cheit hameraglim and the limits of teshuva

first, mazel tov to anyone graduating!  we should all continue to be successful in all our endeavors.

i also want to wish myself a refuah sheleimah in advance as im getting my wisdom teeth pulled tomorrow morning.  (i was wondering for a while if its muttar to go for an elective procedure that will cause you pain on shabbos on erev shabbos, but i think it is.  presumably its at least as much of a dvar mitzvah as parnassa.)

we've mentioned before the idea that there must be some limit to teshuva. this is a little depressing but i want to talk about this.

we know that bnei yisrael sinned pretty badly by the cheit hameraglim. this sin lead hashem to punish bnei yisrael to die in the midbar.  bnei yisrael, hearing hashem's wrath, realized that they sinned, and do teshuva.  they admit to their sin, and want to rectify it by going to eretz yisrael right away.  but its too late. "al taalu", moshe tells the people from G-d, "ki ein hashem bikirbechem" - G-d is no longer with you.

it is true that by cheit ha-egel we also see signs of teshuva not being completely effective.  but it is not nearly to the same extent.  if teshuvah really works, why couldnt hashem "find it in his heart" to forgive and allow bnei yisrael to enter eretz yisrael?

this question is already hinted at in the parshios following the sippur hameraglim.  the torah immediately follows up with the the halachos of nesachim for karbanos, writing, דַּבֵּר אֶל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵהֶם כִּי תָבֹאוּ אֶל־אֶרֶץ מוֹשְׁבֹתֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי נֹתֵן לָכֶם:.  the ramban explains that hashem is promising bnei yisrael that they will eventually get to eretz yisrael.  bnei yisrael needed this promise because they almost lost faith - who's to say we'll go in after forty years - have we really been forgiven?

similarly, shortly thereafter we are given the halachos of the special karbanos for an individual or community who sin in avodah zarah.  the ramban explains: ונכנסה כאן בעבור שהם מרו דבר השם ואמרו נתנה ראש ונשובה מצרימה (לעיל יד ד), להיות שם במצרים כאשר היו בראשונה בלא תורה ובלא מצות. והנה באה הפרשה, להודיעם כי אפילו בע"ז יכפר על השוגגים  - this parsha is here to teach bnei yisrael that teshuva works - hashem forgives even avodah zarah.  (the ramban here focuses on shogeg, but later quotes rashi who writes explicitly that even bimeizid, teshuvah is mechaper.)  this begs the question.  hashem follows up the story of cheit hameraglim teaching bnei yisrael the koach of teshuva - so put your money where your mouth is - forgive bnei yisrael and erase the 40 year decree!

the meshech chochma addresses this question.  he explains that since bnei yisrael only did teshuva after hashem's wrath was revealed and the meraglim were killed, it was not a complete teshuva.  chazal discuss a similar idea - a person who does teshuva when he's old and frail, half-dead and now has no taavos isnt a complete baal teshuvah.  its not so hard to have charata when the taavah to sin is no longer bothering you.  similarly, after an open display of yad hashem, teshuva/charata was cheap - it wasnt 100% real.

i dont have any disproofs of this meshech chochma (and i have nothing but respect for r meir simcha).  but as a limmud zchus for klal yisrael, lets assume bnei yisrael's teshuva was real.  then why were they still punished?

this comes down to a question i heard r twersky address in the rambam.  in the seventh perek of hilchos teshuva, the rambam writes:  ואל ידמה אדם בעל תשובה שהוא מרוחק ממעלת הצדיקים מפני העונות והחטאות שעשה. אין הדבר כן אלא אהוב ונחמד הוא לפני הבורא כאילו לא חטא מעולם.  - ki-ilu lo chata me-olam = doing teshuva "undoes" your aveirah - its as if it were never done.

similarly the rambam writes: אמש היה זה שנאוי לפני המקום משוקץ ומרוחק ותועבה. והיום הוא אהוב ונחמד קרוב וידיד - yesterday the guy was a rasha, and today he's a tzaddik gammur.

but can you really do teshuva for anything in an instant / between yesterday and today, and make it as if you never sinned? earlier in hilchos teshuva (end of perek 1), the rambam brings down the famous daled chilukei kapparah:  אף על פי שהתשובה מכפרת על הכל ועצמו של יום הכפורים מכפר. יש עבירות שהן מתכפרים לשעתן ויש עבירות שאין מתכפרים אלא לאחר זמן. כיצד...  המחלל את השם אע"פ שעשה תשובה והגיע יום הכפורים והוא עומד בתשובתו ובאו עליו יסורין אינו מתכפר לו כפרה גמורה עד שימות. אלא תשובה יום הכפורים ויסורין שלשתן תולין ומיתה מכפרת שנאמר ונגלה באזני ה' צבאות וגו' אם יכופר העון הזה לכם עד תמותון:

r twersky explained that the rambam in perek aleph was referring to a lower level of teshuvah, a teshuvah miyirah, while in the seventh perek the rambam is discussing someone who does teshuvah me-ahavah.  i do not believe that this is correct.  the chiluk has no basis in the rambam - the rambam does not limit the daled chilukei kaaparah to lower levels of teshuvah, and the pesukim make no distinctions: אם יכופר העון הזה לכם עד תמותון - no ifs, ands, or buts.

but if we read the rambam again, the answer is clear.  אהוב ונחמד הוא לפני הבורא כאילו לא חטא מעולם - its not as if he never sinned - rather, g-d loves him as much as he loves somebody who never sinned.  the koach of teshuva isnt to undo your sins - your sins are done, and whats done may sometimes have consequences that last throughout the entire rest of one's life until the moment of death.  the chiddush of teshuvah is that yesterday, g-d hated you for your evil actions.  through teshuva, g-d loves us again, and if he still punishes us for our sins, it is out of love. (this is against everything we've discussed comparing teshuvah to hataras nedarim- umitzvah liyashev.)

there is an idea that is not exactly the same, but perhaps even stronger. (thinking about it, this might help us better understand the meshech chochma.)  there is another stirah in the rambam that bothered many acharonim.  in perek 3 of hilchos teshuva, the rambam writes that a person can do teshuva for any aveirah, no matter how severe. this includes avodah zarah, and fits with the rashi/ramban we saw earlier that one can do teshuvah for avodah zarah even bimeizid.  and yet, in hilchos avodah zarah perek 2, the rambam, disucssing ovdei avodah zarah and apikorsim, writes: אין מקבלים אותם בתשובה לעולם שנאמר כל באיה לא ישובון ולא ישיגו ארחות חיים - so can they or cant they do teshuva?

the answer can be found in the gemara avodah zara 17a.  the gemara tells a sequence of stories of people attempting to do teshuvah for aveiros chamuros such as avodah zarah and giluy arayos.  a woman came to r chisda, asking how to do teshuvah.  r chisda responded, "bring shrouds" - his point was that to properly do teshuvah for some very serious sins, a person has to die from the pain/ remorse they feel because they committed this sin.  so you can do teshuva for anything.  but sometimes teshuvah involves dying.

getting back to the meraglim, perhaps these ideas help us understand why the gezeirah of death in the midbar remained in place even after teshuvah.  focusing in on the first suggestion, if we assume for a second that the ikkar cheit of the meraglim was "vayimasu bi-eretz chemdah",  we readily understand how the punishment could remain in place even after hashem forgave us.  we kicked and rejected hashem's gift to us - we needed  to spend 40 yrs in the desert to learn to appreciate eretz yisrael.  g-d should grant, hashiveinu hashem eilecha vinashuva, to see the fully rebuilt eretz yisrael and yerushalayim speedily in our days.

good shabbos.

kalev's tefillah

the gemara in sotah 34b notices that when discussing the trip of the meraglim, the torah begins in the plural, "vayaalu banegev", but ends in the singular - "vayavo ad chevron".  the gemara famously explains: kalev by himself went to chevron to daven by the graves of his forefathers. he said: avosai - please ask g-d for mercy to prevent me from slipping into the sin of the meraglim.

is this allowed?  isnt kalev using the dead as an intermediary between himself and hashem, which is a violation of the fifth ikkar of the rambam: היסוד החמישי שהוא יתעלה הוא אשר ראוי לעבדו ולרוממו ולפרסם גדולתו ומשמעתו. ואין עושין כן למה שלמטה ממנו במציאות מן המלאכים והכוכבים והגלגלים והיסודות וכל מה שהורכב מהן, לפי שכולם מוטבעים בפעולותיהם אין להם שלטון ולא בחירה אלא רצונו יתעלה, ואין עושין אותם אמצעים להגיע בהם אליו, אלא כלפיו יתעלה יכוונו המחשבות ויניחו כל מה שזולתו. וזה היסוד החמישי הוא האזהרה על עבודה זרה, ורוב התורה באה להזהיר על זה.

so people pointed out to me the obvious distinction: maybe praying to malachim is a violation of this ikkar emunah, but praying to dead people is really just asking them to pray for you.  the same way you can ask someone who is alive, you can ask someone who is dead.

but i was a little skeptical.  so i asked rabbi google, and found http://www.globalyeshiva.com/profiles/blogs/graves-and-cemeteries-1.  the bach (YD 217) writes that it is forbidden to pray to the dead because of the issur of "doresh el hameisim."  he asks from the gemara about kalev, and says that kalev didnt daven to the dead.  rather, kalev went to kivrei avos because it was a makom of kedusah but there davened only to hashem (see the drashos haran drush 8 for a fascinating elaboration on the nature of the kedusha of kivrei tzaddikim).  but i cant understand this bach for the life of me - did he read the next line in the gemara!! (at least edit out the controversial line in his hagahos)

i just point out that this ikkar of the rambam is really a major machlokes rishonim.  this is evidenced by the practice still followed in many shuls of reciting certain selichos which ask malachim to intercede on our behalf to hashem.  for example "malachei rachamim, misharsei elyon, chalu na pinei kel bimeitav higayon..." or even more famously, machnisei rachamim hachnisu rachamaeinu lifnei baal harachamim. according to the rambam, it is a violation of no less an issur than avodah zarah to say these tefillos. other rishonim felt, however, that it is entirely appropriate to ask malachim to intercede on our behalf.  i consider this gemara about kalev a raayah to the anti-rambam camp.

 should one say these tefillos?  i dont know, and i really should ask a sheila.  my eitzah for machnisei rachamim these past few years has been to daven slowly so that i dont have time to say it - making it a non-issue (unfortunately, that usually doesnt work for malachei rachamim, which is recited responsively.)

im looking for mekoros on this issue- if anyone has, i'd love to hear them.

וְהָיִיתָ לָּנוּ לְעֵינָיִם

i have to begin by discussing capital letters.  i have recieved numerous complaints about the fact that i write without them, particularly in light of the fact that it would be so easy to write in microsoft word where they auto-correct capitals for you (as my chavrusa astutely pointed out, since i only type with two fingers, using one of the 2 for the shift key is a major expense.)  one person asked me if i thought capitals were chukas akum.  i responded that if that were so, any non-jewish alphabet would be chukas akum.  but now i think he might have been on to something: why do i dislike capital letters - because they're pointless - we get by just fine without them in hebrew.  a practice of the goyim that is pointless is forbidden because of chukas akum because any practice of unknown origins must be suspected to have roots in idolatry.  so to write in a non-jewish alphabet is fine, because it makes sense to develop an alphabet.  but capitals, which are pointless, fall under chukas akum. (this is partially a joke).

moshe tells yisro not to leave bnei yisrael because וְהָיִיתָ לָּנוּ לְעֵינָיִם.  what does this mean?  rashi, in one pshat, says שתהא חביב עלינו כגלגל עינינו, שנאמר (דברים י, יט) ואהבתם את הגר.  (parenthetically, i wonder if this pshat is taluy in the machlokes whether yisro came to join bnei yisrael before or after mattan torah.  if he came before, then he wasnt really any more of a ger than the rest of bnei yisrael, was he?  unless all of klal yisrael had the din of a ger back then, such that bnei yisrael were all chayav in ahavas hager to each other.  but that seems strange.)

 this goes against my strongly held pedagogical beliefs (I may write something about that some other time), but I don't have a good question to ask here.  but it seems that rashi thinks that regular ahavas yisrael wouldnt have been enough to persuade yisro to stay.  what is stronger about the mitzvah of ahavas hager than standard ahavas yisrael?

we've discussed before the ramban's shittah in viahavta lireacha kamocha.  the ramban explains: the torah doesnt say viahavta oso.  rather it says viahavta LI-reacha.  hence, the torah doesnt mean you have to love him as much as you love yourself, but rather, show love TO him the same way you show love to yourself (but not to the same degree).  the ramban's proof for this is the halacha that chayecha kodmin - you are allowed to care about yourself more than others.

the aruch hashulchan (and i think r shimon in shaarei yosher as well) explains that the ramban is essentially limiting viahavta lireacha to a "dont do him bad" instead of a "do him good".  you arent obligated to give someone all your money if they ask for it, because you dont have to really love them as much as you love yourself.  rather, chazal phrase the obligations that stem from ahavas yisrael as "what you dont like to be done to yourself, dont do to others."

does this apply to ahavas ha-ger?  the rambam writes in hilchos deos, and in sefer hamitzvos that there is a difference between ahavas hager and regular ahavas yisrael.  וברוב המדרשות בארו שהאל יתעלה צונו על הגר כמו שצונו על עצמו יתעלה אמר (פ' שמע) ואהבת את י"י אלדיך ואמר ואהבתם את הגר - the midrashim compare ahavas hager to ahavas hashechina.  in what way is ahavas hager more similar to ahavas hashechinah than regular ahavas yisrael?

i believe (but i dont have it in front of me) that r yaakov kaminetsky in emes liyaakov explains based on the ramban (for those who read my article on kedoshim, this might be slightly problematic.  but lets ignore that for now.)  by ahavas yisrael, the torah says LI-reacha, which we explained means a limited love.  but by both ahavas hager and ahavas hashem, the torah doesnt say show love to the other, but rather to love.  this means that the mitzvos of ahavas hager and ahavas hashem mandate loving hashem/geirim as much as we love ourselves, even if regular ahavas yisrael is not mechayev love of that degree. (hence by ahavas hashem, the pasuk goes on: bichol livavcha uvchol nafshecha uvchol meodecha)

(this also explains why the rambam uses the pasuk va'ahavtaem es hager - from sefer devarim, as the basis for the mitzvah of ahavas hager, and not the earlier pasuk in parshas kedoshim, viahvata LO kamocha (referring to ahavas hager.)  the pasuk in devarim reflects the fuller nature of the mitzvah.)

as such, we understand why moshe needed to specifically reference ahavas hager.  rashi implies, and the ramban says it straight out, that the reason yisro didnt want to come with bnei yisrael to eretz yisrael was that he, as a ger, would not be entitled to a nachala.  moshe responds, the good which G-d gives us we will pass on to you, which rashi interprets to mean that moshe promised him a nachala, even though he wasnt entitled. why would moshe do this? how was he allowed to do this - what he's giving to yisro is coming out of the chelek that the rest of bnei yisrael were entitled to, and ahavas yisrael isnt mechayev that when someone asks for your money, that you just give it to him!  but the answer is, maybe ahavas hager is mechayev that level of ahavah.

we need to understand though, why ahavas hager should be raised above standard ahavas yisrael - and for this we need a framework for the mitzvah of ahavas yisrael in general.

the context that the rambam gives before presenting the mitzvos of ahavas yisrael and ahavas hager in hilchos deos is quite fascinating.  the rambam begins the perek (6): דרך ברייתו של אדם להיות נמשך בדעותיו ובמעשיו אחר ריעיו וחביריו ונוהג כמנהג אנשי מדינתו, לפיכך צריך אדם להתחבר לצדיקים ולישב אצל החכמים תמיד כדי שילמוד ממעשיהם, ויתרחק מן הרשעים ההולכים בחשך כדי שלא ילמוד ממעשיהם, הוא ששלמה אומר הולך את חכמים יחכם ורועה כסילים ירוע.  this halacha is presumably motivated by concerns of bein adam lamakom- you have to surround yourself with tzaddikim so that you will be a tzaddik.

the next halacha emphasizes this point: מצות עשה להדבק בחכמים ותלמידיהם כדי ללמוד ממעשיהם כענין שנאמר ובו תדבק - there is a mitzvah to "cleave" to talmidei chachamim.  as the rambam there explains, this mitvzah is learned from the words in the pasuk "to cleave to hashem - how can you cleave to hashem, who is compared to fire - rather, the pasuk means to attach oneself to talmidei chachamim".   so again, the focus of the perek is how to connect to the shechina.

so is the follow up halacha a shift in focus?  מצוה על כל אדם לאהוב את כל אחד ואחד מישראל כגופו שנאמר ואהבת לרעך כמוך.

i wonder if the rambam thinks that we should view ahavas yisrael almost as an extension of/ broadening out  the mitzvah of cleaving to talmidei chachamim.  we have to love jews because if we love people who are tzaddikim (vi-amech kulam tzaddikim), we ourselves will become bigger tzaddikim.  thus, the mitzvah of ahavas yisrael falls into the framework set up by the beginning of the perek, הולך את חכמים יחכם ורועה כסילים ירוע.

it is with this context that we understand why ahavas hager is taken to a higher level than regular ahavas yisrael.  as gilad barach has already discussed (highly recommended reading), the rambam, as opposed to the sefer hachinuch, does not see the ger's being a stranger and alone (and hence needing extra compassion) as the rationale behind the mitzvah of ahavas hager.  rather, it is the fact that the ger threw off the sheker he was raised with and came to cling to the shechina that merits him this extra love.  why?  i suggest that just like we have a mitzvah to cling to talmidei chachamim, we have an extra mitzvah to love and cling to geirim, people who of themselves recognized the emes of yahadus and torah. again, this mitzvah is part of the broader context of the entire perek.

i was (and still am) a little bothered by the suggestion that  we "use" ahavas yisrael "selifshly", to further our own spiritual growth - this doesnt seem to be the classical understanding of mitzvos bein adam lchaveiro.  but the rambam in pirkei avos talks about the different types of friendships that can exist between people.  the truest friendship, the rambam writes, is one where friends are bound together because of the G-dly ideals and commitments they share.  a friendship that isnt founded on ideals of furthering avodas hashem wont last- whatever you share with the friend isnt eternal, and when what you share fades away, so will the friendship.  thus, ahavas yisrael has to be based in furthering avodas hashem in order for us to be able to truly love all of klal yisrael.

(i think that this is also how i understand why we have no mitzvah to love people who dont keep the mitzvos (bimeizid only, not tinok shenishbas).  its not a punishment against them, its just that the whole platform for  friendship has been undermined. this needs further thought.)

have a great shabbos!

R Elchanan somehow thinks Miriam (sister of Moshe Rabbeinu) was an apikores

The rambam writes at the end of hilchos tumas tzaraas that miriam's mistake that caused her to say lashon hara about moshe was that she "equated him with other neviim".  in truth, the rambam isnt saying a chiddush - this is the clear implication of miriam's statement "harak ach bimoshe diber hashem halo gam banu diber" - we are all neviim just like him.

r elchanan (cited by the sefer hamafteach, kovetz hearos biurei ha-agados siman 7 or so), asks, isnt it one of the 13 ikkarim that moshe rabbeinu was on a fundamentally higher plane than all the other neviim?  was miriam an apikores by denying this?

r elchanan answers that unil this ikkar was revealed through hashem's subsequent response to miriam (lo ken avdi moshe, bichol beisi neeman hu, etc.)  miriam wasnt responsible for not knowing it.

with all due respect, this is preposterous.  consider the implications:  the rambam writes that the source for the ikkar of schar vi-onesh is the dialogue between moshe and hashem right after cheit ha-egel.  moshe tells hashem, "dont punish bnei yisrael, or else you have to kill me".  g-d responds, "thats not the way my ikkar of schar vi-onesh works.  i punish those who sin, and dont punish those who dont."  was moshe unaware of this ikkar until g-d informed him of it right now.  moshe rabbeinu was an apikores bishogeg until now??  hard to swallow, seeing as he got the entirety of the torah (which presumably includes the 13 ikkarim) at har sinai.

furthermore, the ikkar of the superiority of nevuas moshe is divided into four parts (see the rambam seventh ikkar or so) and two of them are proved with pesukim from well before miriam's incident!  so anyways, r elchanan fails to explain how miriam was unaware of the superiority of moshe rabbeinu.

rather, the answer is (for both the dialogue between moshe and hashem and miriam's lashon hara) that everyone knew the ikkarim all along.  moshe / miriam just didnt see the implications to their particular cases of the ikkar.  this seems to be pashut pshat - not a big chiddush.

the rambam quotes these stories as proof for his ikkarim because when hashem explains moshe and miriam's mistakes, he "chazzers" the ikkar for them in its entirety so that we will have it written in the torah.

anyone care to defend r elchanan?

nazir

i meant to write this up before shabbos but i didnt get a chance.  hopefully this isnt like avar yomo batel karbano. (anyone reading this?)

The ramban writes, why does a nazir bring a chatas at the end of his nezirus - ועל דרך הפשט כי האיש הזה חוטא נפשו במלאת הנזירות, כי הוא עתה נזור מקדושתו ועבודת השם, וראוי היה לו שיזיר לעולם ויעמוד כל ימיו נזיר וקדוש לאלהיו, כענין שאמר (עמוס ב יא) ואקים מבניכם לנביאים ומבחוריכם לנזירים, השוה אותו הכתוב לנביא, וכדכתיב (לעיל פסוק ח) כל ימי נזרו קדוש הוא לה' והנה הוא צריך כפרה בשובו להטמא בתאוות העולם:

the reason is, says the ramban, that the nazir is sinning by leaving the spiritual heights of nezirus and coming back to regular every day life.

according to the ramban, a nazir is not a sinner, despite some statements of chazal to that effect.  a nazir, the ramban points out, is compared to a navi.

the ramban's shittah is in contrast to that of rashi, who accepts chazal's statement that a nazir is a sinner as normative.  thus, rashi in parshas naso quotes the chazal that the sin of the nazir that mandates his bringing a karbon is  שציער עצמו מן היין.  how does rashi explain the pesukim in amos which compare a nazir to a navi? rashi in amos explains:  לנזרים - תרגם יונתן למלפין שהיו פרושין מדרכי עם הארץ ועוסקים בתורה - the nazir is amos is not referring to the halachic concept of nezirus found in naso - rather, it means the gedolei torah vihoraah who separate themselves from the ways of normal people to learn and teach torah.  when the pesukim in amos go on to describe the sin of the nazir drinking wine (which would seem to support the ramban's position that the nazir referred to here is the classical nazir), rashi explains: ותשקו את הנזירים יין - שלא יורו אתכם שהשיכור אסור להורות, ותשקו את הנזירים יין, תרגם יונתן ואטעיתון ית מלפיכון בחמר - the sin the navi is referring to is teaching torah while drunk, but it is not connected whatsoever to the prohibition of a classical nazir to drink wine, because the pesukim here arent talking about a classical nazir.  we couldnt compare a classical nazir to a navi - a nazir is a sinner!

whats interesting is the rambam's take on this issue.  on the one hand, the rambam (deos 3) also accepts as normative chazal's statement that a nazir is a sinner: שמא יאמר אדם הואיל והקנאה והתאוה והכבוד וכיוצא בהם דרך רעה הן ומוציאין את האדם מן העולם. אפרוש מהן ביותר ואתרחק לצד האחרון. עד שלא יאכל בשר ולא ישתה יין ולא ישא אשה ולא ישב בדירה נאה ולא ילבש מלבוש נאה אלא השק והצמר הקשה וכיוצא בהן כגון כהני העובדי כוכבים. גם זה דרך רעה היא ואסור לילך בה. המהלך בדרך זו נקרא חוטא. שהרי הוא אומר בנזיר וכפר עליו מאשר חטא על הנפש. אמרו חכמים ומה אם נזיר שלא פירש אלא מן היין צריך כפרה המונע עצמו מכל דבר ודבר על אחת כמה וכמה.

and yet, at the end of hilchos nezirus, the rambam writes like the ramban that a nazir is compared to a navi - הנודר לה' דרך קדושה הרי זה נאה ומשובח ועל זה נאמר נזר אלהיו על ראשו קדש הוא לה'. ושקלו הכתוב כנביא (שנאמר) ואקים מבניכם לנביאים ומבחוריכם לנזירים:   how can the rambam take both sides at once?

this is similar to an issue i struggled with in a different context.  chazal say in brachos that the place where baalei teshuva stand is greater than that of regular tzaddikim.  rabbeinu yonah (somewhere in pirkei avos, i believe perek 3) asks, how could it be that baalei teshuvah are greater than tzaddikim who never sinned?  how could you be better off sinning - how could you lose out by totally following ratzon hashem?  because of this question, he drastically re-interprets the gemara.  but the rambam takes the gemara literally: אמרו חכמים מקום שבעלי תשובה עומדין אין צדיקים גמורין יכולין לעמוד בו. כלומר מעלתן גדולה ממעלת אלו שלא חטאו מעולם מפני שהן כובשים יצרם יותר מהם.

so was your sin a mitzvah - after all, it allowed you to come closer to hashem.  surely the answer is no.  and yet, there were definitely positive benefits achieved through that sin.

nazir is the flip case of the baal teshuvah.  really, a nazir is like a navi, as the rambam said in hilchos nezirus.  but that doesnt mean that there isnt also an element of sin in becoming a nazir.   some aveiros have an aspect of mitzvah within them, and some mitzvos have an aspect of aveirah within them.

how do we understand this?  either an action is ratzon hashem, in which case its entirely a mitzvah, or its not ratzon hashem, in which case its entirely aveirah.

ratzon hashem is multifaceted.  hashem wants many different things on many different levels, and sometimes, the multiplicity of values that hashem is after conflict.  we have to choose one action or another - one value has to override the other.  but that doesnt mean the negated value is gone. while doing a mitzvah, there can still be a tzad aveirah shebo or vica versa.

my mashal to understand this is as follows: compare two people, one a yaakov ish tam his entire life and one, who while now he looks just like the first guy, used to party/get drunk/do drugs / that type of stuff.   whose a better candidate to do kiruv by hanging out with non-religious people in bars and drinking with them?  obviously the second guy.  so is he better off because of his sins?  in some sense, yes.  he has a chance to do a tremendous mitzvah the first guy doesn't have because of his sins.  but in another sense, obviously not.  the purity of the first guy is clearly unmatched by that of the second.

about this it is said, hanistaros lashem elokeinu - we cant know how everything we do may ultimately be for good.  vihaniglos lanu ulvaneinu ad olam, laasos es kol divrei hatorah hazos - our job is to keep the torah to the best of our abilities, and through that, everything will work out.

shavuos - shittas harambam ligabai zechiras maamad har sinai

what im about to say now is not my chiddush- its stuff i've heard/read.  still, i thought it was worthwhile  to write it out.

the ramban, in his hasagos on the sefer hamitzvos of the rambam, says the rambam forgot a pretty important mitzvas lo taaseh - namely, to not forget maamad har sinai. this prohibition is based on the pasuk in parshas vaeschanan: השמר לך ושמור נפשך מאד פן תשכח את הדברים אשר ראו עיניך ופן יסורו מלבבך כל ימי חייך והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך יום אשר עמדת לפני י"י אלהיך בחורב. - as chazal say, hishamer in the torah always means a lav - hence this is a prohibition against forgetting the day we stood at har sinai.  whats pshat in the rambam?

the megillas esther suggests that the rambam holds like rashi's pshat in the pasuk.  rashi there writes, אז כשלא תשכחו אותם ותעשום על אמתתם תחשבו חכמים ונבונים ואם תעוותו אותם מתוך שכחה תחשבו שוטים - the prohibition isnt to forget the specific maamad har sinai, but rather, to forget and fail to practice the torah given over at har sinai.  as such, this commandment is not counted as per shoresh daled of the rambam.  (a mitzvah which doesnt command a new action, but rather, commands us to keep that which we already were commanded, is called a mitzvah klalis.  thus, the mitzvah to not forget the torah and to keep the torah is a mitzvah klalis and not counted.)

the problem is, the rambam does seem to think that the pasuk specifically exhorts us to remember har sinai.  the rambam writes in iggeres teiman:מעמד הר סיני שצונו הקדוש ברוך הוא לזכרו תמיד, וגם הזהירנו מלשכחו אותו, וצונו ללמד אותו לבנינו כדי שיגדלו על תלמודו, הוא מה שנאמר (דברים ד' ט' - י'): "רק השמר לך ושמר נפשך מאד פן תשכח את הדברים אשר ראו עיניך ופן יסורו מלבבך כל ימי חייך והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך יום אשר עמדת לפני ה' אלהיך בחרב" 

the real answer, i think, lies in the mishna in avos.  the mishna says: רבי דוסתאי ברבי ינאי משום רבי מאיר אומר כל השוכח דבר אחד ממשנתו מעלה עליו הכתוב כאילו מתחייב בנפשו שנאמר (דברים ד') רק השמר לך ושמור נפשך מאד פן תשכח את הדברים אשר ראו עיניך

how did chazal extend the pasuk, which we saw is talking about maamad har sinai, and make it into an issur to forget any part of torah?

this goes back to the piece i wrote about the rambam's shittah in talmud torah. when we learn torah, we have to learn the same way it was given over at har sinai.  but even more - we have to learn as if we right now are at har sinai.

if someone learns and really feels that he is right now at har sinai, and hashem himself is giving him the torah, he wont forget.  the mitzvah to remember har sinai is not counted as its own mitzvah because really, it is part of and defines the mitzvah of talmud torah.  we have to learn torah not just for the content, but for the experience of connecting to har sinai.  a person who learns haphazardly and forgets demonstrates his lack of connection to har sinai, and is thus in violation of the pasuk of hishamer.

the more i think about it, the more this directly connects to my previous piece.  i asked, according to the rambam, there doesnt seem to be an issur to teach torah for schar.  the drasha of mah ani bichinam af atah doesnt connote an issur, all it tells us is that klal yisrael learned for free at har sinai.  but the answer is, the torah commands us in our pasuk to learn as if we were at har sinai - we are the bnei yisrael standing underneath the mountain.  if you take money for teaching, that is a violation of remembering maamad har sinai - you are learning in a way that is incompatible with that of har sinai.  (i need to update that article)

emor - kiddush hashem

first of all, ive been told that i was "misleading" in last week's dvar torah - pretending i answered for the ramban when i really didnt.  i think i put 2 disclaimers in there to the effect that i do not have any clear resolution to all the issues i brought up.  but let this be a third.

second, further support for the notion that the rambam paskins like ben petura can be found in the omission of the rambam of the entire sugya in nedarim (80b) based off r akiva's shita of chayecha kodmin.  the gemara there debates when a community with water has to give of its water to the other community - the entire premise of the sugya, as the ran points out, is that if giving water endangers the first community, then they should not give, as per chayecha kodmin.  the rambam's ommission of this sugya points again to his rejection of r akiva.

on to this week's parsha.  parshas emor has lots of stuff about the moadim, but i dont want to talk about that now.  lets look at the mitzvah of kiddush hashem (and the prohibition of chilul hashem), learned from the pasuk "vilo sichalelu es sheim kadshi vinikdashti bitoch bnei yisrael..." - do not profane the name of g-d, and I (g-d) will become sanctified in the midst of bnei yisrael" - what exactly does this mitzvah entail.

explains the ramban: על דעת רבותינו (תו"כ פרק ט ד) מצות עשה, שנקדש את שמו במצות ליהרג עליהן ולא נעבור

the mitzvah of kiddush hashem is to die al kiddush hashem.  the beis yosef on the tur in yoreh deah siman 157 asks a question: והא דבשאר עבירות מפלגינן בין בשעת השמד לשלא בשעת השמד ובין בצינעא לבפרהסיא ובין להנאת עצמן לשלא להנאת עצמן ובג' עבירות לא מפלגינן בינייהו כתוב בנמוקי יוסף (סנהדרין יז סוע"ב) דטעמא משום דהני לאו משום חילול השם הוא דאסירי אלא מפני חומר עצמן הילכך בכל ענין אסירי. 

we know that there are various halachos about when we say yehareg vial yaavor.  the big three (avodah zara, shfichus damim, giluy arayos), are yehareg vial yaavor even bi-tzinah (not in front of ten jews).  other aveiros are only yehareg vial yaavor if they're (a) front of ten jews and the goy forcing one to do them is miskavein not lihanaas atzmo but rather, solely lihaaviro al hamitzvos (b) bishaas hashmad, in a time of general religious persecution   says the beis yosef, this distinction reflects the fact that there are different reasons why these different categories are yehareg vial yaavor.  the big 3 are yehareg vial yaavor not because of kiddush hashem, but rather, because of "chumras atzman" - the severity of the issurim themselves. kiddush hashem, however, is the reason that other mitzvos are yehareg vial yaavor bifarhesya or bishaas hashmad.

this would seem to make sense.  as the lechem mishna (yesodei hatorah 5:4) points out, the simple understanding would be that there is only a kiyum of kiddush hashem bifarhesya - hence it is impossible that kiddush hashem would be michayev one to die bi-tzinah for the big three.

the rambam, however, disagrees.  says the rambam:  וכל מי שנאמר בו יהרג ואל יעבור ונהרג ולא עבר הרי זה קידש את השם - ALL the yehareg vial yaavors are a kiyum of kiddush hashem.  that presumably includes those that are not bifarhesya, i.e. the big three.  (i note for the sake of honesty that the lechem mishna does not understand this way.  however, his understanding seems impossible in the rambam here, and even more so in iggeres hashmad.)  so we have to understand how the rambam understands kiddush hashem to be broader than the conventional definition.

there is a fascinating machlokes between the rambam and the ramban concerning why avraham avinu gets the special title אַבְרָהָם אֹהֲבִי (yeshayahu 41:8).  the ramban writes in parshas yisro that it is because avraham was willing to die al kiddush hashem when he threw himself into the fire at ur kasdim.  but the ramban says, there is another explanation some chachamim hold of.  while he doesnt mention the rambam by name, he is clearly referring to the rambam at the end of the tenth perek of hilchos teshuva, where the rambam writes: העובד מאהבה עוסק בתורה ובמצות והולך בנתיבות החכמה לא מפני דבר בעולם ולא מפני יראת הרעה ולא כדי לירש הטובה אלא עושה האמת מפני שהוא אמת וסוף הטובה לבא בגללה. ומעלה זו היא מעלה גדולה מאד ואין כל חכם זוכה לה. והיא מעלת אברהם אבינו שקראו הקב"ה אוהבו לפי שלא עבד אלא מאהבה והיא המעלה שצונו בה הקב"ה על ידי משה שנאמר ואהבת את ה' אלהיך, ובזמן שיאהוב אדם את ה' אהבה הראויה מיד יעשה כל המצות מאהבה: 

whats so amazing about this rambam is the fact that he could have said like the ramban, but chose not to.  in other words, the maalah of throwing himself into the kivshan ha-eish wasnt enough to merit avraham with his special status.  what was enough?  the fact that avraham loved g-d in his general mitzvah performance and day to day life.

the ramban suggests that this machlokes between himself and the rambam is actually a machlokes in the mechilta.  the first opinion in the mechilta seems to  attribute avraham's status as an ohev shel hashem to his special avodah me-ahava, while the second opinion in the mechilta connects between avraham and all the others who throughout the generations have had to die al kiddush hashem. מה לך יוצא ליהרג, על שמלתי את בני. מה לך יוצא לישרף, על שקראתי בתורה. מה לך יוצא ליצלב, על שאכלתי את המצה. מה לך לוקה מאפרגל, על שנטלתי את הלולב. (the ramban writes that this was during a shaas hashmad when even regular mitzvos  are yehareg vial yaavor - see beis yosef who cites this same medrash from vayikra rabba and disagrees).

i wonder if according to the rambam, we can suggest there is no machlokes in the mechilta. kiddush hashem includes within it that some of the mitzvos are yehareg vial yaavor.  but what that reflects is that we have to dedicate ourselves in our entirety to ahavas hashem - the real mitzvah of kiddush hashem is to live our lives in accordance with ahavas hashem.  hence, it was this that merited avraham his special status.

the rambam basically says this explicitly.  in sefer hamitzvos, the rambam writes that kiddush hashem is מסירת נפשנו למות ביד האונס על אהבתו ית' - (notice the mention of ahavas hashem.) but in iggeres hashmad, the rambam writes that kiddush hashem also includes much more:   וקדושת השם היא הפך חלול השם, וזה שהאדם כשיעשה מצוה מן המצוות ולא יערב עמהן כונה מן הכונות אלא אהבת ה' יתעלה ועבודתו לבד, הנה הוא קדש את השם 

the rambam also agrees that there is a concept of kiddush hashem birabbim.  but as much as thats important, equally important is the kiddush hashem just between us and hashem.  what really is kiddush hashem?  its when we act in a way that hashem can look at us, ויאמר לי עבדי אתה ישראל אשר בך אתפאר.  may we all be zocheh!