovel writes that shevet levi doesnt go to milchamah, because their job is yoru mishpatecha liyaakov - to teach torah to bnei yisrael. people in r shachter's shiur have told me that r shachter understands this rambam to even be referring to a milchemes mitzvah. assuming that the rambam agrees with the sifri quoted by rashi, this would seemingly be a proof that the above rambam is limited to milchemes reshus. this (in my opinion) makes more sense; the rambam, when discussing milchemes mitzvah famously writes that everyone must go to fight: במלחמת מצוה הכל יוצאין ואפילו חתן מחדרו וכלה מחופתה - in my hebrew, hakol means everyone, including leviim.
(parenthetically, the sefer hachinuch writes that women are exempt from hearing the parsha of amalek since women do not go out to war. the minchas chinuch attacks with this rambam - in a milchemes mitzvah, women are part of the war effort as much as men are - kallah me-chupasah. we clearly reject the chinuch (women all come to hear parshas zachor), presumably because we accept the position of the minchas chinuch / rambam.)
whats really interesting (and politically controversial nowadays) is that it wasnt like we needed shevet levi to fight - we sent only 12000 soldiers from a nation with 600,000 males between 20-60. that last 1000 could easily have come from somewhere else. apparently, it was still important for every shevet to play a part in taking G-d's vengeance against the enemies of G-d. draw your own conclusions.
when bar ilan comes back up i have a few things i want to check up about this topic.
Monday, July 1, 2013
atheist debate
So today I had lunch with a Jewish kid, born semi-religious, now an "atheist" and he brought up (I didn't start the debate) G-d / Judaism. This initiated a whole conversation - what made it so difficult was that we were eating with a Christian as well - this idiot thought he was arguing on my side when really I'm as much against him as I am against the atheist. His arguments were hurting my own - he believes in G-d because he has this ridiculous story that G-d came to his grandfather and helped him recover his stolen car. And when I started to argue the uniqueness of Sinaitic revelation, I had my hands tied behind my back - I couldn't contrast with Christianity being a whole big fake without losing focus with the Jewish kid and having a debate with a Christian (which I have zero interest in doing)
There were a few interesting points in the conversation which I think are very instructive.
The "atheist" at first argued from archaeological / historical questions, but you could see they weren't his main problems. These "proofs" don't prove anything - how do we really know by looking at some dust what went on 4000 years ago? (Especially If G-d decided to mess around with the dust for some reason = ananei hakavod, revelation at har Sinai.) He similarly at first argued that there is no plausible reason to believe in G-d, but again soon abandoned that track.
Then came the shift- how do I explain that G-d put to death by stoning a person who gathered sticks on Shabbos? How do I explain the genocide that occurs as we enter Kanaan? If the universe is 100,000 yrs old (which I don't necessarily assume, but he did), how do we explain that G-d just sat on the sidelines and laughed for 95,000 of those years? If G-d cares about us, shouldn't he answer prayers?
So there are 2 parts to my answer. The first is that he wasn't understanding the written law in the context of the oral law - if you accept the torah, you cannot accept one without the other. The person put to death by stoning accepted his punishment in front of two witnesses (al minas kein ani oseh) before being killed. The kanaanites were also sent messengers of peace - they could have accepted the seven noahide mitzvos and prevented the genocide.
But the second part of the answer is more important. This atheist comes claiming that as a scientist, he accepts the truth and only the truth - well, me too. I don't accept religion because it is comforting. I accept it solely because I believe it to be true. G-d's morality not fitting with our own, while it may be an important and perplexing philosophical topic, has no bearings on the existence or lack thereof of G-d or the truth of Judaism. G-d says no to some of our prayers - G-d said no even to Moses- who am I to be answered? That's not comforting- but its the truth.
He asked me if I thought that I would believe in Judaism if I were born a Buddhist. I responded that I would probably not. He asked, "doesn't that make you wonder about the validity of your belief in Judaism" I said no. He said what does it make you think. I said, "Thank G-d I wasn't born in India"
He laughed, but then asked if I wasn't being hypocritical. I said that this goes back to the same point as before. I keep to Judaism because I believe it to be true - all that we can possibly do in this world is what we believe to be true - we have no other choice. The fact that I wouldn't believe it in different circumstances says nothing about whether it is true or not - only about how frail humanity really is. So I thank g-d that he made me lucky enough to be put in a position where I can believe in him, since so many people are not granted that opportunity. The frailty of mankind doesn't take away from the fact that where I am now, I believe Judaism is true - emes is mechayev - We have no choice but to follow our beliefs.
I think this conversation is to be continued. I wish my rebbeim were here to talk instead of me, because they could probably do a much better job. Now I have to go find the chazals to back up what I said - I think the targum yonasan openly mentions al minas kein ani oseh by the mikoshesh - and its a whole discussion in the rambam in sefer hamitzvos and hilchos melachim about k'naan. I would very much appreciate (and I'm very serious about this) any advice from those of you out there who are older and wiser (that's probably all of you.) Thanks!
There were a few interesting points in the conversation which I think are very instructive.
The "atheist" at first argued from archaeological / historical questions, but you could see they weren't his main problems. These "proofs" don't prove anything - how do we really know by looking at some dust what went on 4000 years ago? (Especially If G-d decided to mess around with the dust for some reason = ananei hakavod, revelation at har Sinai.) He similarly at first argued that there is no plausible reason to believe in G-d, but again soon abandoned that track.
Then came the shift- how do I explain that G-d put to death by stoning a person who gathered sticks on Shabbos? How do I explain the genocide that occurs as we enter Kanaan? If the universe is 100,000 yrs old (which I don't necessarily assume, but he did), how do we explain that G-d just sat on the sidelines and laughed for 95,000 of those years? If G-d cares about us, shouldn't he answer prayers?
So there are 2 parts to my answer. The first is that he wasn't understanding the written law in the context of the oral law - if you accept the torah, you cannot accept one without the other. The person put to death by stoning accepted his punishment in front of two witnesses (al minas kein ani oseh) before being killed. The kanaanites were also sent messengers of peace - they could have accepted the seven noahide mitzvos and prevented the genocide.
But the second part of the answer is more important. This atheist comes claiming that as a scientist, he accepts the truth and only the truth - well, me too. I don't accept religion because it is comforting. I accept it solely because I believe it to be true. G-d's morality not fitting with our own, while it may be an important and perplexing philosophical topic, has no bearings on the existence or lack thereof of G-d or the truth of Judaism. G-d says no to some of our prayers - G-d said no even to Moses- who am I to be answered? That's not comforting- but its the truth.
He asked me if I thought that I would believe in Judaism if I were born a Buddhist. I responded that I would probably not. He asked, "doesn't that make you wonder about the validity of your belief in Judaism" I said no. He said what does it make you think. I said, "Thank G-d I wasn't born in India"
He laughed, but then asked if I wasn't being hypocritical. I said that this goes back to the same point as before. I keep to Judaism because I believe it to be true - all that we can possibly do in this world is what we believe to be true - we have no other choice. The fact that I wouldn't believe it in different circumstances says nothing about whether it is true or not - only about how frail humanity really is. So I thank g-d that he made me lucky enough to be put in a position where I can believe in him, since so many people are not granted that opportunity. The frailty of mankind doesn't take away from the fact that where I am now, I believe Judaism is true - emes is mechayev - We have no choice but to follow our beliefs.
I think this conversation is to be continued. I wish my rebbeim were here to talk instead of me, because they could probably do a much better job. Now I have to go find the chazals to back up what I said - I think the targum yonasan openly mentions al minas kein ani oseh by the mikoshesh - and its a whole discussion in the rambam in sefer hamitzvos and hilchos melachim about k'naan. I would very much appreciate (and I'm very serious about this) any advice from those of you out there who are older and wiser (that's probably all of you.) Thanks!
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